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Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher

Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education

Ethics Without Indoctrination

Engineering Reasoning

Accelerating Change

Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering

Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission

Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship

Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


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Engineering Reasoning
 
This is a work of the US Government and is therefore public domain and not subject to copyright. Citations from Engineering Reasoning are used with the permission of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. Forthcoming in the Engineering Management Journal, and adapted from a paper presented at ASEE, June 2008, where it won ‘Best Conference Papers.’

The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia:
Portaging Leadership Lessons with a Critical Thinking Model

Robert J Niewoehner, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ph.D.
Craig E. Steidle, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy

Abstract
Business schools have long valued case studies as a tool for both broadening a student’s perspective, and provoking them to deeper consideration of complex situations. The challenge with case studies is assuring the portability of the lessons; we don’t expect students to see situations imitating those they’ve studied, hence the goal must instead be habits of mind and principles of action which the student can portage to the circumstances of their professional lives. This paper evaluates the suitability of Richard Paul’s Critical Thinking model as a template for evaluating engineering enterprise thinking habits and organizational behavior, using the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report as a case study. With minor refinement, Paul’s model provides a powerful vocabulary for complicated case study analysis, and that familiarity with the model provides participants with both a mechanism for analysis and a means for portaging lessons to other professional situations and organizations.


Introduction
In 1990, as a novice test pilot, I was privileged to attend the first flight readiness review for Northrop’s YF-23. First flight is a risky event in an airplane program, and several dozen experts from across industry and government scrutinized the test team’s preparation and plans. I had thousands of hours of flying in 25 different airplanes, but amongst these grey-beards I was clearly a novice to the hazards of experimental flight test. I had nothing to contribute, and so much to learn.


While impressed with the test team’s professionalism, I was profoundly impressed by the scope and intensity of the questions posed by the gathered reviewers. Most were questions I would never have thought to pose. During a break, I occasionally asked a reviewer for the motive behind their question. Invariably I heard a story of an airplane damaged, pilot killed, or tragedy narrowly avoided. My three days in the back row provided an accelerated education in risk management. I walked away with rich lessons in the questions I should be prepared to answer as a project pilot, and questions I would later ask as a program leader.
Research in the traits distinguishing experts and novices has noted that experts ask richer questions, questions that are broader, deeper, and more complex, questions that do not balk at obstacles but ferret their way through difficulty [Bransford, 2000]. Novices do not even know what questions to ask, let alone the answers. Furthermore, novices either content themselves with simplistic answers, or suspend their inquiry in the face of complexity. The challenges for engineering leaders include, “How can we help our young engineers more quickly learn to ask more expert questions of themselves and others?” Teach them a model of Critical Thinking.
The analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The intellect requires a voice. Richard Paul and his colleague, Linda Elder, from the Foundation for Critical Thinking, have proposed a critical thinking model documented in various sources [Paul & Elder], including over a dozen Thinkers' Guides that apply this model to diverse disciplines. Their Thinker’s Guide to Engineering Reasoning specifically adapts Paul’s model to the intellectual work of engineers, exemplifying the questions that experienced engineers ask of themselves and others [Paul, 2006].
Specifically, the authors sought to answer the following questions: “Does the Paul model of Critical Thinking provide a beneficial vocabulary and construct for evaluating complex technological case studies?” and, “Does the structure of Paul’s model enhance the portability of the lessons?”
This paper summarizes the Paul model including includes brief discussions of our approach in introducing the Paul model and vocabulary to students. Next, the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report are summarized for those who are not familiar with its contents [Gehman, 2003]. Importantly, we do not seek to re-analyze the CAIB’s findings or recommendations, nor further excoriate those whose mistakes may have contributed to the mishap. We cannot improve on what we regard as a masterful contribution to the literature describing high technology organizations. No, it is instead the Paul model which is under examination. Our question was solely whether the Paul model was adequate to the purpose of opening the CAIB report and its complexities to undergraduate students in ways that they could retain and apply. We’ve used the same approach for in-service engineers and faculty development.


A Critical Thinking Model For Engineering
Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Paul, Niewoehner and Elder apply a model to the way in which engineers think, an architecture whose purpose is aiding the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought.
The analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The model that follows is not unique to engineering; indeed, its real power is its portability, adapting to any domain of life and thought. In so far as an engineer masters the rudimentary skills of critical thinking in the context of engineering, they have really appropriated the skills of life-long learning for whatever domain of learning their professional and personal lives lead them.
We need a definition of Critical Thinking. We are particularly fond of David Moore’s: 
“Critical Thinking is a deliberate meta-cognitive (thinking about thinking) and cognitive (thinking) act whereby a person reflects on the quality of the reasoning process simultaneously while reasoning to a conclusion. The thinker has two equally important goals: coming to a solution and improving the way she or he reasons.” [Moore, 2006, italics in original]


Hence, critical thinking means much more than “Logic.” Metacognition is vital to this definition. “Meta” means above or beyond; hence, metacognition means “thinking that looks back on itself.” 
Consider a modern fighter, a system of systems, each of which is overseen by some microprocessor. Those computers constantly monitor the health of each system. Vital systems, such as flight controls, have up to four duplicate processors working in parallel.  The flight control computers do not simply process the next aileron deflection, they also constantly ask one another, “Do you agree? Are we all healthy?” If one disagrees, it’s “voted off.” These health management technologies have provided much of the astounding improvement in the maintainability of today’s airplanes and automobiles.


