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Attack on Pearl Harbor
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Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese planes view.jpg
 Photograph of Battleship Row taken from a Japanese plane at the beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center is a torpedo strike on the USS West Virginia. Two attacking Japanese planes can be seen: one over the USS Neosho and one over the Naval Yard.

Date
December 7, 1941
Location
Primarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, U.S.
Result
Japanese major tactical victory
U.S. declaration of war on the Empire of Japan.
Germany and Italy declare war on the United States.
Entrance of the United States of America into the war


Belligerents
 United States of America    Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Husband Kimmel
Walter Short Chuichi Nagumo
Isoroku Yamamoto
Strength
8 battleships
 8 cruisers
 30 destroyers
 4 submarines
 1 USCG Cutter[nb 1]
 49 other ships[1]
 ~390 aircraft Mobile Unit:
 6 aircraft carriers
 2 battleships
 2 heavy cruisers
 1 light cruiser
 9 destroyers
 8 tankers
 23 fleet submarines
 5 midget submarines
 414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
2 battleships totally lost
 2 battleships sunk and recovered
 3 battleships damaged
 1 battleship grounded
 2 other ships sunk[nb 2]
 3 cruisers damaged[nb 3]
 3 destroyers damaged
 3 other ships damaged
 188 aircraft destroyed
 159[3] aircraft damaged
 2,403 killed
 1,178 wounded[4][5] 4 midget submarines sunk
 1 midget submarine grounded
 29 aircraft destroyed
 64 killed
1 captured[6]
Civilian casualties
68 killed[7][8]
 35 wounded[4]


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The attack on Pearl Harbor[nb 4] was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan). The attack led to the United States' entry into World War II.
The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. There were simultaneous Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
From the standpoint of the defenders, the attack commenced at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time.[13] The base was attacked by 353[14] Japanese fighters, bombers and torpedo planes in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers.[14] All eight U.S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four being sunk. All but one (Arizona) were later raised, and six of the eight battleships were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship,[nb 5] and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,403 Americans were killed[16] and 1,178 others were wounded. Important base installations such as the power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 65 servicemen killed or wounded. One Japanese sailor was captured.
The attack came as a profound shock to the American people and led directly to the American entry into World War II in both the Pacific and European theaters. The following day, December 8, the United States declared war on Japan. Domestic support for non-interventionism, which had been strong,[17] disappeared. Clandestine support of Britain (e.g., the Neutrality Patrol) was replaced by active alliance. Subsequent operations by the U.S. prompted Germany and Italy to declare war on the U.S. on December 11, which was reciprocated by the U.S. the same day.
Years later several writers alleged that parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may have let it happen (or even encouraged it) with the aim of bringing America into war.[18][19] However, this advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians.[20][nb 6]
There were numerous historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan. However, the lack of any formal warning, particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy".
Due to the fact the attack happened without a declaration of war and without explicit warning, the attack on Pearl Harbor was judged by the Tokyo Trials to be a Japanese war crime.[22][23]


Contents  [hide]
1 Background to conflict 1.1 Anticipating war
1.2 Objectives
2 Approach and attack 2.1 Submarines
2.2 Japanese declaration of war
2.3 First wave composition
2.4 Second wave composition
2.5 American casualties and damages
2.6 Japanese losses
2.7 Possible third wave
3 Photographs
4 Ships lost or damaged 4.1 Battleships
4.2 Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)
4.3 Cruisers
4.4 Destroyers
4.5 Auxiliaries
5 Salvage
6 Aftermath 6.1 Niihau Incident
6.2 Strategic implications
6.3 Present day
7 Media 7.1 Non-fiction/historical
7.2 Alternate history
8 See also
9 Notes
10 References 10.1 Bibliography
11 Further reading
12 External links
Background to conflict



 Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941, looking southwest
Main article: Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor
Anticipating war
The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and hence protect Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where it sought access to natural resources such as oil and rubber.[3] War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility of which each nation had been aware (and developed contingency plans for) since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow seriously until Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand into China, leading to all-out war between those countries in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China and achieve sufficient resource independence to attain victory on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these efforts.[24]
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay, the Allison incident, and the Nanking Massacre (more than 200,000 Chinese non-combatants killed in indiscriminate massacres) swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan. Fearing Japanese expansion,[25] the United States, the United Kingdom, and France provided loan assistance for war supply contracts to the Republic of China.
In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to control supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline to Japan, which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act.[nb 7] The U.S. did not stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil,[27][28] and likely to be considered a provocation by Japan.
Early in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii from its previous base in San Diego and ordered a military buildup in the Philippines in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain that any attack on Britain's Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into war, a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to avoid U.S. naval interference.[29] An invasion of the Philippines was also considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan Orange had envisioned defending the Philippines with a 40,000-man elite force. This was opposed by Douglas MacArthur, who felt that he would need a force ten times that size, and was never implemented.[30] By 1941, U.S. planners anticipated abandonment of the Philippines at the outbreak of war and orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet.[31]
The U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following Japanese expansion into French Indochina after the fall of France, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.[32] This in turn caused the Japanese to proceed with plans to take the Dutch East Indies, an oil-rich territory.[nb 8] On 17 August, Roosevelt warned Japan that the U.S. was prepared to take steps against Japan if it attacked "neighboring countries".[34] The Japanese were faced with the option of either withdrawing from China and losing face or seizing and securing new sources of raw materials in the resource-rich, European-controlled colonies of Southeast Asia.
Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina when peace was made with the Nationalist government, adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, and to not discriminate in trade provided all other countries reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. Japan's final proposal, on 20 November, offered to withdraw their forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in Southeast Asia provided that the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan.[35] The American counter-proposal of 26 November (November 27 in Japan) (the Hull note) required Japan to evacuate all of China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. However the day before the Hull Note was delivered, on November 26 in Japan, the main Japanese attack fleet left port for Pearl Harbor.
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet.[36] He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.[37] Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, with assistance from Captain Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima.[38] The planners studied the 1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively.[nb 9][nb 10]
Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.[41] Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."[42]
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent. A Gallup poll just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion.[43] While U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south.[44] They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.[45]
Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Several writers, including journalist Robert Stinnett and former United States rear admiral Robert Alfred Theobald, have argued that various parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force America into war via the so-called "back door." However, this Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians.[46][47][48]
Objectives
The attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory.[49][50] Finally, it was meant to deliver a severe blow to American morale, one which would discourage Americans from committing to a war extending into the western Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies. To maximize the effect on morale, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. The overall intention was to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference.[49]
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga). IJN top command was so imbued with Admiral Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine—especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships—that, despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, were ignored, since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.[51]
Approach and attack
See also: Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor



 Route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back.


 An Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero" fighter on the aircraft carrier Akagi.
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—departed northern Japan en route to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack carriers as first objective and cruisers as second one, afterward second wave was to attack battleships.[52] The first wave carried most of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water.[53] The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if these were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First wave dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over U.S. airfields.
Before the attack commenced, two reconnaissance aircraft launched from cruisers Chikuma and Tone were sent to scout over Oahu and Maui and report on U.S. fleet composition and location. Reconnaissance aircraft flights risked alerting the U.S.,[54] and were not necessary. U.S. fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor was already known due to the reports of the Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa. A report of the absence of the U.S. fleet in Lahaina anchorage off Maui was received from the fleet submarine I-72.[55] Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the Kido Butai) and Niihau, to detect any counterattack.[56]
Submarines
Fleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu.[57] The five I-boats left Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941.[58] On December 6, they came to within 10 nautical miles (19 km; 12 mi) of the mouth of Pearl Harbor[59] and launched their midget subs at about 01:00[clarification needed] on December 7.[60] At 03:42[61] Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward.[62] The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37[62][nb 11] in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.[62]
A third midget submarine grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.[64] Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and was captured by Hawaii National Guard Corporal David Akui, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war.[nb 12] A fourth had been damaged by a depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.[65] Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming damage to one or more large war vessels inside Pearl Harbor.[66] The fifth midget submarine was found in three parts in 1992, 2000 and 2001 by Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory's submarines outside Pearl Harbor within U.S. amphibious warfare debris field. Both torpedoes were missing and their fate correlates to the reports of firing two torpedoes at light cruiser St. Louis at 10:04 at Pearl Harbor entrance and possible torpedo firing at destroyer Helm at 08:21.[67]
Japanese declaration of war
See also: Japanese war crimes
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.[68][69] The Japanese tried to uphold the conventions of war while still achieving surprise, but the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5,000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it in time. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.)[70] The final part of the "14 Part Message" is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations, it was viewed by a number of senior U.S government and military officials as a very strong indicator that negotiations were likely to be terminated [71] and that war might break out at any moment.[72] A declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8,[73] but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.
For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... and they clearly prevailed."[74]
First wave composition



 The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was misidentified as USAAF bombers arriving from the American mainland
 Top:
 A. Ford Island NAS B. Hickam Field C. Bellows Field D. Wheeler Field
 E. Kaneohe NAS F. Ewa MCAS R-1. Opana Radar Station R-2. Kawailoa RS R-3. Kaaawa RS
 G. Haleiwa H. Kahuku I. Wahiawa J. Kaneohe K. Honolulu
 0. B-17s from mainland 1. First strike group 1-1. Level bombers 1-2. Torpedo bombers 1-3. Dive bombers 2. Second strike group 2-1. Level bombers 2-1F. Fighters 2-2. Dive bombers
 Bottom:
 A. Wake Island B. Midway Islands C. Johnston Island D. Hawaii
 D-1. Oahu 1. USS Lexington 2. USS Enterprise 3. First Air Fleet



  <21 feet (6.4 m)
  22–23 feet (6.7–7.0 m)
  29 feet (8.8 m)
  30–32 feet (9.1–9.8 m)
  33–34 feet (10.1–10.4 m)
  34–35 feet (10.4–10.7 m)
  36–37 feet (11.0–11.3 m)
  38–39 feet (11.6–11.9 m)
  40–41 feet (12.2–12.5 m)
  42–48 feet (12.8–14.6 m)
  >49 feet (14.9 m)
  City
  Army base
  Navy base
Attacked targets:
 1: USS California
 2: USS Maryland
 3: USS Oklahoma
 4: USS Tennessee
 5: USS West Virginia
 6: USS Arizona
 7: USS Nevada
 8: USS Pennsylvania
 9: Ford Island NAS
 10: Hickam field
 Ignored infrastructure targets:
 A: Oil storage tanks
 B: CINCPAC headquarters building
 C: Submarine base
 D: Navy Yard
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida.[75] It included:[nb 13]
1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)[77] 49 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, organized in four sections (1 failed to launch)
40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections
2nd Group – (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field) 51 Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs (3 failed to launch)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe) 43 Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters for air control and strafing[76] (2 failed to launch)

Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.[56]
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.[78] Although the operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard,[79] reported a target, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers. The direction from which the aircraft were coming was close (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses),[80] while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar;[81] they neglected to tell Tyler of its size,[82] while Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell them the B-17s were due[82] (even though it was widely known).[82]
As the first wave planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already attacked at Pearl.
The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time[13] (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai),[83][nb 14] with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353[14] Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks, and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier USS Enterprise.[nb 15]
Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men to dress as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.",[nb 16] was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to deter sabotage,[84] guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).[84] Despite this low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack.[nb 17] Ensign Joe Taussig Jr., aboard USS Nevada, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was severely wounded, but continued to be on post. Lt. commander F.J. Thomas was commanding USS Nevada in captain's absence and got her under way until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m.[85] One of the destroyers, USS Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.[86] Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding USS West Virginia, led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit USS Tennessee, moored alongside.
Second wave composition



 A destroyed Vindicator at Ewa field, the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor.
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki.[76] Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.[56] This wave and its targets comprised:[76]
1st Group – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs[77] 27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers) 78 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections (3 aborted)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe) 35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)

The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.
American casualties and damages
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over, as 2,008 sailors were killed and 710 others were wounded; 218 soldiers and airmen (who were part of the Army) were killed and 364 others were wounded; 109 marines were killed and 69 others were wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 others were wounded. In total, 2,403 Americans died and 1,178 others were wounded during the attack.[87] Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.[4][5] All of the Americans killed or wounded during the attack were non-combatants, given the fact there was no state of war when the attack occurred.[22][23][88]



 USS Arizona (BB-39) during the attack.
Of the American fatalities, nearly half of the total (1,177) were due to the explosion of Arizona's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16 in.) shell.[nb 18]
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, Nevada attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way and sustained more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs, which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance.
California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock, Cassin and Downes were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.[89]



 This message denotes the first US ship, USS St. Louis (CL49) to clear Pearl Harbor. (National Archives and Records Administration) (Note that this is in answer to question "Is channel clear?" and faint writing at bottom concerning the answer being held until St. Louis had successfully cleared.)
Of the 402[14] American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged,[14] 155 of them on the ground. Almost none was actually ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Forces pilots managed to get airborne during the attack[90] and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack, 1st Lt. Lewis M. Sanders, 2nd Lt. Philip M. Rasmussen, 2nd Lt. Kenneth M. Taylor, 2nd Lt. George S. Welch, 2nd Lt. Harry W. Brown, and 2nd Lt. Gordon H. Sterling Jr. Sterling was shot down by Lt. Fujita over Kaneohe Bay and is listed as Body Not Recovered (not Missing In Action). Johnny Dains was killed by friendly fire returning from a victory over Kaawa.[91][92] Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Friendly fire brought down some U.S. planes on top of that, including five from an inbound flight from Enterprise. Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.
At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down.[87]
Japanese losses
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414[76] available planes, 29 were lost during the battle[93] (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second),[nb 19] with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

Possible third wave
Several Japanese junior officers including Fuchida and Genda urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo[nb 20] storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible.[94] Genda, who had unsuccessfully advocated for invading Hawaii after the air attack, believed that without an invasion multiple strikes were necessary to disable the base as much as possible.[95] The captains of the other five carriers in the formation reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike.[96] Military historians have suggested the destruction of these would have hampered the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships.[97] If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";[98] according to American Admiral Chester Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years."[99] Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:
American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.[100] Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.[100]
The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.[100] Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.[101]
A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the (British) Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.[102]
Weather had deteriorated notably since the first and second wave launching, and rough seas complicated takeoff and landing for a third wave attack.
The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.[103]
He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.[104] Moreover, it was Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.[105]
At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo.[104] In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.[106]
Photographs
The first aerial photographs of the attack on Pearl Harbor were taken by Lee Embree, who was aboard a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress en route from Hamilton Field, California, to the Philippines.[107] Lee's 38th Reconnaissance Squadron had scheduled a refueling stop at Hickam Field at the time of the attack.[107]




Crew members aboard Shokaku launching the attack




A Japanese Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero" fighter airplane of the second wave takes off from the aircraft carrier Akagi on the morning of December 7, 1941.