Likewise, a robust conception of critical thinking includes not only the process leading from information to a valid conclusion, it must also include the process by which we ask, in parallel, “Is my thinking healthy?”  Critical Thinking simultaneously assesses its own quality. Critical thinking certainly entails logic, but it must also necessarily entail health management for our thinking.
The CAIB report provides engineering leaders with a masterpiece analysis of high technology organizational behavior. In summary comments, the board described NASA as bereft of deliberate meta-cognition.


“NASA is not functioning as a learning organization.”[Gehman, 2003, pg 127]


“[NASA mission managers] were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency. The intellectual curiosity and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was al­most entirely absent. Shuttle managers did not embrace safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this in­stance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and reason.” [Gehman, 2003, pg 181]


A bright, hard-working, dedicated team proved dysfunctional because their organizational culture did not demand that they consciously monitor the health of their own thinking. We may also be leading a bright, hard-working, dedicated, dysfunctional team if we’ve not purposefully taught them how to monitor the health of their thinking. [If our team is high performing, then it’s likely we’ve inadvertently taught them metacognition.]
Figure 1 depicts Paul’s model. The goal, at the bottom, is the mature thinker, whose thinking skills and ethical dispositions act in concert, as evidenced by intellectual traits/virtues. The Elements of Thought comprise the tools by which we analyze intellectual work, our own and others, taking it apart to understand its constituent parts. Intellectual Standards are the criteria against which we evaluate the quality of intellectual work. Specifically, the model identifies the vital questions we should be asking ourselves and others. It’s all about the questions!


Exhibit 1:  Richard Paul’s Critical Thinking Model [adapted from Paul, 2006]
Effective Teams Manifest Intellectual Traits/Virtues


The engineer does not work in isolation, but in the context of enterprises, cultures and communities, each of which represents divergent interests and perspectives. Furthermore, no engineer can claim perfect objectivity; their work is unavoidably influenced by strengths and weaknesses, education, experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and self-interest. They avoid paths they associate with past mistakes and trudge down well worn paths that worked in the past. The profession engineer must cultivate personal and intellectual virtues. The leader must both model and foster these traits with those they lead.


These virtues are not radically distinct from those sought by any maturing thinker, regardless of the discipline. They determine the extent to which we think with insight and integrity, regardless of the subject. The engineering enterprise does however pose distinct questions for the engineer in pursuit of such virtues.
•Intellectual humility admits to ignorance, frankly sensitive to what you know and what you do not know. It implies being aware of your biases, prejudices, self-deceptive tendencies and the limitations of your viewpoint and experience.
•Intellectual courage is the disposition to question beliefs about which we feel strongly. It includes questioning the beliefs of our enterprise culture and any sub-culture to which we belong, and a willingness to express our views even when they are unpopular (with management, peers, subordinates or customers).
•Intellectual empathy is awareness of the need to actively entertain views that differ from our own, especially those with which we strongly disagree. It entails accurately reconstructing others’ viewpoints and to self-consciously reason from premises, assump­tions, and ideas other than our own.
•Intellectual integrity consists in holding ourselves to the same intel­lectual standards you expect others to honor (no double standards).
•Intellectual perseverance is the disposition to work our way through intellectual complexities despite the frustration inherent in the task.
•Confidence in reason is based on the belief that one’s own higher interests and those of humankind at large are best served by giving the freest play to reason. It means using standards of reasonability as the fundamental criteria by which to judge whether to accept or reject any proposition or position.
•Intellectual autonomy is thinking for oneself while adhering to standards of rationality. It means thinking through issues using one’s own thinking rather than uncritically accepting the viewpoints, opinions and judgments of others.
•Fairmindedness is being conscious of the need to treat all viewpoints alike, without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested interests of one's friends, company, community or nation; implies adherence to intellectual standards without reference to one's own advantage or the advantage of one's group.
•Intellectual Curiosity motivates intellectual perseverance (above), and manifests itself as discontentment with unanswered questions. Curiosity does not explicitly appear in Paul’s lists of intellectual virtues, though tacitly lauded in several of Paul and Elder’s papers. We include it here because it explicitly appears in the CAIB report multiple times, and none of the other traits above adequately capture this vital trait.


The intellectual traits/virtues were introduced in a Technical Leadership seminar using a workshop format. Individuals within groups of 3-4 were assigned a trait which they then studied briefly from the Engineering Reasoning Guide [Paul, 2006, pgs 6-8] and then explained to their teammates. Successful rounds of this reciprocal teaching were conducted until the list of traits was covered. Students were then asked to write down a vignette illustrating how they had personally witnessed the positive contribution of one of the traits to a team on which they’d served, and likewise one vignette exemplifying how a deficit in one trait had adversely affected a team. The entire class was then polled to nominate particularly noteworthy stories for the entire class. We’ve conducted similar workshops on this topic in several contexts. By the time they’re twenty, students have no shortage of applicable experiences from which to draw, whether athletic, academic, or extra-curricular, exemplifying virtue’s relevance. Older participants easily recall multiple stories.
All Thinking Builds Upon Eight Fundamental Elements


All thinking entails eight fundamental elements, whether it is about engineering, philosophy, cooking, sports, or business. These eight elements express eight questions that we can pose about any intellectual activity or subject. The eight elements, and their use in analyzing a document, were introduced by asking students to write out the purpose, point of view, data, etc. for the CAIB report [Paul, 2006, pgs 12-13]. These were then discussed Socratically as a class. The below summarizes/paraphrases students’ responses. Note that these questions and this activity work with any topic in any field.


Q- What was the purpose of the CAIB?
A- The CAIB sought to identify the causes of the Columbia’s loss and recommend actions for the resumption of U.S space flight activity.


Q- What questions did the CAIB principally try to answer?
A- What caused the loss of Columbia? What contributory factors may have been present? What actions should NASA and the U.S. government take in the future to reduce the likelihood of future mishaps.


Q- What point of view did the CAIB represent?
A- The CAIB was composed of senior engineers and leaders representing the military, government, academia, and industry. The report acknowledged other points of view, including the NASA workforce and astronaut office, the U.S. Congress, the aerospace industry.


Q- What did the CAIB assume?
A- All accident investigations take for granted that all accidents have causal factors traceable to both physical and cultural factors, and that understanding those factors can lead to improved safety in future operations. Additionally, the failures of complex systems are commonly traced to the complex interaction of many cultural and technological features surrounding that system. From the outset, the CAIB assumed that the answers wouldn’t be simple. Additionally, they assumed that their recommendations would be taken seriously and would form the basis for both a return to flight and the future vitality of U.S. space activities.


Q- What information did the CAIB report?
A- The CAIB report is very expansive in the nature of the information reported. It describes the history of the Space Shuttle Program, including the varying political/budgetary climates in which it was conceived and operated over 30 years time. Additionally, it reports specific technical details of the Columbia’s last flight and data from other previous flights bearing on the incident. It includes detailed transcripts of relevant team interactions (meetings, presentations, email) during the months leading to the accident. It analyzes the results of experiments conducted by the board to better understand the failure mechanism. Finally, the report details over a hundred pertinent “findings” and several dozen recommendations.


Q- What are the most significant concepts upon which the report rests?
A- The span of the report is very, very broad, including U.S. space policy and spending, program management, materials science, organizational behavior, government/contractor relations, flight mechanics, among many others. Particularly important concepts include risk management and accepted risk, failure trees, organizational behavior, safety, and leadership.


Q- What did the CAIB conclude?
A- The CAIB concluded that the shuttle’s loss was directly attributable to a breech in the left wing, caused by foam shed from the external tank during the shuttle’s ascent. That breech allowed a hot jet of air into the left wing’s structure which burned through the structure, causing its failure. Tragically, the loss of foam was acknowledged by NASA as a persistent problem, but not viewed as a threat to an orbiter’s safety. Consequently, the board concluded that the accident was attributable as much to poor organizational and leadership practices, as it was to foam. “It is the view of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that the Columbia accident is not a random event, but rather a product of the Space Shuttle Program’s history and current management processes.”[Gehman, 2003, pg. 21]


Q- What are the implications of the CAIB?
A- The CAIB provided a foundation for the return to shuttle service two years after the publication of their report, reestablishing U.S. confidence in manned space flight, and providing the means for resumption of the International Space Station’s construction.


Engineering Reasoning Applies Intellectual Standards


Universal intellectual standards must be applied to thinking whenever one is interested in checking the quality of reasoning about a problem, issue, or situation. To think professionally as an engineer entails having command of these standards. The standards are not unique to engineering, but are universal to all domains of thinking. They may however have particular meaning or significance which is contextual or disciplinary. While there are a number of universal standards, we focus here on some of the most significant to engineering. Unlike the elements above, this list is not necessarily comprehensive and lists found in Paul’s work do not always agree in detail.

Importantly, participants must be explicitly introduced to the notion of intellectual standards. High school and undergraduate students seem to recognize only two standards: “Did I get the right answer?” and “Am I done?” Defining intellectual standards, and helping students see that they are universal, helps them understand that good intellectual work is characterized by more than the right answer.
Clarity
Clarity is the gateway standard. If a statement is unclear, we cannot determine whether it is accurate or relevant. In fact, we cannot tell anything about it because we don’t yet know what it is saying. "Could you elaborate further on that point?" "Could you express that point in another way?" "Could you give me an illustration or example?"
Accuracy
A statement can be clear but not accurate, as in “Most creatures with a spine are over 300 pounds in weight.” "Is that really true?" "How could we check that?" "How could we find out if that is true?" "What is your confidence in that data?"


Precision
A statement can be both clear and accurate, but not precise, as in “The solution in the beaker is hot.” (We don’t know how hot it is. "Could you give me more details?" "Could you be more specific?") Engineers commonly express precision in quantitative terms associated with the calibration of our instrumentation. We can’t lose sight however that precision is also qualitative, bearing on the precision of our prose.
 Relevance
A statement can be clear, accurate, and precise, but not relevant to the question at issue. A technical report might mention the time of day and phase of the moon at which the test was conducted. This would be relevant if the system under test was a night vision device. It would be irrelevant if it had been a microwave oven. "How is that connected to the question?" "How does that bear on the issue?" 


Depth
A statement can be clear, accurate, precise, and relevant, but superficial. For example, the statement “Radioactive waste from nuclear reactors threatens the environment,” is clear, accurate, and relevant. Nevertheless, it lacks depth because it treats an extremely complex issue superficially. (It also lacks precision.) "How does your analysis address the complexities in the question?"
Breadth
A line of reasoning may be clear, accurate, precise, relevant, and deep, but lack breadth (as in an argument from either of two conflicting theories, both consistent with available evidence). Broad thinking suggests questions such as: "Do we need to consider another point of view?" "Is there another way to look at this question?" "What would this look like from the point of view of a conflicting theory, hypothesis or conceptual scheme?"
Logical Validity
When we think, we bring a variety of thoughts together into some order. The thinking is “logical” when the conclusion follows from the supporting data or propositions. The conclusion is “illogical” when it contradicts proffered evidence, or the arguments fail to cohere." Does this really make sense?" "How does that follow from what you said?" "But before you implied this and now you are saying that, I don’t see how both can be true." 