Zeroes of the second wave preparing to take off from Shokaku for Pearl Harbor




A Japanese Nakajima B5N2 "Kate" torpedo bomber takes off from Shokaku.




Japanese Aichi D3A1 "Val" dive bombers of the second wave preparing for take off. Aircraft carrier Soryu in the background.




An Aichi D3A Type 99 kanbaku (dive bomber) launches from the Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Akagi to participate in the second wave during the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.




Battleship USS California sinking




Battleship USS Arizona explodes.




Destroyer USS Shaw exploding after her forward magazine was detonated




Battleship USS Nevada attempting to escape from the harbor.




Battleship USS West Virginia took two aerial bombs, both duds, and seven torpedo hits, one of which may have come from a midget submarine.




A destroyed B-17 after the attack on Hickam Field.




Hangar on Ford Island burns




Aftermath: USS West Virginia (severely damaged), USS Tennessee (damaged), and the USS Arizona (sunk).

Ships lost or damaged
Battleships
Arizona (Kidd's flagship): hit by an armor-piercing bomb, exploded; total loss. 1,177 dead.
Oklahoma: hit by five torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 429 dead. Refloated November 1943; capsized and lost while under tow to the mainland May 1947.
West Virginia: hit by two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned to service July 1944. 106 dead.
California: hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service January 1944. 100 dead.
Nevada: hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to service October 1942. 60 dead.
Tennessee: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5 dead.
Maryland: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead (including floatplane pilot shot down).
Pennsylvania (Kimmel's flagship):[108] in drydock with Cassin and Downes, hit by one bomb, debris from USS Cassin; remained in service. 9 dead.
Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)
Utah: hit by two torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 64 dead.
Cruisers
Helena: hit by one torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20 dead.
Raleigh: hit by one torpedo; returned to service February 1942.
Honolulu: Near miss, light damage; remained in service.
Destroyers
Cassin: in drydock with Downes and Pennsylvania, hit by one bomb, burned; returned to service February 1944.
Downes: in drydock with Cassin and Pennsylvania, caught fire from Cassin, burned; returned to service November 1943.
Shaw: hit by three bombs; returned to service June 1942.
Auxiliaries
Oglala (minelayer): Damaged by torpedo hit on Helena, capsized; returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
Vestal (repair ship): hit by two bombs, blast and fire from Arizona, beached; returned to service by August 1942.
Curtiss (seaplane tender): hit by one bomb, one crashed Japanese aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.
Salvage



 Captain Homer N. Wallin (center) supervises salvage operations aboard USS California, early 1942
After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations began. Captain Homer N. Wallin, Material Officer for Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was immediately ordered to lead salvage operations. "Within a short time I was relieved of all other duties and ordered to full time work as Fleet Salvage Officer".[109][nb 21]
Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the Naval Shipyard, and civilian contractors (Pacific Bridge and others) began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes, cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked inside the damaged ships. Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards in Pearl Harbor and on the mainland for extensive repair.
Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of some 20,000 man-hours under water.[111] Oklahoma, while successfully raised, was never repaired, and capsized while under tow to the mainland in 1947. Arizona and the target ship Utah were too heavily damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks remain where they were sunk,[112] with Arizona becoming a war memorial.

Aftermath
Main article: Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor
See also: Infamy Speech, Declaration of war by the United States, United States declaration of war upon Japan and United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan (1941)



USS Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of the USS Downes and USS Cassin.
In the wake of the attack, 15 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 53 Silver Stars, four Navy and Marine Corps Medals, one Distinguished Flying Cross, four Distinguished Service Crosses, one Distinguished Service Medal, and three Bronze Star Medals were awarded to the American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl Harbor.[113] Additionally, a special military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.
The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous Infamy Speech to a Joint Session of Congress, calling for a formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan. Congress obliged his request less than an hour later. On December 11 Germany and Italy, honoring their commitments under the Tripartite Pact, declared war on the United States. The Tripartite Pact was an earlier agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan which had the principal objective of limiting U.S. intervention in any conflicts involving the three nations.[114] The United States Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany and Italy later that same day. Britain actually declared war on Japan nine hours before the US did, partially due to Japanese attacks on Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, and partially due to Winston Churchill's promise to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States.[115]
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan attacked the Philippines hours later (because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaya, causing British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked".[116]
Throughout the war, Pearl Harbor was frequently used in American propaganda.[117]
One further consequence of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath (notably the Niihau Incident) was that Japanese American residents and citizens were relocated to nearby Japanese-American internment camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese American leaders were rounded up and brought to high-security camps such as Sand Island at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and Kilauea Military Camp on the island of Hawaii.[118][119] Later, over 110,000 Japanese Americans, including United States citizens, were removed from their homes and transferred to internment camps in California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas.[120][121]
The attacks also had international consequences. The Canadian province of British Columbia, being situated on the Pacific coast, had long had a large population of Japanese immigrants. Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor attack, leading to a reaction from the Government of Canada. On February 24, 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. no. 1486 was passed under the War Measures Act allowing for the forced removal of any and all Canadians of Japanese descent from British Columbia, as well as the prohibiting from them returning to the province. The Japanese were given a choice: either be moved into internment camps or be deported back to Japan.[122]
Niihau Incident



 Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi's aircraft shown ten days after it crashed
Main article: Niihau Incident
The Japanese planners had determined that some means of rescuing fliers whose aircraft were too badly damaged to return to the carriers was required. The island of Niihau, only 30 minutes flying time from Pearl Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.
The Zero flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of Hiryu was damaged in the attack on Wheeler, and he flew to the rescue point on Niihau. The aircraft was further damaged on landing. Nishikaichi was helped from the wreckage by one of the native Hawaiian inhabitants, who, aware of the tension between the United States and Japan, took the pilot's maps and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radio and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles, Nishikaichi was killed and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third collaborator were sent to prison.
The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents apparently went to the assistance of Nishikaichi was a source of concern for many, and tended to support those who believed that local Japanese could not be trusted.[123]
Strategic implications
Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war."[124] While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of Plan Orange).[29] The U.S. instead adopted "Plan Dog" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia while the U.S. concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.[125]
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched by the Japanese attack, otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles (their only major action being the Battle of Surigao Strait). A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.[126]
The Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair yards, oil tank farms, submarine base, and old headquarters building.[51] All of these targets were omitted from Genda's list, yet they proved more important than any battleship to the American war efforts in the Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support to the US Navy's operations,[127][128] such as the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the transportation of oil and raw materials: import of raw materials was down by half what it had been at the end of 1942, "to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil import "was almost completely stopped". Lastly, the basement of the Old Administration Building was the home of the cryptanalytic unit which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success. [129]
Present day



 USS Arizona to left, museum to right next to the Admiral Clarey Bridge
Today, the USS Arizona Memorial on the island of Oahu honors the lives lost on the day of the attack. Visitors to the memorial reach it via boats from the naval base at Pearl Harbor. Alfred Preis is the architect responsible for the memorial's design. The structure has a sagging center and its ends strong and vigorous. It commemorates "initial defeat and ultimate victory" of all lives lost on December 7, 1941.[130] Although December 7 is known as Pearl Harbor Day, it is not considered a federal holiday in the United States. The nation does however, continue to pay homage remembering the thousands injured and killed when attacked by the Japanese in 1941. Schools and other establishments in some places around the country lower the American flag to half-staff out of respect.[131]



 Pearl Harbor survivor Bill Johnson reads the list of names inscribed in the USS Arizona Memorial.
Media




FDR Pearl Harbor speech







Speech given before Joint Session of Congress in entirety. (3.1 MB, ogg/Vorbis format).
Read full text on Wikisource


"A date which will live in infamy"







Section of Pearl Harbor speech with famous phrase. (168 KB, ogg/Vorbis format).

Problems playing these files? See media help.
Films set at or around the bombing of Pearl Harbor include:
Remember Pearl Harbor (1942) A Republic Pictures B-movie, starring Don "Red" Barry, one of the first motion pictures to respond to the events.[132]
Air Force, a 1943 propaganda film depicting the fate of the crew of the Mary-Ann, one of the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers that fly into Hickam Field during the attack.
December 7th, directed by John Ford for the U.S. Navy in 1943, is a film that recreates the attacks of the Japanese forces. CNN mistakenly ran footage of this as actual attack footage during an entertainment news report in 2003. One film historian believes two documentaries a decade earlier did also.[133]
From Here to Eternity (1953), an adaptation of the James Jones novel set in Hawaii on the eve of the attack.
In Harm's Way (1965), director Otto Preminger's adaptation of the James Bassett novel, which opens on December 6, 1941, in Hawaii, and depicts the attack from the point of view of the men of a ship able to leave the harbor.
Storm Over the Pacific, also known as Hawai Middouei daikaikusen: Taiheiyo no arashi (Hawaii-Midway Battle of the Sea and Sky: Storm in the Pacific Ocean) and I Bombed Pearl Harbor (1961), produced by the Japanese studio Toho Company and starring Toshiro Mifune, tells the story of Japanese airmen who served in the Pearl Harbor Raid and the Battle of Midway. An edited version dubbed into English as I Bombed Pearl Harbor was given U.S. release in 1961.[132]
Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970), a Japan-U.S. coproduction about the attack is "meticulous"[134] in its approach to dissecting the situation leading up to the bombing. It depicts the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor from both American and Japanese points of view, with scrupulous attention to historical fact, including the U.S. use of Magic cryptanalysis.
Pearl (1978), a TV miniseries, written by Stirling Silliphant, about events leading up to the attack.
1941 (1979), director Steven Spielberg comedy about a panicked Los Angeles immediately after the attack.
The Final Countdown (1980), in which the nuclear aircraft carrier, USS Nimitz travels through time to one day before the attack.
The Winds of War, a novel by American writer Herman Wouk, was written between 1963 and 1971. The novel finishes in December 1941 with the aftermath of the attack. The TV miniseries based on the book was produced by Dan Curtis, airing in 1984. It starred Robert Mitchum and Ali MacGraw, with Ralph Bellamy as President Roosevelt.
Pearl Harbor (2001), directed by Michael Bay, a love story set amidst the lead up to the attack and its aftermath.
Non-fiction/historical
The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History by Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis is a careful recreation of the "Day of Infamy" using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD. From the early stages of Japanese planning, through the attack on Battleship Row, to the salvage of the U.S. Pacific fleet, this book provides a detailed overview of the attack.
At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Prange is an extremely comprehensive account of the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and is considered by most scholars to be the best single work about the raid. It is a balanced account that gives both the Japanese and American perspectives. Prange spent 37 years researching the book by studying documents about Pearl Harbor and interviewing surviving participants to attempt the most exhaustive account of what happened: the Japanese planning and execution, why US intelligence failed to warn of it, and why a peace agreement was not attained. The book is the first in the so-called "Prange Trilogy" of Pearl Harbor books co-written with Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, the other two being: Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History – a dissection of the various revisionist theories surrounding the attack.
December 7, 1941: The Day The Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor – a recollection of the attack as narrated by eyewitnesses.
Day of Infamy by Walter Lord was one of the most popular nonfiction accounts of the attack on Pearl Harbor.[135]
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee tells of Clausen's top-secret investigation of the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information in this book was still classified when previous books were published.
Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richardson by Skipper Steely is an insightful and detailed account of the events leading up to the attack. Through his comprehensive treatment of the life and times of Admiral James O. Richardson, Steely explores four decades of American foreign policy, traditional military practice, U.S. intelligence, and the administrative side of the military, exposing the largely untold story of the events leading up to the Japanese attack.
Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, released by Goldstein and Dillon in 1993, used materials from Prange's library to further flesh out the Japanese perspective of the attack, including diaries from some officers and ship logs.
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy by Percy L. Greaves, Jr. The first part provides a detailed history of pre-war U.S.-Japan relations, documenting the sources of rising tension. The second part suggests that the attack on Pearl Harbor was neither unexpected nor unprovoked.
The Last Zero Fighter, released in 2012, uses interviews conducted in Japanese, in Japan, with five Japanese aviators, three of whom participated in the Pearl Harbor strike: Kaname Harada, Haruo Yoshino and Takeshi Maeda. The aviators share their personal experiences (translated into English) in regards to their personal experiences training for and executing the raid on Pearl Harbor.[136]
Alternate history
Days of Infamy is a novel by Harry Turtledove in which the Japanese attack on Hawaii is not limited to a strike on Pearl Harbor, but is instead a full-scale invasion and eventual occupation after U.S. forces are driven off the islands (something one of the key planners of the attack, Commander Minoru Genda, wanted but the senior officers realized was impossible).[137] The many viewpoint characters (a Turtledove trademark) are drawn from Hawaiian civilians (both white and Japanese) as well as soldiers and sailors from both Japan and the USA. Turtledove has to date written one sequel, The End of the Beginning.
The airstrike and Hawaii-invasion premise of Days of Infamy was earlier used in the first episode of the anime OVA series Konpeki no Kantai. In the episode, Japan carries out the attack in the early hours of the morning, having perfected night carrier operations. The raid begins with a flare drop by pathfinders. The entire base (including the repair facilities) and a number of supply ships in the harbor are destroyed by daybreak. As for the main body of the Pacific Fleet, the Combined Fleet regroups and annihilates them while they return to Pearl Harbor. The episode, which is divided into three stages in the series' game version, ends with Japanese troops landing at all islands in Hawaii.
See also