Fairness
Fairness is particularly at play where either a problem has multiple approaches (conflicting conceptual systems), or conflicting interests among stake-holders. Fairness gives all perspectives a voice, while recognizing that all perspectives may not be accurate or equally valuable.


The following three standards are not found either in Figure 1 above, nor in Paul and Elder’s writing. We have included them in our teaching because they have frequently caught our attention as defects in the work of our undergraduates.


Concision
The days are well past when great oratory meant hours, or great literature necessarily included chapter-long depictions of the field at Waterloo or the implements of the New England Whaling trade. Abraham Lincoln was derided for demeaning the fallen by his brevity at Gettysburg; his partner on the podium later confessed that the President had said more in several minutes than he had said in an hour. Concision does not connote short for brevity’s sake (the sound bite), but rather an economy of thoughts whereby the thinking is deep and significant, and clarity is enhanced by the economy of words and/or images. In the hours building to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, engineers understood the peril faced by launching at extremely low temperatures. Yet, they buried their management in insignificant detail such that their message was missed; their signal was obscured by self-generated noise [Tufte, 1997].


Suitability-
 Suitability applies largely to our written and oral communications, seeking to be “fitting”, “appropriate”, or “suited to the purpose.” Suitability entails selecting right tone and presentation for the audience. It is seldom easy to craft our speech or writing to squarely address the interests, knowledge, and abilities of our audience/readers.


The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report
The general facts surrounding the loss of the space shuttle Columbia on the morning of February 1, 2003, are well known. A piece of insulating foam broke away from the external fuel tank seconds after launch, puncturing the leading edge of the orbiter’s left wing. The crew then spent fifteen days on orbit conducting a host of very successful science experiments, unaware that their spacecraft had been catastrophically damaged. On re-entry, hot gas tore through the interior structure of the wing, leading to wing failure, disintegration of the vehicle, and the death of the crew.


Unfortunately, the board’s findings on organizational behavior have not been as broadly discussed. The technical story is fascinating; the CAIB’s discussion of organizational behavior is heart-rending. The real meat lies here for those who lead or will lead technical organizations, because it’s a tragic story of bright, devoted, hard-working professionals whose leaders allowed the team’s thinking to stray adrift, killing seven of their friends and scattering an irreplaceable national asset across the Southwestern United States. We regard the CAIB report as required reading for all leaders in high technology enterprises not because of what they might learn about the threat of insulating foam to spacecraft, but rather the threat that uncritical thinking poses to even the nation’s most successful, talented and hard-working teams.  We’ll briefly summarize the organizational piece for those unfamiliar with this second most disturbing facet of the Columbia mishap.
The CAIB’s most severe criticism of NASA sprang from their observation of the strong similarity between the loss of Columbia and the loss of Challenger. Neither the loss of foam (Columbia), nor O-ring erosion (Challenger), were new issues; both had been observed on numerous prior flights. In both mishaps, technical team members raised grave concerns about the safety of the mission during the week prior to each orbiter’s loss. In both events, leadership dismissed team member concerns, focused on keeping the schedule, and blithely inferred that past minor issues with O-rings/foam would remain minor. The “echoes of Challenger” led the CAIB to entitle an entire chapter, “History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger.” [Gehman, 2003, pgs. 195ff.] 


Surely in these grand tragedies we have the grist of poignant lessons for future leaders. Our issue as engineering educators and leaders is modeling consideration of the board’s findings in such a way that students can extract lessons about how to think about thinking in organizational contexts, rather than simply reiterating criticism of the actors’ mistakes. We want them to portage worthwhile, generalizable lessons from situation to situation, much as a canoe might be portaged from one body of water to another.


The pages that follow are extracted directly from the CAIB Report, Chapter 6, “Decision Making at NASA.” They summarize a very lengthy section 6.3, “Decision-Making During the Flight of STS-107,” which detailed the substance of multiple meetings and extensive correspondence within and between program teams as decisions were made regarding the condition of Columbia during its final mission. The left column is verbatim from the report; our  italicized remarks are to the right note, with vocabulary from Paul’s model underlined. 
We’ve chosen this section for emphasis because it describes the dysfunction of a specific team, involving small meetings and personal communications, rather than the report’s broader treatment of the dysfunction of an entire agency or U.S. space policy. The team setting is more accessible to the undergraduate who can more readily imagine themselves in a team setting than executive management, and it is for that setting that we seek to first prepare them.


Summary: Mission Management Decision Making [Gehman, 2003, pgs. 166-170]

Discovery and Initial Analysis of Debris Strike


 


In the course of examining film and video images of Columbia’s ascent, the Intercenter Photo Working Group identified, on the day after launch, a large debris strike to the leading edge of Columbia’s left wing. Alarmed at seeing so severe a hit so late in ascent, and at not hav­ing a clear view of damage the strike might have caused, Intercenter Photo Working Group members alerted senior Program managers by phone and sent a digitized clip of the strike to hundreds of NASA personnel via e-mail. These actions initiated a contingency plan that brought together an interdisciplinary group of experts from NASA, Boeing, and the United Space Alliance to analyze the strike. So concerned were Intercenter Photo Working Group personnel that on the day they discovered the debris strike, they tapped their Chair, Bob Page, to see through a request to image the left wing with Department of Defense assets in anticipa­tion of analysts needing these images to better determine potential damage. By the Board’s count, this would be the first of three requests to secure imagery of Columbia on-orbit during the 16-day mission.



Clear recognition of the need for better data.

Upon learning of the debris strike on Flight Day Two, the responsible system area manager from United Space Alliance and her NASA counterpart formed a team to analyze the debris strike in accordance with mission rules requiring the careful examination of any “out-of-fam­ily” event. Using film from the Intercenter Photo Working Group, Boeing systems integration analysts prepared a preliminary analysis that afternoon. (Initial estimates of debris size and speed, origin of debris, and point of impact would later prove remarkably accurate.)



Excellent initial inferences based upon scant preliminary data.
“out-of-family” meant out of NASA’s experience base.

As Flight Day Three and Four unfolded over the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend, en­gineers began their analysis. One Boeing analyst used Crater, a mathematical prediction tool, to assess possible damage to the Thermal Protection System. Analysis predicted tile damage deeper than the actual tile depth, and penetration of the RCC coating at impact angles above 15 degrees. This suggested the potential for a burn-through during re-entry. Debris Assessment Team members judged that the actual damage would not be as severe as predicted because of the inherent conservatism in the Crater model and because, in the case of tile, Crater does not take into account the tile’s stronger and more impact-resistant “densified” layer, and in the case of RCC, the lower density of foam would preclude penetration at impact angles under 21 degrees.



Gut-based judgment replaces engineering analysis. Inaccurate inference based on invalid logic, and unsubstantiated assumptions. (RCC= Reinforced Carbon-Carbon, from which the wing leading edges were made.)

On Flight Day Five, impact assessment results for tile and RCC were presented at an informal meeting of the Debris Assessment Team, which was operating without direct Shuttle Program or Mission Management leadership. Mission Control’s engineering support, the Mission Evalu­ation Room, provided no direction for team activities other than to request the team’s results by January 24. As the problem was being worked, Shuttle managers did not formally direct the actions of or consult with Debris Assessment Team leaders about the team’s assumptions, uncertainties, progress, or interim results, an unusual circumstance given that NASA managers are normally engaged in analyzing what they view as problems. At this meeting, participants agreed that an image of the area of the wing in question was essential to refine their analysis and reduce the uncertainties in their damage assessment.



Unchallenged working assumptions.
Conspicuous lack of intellectual curiosity on the part of leadership.
Some team-members continued to recognize the inadequacy of the data. 

Each member supported the idea to seek imagery from an outside source. Due in part to a lack of guidance from the Mission Management Team or Mission Evaluation Room managers, the Debris Assessment Team chose an unconventional route for its request. Rather than working the request up the normal chain of command – through the Mission Evaluation Room to the Mission Management Team for action to Mission Control – team members nominated Rodney Rocha, the team’s Co-Chair, to pursue the request through the Engineering Directorate at John­son Space Center. As a result, even after the accident the Debris Assessment Team’s request was viewed by Shuttle Program managers as a non-critical engineering desire rather than a critical operational need.





Insufficient clarity regarding the extent of team-member’s discomfort with lack of imagery (data).

When the team learned that the Mission Management Team was not pursuing on-orbit imag­ing, members were concerned. What Debris Assessment Team members did not realize was the negative response from the Program was not necessarily a direct and final response to their official request. Rather, the “no” was in part a response to requests for imagery initiated by the Intercenter Photo Working Group at Kennedy on Flight Day 2 in anticipation of analysts’ needs that had become by Flight Day 6 an actual engineering request by the Debris Assessment Team, made informally through Bob White to Lambert Austin, and formally through Rodney Rocha’s e-mail to Paul Shack. Even after learning that the Shuttle Program was not going to provide the team with imagery, some members sought information on how to obtain it anyway.



Leadership canceled photo requests because:
 a) inaccurate assumptions of the imaging capability,
 b) inaccurate assumptions regarding value of photos
d) unwillingness to disrupt mission to inspect orbiter (confused purpose)
e) inaccurate assumption that rescue was infeasible.
These assumptions were accepted as fact.

Some perseverance displayed by those willing to circumvent bureaucratic obstacles.



Debris Assessment Team members believed that imaging of potentially damaged areas was necessary even after the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting, where they had re­ported their results. Why they did not directly approach Shuttle Program managers and share their concern and uncertainty, and why Shuttle Program managers claimed to be isolated from engineers, are points that the Board labored to understand. Several reasons for this communica­tions failure relate to NASA’s internal culture and the climate established by Shuttle Program management, which are discussed in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8.



Other parts of the report attribute this behavior to lack of intellectual courage on the part of team-members, and lack of empathy on the part of management.


A Flawed Analysis


 


An inexperienced team, using a mathematical tool that was not designed to assess an impact of this estimated size, performed the analysis of the potential effect of the debris impact. Cra­ter was designed for “in-family” impact events and was intended for day-of-launch analysis of debris impacts. It was not intended for large projectiles like those observed on STS-107. Crater initially predicted possible damage, but the Debris Assessment Team assumed, without theoretical or experimental validation, that because Crater is a conservative tool – that is, it pre­dicts more damage than will actually occur – the debris would stop at the tile’s densified layer, even though their experience did not involve debris strikes as large as STS-107’s. Crater-like equations were also used as part of the analysis to assess potential impact damage to the wing leading edge RCC. Again, the tool was used for something other than that for which it was designed; again, it predicted possible penetration; and again, the Debris Assessment Team used engineering arguments and their experience to discount the results.