Portal icon World War II portal
Battle of Taranto
Operation K
Air warfare of World War II
Attack on Howland Island
List of United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
Nagai Kita
National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day
Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
Winds Code
Notes
1.Jump up ^ USCGC Taney (WHEC-37)
2.Jump up ^ Utah and Oglala
3.Jump up ^ Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed were salvageable.[2]
4.Jump up ^ Also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor,[9] the Hawaii Operation or Operation AI by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,[10][11] and Operation Z during planning.[12]
5.Jump up ^ USS Utah (AG-16, formerly BB-31); the Utah was moored in the space intended to have been occupied by the carrier Enterprise which, returning with a task force, had been expected to enter the channel at 0730 on 7 December. Strong headwinds delayed the refueling of the destroyers, and the task force did not reach Pearl Harbor until dusk the following day.[15]
6.Jump up ^ Gordon Prange specifically addresses some revisionist works, including "Charles A. Beard. President Roosevelt and the Coming War 1941; William Henry Chamberlain, America's Second Crusade; John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor; Frederic R. Sanborn, Design for War; Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor; Harry E. Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace and The Court Historians versus Revisionism; Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Story."[21]
7.Jump up ^ After it was announced in September iron and steel scrap export would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 warning this might be considered an "unfriendly act".[26]
8.Jump up ^ This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army would have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.[33]
9.Jump up ^ "The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval attaché to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr. Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941."[39]
10.Jump up ^ "A torpedo bomber needed a long, level flight, and when released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep before swerving upward to strike a hull. Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."[40]
11.Jump up ^ She was located by a University of Hawaii research submersible on August 28, 2002 in 400 m (1,300 ft) of water, 6 nmi (11 km) outside the harbor.[63]
12.Jump up ^ While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly lionized by the Japanese government as Kyūgunshin ("The Nine War Heroes"), the news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in US news broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he received recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not sacrificing his own life.
13.Jump up ^ The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.[76]
14.Jump up ^ In 1941, Hawaii was a half hour different from the majority of other time zones. See UTC−10:30.
15.Jump up ^ In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.
16.Jump up ^ Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate.
17.Jump up ^ The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the attack by Tautog, and Dorie Miller's Navy Cross-worthy effort. Miller was an African-American cook aboard West Virginia who took over an unattended anti-aircraft gun on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross.
18.Jump up ^ The wreck has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil, over 70 years after the attack.
19.Jump up ^ USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
20.Jump up ^ In the event, loss of these might have been a net benefit to the U.S. Blair, passim.
21.Jump up ^ Commander Edward Ellsberg was ordered to Massawa as his replacement, to assist the British in clearing scuttled Italian and German ships. This arguably delayed by several months British hopes for a useful port on the Red Sea. Commander Edward Ellsberg, O.B.E.[110]
References
1.Jump up ^ "Ships present at Pearl Harbor 0800 December 7, 1941 US Navy Historical Center". History.navy.mil. Archived from the original on 10 July 2011. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
2.Jump up ^ CinCP report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar.
3.^ Jump up to: a b USN website
4.^ Jump up to: a b c Conn 2000, p. 194
5.^ Jump up to: a b GPO 1946, pp. 64–65
6.Jump up ^ Gilbert 2009, p. 272.
7.Jump up ^ Gailey 1995
8.Jump up ^ "Pearl Harbor Casualty List". USSWestVirginia.org. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
9.Jump up ^ Morison 2001, pp. 101, 120, 250
10.Jump up ^ Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald, & Dillon, Katherine. The Pearl Harbor Papers (Brassey's, 2000), p.17ff; Google Books entry on Prange et al.
11.Jump up ^ For the Japanese designator of Oahu. Wilford, Timothy. "Decoding Pearl Harbor", in The Northern Mariner, XII, #1 (January 2002), p.32fn81.
12.Jump up ^ Fukudome, Shigeru, "Hawaii Operation". United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, 81 (December 1955), pp.1315–1331
13.^ Jump up to: a b Prange et al. December 7, 1941, p.174.
14.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Parillo 2006, p. 288
15.Jump up ^ Thomas 2007, pp. 57–59.
16.Jump up ^ "Full Pearl Harbor casualty list". Usswestvirginia.org. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
17.Jump up ^ Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction. New York: The Free Press, 1957 p. 239–258.
18.Jump up ^ Design For War: A Study of Secret Power Politics 1937–1941, Frederic R. Sanborn, Devin-Adair Company, New York, NY 1951.
19.Jump up ^ Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941, Charles C. Tansill, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, IL, 1952.
20.Jump up ^ Stevenson, Richard W. "New Light Shed on Churchill and Pearl Harbor". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 March 2014.
21.Jump up ^ Prange, Gordon W.; Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V. (1991). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin Books. p. 867. ISBN 9780140157345.
22.^ Jump up to: a b Yuma Totani (April 1, 2009). The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Harvard University Asia Center. p. 57.
23.^ Jump up to: a b Stephen C. McCaffrey (September 22, 2004). Understanding International Law. AuthorHouse. pp. 210–229.
24.Jump up ^ Barnhart 1987.
25.Jump up ^ Werner Gruhl (2007). Imperial Japan's World War Two, 1931–1945. Transaction Publishers. p.39. ISBN 978-0-7658-0352-8
26.Jump up ^ GPO 1943, p. 96
27.Jump up ^ GPO 1943, p. 94
28.Jump up ^ Toland, Japan's War.[clarification needed]
29.^ Jump up to: a b Peattie 1997
30.Jump up ^ William Chalek (2002), "8. War Plan Orange", Guest of the Emperor, iUniverse, pp. 45–52, ISBN 978-0-595-23996-2
31.Jump up ^ Edward S. Miller (2007), War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, Naval Institute Press, pp. 63, ISBN 978-1-59114-500-4
32.Jump up ^ GPO 1943, p. 125
33.Jump up ^ Peattie 1997; Coox, Kobun.
34.Jump up ^ Chapter IV The Showdown With Japan August-December 1941 Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942
35.Jump up ^ Chapter V: The Decision for War Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
36.Jump up ^ Gailey 1995, p. 68
37.Jump up ^ Gailey 1995, p. 70
38.Jump up ^ Lord, Walter (2012). Day of Infamy. Open Road Media. p. 14. ISBN 1-4532-3842-5.
39.Jump up ^ Borch & Martinez 2005, pp. 53–54.
40.Jump up ^ Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II. By Robert Gannon, Published by Penn State Press, 1996, page 49.ISBN 0-271-01508-X
41.Jump up ^ Wetzler 1998, p. 39.
42.Jump up ^ Bix 2000, p. 417, citing the Sugiyama memo
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Bibliography
BooksBarnhart, Michael A. (1987), Japan prepares for total war: the search for economic security, 1919–1941, Cornell University Press, ISBN 978-0-8014-1915-7
Bix, Herbert P. (2000), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Diane Pub Co, ISBN 978-0-7567-5780-9
Borch, Frederic L.; Martinez, Daniel (2005), Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: the final report revealed, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-59114-090-0
Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron; Engelman, Rose C. (2000), "7 – The Attack on Pearl Harbor", Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army
Gailey, Harry A. (1997), War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, Presidio, ISBN 0-89141-616-1
Gilbert, Martin (2009), The Second World War, Phoenix, ISBN 978-0-7538-2676-8
Goldstein, Donald M. (2000), Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V., eds., The Pearl Harbor papers: inside the Japanese plans, Brassey's, ISBN 978-1-57488-222-3
Hakim, Joy (1995), A History of US: Book 9: War, Peace, and All that Jazz, Oxford University Press, USA, ISBN 978-0-19-509514-2
Hixson, Walter L. (2003), The American Experience in World War II: The United States and the road to war in Europe, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 978-0-415-94029-0
Hoyt, Edwin P. (2000), Pearl Harbor, G. K. Hall, ISBN 0-7838-9303-5
Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001), History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The rising sun in the Pacific, 1931 – April 1942, University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0-252-06973-0
Ofstie, Ralph, A., RADM USN, Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) (1946), The Campaigns of the Pacific War, United States Government Printing Office
Peattie, Mark R.; Evans, David C. (1997), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0-87021-192-7
Peattie, Mark R. (2001), Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-59114-664-X
Parillo, Mark (2006), "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin; Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat, The University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 978-0-8131-2374-5
Prange, Gordon William; Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V. (1988), December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor, McGraw-Hill, ISBN 978-0-07-050682-4
Smith, Carl (1999), Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy; Osprey Campaign Series #62, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-798-8
Stille, Mark E. (2011), Tora! Tora! Tora!: Pearl Harbor 1941; Osprey Raid Series #26, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84908-509-0
Thomas, Evan (2007), Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 978-0-7432-5222-5
Willmott, H. P. (1983), The barrier and the javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies, February to June 1942, Naval Institute Press
Zimm, Alan D. (2011), Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers, ISBN 978-1-61200-010-7
U.S. Government Documents"Document text", US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, 1942, archived from the original on 13 January 2008, retrieved 2007-12-25
"Document text", Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943, retrieved 2007-12-08
"Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of the Attack", Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946, retrieved 2007-12-08
Magazine articlesRodgaard, John; Peter Hsu, Carroll Lucas, and Captain Andrew Biach (December 1999), "Pearl Harbor – Attack from Below", Naval History (United States Naval Institute) 13 (6)  (requires subscription)
Wetzler, Peter (1998), Hirohito and war: imperial tradition and military decision making in prewar Japan, University of Hawaii Press, ISBN 978-0-8248-1925-5
Online sourcesOrganization of the Japanese Air Attack Units December 7, 1941, NavSource Naval History, 2003, archived from the original on 13 December 2007, retrieved 2007-12-08
USS Shaw, destroyerhistory.org, archived from the original on March 3, 2006, retrieved 2007-12-08[dead link]
Homer N. Wallin, "Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal", Hyperwar (ibiblio.org), retrieved 2011-10-10
Further reading
George Edward Morgenstern. Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War. (The Devin-Adair Company, 1947) ISBN 978-1-299-05736-4. Conspiracy theory.
James Dorsey. "Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine Gods of War: 'Fascist Proclivities' Made Real," in The Culture of Japanese Fascism, ed. by Alan Tansman (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2009), pp 409–431. A study of Japanese wartime media representations of the submarine component of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.
Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X).
Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, "The U.S. Army Medical Department and the Attack on Pearl Harbor". (The Journal of Medical History, January 1989). PMID 11617401. This article discusses the state of medical readiness prior to the attack, and the post-attack response by medical personnel.
Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
Edward L. Beach, Jr., Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor ISBN 1-55750-059-2
Andrew Krepinevich, [4] PDF (186 KB) (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
Douglas T. Shinsato and Tadanori Urabe, "For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor". (eXperience: 2011) ISBN 978-0-9846745-0-3
Horn, Steve (2005), The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-59114-388-8
Seki, Eiji. (2006). Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second World War: The Global Consequences Following Germany's Sinking of the SS Automedon in 1940. London: Global Oriental. ISBN 1-905246-28-5; ISBN 978-1-905246-28-1 (cloth) Published by BRILL/Global Oriental, 2006. Previously announced as Sinking of the SS Automedon and the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation.
Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
Takeo, Iguchi, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective From Japan, I-House Press, 2010, ASIN: B003RJ1AZA.
Haynok, Robert J. (2009). "How the Japanese Did It". Naval History Magazine (United States Naval Institute) 23 (6).
Moorhead, John J. 1942 "Surgical Experience at Pearl Harbor", The Journal of the American Medical Association. An overview of different surgical procedures at the hospital at the scene of the event.
External links

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"Remembering Pearl Harbor:The USS Arizona Memorial", a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan
Hawaii War Records Depository, Archives & Manuscripts Department, University of Hawaii at Manoa Library
7 December 1941, The Air Force Story
The "Magic" Background (PDFs or readable online)
The Congressional investigation
AccountsGuarding The United States And Its Outposts, in Guarding the United States and Its Outposts Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor by the United States Army Center of Military History
War comes to Hawaii Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Monday, September 13, 1999
MediaVideo of first Newsreel from December 23, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
Attack on Pearl Harbor 1, Nippon News, No. 82. in the official website of NHK.
Attack on Pearl Harbor 2, Nippon News, No. 84. in the official website of NHK.
Historic footage of Pearl Harbor during and immediately following attack on December 7, 1941
Historic documentsWW2DB: US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor
Second World War – USA Declaration of War on Japan.
Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents


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Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor
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Main article: Attack on Pearl Harbor
The results of the attack on Pearl Harbor are many and significant.