Inaccurate conclusions based on unjustified extrapolation of assumptions. The tool’s severe predictions were dismissed  not on the basis of logic, but on a history which showed that foam had never previously been a safety of flight issue.

As a result of a transition of responsibility for Crater analysis from the Boeing Huntington Beach facility to the Houston-based Boeing office, the team that conducted the Crater analyses had been formed fairly recently, and therefore could be considered less experienced when com­pared with the more senior Huntington Beach analysts. In fact, STS-107 was the first mission for which they were solely responsible for providing analysis with the Crater tool. Though post-ac­cident interviews suggested that the training for the Houston Boeing analysts was of high quality and adequate in substance and duration, communications and theoretical understandings of the Crater model among the Houston-based team members had not yet developed to the standard of a more senior team. Due in part to contractual arrangements related to the transition, the Hous­ton-based team did not take full advantage of the Huntington Beach engineers’ experience.



A new support team failed to admit when they were over their heads (Intellectual humility).

At the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting at which the “no safety-of-flight” con­clusion was presented, there was little engineering discussion about the assumptions made, and how the results would differ if other assumptions were used.



Unchallenged assumptions.
Lack of intellectual curiosity.



Engineering solutions presented to management should have included a quantifiable range of uncertainty and risk analysis. Those types of tools were readily available, routinely used, and would have helped management understand the risk involved in the decision. Management, in turn, should have demanded such information. The very absence of a clear and open discussion of uncertainties and assumptions in the analysis presented should have caused management to probe further.



Imprecise information.
Inadequate intellectual perseverance and curiosity. 

Shuttle Program Management’s Low Level of Concern


 


While the debris strike was well outside the activities covered by normal mission flight rules, Mission Management Team members and Shuttle Program managers did not treat the debris strike as an issue that required operational action by Mission Control. Program managers, from Ron Dittemore to individual Mission Management Team members, had, over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, gradually become inured to External Tank foam losses and on a funda­mental level did not believe foam striking the vehicle posed a critical threat to the Orbiter. In particular, Shuttle managers exhibited a belief that RCC panels are impervious to foam impacts. Even after seeing the video of Columbia’s debris impact, learning estimates of the size and location of the strike, and noting that a foam strike with sufficient kinetic energy could cause Thermal Protection System damage, management’s level of concern did not change.



Insufficient intellectual perseverance and curiosity. 

The opinions of Shuttle Program managers and debris and photo analysts on the potential severity of the debris strike diverged early in the mission and continued to diverge as the mis­sion progressed, making it increasingly difficult for the Debris Assessment Team to have their concerns heard by those in a decision-making capacity. In the face of Mission managers’ low level of concern and desire to get on with the mission, Debris Assessment Team members had to prove unequivocally that a safety-of-flight issue existed before Shuttle Program management would move to obtain images of the left wing. The engineers found themselves in the unusual position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe – a reversal of the usual requirement to prove that a situation is safe.



Insufficient intellectual fairness.
 Confused purpose (emphasis was justifying the safety of the next mission in lieu of recovering the current mission).



Other factors contributed to Mission management’s ability to resist the Debris Assessment Team’s concerns. A tile expert told managers during frequent consultations that strike damage was only a maintenance-level concern and that on-orbit imaging of potential wing damage was not necessary. Mission management welcomed this opinion and sought no others. This constant reinforcement of managers’ pre-existing beliefs added another block to the wall between deci­sion makers and concerned engineers.



Sociocentric blindness. No breadth of inquiry. No cultivation of dissenting points of view.

Another factor that enabled Mission management’s detachment from the concerns of their own engineers is rooted in the culture of NASA itself. The Board observed an unofficial hierarchy among NASA programs and directorates that hindered the flow of communications. The effects of this unofficial hierarchy are seen in the attitude that members of the Debris Assessment Team held. Part of the reason they chose the institutional route for their imagery request was that without direction from the Mission Evaluation Room and Mission Management Team, they felt more comfortable with their own chain of command, which was outside the Shuttle Program. Further, when asked by investigators why they were not more vocal about their concerns, De­bris Assessment Team members opined that by raising contrary points of view about Shuttle mission safety, they would be singled out for possible ridicule by their peers and managers.



Insufficient intellectual courage.

A Lack of Clear Communication
 


Communication did not flow effectively up to or down from Program managers. As it became clear during the mission that managers were not as concerned as others about the danger of the foam strike, the ability of engineers to challenge those beliefs greatly diminished. Managers’ ten­dency to accept opinions that agree with their own dams the flow of effective communications.



Sociocentric blindness.
No cultivation of dissenting points of view.

After the accident, Program managers stated privately and publicly that if engineers had a safe­ty concern, they were obligated to communicate their concerns to management. Managers did not seem to understand that as leaders they had a corresponding and perhaps greater obligation to create viable routes for the engineering community to express their views and receive infor­mation. This barrier to communications not only blocked the flow of information to managers, but it also prevented the downstream flow of information from managers to engineers, leaving Debris Assessment Team members no basis for understanding the reasoning behind Mission Management Team decisions.



Deficient Intellectual Fairness/Empathy

The January 27 to January 31, phone and e-mail exchanges, primarily between NASA engi­neers at Langley and Johnson, illustrate another symptom of the “cultural fence” that impairs open communications between mission managers and working engineers. These exchanges and the reaction to them indicated that during the evaluation of a mission contingency, the Mission Management Team failed to disseminate information to all system and technology experts who could be consulted. Issues raised by two Langley and Johnson engineers led to the development of “what-if” landing scenarios of the potential outcome if the main landing gear door sustained damaged. This led to behind-the-scenes networking by these engineers to use NASA facilities to make simulation runs of a compromised landing configuration. These engineers – who un­derstood their systems and related technology – saw the potential for a problem on landing and ran it down in case the unthinkable occurred. But their concerns never reached the managers on the Mission Management Team that had operational control over Columbia



Here’s a team that showed perseverance, running their questions to ground by end-running the bureaucracy. Their ad hoc study simulating landing with a blown tire showed the crew would survive, so they allayed their own concern.

A Lack of Effective Leadership


 


The Shuttle Program, the Mission Management Team, and through it the Mission Evaluation Room, were not actively directing the efforts of the Debris Assessment Team. These manage­ment teams were not engaged in scenario selection or discussions of assumptions and did not actively seek status, inputs, or even preliminary results from the individuals charged with analyzing the debris strike. They did not investigate the value of imagery, did not intervene to consult the more experienced Crater analysts at Boeing’s Huntington Beach facility, did not probe the assumptions of the Debris Assessment Team’s analysis, and did not consider actions to mitigate the effects of the damage on re-entry. Managers’ claims that they didn’t hear the engineers’ concerns were due in part to their not asking or listening.



This is a catalog of what’s already been said.

The Failure of Safety’s Role


 


As will be discussed in Chapter 7, safety personnel were present but passive and did not serve as a channel for the voicing of concerns or dissenting views. Safety representatives attended meetings of the Debris Assessment Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Mission Management Team, but were merely party to the analysis process and conclusions instead of an independent source of questions and challenges. Safety contractors in the Mission Evaluation Room were only marginally aware of the debris strike analysis. One contractor did question the Debris As­sessment Team safety representative about the analysis and was told that it was adequate. No additional inquiries were made. The highest-ranking safety representative at NASA headquar­ters deferred to Program managers when asked for an opinion on imaging of Columbia. The safety manager he spoke to also failed to follow up.



Deficient Intellectual Courage, Curiosity, and Perseverance.

Summary
 


Management decisions made during Columbia’s final flight reflect missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis, and ineffective leadership. Perhaps most striking is the fact that management – including Shuttle Program, Mission Man­agement Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Flight Director and Mission Control – displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications. Because managers failed to avail themselves of the wide range of expertise and opinion necessary to achieve the best answer to the debris strike question – “Was this a safety-of-flight concern?” –some Space Shuttle Program managers failed to fulfill the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew. In fact, their management techniques unknowingly imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views, and ultimately helped create “blind spots” that prevented them from seeing the danger the foam strike posed.



The most damning line in the report expresses dismay at the want of intellectual curiosity regarding implications [Emphasis added.]

The real tragedy- the Point of View of the crew and their families didn’t intrude (Intellectual Empathy and Fairness). The focus on keeping the program schedule (a confused purpose) trumped ensuring the safety of the mission in progress.



Because this chapter has focused on key personnel who participated in STS-107 bipod foam debris strike decisions, it is tempting to conclude that replacing them will solve all NASA’s problems. However, solving NASA’s problems is not quite so easily achieved. Peoples’ actions are influenced by the organizations in which they work, shaping their choices in directions that even they may not realize. The Board explores the organizational context of decision making more fully in Chapters 7 and 8.



Here the board hints at implications of their findings, yet to be discussed.

Throughout the above, vocabulary from all three parts of the Paul model—Standards, Elements, and Traits—are applicable to understanding the team’s thinking.

Another meaty paragraph, found in chapter 7, “The Accident’s Organizational Causes,” holistically evaluates the NASA leadership culture, and provides another condensed opportunity for applying the same methodology.


Conditioned by Success: Even after it was clear from the launch videos that foam had struck the Orbiter in a manner never before seen, Space Shuttle Program man­agers were not unduly alarmed. They could not imagine why anyone would want a photo of something that could be fixed after landing. More importantly, learned attitudes about foam strikes diminished management’s wariness of their danger. The Shuttle Program turned “the experience of failure into the memory of suc­cess.” Managers also failed to develop simple con­tingency plans for a re-entry emergency. They were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency. The intellectual curiosity and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was al­most entirely absent. Shuttle managers did not embrace safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this in­stance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and reason. [Gehman, 2003, pg. 181]

-Managers failed to follow the data through to the full range of implications (breadth).

- Though the foam was discussed repeated in team meetings, no decision-maker demanded, “Can you prove that Columbia has not been harmed?” This was the question at hand, but was not asked.
- A fact, “foam hasn’t hurt us badly yet,” became an tragically inaccurate conclusion, “foam is harmless.”

- An ungrounded assumption, “the crew can’t be rescued,” was confused as an inference which then justified inaction.
- Intellectual curiosity cited as an indispensable attribute of a solid safety culture.
- The organization was not metacognitive; it was not thinking about its thinking.

-In sum, the organization wasn’t thinking critically.



Conclusion
As with any case study, the goal is not preparing students for decisions identical to those faced by the Space Shuttle Program. The goal is instead fostering a recognition that organizations must not only think, but that they must also think about their thinking. A learning organization is necessarily meta-cognitive, both thinking and thinking about its thinking. This is true both for the team and the team-member.


But in order to think about their thinking, they must also recognize the key questions they’re to ask themselves. Paul’s model suggests broad classes (genera) of questions that critically thinking teams and team-members will ask themselves. Lastly, the teams will recognize and foster members’ growth in intellectual virtues: demanding integrity, honoring humility, cultivating fairness, praising empathy.