Contents  [hide]
1 American response
2 Japanese views
3 Germany and Italy declare war
4 Canadian response
5 Investigations and blame
6 Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance
7 Perception of the attack today 7.1 Revisionism controversies
8 Analysis 8.1 Tactical implications 8.1.1 Battleships
8.1.2 Carriers
8.1.3 Shore installations
8.1.4 Charts
8.2 Strategic implications
9 See also
10 Notes

American response[edit]



 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the attack
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor without warning, catching the U.S. servicemen there, especially those who were sleeping, off-guard. After two hours of bombing, 18 U.S. ships had either been sunk or damaged, 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, and 2,403 U.S. non-combatants (neutral military personnel and civilians) were killed.
The day after the attack, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a joint session of United States Congress. Roosevelt called December 7 "a date which will live in infamy". Congress declared war on the Empire of Japan amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note from the Japanese government breaking off relations with the U.S. government, actions considered treacherous. Pacifist Representative Jeannette Rankin, a Republican from Montana, cast the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration of war later the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished converting to a war economy, a process begun by provision of weapons and supplies to the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Japanese Americans from the West Coast were sent to internment camps for the duration of the war.
The attack on Pearl Harbor immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan in response to calls to "Remember Pearl Harbor." American solidarity in the war effort probably made possible the unconditional surrender position later taken by the Allied Powers.[citation needed] Some historians, among them Samuel Eliot Morison, believe the attack doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the "sleeping giant", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others, such as Clay Blair, Jr.,[1] and Mark Parillo[2] believe Japanese trade protection was so incompetent that American submarines alone might have strangled Japan into defeat.
The closest friend Roosevelt had in the developing Allied alliance, Sir Winston Churchill, stated that his first thought regarding American assistance to the United Kingdom was that "We have won the war"[3] very soon after the United States had been attacked.
Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including citizens of Japanese descent and was a factor in the subsequent Japanese internment in the western United States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by General John DeWitt, commanding general of Western Defense Command on the Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans.[4] In February 1942, Roosevelt signed United States Executive Order 9066, requiring all Japanese Americans to submit themselves for an internment.
Propaganda made repeated use of the attack, because its effect was enormous and impossible to counter.[5] "Remember Pearl Harbor!" became the watchwords of the war.[6]
The American government understated the damage inflicted, in hopes of preventing the Japanese from learning it, but the Japanese had, through surveillance, a good estimate.[7]
Japanese views[edit]



 Japanese depiction of nine midget submarine crewmembers lost during the attack, excluding the POW, Kazuo Sakamaki.
On December 8, 1941, the Empire of Japan declared war on the United States and the British Empire. The belated Japanese document discussed world peace and the disruptive actions of the United States and Great Britain. The document claimed all avenues for averting war had been exhausted by the Government of Japan.
Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare their population for war via anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired. Nevertheless, the people at home and overseas thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.[8]
Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early 1930s, of which the United States strongly disapproved. In 1942, Saburō Kurusu, former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia."[9] He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the San Francisco School incident, (the United States' racist policies on Japanese immigrants), Naval Limitations Treaty, other Unequal treaties, the Nine Power Pact, constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the "belligerent" scrap metal and oil embargo in 1941 by the United States and Allied countries to contain and/or reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan especially in IndoChina during her expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia. In light of Japan's dependence on imported oil, the trade embargoes were especially significant. These pressures directly influenced Japan to go into alliance with Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact. According to Kurusu, because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Kurusu also states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister designs".[9] Some of this view seems to have been shared by Adolf Hitler, when he called it one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned European imperialism toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring Germany and Italy closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.
Japan's leaders also saw themselves as justified in their conduct, believing that they were building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They also explained Japan had done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the Hull note, and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since the Japanese-American relationship already had hit its lowest point, there was no alternative; in any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the Carrier Striking Task Force could have been called back.
Germany and Italy declare war[edit]


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See also: German American internment, Italian American internment and German-Japanese relations



 Hitler declares war on the United States, 11 December 1941 from the Kroll Opera House's stage
On December 11, 1941, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war on the United States, and the United States reciprocated, formally entering the war in Europe.
German dictator Adolf Hitler and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini were under no obligation to declare war on the United States under the mutual defense terms of the Tripartite Pact. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the United States had deteriorated since 1937. Earlier in 1941, the Germans learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was Rainbow Five, made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's New Deal, and published by the Chicago Tribune. Moreover, with Roosevelt's initiation of a Neutrality Patrol, which in fact also escorted British ships, as well as orders to U.S. Navy destroyers first to actively report U-boats, then "shoot on sight", American neutrality was honored more in the breach than observance.
Having been unaware of Japanese plans, Hitler was initially furious that the United States had been dragged into the war at a time when he had not yet acquired full control of continental Europe — on the very day of the Pearl Harbor attack, Hitler himself had issued his Nacht und Nebel decree, concerning the suppression of resistance activities within Nazi-occupied lands. Hitler, who had previously declared the Japanese "Honorary Aryans" claimed that this is what happens when your allies are not Anglo-Saxons.[10][citation needed] However, he decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of Rainbow Five, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. Hitler disastrously underestimated American military production capacity, the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own Operation Barbarossa would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in Eurasia, particularly against the Soviet Union. Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an enormous strategic blunder and allowed the United States to enter the European war in support of the United Kingdom and the Allies without much public opposition.
Author Ian Kershaw records Hitler's initial reaction to the attack, when he was first informed about it on the evening of 7 December at Führer Headquarters: "We can't lose the war at all. We now have an ally which has never been conquered in 3,000 years".[11] Well before the attack, in 1928 Hitler had confided in the text of his then-unpublished Zweites Buch that while the Soviet Union was the most important immediate foe that the Third Reich had to defeat, the United States was the most important long-term challenge to Nazi aims.[12]
Hitler awarded Imperial Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany Hiroshi Ōshima the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold (1st class) after the attack, praising Japan for striking hard and without first declaring war.[13]
Canadian response[edit]
As a result of the Japanese attack on the Americans, the Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada advised George VI, King of Canada, that a state of war should exist between Canada and Japan.

In the late evening of December 7, 1941, the Canadian Prime Minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, announced the Cabinet's decision to declare war on Japan. The King approved Canada's declaration of war in the following proclamation issued on December 8, 1941.
Whereas by and with the advice of our Privy Council for Canada we have signified our approval of the issue of a proclamation in the Canada Gazette declaring that a state of war with Japan exists and has existed in Canada as and from the 7th day of December 1941.
Now, therefore, we do hereby declare and proclaim that a state of war with Japan exists and has existed as and from the seventh day of December 1941. Of all which our loving subjects and all others whom these presents may concern are hereby required to take notice and to govern themselves accordingly.[14]
Canada remained focused on the European theatre however, and following VE Day was still in the process of transitioning its military force for a campaign in east Asia and the western Pacific when VJ Day arrived.
Investigations and blame[edit]
President Roosevelt appointed the Roberts Commission, headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, to investigate and report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many official investigations (nine in all). Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and the Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Short (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations. None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the Congressional investigation afterward, provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The decisions of the Navy and War Departments to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington".
A Joint Congressional Committee was also appointed, on September 14, 1945, to investigate the causes of the attack and subsequent disaster, and was convened on November 15, 1945.[15]
Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance[edit]



 United States World War II propaganda poster depicting Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tōjō.


Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam, still visible.
See also: Anti-Japanese sentiment, In Defense of Internment, List of Japanese spies, 1930–45 and Niihau Incident
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor coupled with their alliance with the Nazis and the ensuing war in the Pacific fueled anti-Japanese sentiment, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Axis sentiment in the Allied nations like never before. Japanese, Japanese-Americans and Asians having a similar physical appearance were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack". Suspicions were further fueled by the Niihau Incident, as historian Gordon Prange stated "the rapidity with which the three resident Japanese went over to the pilot's cause" which troubled the Hawaiians. "The more pessimistic among them cited the Niʻihau incident as proof that no one could trust any Japanese, even if an American citizen, not to go over to Japan if it appeared expedient."[16]
The attack, the subsequent declarations of war, and fear of "Fifth Columnists" resulted in internment of Japanese, German, and Italian populations in the United States and others, for instance the Japanese American internment, German American internment, Italian American internment, and Japanese Canadian internment. The attack resulted in the United States fighting the Germans and Italians among others in Europe and Japan in the Pacific.
The consequences were world-changing. Prime Minister Winston Churchill knew that the survival of the British Empire depended on American aid, and since 1940 had frequently asked Roosevelt to declare war. Churchill aide John Colville stated that the prime minister and American Ambassador John Gilbert Winant, who also supported the British, "sort of danced around the room together" as the United States would now enter the war, making a British victory likely.[17]:164–165 Churchill later wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful."[18] By opening the Pacific War, which ended in the unconditional surrender of Japan, it broke the power of an Asian check on Soviet expansion. The Allied victory in this war and subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power, eclipsing Britain, have shaped international politics ever since.
Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, remembered as the first time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by another country - with only the September 11 attacks almost 60 years later being of a similar catastrophic scale to Pearl Harbor. While this assertion is technically erroneous, as Hawaii was not a state at the time, it was widely regarded as such. It was the first decisive defeat for the United States in World War II. It has become synonymous with "surprise attack" ever since in the U.S. Unfortunately, the mistakes of intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis leading to the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor did not, in the end, lead to lessons.[19]
Perception of the attack today[edit]
Some Japanese today feel they were compelled to fight because of threats to their national interests and an embargo imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the economy was dependent.[20] For example, the Japan Times, an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s (decade) echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.[21]
In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. non-combatants killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in U.S. air attacks on Japan later in the war, even without mentioning the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States.
However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes, "The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow."[22] In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something that had been publicly known for years. Diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time. It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to deliver this message until well after the attack had begun.
Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."[23] The reports of American reactions, terming it a "sneak attack" and "infamous behavior", confirmed that the effect on American morale had been the opposite of intended.[24]
The first Prime Minister of Japan during World War II, Hideki Tōjō later wrote, "When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven."
Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States, "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?" [25]
Revisionism controversies[edit]



 Some exhibits of Yasukuni Yusyukan have been criticised because of justification of Attack on Pearl Harbor
There are some revisionists in Japan who claim that the Attack on Pearl Harbor was a legitimate attack. These historical perspectives are often claimed by Japanese Shintoist and nationalists and have been criticized from both inside and outside of Japan.
An exhibit at the Yasukuni Shrine Museum (Yūshūkan) asserts that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a trick by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and denies that Japan committed any atrocities.[26][27][28]
In 2006, Henry Hyde, chairman of the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to House Speaker Dennis Hastert on April 26 to show concern about Junichiro Koizumi visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He pointed out that this Shrine honors Hideki Tōjō and other convicted Class-A war criminals who were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack.[29]
In May 2007, the Japan Ministry of Education distributed an animated DVD "Hokori" (Pride) which was created by Junior Chamber International Japan (JC). Japanese Communist Party diet member Yuko Ishii introduced and criticized it to the House of Representatives of Japan in May 17, revealed that its contents admiring Class-A war criminals and make main character 'Yuta' talk to his girlfriend 'Kokoro' that purpose of Attack on Pearl Harbor was a "self-defense attack" and "Asia colonial liberation" against American imperialism.[30]
In October 31, 2008, Toshio Tamogami, former chief of staff of Japan's Air Self-Defense Force, published an essay which argued that Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had allegedly been manipulated by the Comintern, drew Japan into the attack on Pearl Harbor. Following the essay's publication, Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada removed Tamogami from his post and ordered him to retire, since the essay's viewpoint contradicted the government position.[31][32] Tamogami, on November 3, 2008 confirmed that the essay accurately expressed his views on the war and Japan's role in it.[33]
Analysis[edit]



 Posters like Allen Saalberg's strengthened American resolve against the Axis powers
Tactical implications[edit]
The attack was notable for its considerable destruction, as putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both navies and by most military observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan. Influenced by the earlier Battle of Taranto, which pioneered the all-aircraft naval attack but resulted in far less damage and casualties, the Japanese struck against Pearl Harbor on a much larger scale than did the British at Taranto.[34]
The attack was a great shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater, and it was initially believed Pearl Harbor changed the balance of power, similar to how Taranto did the Mediterranean, both in the attackers' favor. Three days later, with the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malaya, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill exclaimed, "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked."[35]
However, Pearl Harbor did not have as crippling an effect on American operations as initially thought. Unlike the close confines of the Mediterranean, the vast expanses of the Pacific limited the tactical value of battleships as a fleet in being. Furthermore, unlike new fast battleships such as the Iowa class, the slow battleships were incapable of operating with carrier task forces, so once repaired they were relegated to delivering pre-invasion bombardments during the island hopping offensive against Japanese-held islands. These Pearl Harbor veterans were later part of a force that defeated IJN battleships at the Battle of Surigao Strait, an engagement very lopsided in the USN's favor in any case.[36][37] A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. Seeing the decimation of battleships at the hands of aircraft, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened, only committing a handful to the forefront of the Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal.
One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American aircraft carriers stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: Enterprise was returning from Wake, Lexington from Midway, and Saratoga was under refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Had Japan sunk the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—particularly the large numbers under construction of the U.S. Navy's Essex-class aircraft carriers, eleven of which had been ordered before the attack—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance.



 Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. Legend:
   Kido Butai
  USS Enterprise (CV-6)
  USS Lexington (CV-2)
Battleships[edit]
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships Arizona, Oklahoma, and the old battleship Utah (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from Arizona. The majority of each battleship's crews survived; there were exceptions as heavy casualties resulted from Arizona's magazine exploding and the Oklahoma capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships California, West Virginia and Nevada. California and West Virginia had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved. Maryland and Tennessee suffered relatively light damage, as did Pennsylvania, which was in drydock at the time.
Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (up to twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately restored to duty.[38] This was also the reaction of Joseph Rochefort, head of HYPO, when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price.
Many of the surviving battleships were extensively refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5"/51 caliber guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose 5"/38 caliber guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality.[39] Addition of modern radar to the salvaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over those of the IJN.[36][37]
The repaired U.S. battleships primarily provided fire support for amphibious landings. Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the Pacific, for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatants. Six of the Standard Type vessels participated in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history, the Battle of Surigao Strait, where none of them were hit. During active duty, being well protected by escorts and air cover, none of the Pearl Harbor battleships suffered serious damage save for Pennsylvania which was permanently crippled by a torpedo in the closing stages of the war.
Carriers[edit]
The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to sight, or destroy, any of the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers; they had been designated as primary targets along with the battleships.[40] The carriers Lexington and Enterprise were ferrying additional fighters to American bases on the islands of Wake and Midway.[41] At the time of the Japanese attack, the US was expecting imminent war with Japan, beginning in any of several places, such as the Philippines or Allied bases in Borneo.[42] Nagumo's hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the attack plan, and of the fact he was a gunnery officer, not an aviator. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing battleships first in importance, reflected an out-of-date Mahanian doctrine, and an inability to extrapolate from history, given the damage German submarines did to British trade in World War I. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring and apparent success.[43]
Cruisers, essential to carrier task forces later in the war, had been considered tertiary targets and only three suffered damage. Of 27 destroyers present, only two were lost: Cassin and Downes were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining their original names, while Shaw was raised and returned to service.
Shore installations[edit]
Tank farms, containing 140 million U.S. gallons (530 million liters) of bunker oil, were unscathed, providing a ready source of fuel for American fleets at the submarine base. About this missed opportunity, Admiral Chester Nimitz would later say, "Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years."[44] These were vital to the initial phase of the war, and to commerce raiding throughout, and illustrate the deficiencies of Japanese planning for the attack. The Navy Yard, critical to ship maintenance, and repair of ships damaged in the attack was untouched. The engineering and initial repair shops, as well as the torpedo store, were intact. Other items of base infrastructure and operation, such as power generation, continued to operate normally. Also critical to the way the Pacific War was actually fought was the cryptanalysis unit, Station HYPO, located in the basement of the old Administration Building. It was undamaged and even benefited by gaining staff from unemployed ship's bands.[45]
The Army Air Force's loss of aircraft must be balanced against the fact that many of them were obsolete, such as the P-40's predecessor, the P-36. Japan might have achieved a good deal more with not much additional effort or loss.[46]
Charts[edit]



Capital ships prior to attack[47]

Location
Battleships
Aircraft carriers

US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg United States US flag 48 stars.svg

Atlantic 6 (+2*) 4 (+1*)
Pacific 9 3
Japan Empire of Japan Japan

Pacific 10 (+1*) 9
*Plus ships completed but not yet commissioned.
 US: North Carolina, Washington and Hornet
 Japan: Yamato

Capital ships after attack

Location
Battleships
Aircraft carriers

US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg United States US flag 48 stars.svg

Atlantic 6 (+2*) 4 (+1*)
Pacific 1 (+6**) 3
Japan Empire of Japan Japan

Pacific 10 (+1*) 9
**Ships which can be repaired:
California,West Virginia, Nevada, Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania.

Capital ships 12/1942

Location
Battleships
Aircraft carriers

US Naval Jack 48 stars.svg United States US flag 48 stars.svg

Atlantic 4 1
Pacific 12 (+3**) 3
Japan Empire of Japan Japan

Pacific 10 6
**Ships which can be repaired:

California,West Virginia, Nevada
 US ships lost:
Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, Hornet
 US ships gained:
Essex, North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama
 Japanese ships lost:
Shoho, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Hiei, Kirishima
 Japanese ships gained: Yamato, Musashi, Junyo, Hiyo.


Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the Coast Guard Cutter Taney and the yard tug USS Hoga. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated museum ships.
Strategic implications[edit]
A common view is that the Japanese fell victim to victory disease because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States, that their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war with the United States relatively lightly, compared to them. For instance, Admiral Yamamoto and General Tadamichi Kuribayashi expressed concerns about the greater industrial power of the United States.
The politics of a "Europe First" strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent loss of the Philippines, meant the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps were unable to play a significant role in the Pacific War for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the major rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of the intention for the attack. Because Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and most British forces were already in Europe, Japan conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the Indian Ocean, without significant interference. The various Japanese advances were a nearly complete tactical success.
In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a grand strategic blunder for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted even success here could not win a war with the United States, because American productive capacity was too large. It spurred the United States into a determination to fight to complete victory. The war resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, the occupation of the home islands (a state never before achieved in Japan's history), and the loss of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to the United States until 1972, while the Soviet Russian re-annexation of the Kurile islands and Sakhalin Island's southern part, and the restoration of Formosa (Taiwan) to the Republic of China, and the loss of Korea have not been reversed to this day.
See also[edit]



Arizona barbette, 2005.Remember Pearl Harbor
Japanese war crimes
List of Japanese spies, 1930-45
Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group
Unrestricted submarine warfare
Attack on Pearl Harbor
Notes[edit]
1.Jump up ^ Silent Victory (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975)
2.Jump up ^ The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1993)
3.Jump up ^ Stokesbury, James L. (1980). A Short History of WWII. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. p. 171. ISBN 0-688-03587-6.
4.Jump up ^ Testimony of John L. DeWitt, 13 April 1943, House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, Part 3, pp. 739-40 (78th Cong. , 1st Sess.), cited in Korematsu v. United States, footnote 2, reproduced at findlaw.com, accessed 13 April 2007
5.Jump up ^ Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II, p257 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York
6.Jump up ^ Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa to the Present, p210, ISBN 0-19-511060-9. OCLC 49704795
7.Jump up ^ Lee Kennett, For the Duration.. . : The United States Goes To War p 141 ISBN 0-684-18239-4
8.Jump up ^ Robert Guillain, I saw Tokyo burning: An eyewitness narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima (J. Murray, 1981). ISBN 0-7195-3862-9
9.^ Jump up to: a b Saburō Kurusu, Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).
10.Jump up ^ Adolf Hitler http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhitler.htm
11.Jump up ^ Peter Grier (December 7, 2011). "Pearl Harbor Day: How did Adolf Hitler react to the attack?". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 2012-09-09.
12.Jump up ^ Hillgruber, Andreas Germany and the Two World Wars, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1981 pages 50-51
13.Jump up ^ Trial transcripts at Nuremberg 11 December 1945. More details of the exchanges at the meeting are available online at nizkor.org
14.Jump up ^ "CANADA DECLARES WAR ON JAPAN". Retrieved 2011-02-28.
15.Jump up ^ Jessup, John E. (1989). A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945-1985. New York: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-24308-5.
16.Jump up ^ Prange 1962, pp. 375–77.
17.Jump up ^ Olson, Lynne (2010). Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood With Britain In Its Darkest, Finest Hour. Random House. ISBN 978-1-58836-982-6.
18.Jump up ^ Churchill, Winston. The Second World War, Vol. 3. p. 539.
19.Jump up ^ Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders & Cover-Ups (Harper Collins, 2001). Clausen suggests creation of CIA solved the problem; the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrate this is far from certain.
20.Jump up ^ Haruko Taya & Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New Press; Reprint edition, 1993). ISBN 1-56584-039-9
21.Jump up ^ Charles Burress, "Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor", Japan Times, July 19, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005);
22.Jump up ^ Burritt Sabin, "The War's Leagacy [sic]: Dawn of a tragic era", Japan Times, February 8, 2004 (accessed June 10, 2005).
23.Jump up ^ Isoroku Yamamoto to Shigeharu Matsumoto (Japanese cabinet minister) and Fumimaro Kondoye (Japanese prime minister), quoted in Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (Vintage, 1985).
24.Jump up ^ Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War, p 232 ISBN 0-07-030612-5
25.Jump up ^ National Geographic mini-biography of Isoroku Yamamoto
26.Jump up ^ "Tokyo shrine a focus of fury around Asia". USA Today. 2005-06-22. Retrieved 2011-11-23.
27.Jump up ^ "A Shrine to Japan’s Tainted Past". The New York Times. 2006-08-05. Retrieved 2011-11-23.
28.Jump up ^ "Lee should avoid Yasukuni". The Japan Times. 2007-06-02. Retrieved 2011-11-23.
29.Jump up ^ "Bid to address Congress has Yasukuni proviso". The Japan Times. 2006-05-17. Retrieved 2011-11-23.
30.Jump up ^ "Brainwashing for justification - Ministry of Education deploying "Yasukuni DVD" -". Shimbun Akahata. 2007-05-18. Retrieved 2011-11-23.
31.Jump up ^ Hongo, Jun, "New ASDF chief Hokazono sorry for Tamogami's 'damaging' essay", Japan Times, 8 November 2008, p. 1.
32.Jump up ^ Hongo, Jun, "Tamogami's cohorts reprimanded", Japan Times, 26 December 2008.
33.Jump up ^ Onishi, Norimitsu, "Japan: New Fallout From Essay On War", New York Times, November 5, 2008, p. 20.
34.Jump up ^ "The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistance naval attaché to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr. Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941." Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed.
35.Jump up ^ "Welcome to the website of the Force Z Survivors Association". forcez-survivors.org.uk. Retrieved 2014-07-11.
36.^ Jump up to: a b Morison, Samuel E. (1956). "Leyte, June 1944 – January 1945". History of United States Naval Operations in World War II XII. Boston: Little & Brown.
37.^ Jump up to: a b Howard (1999).
38.Jump up ^ Gordon Prange, Miracle at Midway, 1983, paperback, p.9
39.Jump up ^ In fact, their rate of fire was too low to deal with aircraft, as experience with kamikaze would demonstrate. Not until the introduction of a fully automatic 3 inch {76 mm} postwar was a suitable solution found.
40.Jump up ^ Japanese Monograph Number 97 Pearl Harbor operation Prepared by Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East from ibiblio.org/pha.
41.Jump up ^ Richard Holmes, The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History (Viking, 1988), p.211.
42.Jump up ^ War warning, dated 27 November 1941 The involvement of numerous units of the Japanese Army and the apparent disposition of IJN forces suggested amphibious operations against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, which was the reason warning cables had been sent to all Pacific commands by both the Navy and War Departments at Washington.
43.Jump up ^ Willmott, op. cit.; Peattie and Evans, op. cit..
44.Jump up ^ [Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and World Power, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991): 326-327.]
45.Jump up ^ Willmott, H.P. (1983), The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0-87021-092-0 ; Blair, op. cit.; Beach, Submarine!; Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets and Undersea Victory.
46.Jump up ^ Caidin, op. cit. and Fork-Tailed Devil (Ballantine, 1968).
47.Jump up ^ Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Pt. 15, p. 1901-06 from http://www.ibiblio.org





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USS Arizona (BB-39)
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For other ships of the same name, see USS Arizona.
Arizona (BB39) Port Bow, Underway - NARA - 5900075 - 1930.jpg
USS Arizona, 1920s

Career


Name: Arizona
Namesake: Arizona
Ordered: 4 March 1913
Builder: Brooklyn Navy Yard
Cost: $16,000,000[1]
Laid down: 16 March 1914
Launched: 19 June 1915
Commissioned: 17 October 1916
Decommissioned: 29 December 1941[2]
Struck: 1 December 1942
Identification: Hull number: BB-39
Fate: Sunk in Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941
General characteristics (as completed)
Class & type: Pennsylvania-class battleship
Displacement:
29,158 long tons (29,626 t) (standard)
31,917 long tons (32,429 t) (deep load)

Length: 608 ft (185.3 m)
Beam: 97 ft (29.6 m)
Draft: 29 ft 3 in (8.9 m) (deep load)
Installed power: 29,366 shp (21,898 kW) (on sea trials)
Propulsion: 4 shafts
 4 sets of Parsons steam turbines
 12 Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers
Speed: 21 knots (39 km/h; 24 mph)
Range: 8,000 nmi (15,000 km; 9,200 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement: 55 officers and 860 men
Armament: 4 × 3 – 14-inch/45 guns
 22 × 1 – 5-inch/51 guns
 4 × 1 – 3-inch/50 AA guns
 2 × 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes
Armor: Belt: 13.5–8 in (343–203 mm)
Bulkheads: 13–8 in (330–203 mm)
Barbettes: 13 in (330 mm)
Turrets: 18 in (457 mm)
Decks: 5 in (127 mm)
Conning tower: 16–14 in (406–356 mm)
USS Arizona was a Pennsylvania-class battleship built for and by the United States Navy in the mid-1910s. Named in honor of the 48th state's recent admission into the union, the ship was the second and last of the Pennsylvania-class of "super-dreadnought" battleships. Although commissioned in 1916, the ship remained stateside during World War I. Shortly after the end of the war, Arizona was one of a number of American ships that briefly escorted President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference. The ship was sent to Turkey in 1919 at the beginning of the Greco-Turkish War to represent American interests for several months. Several years later, she was transferred to the Pacific Fleet and remained there for the rest of her career.
Aside from a comprehensive modernization in 1929–31, Arizona was regularly used for training exercises between the wars, including the annual Fleet Problems (training exercises). When an earthquake struck Long Beach, California, in 1933, Arizona's crew provided aid to the survivors. Two years later, the ship was featured in a Jimmy Cagney film, Here Comes the Navy, about the romantic troubles of a sailor. In April 1940, she and the rest of the Pacific Fleet were transferred from California to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as a deterrent to Japanese imperialism.
During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Arizona was bombed. She exploded and sank, killing 1,177 officers and crewmen. Unlike many of the other ships sunk or damaged that day, Arizona could not be fully salvaged, though the Navy removed parts of the ship for reuse. The wreck still lies at the bottom of Pearl Harbor and the USS Arizona Memorial, dedicated on 30 May 1962 to all those who died during the attack, straddles the ship's hull.


Contents  [hide]
1 Description
2 Construction and trials
3 World War I
4 1920s
5 Modernization
6 1930s
7 Attack on Pearl Harbor 7.1 Magazine explosion
7.2 Awards and recognition
8 Salvage and memorial 8.1 Arizona memorials
9 See also
10 Notes 10.1 Footnotes
10.2 Citations
11 References
12 Further reading
13 External links

Description[edit]
The Pennsylvania-class ships were significantly larger than their predecessors, the Nevada class. Arizona had an overall length of 608 feet (185.3 m), a beam of 97 feet (29.6 m) (at the waterline), and a draft of 29 feet 3 inches (8.9 m) at deep load. This was 25 feet (7.6 m) longer than the older ships. She displaced 29,158 long tons (29,626 t) at standard and 31,917 long tons (32,429 t) at deep load, over 4,000 long tons (4,060 t) more than the older ships. The ship had a metacentric height of 7.82 feet (2.4 m) at deep load.[3]
The ship had four direct-drive Parsons steam turbine sets, each of which drove a propeller 12 feet 1.5 inches (3.7 m) in diameter.[4] They were powered by twelve Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers.[3] The turbines were designed to produce a total of 34,000 shaft horsepower (25,000 kW), but only achieved 33,376 shp (24,888 kW) during Arizona's sea trials, when she met her designed speed of 21 knots (39 km/h; 24 mph).[5] However, she did manage to reach 21.5 knots (39.8 km/h; 24.7 mph) during a full-power trial in September 1924.[6] She was designed to normally carry 1,548 long tons (1,573 t) of fuel oil, but had a maximum capacity of 2,305 long tons (2,342 t). At full capacity, the ship could steam at a speed of 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph) for an estimated 7,552 nautical miles (13,990 km; 8,690 mi) with a clean bottom. She had four 300-kilowatt (402 hp) turbo generators.[3]
Arizona carried twelve 45-caliber 14-inch guns in triple gun turrets.[3] The turrets were numbered from I to IV from front to rear. The guns could not elevate independently and were limited to a maximum elevation of +15° which gave them a maximum range of 21,000 yards (19,000 m).[7] The ship carried 100 shells for each gun. Defense against torpedo boats was provided by twenty-two 51-caliber five-inch guns mounted in individual casemates in the sides of the ship's hull. Positioned as they were they proved vulnerable to sea spray and could not be worked in heavy seas.[8] At an elevation of 15°, they had a maximum range of 14,050 yards (12,850 m).[9] Each gun was provided with 230 rounds of ammunition.[3] The ship mounted four 50-caliber three-inch guns for anti-aircraft defense, although only two were fitted when completed. The other pair were added shortly afterward on top of Turret III.[10] Arizona also mounted two 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes and carried 24 torpedoes for them.[3]



Arizona's launch, 19 June 1915
The Pennsylvania-class design continued the all-or-nothing principle of armoring only the most important areas of the ship begun in the Nevada-class. The waterline armor belt of Krupp armor measured 13.5 inches (343 mm) thick and only covered the ship's machinery spaces and magazines. It had a total height of 17 feet 6 inches (5.3 m), of which 8 feet 9.75 inches (2.7 m) was below the waterline; beginning 2 feet 4 inches (0.7 m) below the waterline, the belt tapered to its minimum thickness of 8 inches (203 mm).[3] The transverse bulkheads at each end of the ship ranged from 13 to 8 inches in thickness. The faces of the gun turrets were 18 inches (457 mm) thick while the sides were 9–10 inches (229–254 mm) thick and the turret roofs were protected by 5 inches (127 mm) of armor. The armor of the barbettes was 18 to 4.5 inches (457 to 114 mm) thick. The conning tower was protected by 16 inches (406 mm) of armor and had a roof eight inches thick.[11]
The main armor deck was three plates thick with a total thickness of 3 inches (76 mm); over the steering gear the armor increased to 6.25 inches (159 mm) in two plates. Beneath it was the splinter deck that ranged from 1.5 to 2 inches (38 to 51 mm) in thickness.[12] The boiler uptakes were protected by a conical mantlet that ranged from 9 to 15 inches (230 to 380 mm) in thickness.[11] A three-inch torpedo bulkhead was placed 9 feet 6 inches (2.9 m) inboard from the ship's side and the ship was provided with a complete double bottom. Testing in mid-1914 revealed that this system could withstand 300 pounds (140 kg) of TNT.[12]
Construction and trials[edit]
The keel of battleship number 39 was laid on the morning of 16 March 1914 with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt in attendance.[13] The builders intended to set a world-record ten months between the ship's keel-laying and launch,[14] for what The New York Times declared would be "...the world's biggest and most powerful, both offensively and defensively, superdreadnought ever constructed",[15] but the ship was only a little over half complete a year later.[16] She was launched on 19 June 1915, making it about fifteen months from keel-laying to launch. In the meantime, the ship was named after the newest state in the union by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.[17]



Arizona on the East River, New York City (1916)
The New York Times estimated that 75,000 people attended the launch, including John Purroy Mitchel, the mayor of New York City, George W. P. Hunt, the governor of Arizona, and many high-ranking military officials. Several warships were also nearby, including many of the new dreadnoughts which had already entered service (Florida, Utah, Wyoming, Arkansas, New York, and Texas). Esther Ross, the daughter of an Arizona pioneer family, was given the honors of ship sponsor and christening. To acknowledge a ban on alcohol recently passed by the state legislature, the state's governor decided that two bottles would be used: one full of sparkling wine from Ohio, and another filled with water from the Roosevelt Dam. After the launch, Arizona was towed to the Brooklyn Navy Yard for fitting-out.[18]
Arizona was commissioned into the Navy on 17 October 1916 with John D. McDonald as captain.[19] She departed New York on 10 November 1916 after the crew had cleaned the ship and the propulsion system had been tested at the dock.[20] After declinating the ship's magnetic compasses, the ship sailed south for her shakedown cruise. Outside Guantanamo Bay, a stripped turbine on 7 December forced the navy to order Arizona back to New York for repairs, although she was able to enter Chesapeake Bay to test her main and secondary gun batteries on 19–20 December. The turbine could not be repaired inside the ship, so the yard workers had to cut holes in the upper decks to lift the damaged casing out. It was reinstalled after almost four months of repairs at the naval yard.[21]
World War I[edit]



Arizona at the New York City naval review, leading ten dreadnoughts that paraded past Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
Arizona left the yard on 3 April 1917,[22] and three days later, the United States declared war on Germany. Assigned to Battleship Division 8 operating out of the York River,[22][23] Arizona was only employed as a gunnery training ship for the crewmen on armed merchant vessels crossing the Atlantic in convoys. Shortly after the war began, eight of her 5-inch guns (the four guns furthest forward and the sternmost four guns) were removed to equip merchant ships. When the ship sailed near the wreck of the old San Marcos (ex-Texas), the wreck was sometimes used as a target for the 14-inch guns. Arizona rarely ventured into the ocean for fear of U-boats, and when she did, it was only in the company of other battleships and escort ships. Four coal-fired American dreadnoughts were eventually sent across the Atlantic in December 1917 as Battleship Division Nine, but Arizona was not among them, as it was easier to obtain coal than oil in the United Kingdom. Life for Arizona's crew was not all training as the race-boat team from Arizona was able to win the Battenberg Cup in July 1918 by beating the team from Nevada by three lengths over the three-mile course.[24]
The fighting ended on 11 November 1918 with an armistice. A week later, the ship left the United States for the United Kingdom, arriving on 30 November 1918.[22] After two weeks berthed at Portland Harbor, Arizona sailed for France.[25] On 13 December 1918, Arizona joined nine battleships and twenty-eight destroyers escorting President Woodrow Wilson on the ocean liner George Washington into Brest for one day on Wilson's journey to the Paris Peace Conference.[26] The ten battleships departed France the next day,[27] taking less than two weeks to cross the Atlantic, and arrived in New York on 26 December to parades, celebrations, and a full naval review by Secretary Daniels. Arizona was the first in line and rendered a nineteen-gun salute to Daniels. Along with many of the other members of the recently returned fleet, she was anchored off New York City for the next several weeks and open to the public.[28]
1920s[edit]
Arizona sailed from New York for Hampton Roads, where she arrived on 22 January, and she continued south to Guantanamo Bay not long after, arriving on 8 February.[22] The time in Caribbean waters was mostly used in training for battles and fleet maneuvering, although it included a liberty visit to Port of Spain. In April, Arizona's crew won the Battenberg Cup rowing competition for the second straight year before the ship was deployed to France once again to escort President Wilson back to the United States. While the ship was awaiting Wilson's departure, she was redeployed to Smyrna (now Izmir) in Turkey in response to tensions between Greece and Italy over the awarding of Smyrna to Greece in the Paris Peace Treaty.[29] The Greek and Italian governments had each deployed a major warship to the area (Georgios Averof and Caio Duilio, respectively) to enforce their interests. Shortly after Arizona arrived, Greek ground forces arrived in transports and were off-loaded in the port. The resultant chaos in the city caused many American citizens in the area to seek shelter on board Arizona.[30]
When the crisis abated, Arizona was ordered to Constantinople (now Istanbul) before she sailed for home on 15 June. She put into the New York Navy Yard on 30 June for an overhaul, where six 5-inch guns were removed and the fire control system was modernized. Work was completed in January 1920 and the battleship sailed south to Guantanamo Bay for crew training. During this time, Arizona was fitted with a flying-off platform similar to the one given to Texas in March 1919. In April, Arizona lost the Battenberg Cup to Nevada, and in June she was present for the Naval Academy's graduation ceremonies. In August she became the flagship of Battleship Division Seven, although it was only later in 1920 that the battleship was refitted to be an admiral's flagship.[31]



Arizona with ship's complement (1924)
In company with six battleships and eighteen destroyers, Arizona was sent south again to transit the Panama Canal in January 1921. After meeting up with the Pacific Fleet, Arizona continued on to Peru for a week before the two fleets combined to practice battle maneuvers. After a short return to the Atlantic, which included an overhaul in New York, Arizona returned to Peru in the summer before she began operating from her new home port of San Pedro, California, part of Los Angeles, where she was based until 1940.[22][32]
For the rest of the 1920s, Arizona's service consisted of routine training exercises. Naval historian Paul Stillwell remarked that "the Pacific years included a great deal of sameness and repetition", and his chronology of the ship's movements is filled with phrases like "torpedo-defense practice", "battle-practice rehearsal", "gunnery practice", "en route to…", and "anchored at…".[33] A recurring theme in these years were the annual Fleet Problems, which began in 1923 and simulated large fleet actions by having most of the active fleet face off against each other. The first two simulated an attack on the Panama Canal from the west, while in 1925 they attempted to defend the Hawaiian Islands. Other 1920s Fleet Problems included the Caribbean, near Central America, the West Indies, and Hawaii. On 27 July 1923 the ship joined President Warren G. Harding's naval review in Seattle. Harding died just one week later, and Arizona joined the Pacific Fleet to fire a salute in his honor on 3 August.[22][34]
Modernization[edit]
Four months after Fleet Problem IX in January 1929, Arizona was modernized at the Norfolk Navy Yard.[22] New tripod masts, surmounted by three-tiered fire-control directors for the main and secondary armament, replaced the old hyperboloid cage masts; the number of 5-inch (130 mm) guns was reduced to 12 and the guns re-positioned one deck higher, and eight 25-caliber 5-inch anti-aircraft guns replaced the 3-inch (76 mm) guns with which she had been originally equipped. The ship's main gun turrets were modified to increase the maximum elevation of their guns to 30°.[35] The compressed-air catapult on the quarterdeck was replaced by one that used black powder.[36] Her deck armor was increased by the addition of a 1.75-inch (44 mm) thickness of Special Treatment Steel and the ship was bulged to protect her from torpedoes. An additional bulkhead was added to the sides of the boiler rooms for the same purpose. Arizona's machinery was almost entirely replaced; her high-pressure turbines were replaced by more powerful geared turbines from the cancelled battleship Washington and six new boilers replaced her originals. Their additional power offset the ship's increased displacement as demonstrated during her sea trials; Arizona made 20.7 knots (38.3 km/h; 23.8 mph) with 35,081 shp (26,160 kW) at a displacement of 37,654 long tons (38,258 t).[35]
1930s[edit]



Arizona after her modernization during the 1930s
On 19 March 1931, even before Arizona was put through post-modernization sea trials, she hosted President Herbert Hoover for a brief vacation in the Caribbean. The President visited Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Returning on 29 March, Arizona conducted her sea trials at Rockland, Maine, and had another catapult fitted on the top of Turret III, before she was transferred to the West Coast in August with her sister Pennsylvania. In February 1932, the ship participated in Fleet Problem XIII in which carrier aircraft successfully attacked Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, 7 February. After returning to the West Coast from Fleet Problem XIV in 1933, the ship was anchored in San Pedro when an earthquake struck nearby Long Beach, California, on 10 March. Sailors from the ship joined the relief efforts, providing food, treating the injured and providing security from looters.[37]
In early 1934, the ship and her crew were featured in a James Cagney film for Warner Brothers, Here Comes the Navy, which made extensive use of exterior footage as well as on-board location shots. In the early morning of 26 July, Arizona collided with a fishing trawler, Umatilla, that was under tow by another trawler off Cape Flattery. Two men aboard the Umatilla were killed in the collision and the Navy convened a Court of Inquiry to investigate the incident. The court recommended that the ship's captain, Captain MacGillivray Milne, be court-martialed. This took place at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, while the ship was participating in that year's Fleet Problem off the East Coast. Milne was judged guilty and replaced several months later by Captain George Baum after the ship returned to the West Coast. In the meantime, Rear Admiral Samuel W. Bryant assumed command of Battleship Division Two on 4 September, with Arizona as his flagship.[38]
Rear Admiral George Pettengill relieved Bryant on 4 March 1935 and the ship participated in Fleet Problem XVI two months later. Arizona made a port visit to Balboa, Panama, in May 1936 during Fleet Problem XVII. On 8 June, Captain George A. Alexander relieved Baum as captain, and, 15 days later, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch relieved Pettengill. During gunnery practice on 24 July, the combustion gases from one gun of Turret II entered the gun turret, burning one crewman. The turret's sprinkling system was turned on to prevent any powder explosion, but the water leaked into the turret's electrical switchboard and started a small fire that was easily put out. Due to the navy's limited budget, the ship spent most of this period in port as a fuel-saving measure. In Fiscal Year 1936–37, the ship was anchored for 267 days; the following year it was in port for 255 days. The ship spent the rest of her career based on the West Coast or in Hawaii.[39]



Arizona in 1931 after her modernization
On 2 January 1937, Rear Admiral John Greenslade assumed command of Battleship Division Two from Bloch and transferred his flag to the battleship Maryland on 13 April. Rear Admiral Manley Simons, commander of Battleship Division One, transferred his flag to Arizona on 7 August. He was relieved by Rear Admiral Adolphus Wilson on 8 November. Captain Alfred Winsor Brown relieved Baum on 11 December. The ship participated in Fleet Problem XIX off Hawaii in April–May 1938. Captain Brown died in his sleep on 7 September and Captain Isaac C. Kidd assumed command of the ship on 17 September 1938. That same day, Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz assumed command of Battleship Division One. Nimitz was relieved on 27 May 1939 by Rear Admiral Russell Willson.[40]
Arizona's last fleet problem was off Hawaii in April–May 1940. At its conclusion, the United States Pacific Fleet was retained in Hawaiian waters, based at Pearl Harbor, to deter the Japanese.[41] She was overhauled at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, from October 1940 to January 1941. During this refit, her anti-aircraft armament was increased to twelve 5-inch guns, the foundation for a search radar was added atop her foremast, her anti-aircraft directors were upgraded and a platform for four water-cooled .50-inch (12.7 mm) caliber M2 Browning machine guns was installed at the very top of the mainmast. Her last flag change-of-command occurred on 23 January 1941, when Willson was relieved by Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd. Captain Harold C. Train assumed command of the ship on 3 February.[42]
Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh relieved Train on 3 February 1941.[43] The battleship's last training exercise was night-firing in company with the battleships Nevada and Oklahoma, on the night of 4 December. All three ships moored at quays along Ford Island on the following day.[22] On 6 December, the repair ship Vestal came alongside to assist the ship's crew with minor repairs.[44]
Attack on Pearl Harbor[edit]
Main article: Attack on Pearl Harbor



Arizona burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Shortly before 08:00 local time on 7 December 1941, Japanese aircraft from six aircraft carriers struck the Pacific Fleet as it lay in port at Pearl Harbor, and wrought devastation on the warships and the facilities defending Hawaii. On board Arizona, the ship's air raid alarm went off at about 07:55, and the ship went to general quarters soon after. Shortly after 08:00, 10 Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bombers, five each from the carriers Kaga and Hiryū, attacked Arizona. All of the aircraft were carrying 410-millimeter (16.1 in) armor-piercing shells modified into 797-kilogram (1,757 lb) bombs. Flying at an estimated altitude of 3,000 meters (9,800 ft), Kaga's aircraft bombed Arizona from amidships to stern. Soon after, Hiryu's bombers hit the bow area.[45]
The aircraft scored four hits and three near misses on and around Arizona. The near miss off the port bow is believed to have caused observers to believe that the ship had been torpedoed, although no torpedo damage has been found. The sternmost bomb ricocheted off the face of Turret IV and penetrated the deck to detonate in the captain's pantry, causing a small fire. The next forwardmost hit was near the port edge of the ship, abreast the mainmast, probably detonating in the area of the anti-torpedo bulkhead. The next bomb struck near the port rear 5-inch AA gun.[46][Note 1]
Magazine explosion[edit]



Arizona's forward magazines explode in a still from a film made during the attack.
The last bomb hit at 08:06 in the vicinity of Turret II, likely penetrating the armored deck near the ammunition magazines located in the forward section of the ship. While not enough of the ship is intact to judge the exact location, its effects are indisputable: about seven seconds after the hit, the forward magazines detonated in a cataclysmic explosion, mostly venting through the sides of the ship and destroying much of the interior structure of the forward part of the ship. This caused the forward turrets and conning tower to collapse downward some 25–30 feet (7.6–9.1 m) and the foremast and funnel to collapse forward.[48] The explosion killed 1,177 of the 1,512 crewmen on board at the time, over half of the lives lost during the attack.[22] It touched off fierce fires that burned for two days; debris showered down on Ford Island in the vicinity. The blast from this explosion also put out fires on the repair ship Vestal, which was moored alongside.[49]
Two competing theories have arisen about the cause of the explosion. The first is that the bomb detonated in or near the black powder magazine used for the ship's saluting guns and catapult charges. This would have detonated first and then ignited the smokeless powder magazines which was used for the ship's main armament. A 1944 Navy Bureau of Ships report suggests that a hatch leading to the black powder magazine was left open, possibly with flammable materials stocked nearby. The Naval History & Heritage Command explained that black powder might have been stockpiled outside the armored magazine.[50] The alternative explanation is that the bomb penetrated the armored decks and detonated directly inside one of the starboard magazines for the main armament, but smokeless powder is relatively difficult to detonate. Thus the 14-inch powder bags required a black powder pad to quickly ignite the powder. The time elapsed from the bomb hit to the magazine explosion was shorter than experience suggested burning smokeless powder required to explode.[51] It seems unlikely that a definitive answer to this question will ever be found, as the surviving physical evidence is insufficient to determine the cause of the magazine explosion.[48][52]
Awards and recognition[edit]
After the attack, several sailors received medals for their conduct and actions under fire. Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Fuqua, the ship's damage control officer, earned the Medal of Honor for his cool-headedness while quelling fires and getting survivors off the ship. Posthumous awards of the Medal of Honor also went to Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, the first flag officer killed in the Pacific war, and to Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, who reached the bridge and was attempting to defend his ship when the bomb that hit the ammunition magazines destroyed her.[53] The ship herself was awarded one battle star for her service in World War II.[22]
Salvage and memorial[edit]



 The visible superstructure of Arizona after her sinking
Arizona was placed "in ordinary" (declared to be temporarily out of service)[54] at Pearl Harbor on 29 December, and was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 1 December 1942. She was so badly damaged by the magazine explosion that she was not thought fit for service even if she could be salvaged, unlike many of the other sunken ships nearby.[55] Her surviving superstructure was scrapped in 1942, and her main armament was salvaged over the next year and a half.[56] The aft main gun turrets were removed and reinstalled as United States Army Coast Artillery Corps Battery Arizona at Kahe Point on the west coast of Oahu and Battery Pennsylvania on the Mokapu Peninsula, covering Kaneohe Bay at what is now Marine Corps Base Hawaii. This battery, known as Battery Pennsylvania, fired its guns for the first and last time on V-J Day in August 1945 while training, while the nearby Battery Arizona was never completed.[57] Both forward turrets were left in place, although the guns from Turret II were salvaged and later installed on the battleship Nevada in the fall of 1944 after having been straightened and relined.[58] Nevada later fired these same guns against the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Iwo Jima.[22]
Arizona memorials[edit]
Main article: USS Arizona Memorial
It is commonly—but incorrectly—believed that Arizona remains perpetually in commission, like the USS Constitution.[59] Arizona is under the control of the National Park Service, but the U.S. Navy still retains the title.[2] Arizona retains the right, in perpetuity, to fly the United States flag as if she were an active, commissioned naval vessel.[59]



 Aerial view of the USS Arizona Memorial, showing the wreck and oil seepage from the ship's bunkers
The wreck of Arizona remains at Pearl Harbor to commemorate the men of her crew lost that December morning in 1941. On 7 March 1950, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet at that time, instituted the raising of colors over her remains.[60] Legislation during the administrations of presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy resulted in the designation of the wreck as a national shrine in 1962. A memorial was built across the ship's sunken remains, including a shrine room listing the names of the lost crew members on a marble wall. The national memorial was administratively listed on the National Register of Historic Places on 15 October 1966. The ship herself was designated a National Historic Landmark on 5 May 1989.[61] Upon their death, survivors of the attack may have their ashes placed within the ship, among their fallen comrades. Veterans who served aboard the ship at other times may have their ashes scattered in the water above the ship.[62]
While the superstructure and two of the four main gun turrets were removed, the barbette of one of the turrets remains visible above the water.[59] Seventy-two years after her sinking, oil still leaks from the hull, with more than 2.3 quarts (2.18 l) escaping into the harbor per day.[63] The Navy, in conjunction with the National Park Service, has recently overseen a comprehensive computerized mapping of the hull, being careful to honor its role as a war grave.[64] The Navy is considering non-intrusive means of abating the continued leakage of oil to avoid the further environmental degradation of the harbor.[65]
One of the original Arizona bells now hangs in the University of Arizona Student Union Memorial Center bell tower. The bell is rung after every home football victory.[66] A mast and anchor from Arizona are in Wesley Bolin Memorial Plaza just east of the Arizona state capitol complex in downtown Phoenix, Arizona.[67] Other artifacts from the ship, such as items from the ship's silver service, are on permanent exhibit in the Arizona State Capitol Museum.[68]
See also[edit]

Portal icon Battleships portal
List of the largest artificial non-nuclear explosions
Notes[edit]

Footnotes[edit]
1.Jump up ^ The preliminary damage report, filed on 28 January 1942, listed seven bomb hits as well one torpedo hit on the port bow forward. This last hit was based on a report from the captain of the repair ship Vestal moored alongside and could not be verified at the time. One bomb was thought to have gone down the stack, but this was contradicted when the ship's superstructure was salvaged in 1942 and the funnel cap was found to be intact.[47]
Citations[edit]
1.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 11–12.
2.^ Jump up to: a b "Arizona (BB 39)". Naval Vessel Registry. 30 August 2001. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
3.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Friedman, p. 440.
4.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 360.
5.Jump up ^ Breyer, p. 214.
6.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 305.
7.Jump up ^ Wright, pp. 66, 123, 285.
8.Jump up ^ Friedman, pp. 116, 440.
9.Jump up ^ Campbell, p. 136.
10.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 19.
11.^ Jump up to: a b Stillwell, p. 359.
12.^ Jump up to: a b Friedman, pp. 115, 118, 440.
13.Jump up ^ "Lay Keel of Navy's New Dreadnought." The New York Times. 17 March 1914.
14.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 3–5.
15.Jump up ^ "Two Best Warships to be Built for US." The New York Times. 13 July 1913.
16.Jump up ^ "Arizona Launching Here in Early June." The New York Times. 21 March 1915.
17.Jump up ^ "50,000 to witness Arizona launching." The New York Times. 13 June 1915.
18.Jump up ^ "Arizona Afloat as 75,000 Cheer." The New York Times. 20 June 1915.
19.Jump up ^ "The Mighty Arizona Now a Part of Navy." The New York Times. 18 October 1918.
20.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 14–15.
21.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 16–21.
22.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k NH&HC, "Arizona"
23.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 21–22.
24.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 22–31.
25.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 36–37.
26.Jump up ^ "Fleet Met Wilson Before Daylight." The New York Times. 14 December 1918.
27.Jump up ^ "Battleship Fleet sails for New York." The New York Times. 15 December 1918.
28.Jump up ^ "Ovation to Sea Fighters." The New York Times. 26 December 1918.
29.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 41–43.
30.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 44–45.
31.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 45, 48, 51, 56–57.
32.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 61, 64, 66–68.
33.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 69, 300–14.
34.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 74, 303.
35.^ Jump up to: a b Friedman, pp. 197, 201.
36.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 111.
37.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 112–20, 124, 128–29.
38.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 133–42, 183, 185, 321.
39.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 190–91, 196, 322–31.
40.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 324–30.
41.Jump up ^ Wohlstetter, pp. 80–81
42.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 217, 330–31.
43.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 331.
44.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 228.
45.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 274–76.
46.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 273–75.
47.Jump up ^ Reproduced in Wright, pp. 275–76.
48.^ Jump up to: a b Stillwell, pp. 277–78.
49.Jump up ^ Prange, pp. 513–14.
50.Jump up ^ "Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December 1941, USS Arizona during the Pearl Harbor Attack". Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved 26 August 2010.
51.Jump up ^ Wright, pp. 287–88, 60–61
52.Jump up ^ Friedman, p. 6.
53.Jump up ^ Stillwell, pp. 267–68.
54.Jump up ^ "History of USS Utah". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. Retrieved 26 August 2010.[dead link]
55.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 279.
56.Jump up ^ Wright, pp. 78, 80.
57.Jump up ^ Lewis, E. R.; Kirchner, D. P. (1992). "The Oahu Turrets". Warship International (Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization) XXIX (2): 289, 299. ISSN 0043-0374.
58.Jump up ^ Wright, pp. 80, 84, 88.
59.^ Jump up to: a b c "History and Culture". National Park Service. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
60.Jump up ^ Stillwell, p. 281.
61.Jump up ^ "USS ARIZONA Wreck". National Park Service. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
62.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Interments". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. 18 December 2007. Retrieved 16 November 2011.[dead link]
63.Jump up ^ "Baseline Environmental Data Collection". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. 18 December 2007. Retrieved 16 November 2011.[dead link]
64.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Preservation Project". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. 18 December 2007. Retrieved 16 November 2011.[dead link]
65.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Preservation Project FAQ". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. 18 December 2007. Retrieved 16 November 2011.[dead link]
66.Jump up ^ "U.S.S. Arizona Bell". University of Arizona. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
67.Jump up ^ "Phoenix, Arizona – USS Arizona Anchor and Mast". Roadside America.com. 15 July 2011. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
68.Jump up ^ "Flagship of the Fleet: Life and Death of the USS Arizona". Current Exhibits. Arizona Capitol Museum. Retrieved 22 May 2008.[dead link]
References[edit]
Breyer, Siegfried (1973). Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905–1970. Garden City, New York: Doubleday. OCLC 702840.
Campbell, John (1985). Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-459-4.
Friedman, Norman (1985). U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-715-1.
"Arizona". Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Naval History & Heritage Command (NH&HC). 9 November 2004. Retrieved 20 November 2011.
Prange, Gordon (1981). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-14-015734-4. OCLC 48171319.
Stillwell, Paul (1991). Battleship Arizona: An Illustrated History. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-023-8. OCLC 2365447.
Wohlstetter, Roberta (1962). Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. OCLC 269470.
Wright, Christopher C, ed. (Mar 2002). "The US Navy's Study of the Loss of the Battleship Arizona". Warship International (Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization). XXXIX–XL (3–4, 1): 44–105, 247–99, 360–80. ISSN 0043-0374.
Further reading[edit]
Gardiner, Robert; Gray, Randal (1985). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1906–1921. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-87021-907-3.
Hone, Thomas C; Hone, Trent (2006). Battle Line: The United States Navy 1919–1939. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-378-0. OCLC 62324475.
Jones, Jerry W (1998). U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-411-3. OCLC 37935228.
Madsen, Daniel (2003). Resurrection: Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-488-1.
Raymer, Edward C. (1996). Descent into Darkness: Pearl Harbor, 1941: A Navy Diver's Memoir. Novato, California: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-589-0.
Wallin, Homer N. (1968). Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. ISBN 0-89875-565-4. OCLC 51673398.
External links[edit]
 Wikimedia Commons has media related to USS Arizona (BB-39).
Interactive USS Arizona Memorial Search the memorial for names.
Maritimequest USS Arizona BB-39 photo gallery
USS Arizona (BB-39), 1916–1941—Online Library of Selected Images (US Navy)
Photo gallery of BB-39 USS Arizona Construction – 1918 at NavSource Naval History
Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) No. HI-13, "USS Arizona, Submerged off Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Honolulu County, HI", 5 photos, 4 measured drawings, 2 data pages, 1 photo caption page


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USS Arizona Memorial
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USS Arizona Memorial

IUCN category V (protected landscape/seascape)

USS Arizona Memorial (aerial view).jpg
Location
Pearl Harbor
Nearest city
Honolulu, Hawaii
Coordinates
21°21′54″N 157°57′0″WCoordinates: 21°21′54″N 157°57′0″W
Area
10.50 acres (4.25 ha)
Established
30 May 1962
Visitors
1,556,808 (in 2005)
Governing body
U.S. Navy
National Park Service



 The USS Arizona (BB-39) sunk and burning during the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941
The USS Arizona Memorial, located at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, marks the resting place of 1,102 of the 1,177 sailors and marines killed on the USS Arizona (BB-39) during the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 by Japanese imperial forces and commemorates the events of that day. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the island of Oʻahu was the action that led to the United States' direct involvement in World War II.
The memorial, built in 1962, is visited by more than one million people annually.[1] Accessible only by boat, it straddles the sunken hull of the battleship without touching it. Historical information about the attack, shuttle boats to and from the memorial, and general visitor services are available at the associated USS Arizona Memorial Visitor Center, which opened in 1980 and is operated by the National Park Service. The sunken remains of the battleship were declared a National Historic Landmark on 5 May 1989.[2]


Contents  [hide]
1 The Memorial 1.1 Conception and funding
1.2 Design
1.3 Description
1.4 History
2 USS Missouri
3 Visiting the memorial
4 Honors
5 See also
6 References
7 External links

The Memorial[edit]
Conception and funding[edit]
During and following the end of World War II, the Arizona's wrecked superstructure was removed and efforts began to erect a memorial at the remaining submerged hull. The Pacific War Memorial Commission was created in 1949 to build a permanent memorial somewhere in Hawaiʻi. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commander of the Pacific Fleet attached a flag pole to the main mast of the Arizona in 1950 and began a tradition of hoisting and lowering the flag. In that same year a temporary memorial was built above the remaining portion of the deckhouse.[3] Radford requested funds for a national memorial in 1951 and 1952 but was denied because of budget constraints during the Korean War.
The Navy placed the first permanent memorial, a ten-foot-tall basalt stone and plaque, over the mid-ship deckhouse on December 7, 1955.[4] President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the creation of a National Memorial in 1958. Enabling legislation required that the memorial budgeted at US$500,000 be privately financed; however, $200,000 of the memorial cost was actually government subsidized.
Principal contributions[5] to the memorial included:
$50,000 Territory of Hawaiʻi initial contribution in 1958
$95,000 privately raised following a 1958 This Is Your Life television segment featuring Rear Admiral (ret.) Samuel G. Fuqua,[6] Medal of Honor recipient and the senior surviving officer from the USS Arizona
$64,000 from 25 March 1961 benefit concert by Elvis Presley
$40,000 from the sale of plastic models of the Arizona in a partnership between the Fleet Reserve Association and Revell Model Company
$150,000 from federal funds in legislation initiated by Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye in 1961
During planning stages, the ultimate purpose of the memorial was the subject of competing visions. Some were eager to keep it a tribute to the sailors of the Arizona, while others anticipated a dedication to all the war dead of the Pacific theater.[7] In the end, the legislation authorizing and funding the memorial (HR 44, 1961) declared that the Arizona would "be maintained in honor and commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the United States who gave their lives to their country during the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941."[7]
Design[edit]

USS Arizona Memorial.JPG


The national memorial was designed by Honolulu architect Alfred Preis who had been detained at Sand Island at the start of the war as an enemy of the country because of his Austrian birth.[8] The United States Navy specified that the memorial be in the form of a bridge floating above the ship and accommodating 200 people.[citation needed]
The 184-foot (56 m)-long structure has two peaks at each end connected by a sag in the center of the structure. It represents the height of American pride before the war, the sudden depression of a nation after the attack and the rise of American power to new heights after the war. Critics initially called the design a "squashed milk carton".[9]
The architecture of the USS Arizona Memorial is explained by Preis as, "Wherein the structure sags in the center but stands strong and vigorous at the ends, expresses initial defeat and ultimate victory ... The overall effect is one of serenity. Overtones of sadness have been omitted to permit the individual to contemplate his own personal responses ... his innermost feelings."[10]
Description[edit]



"To the Memory of the Gallant Men Here Entombed and their shipmates who gave their lives in action on 7 December 1941, on the U.S.S. Arizona"
— inscription in marble with the names of Arizona's honored dead
There are three main parts to the national memorial: entry, assembly room, and shrine. The central assembly room features seven large open windows on either wall and ceiling, to commemorate the date of the attack. The total number of windows is 21. Rumor says this symbolically represents a 21-gun salute or 21 Marines standing at eternal parade rest over the tomb of the fallen, but guides at the site will confirm that this was not the intention of the architect. The memorial also contains an opening in the floor overlooking the sunken decks. It is from this opening that visitors come to pay their respects by tossing flowers in honor of the fallen sailors. In the past, leis were tossed in the water, but because string from leis poses a hazard to sea life, leis now are placed on guardrails located in front of the names of the fallen.
One of the three 19,585-pound anchors of the Arizona is displayed at the entrance of the visitor center. (One of the other two is at the Arizona State Capitol in Phoenix.) One of the two ship's bells is in the visitor center. (Its twin is in the clock tower of the Student Memorial Center at the University of Arizona in Tucson.)
The shrine at the far end is a marble wall that bears the names of all those killed on the Arizona, protected behind velvet ropes. To the left of the main wall is a small plaque which bears the names of thirty or so crew members who survived the 1941 sinking and chose prior to their death, or whose family chose after their death, to have a canister containing their ashes interred within the wreck by U.S. Navy divers. Any surviving crew members of the Arizona (or their families on their behalf) can elect to have their ashes interred within the wreck.[11]
History[edit]
The USS Arizona Memorial was formally dedicated on 30 May 1962 (Memorial Day) by Texas Congressman and Chairman of Veteran Affairs Olin E. Teague and Hawaiʻi Governor John A. Burns.
It was listed on the National Register of Historic Places on 15 October 1966. While the actual wreck of the USS Arizona was declared a National Historic Landmark in 1989, the memorial itself does not share in this status. Rather, it is listed separately from the wreck on the National Register of Historic Places. The joint administration of the memorial by the United States Navy and the National Park Service was established on 9 September 1980.



 The "tears of the Arizona". Oil slick visible on water's surface above the sunken battleship.
Oil leaking from the sunken battleship can still be seen rising from the wreckage to the surface of the water. This oil is sometimes referred to as "the tears of the Arizona"[12][13] or "black tears."[14] In a National Geographic feature published in 2001, concerns were expressed that the continued deterioration of the Arizona's bulkheads and oil tanks from saltwater corrosion could pose a significant environmental threat from a rupture, resulting in a significant release of oil.[15] The National Park Service states that it has an ongoing program closely monitoring the condition of the submerged vessel.
The Park Service, as part of its Centennial Initiative celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2016, is developing a "mobile park" to tour the continental United States to increase exposure of the park. The mobile park will also collect oral histories of the attack on Pearl Harbor.[16]

USS Missouri[edit]



 The USS Missouri and USS Arizona memorials.
In 1999, the battleship USS Missouri was moved to Pearl Harbor from the United States west coast and docked near, and perpendicular to, the USS Arizona Memorial (parallel to the Arizona). Upon the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, the Japanese surrendered to United States General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, ending World War II. The pairing of the two ships became an evocative symbol of the beginning and end of the United States' participation in the war.
Memorial staff initially criticized the placement of the Missouri, saying the large battleship would "overshadow" the Arizona Memorial. To help guard against this perception Missouri was placed well back of the Arizona Memorial, and positioned in Pearl Harbor in such a way as to prevent those participating in military ceremonies on Missouri's aft decks from seeing the Arizona Memorial. The decision to have Missouri's bow face the Memorial was intended to convey that the Missouri now watches over the remains of the Arizona so that those interred within the Arizona's hull may rest in peace. These measures have helped preserve the individual identities of the Arizona Memorial and the Missouri Memorial, which has improved the public's perception of having both Arizona and Missouri in the same harbor.[17]
Visiting the memorial[edit]



 An observation site with interpretive materials; Battleship Row is in the distance


 65 years after the attack on Pearl Harbor, retired Lieutenant Commander Joseph Langdell, a USS Arizona survivor, recalls the experience at the memorial
The Visitor Center operated by the National Park Service is free to the public and has a museum with exhibits about the Pearl Harbor attack, such as the ship's bell from the USS Arizona. The Pacific Historic Parks Bookstore revenue helps support the museum.[13]
Access to the USS Arizona Memorial is by U.S. Navy boat, for which a numbered ticket, obtained at the Visitor Center and valid for a designated departure time, is required. The memorial is visited by more than one million people annually.[1] Because of the large number of visitors and the limited number of boat departures, the 4,500 tickets available each day are often fully allocated by mid-morning.[18] Before boarding the boat for the short trip to the Memorial, a 23-minute documentary film depicting the attack on Pearl Harbor is presented. Touring of the Memorial is self-guided. The National Park Service Web site provides visitor information, including hours of operation and ticketing advisories.



 USS Arizona and museum (center left) and the Admiral Clarey Bridge
A one-hour audio tour of the Memorial and Center exhibits, narrated by actress Jamie Lee Curtis, is available for rent at the Visitor Center. On the Center's grounds along the shoreline are more exhibits and a "Remembrance Circle". Nearby is the USS Bowfin, a World War II Diesel submarine, which may be toured with separate, paid admission. The battleship USS Missouri and the Pacific Aviation Museum Pearl Harbor may also be visited, but require a bus ride to Ford Island.
Every President of the United States since Franklin D. Roosevelt, and both Emperors Hirohito and Akihito, have visited the site.[citation needed]
Honors[edit]



 Crew of USS Abraham Lincoln (left) manning the rails near the Missouri and the USS Arizona Memorial
Every United States Navy, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine vessel entering Pearl Harbor participates in the tradition of "manning the rails". Personnel serving on these ships stand at attention at the ship's guard rails and salute the USS Arizona Memorial in solemn fashion as their ship slowly glides into port. More recently,[when?] as foreign military vessels are entering Pearl Harbor for joint military exercises, foreign troops have participated in the traditional manning the rails.[citation needed]
The USS Arizona is no longer in commission, but is an active U.S. military cemetery. As a special tribute to the ship and her lost crew, the United States flag flies from the flagpole, which is attached to the severed mainmast of the sunken battleship.[19]
The Arizona memorial is one of the nine major historical sites incorporated into the wide-ranging World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument, established by Congress in 2008 and dedicated on 7 December 2010.[8]

See also[edit]
USS Utah (BB-31) wreck of ship lost at Pearl Harbor and memorial
U.S. Navy museums (and battleship museums)
References[edit]
1.^ Jump up to: a b "Remembering Pearl Harbor: The USS Arizona Memorial". U.S. National Park Service. Archived from the original on 15 March 2008. Retrieved 2008-05-09.
2.Jump up ^ "Arizona, USS (battleship) (shipwreck)". National Historic Landmark summary listing. National Park Service. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
3.Jump up ^ After The Battle magazine, Issue 38
4.Jump up ^ Bergman, p. 37.
5.Jump up ^ Arizona Memorial Museum Association. "Creating the Memorial". AMMA website. Retrieved 2009-10-08.
6.Jump up ^ "Samuel Glenn Fuqua". Recipients, World War II (A-F). Medal of Honor. United States Army Center of Military History. 16 July 2007.
7.^ Jump up to: a b Bergman, Teresa (2013). Exhibiting Patriotism: Creating and Contesting Interpretations of American Historic Sites. Left Coast Press. p. 39. ISBN 9781598745979.
8.^ Jump up to: a b Bergman, p. 36.
9.Jump up ^ By Treena Shapiro (27 May 2002). "Arizona Memorial seen as a dedication to peace". Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
10.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Memorial - History & Culture". National Park Service. 18 September 2006.
11.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Interments". USS Arizona Preservation Project 2004. 18 December 2007. Retrieved 5 December 2011.
12.Jump up ^ Horst Bendzulla. "The Tears of the Arizona". Artist's website. Retrieved 2009-10-08.
13.^ Jump up to: a b Christine Hansen (September–October 2007). "Little Big Store". Hana Hou! Vol. 10, No. 4. Retrieved 2009-10-08.
14.Jump up ^ Tritten, Larry (7 December 2003). "`Black Tears' Still Shed For U.S.S. Arizona". South Florida Sun-Sentinel. Retrieved 28 November 2011.
15.Jump up ^ "Oil and Honor at Pearl Harbor". National Geographic. June 2001. Retrieved 2008-01-02.
16.Jump up ^ Bomar, Mary A. (August 2007). "Summary of Park Centennial Strategies" (PDF). National Park Service. Retrieved 2008-02-15.
17.Jump up ^ Gregg K. Kakesako (15 October 1997). "Will ‘Mighty Mo’ be too much?". Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
18.Jump up ^ "Plan Your Visit (USS Arizona Memorial)". National Park Service. Retrieved 2008-04-04.
19.Jump up ^ "USS Arizona Memorial (National Park Service website)". Retrieved 2010-05-09.
External links[edit]
 Wikimedia Commons has media related to USS Arizona Memorial.
Official website
Interactive USS Arizona Memorial, search the memorial for names
USS Arizona Memorial Museum Association
Battleship Missouri Memorial
Pacific Aviation Museum Pearl Harbor
"Remembering Pearl Harbor:The USS Arizona Memorial", a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan
High resolution, zoomable panorama taken inside the Arizona Memorial
A Memorial Day to Remember
Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) No. HI-13, "USS Arizona, Submerged off Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Honolulu County, HI"


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Categories: IUCN Category V
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