As we surveyed the CAIB report, we found that the board’s broadest findings all fit within the model’s bounds, once we’d added “Intellectual Curiosity” to the list of traits. Some findings did not fit due to the specialized discussion, such as those pertaining to centralized vs. decentralized organizations, or particulars with respect to safety management. These are surely beyond the goals of such a model.


More importantly, the model provided participants with a ready point of entry into a complicated story with numerous interwoven sub-plots. It permitted them to recognize the necessity of not only thinking, but thinking about thinking (metacognition). It permitted ready identification of broad classes of common organizational errors and the challenges facing leaders, without being mired in the details of NASA’s particular errors. This latter is what we hope they might portage.


Acknowledgement
Extracts of Paul, Niewoehner and Elder’s Engineering Reasoning are used with permission from the Foundation for Critical Thinking.


This is certified to be a work of the U.S. Government and may not be copyrighted under U.S. law.


References
Bransford, John D., Brown, Ann L., and Cocking, Rodney R. (editors), How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience, and School (expanded edition), National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 2000.


Gehman, H.W. et. al., Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1[CAIB], August 2003.
Moore, David T. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis, Joint Military Intelligence College, Occasional Paper 14, May 2006, pg. 2.


Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle, NJ, 2002.


Paul, R.W., Niewoehner, R.J., and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Engineering Reasoning, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2006.


Tufte, Edward R. Visual Explanations, (Graphics Press: Cheshire CT, 1997), pg. 45ff.






Purpose                     Question at Hand
Point of View             Assumptions
Information                Concepts
Conclusions               Implications





Elements of Thought





Intellectual Humility       Fairmindedness
Intellectual Autonomy    Confidence in Reason
Intellectual Integrity       Intellectual Empathy
Intellectual Courage      Intellectual Curiosity Intellectual Perseverance




Intellectual Traits



Applied
 to



To develop





Clarity              Precision          Accuracy   
Significance      Relevance        Fairness
Logical             Depth               Breadth     
Concision         Suitability         Beauty




Intellectual Standards


Exhibit 1.

Robert Niewoehner, U.S. Naval Academy
Captain Rob Niewoehner, USN, PhD is Director of Aeronautics at the US Naval Academy. Prior to joining the Naval Academy faculty, he served as a fleet F-14 pilot, and then as an experimental test pilot, including Chief Test Pilot for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, throughout its development.

Craig Steidle, US Naval Academy
Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, USN (ret) holds the Rogers Chair of Aeronautics at the U.S. Naval
Academy. In uniform, RADM Steidle served as a combat A-6 pilot, test pilot, F/A-18 Program
Manager, Joint Strike Fighter Program Manager, and Vice Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command. Prior to joining the Naval Academy’s faculty, he served as Associate Administrator of NASA for Deep Space Exploration.

This paper is adapted from a similar paper with the same title, by Niewoehner, Steidle and Johnson, which won “Best Paper” in the Engineering Management Division, and “Best Conference Papers” at the June 2008 Conference of the American Society of Engineering Educators. (http://www.asee.org/conferences/annual/2008/Highlights.cfm#Awards ).
This paper omits findings pertaining exclusively to the undergraduate setting.

Engineering Reasoning
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher

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Engineering Reasoning

Accelerating Change

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Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

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Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


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Engineering Reasoning
 
This is a work of the US Government and is therefore public domain and not subject to copyright. Citations from Engineering Reasoning are used with the permission of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. Forthcoming in the Engineering Management Journal, and adapted from a paper presented at ASEE, June 2008, where it won ‘Best Conference Papers.’

The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia:
Portaging Leadership Lessons with a Critical Thinking Model

Robert J Niewoehner, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ph.D.
Craig E. Steidle, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy

Abstract
Business schools have long valued case studies as a tool for both broadening a student’s perspective, and provoking them to deeper consideration of complex situations. The challenge with case studies is assuring the portability of the lessons; we don’t expect students to see situations imitating those they’ve studied, hence the goal must instead be habits of mind and principles of action which the student can portage to the circumstances of their professional lives. This paper evaluates the suitability of Richard Paul’s Critical Thinking model as a template for evaluating engineering enterprise thinking habits and organizational behavior, using the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report as a case study. With minor refinement, Paul’s model provides a powerful vocabulary for complicated case study analysis, and that familiarity with the model provides participants with both a mechanism for analysis and a means for portaging lessons to other professional situations and organizations.


Introduction
In 1990, as a novice test pilot, I was privileged to attend the first flight readiness review for Northrop’s YF-23. First flight is a risky event in an airplane program, and several dozen experts from across industry and government scrutinized the test team’s preparation and plans. I had thousands of hours of flying in 25 different airplanes, but amongst these grey-beards I was clearly a novice to the hazards of experimental flight test. I had nothing to contribute, and so much to learn.


While impressed with the test team’s professionalism, I was profoundly impressed by the scope and intensity of the questions posed by the gathered reviewers. Most were questions I would never have thought to pose. During a break, I occasionally asked a reviewer for the motive behind their question. Invariably I heard a story of an airplane damaged, pilot killed, or tragedy narrowly avoided. My three days in the back row provided an accelerated education in risk management. I walked away with rich lessons in the questions I should be prepared to answer as a project pilot, and questions I would later ask as a program leader.
Research in the traits distinguishing experts and novices has noted that experts ask richer questions, questions that are broader, deeper, and more complex, questions that do not balk at obstacles but ferret their way through difficulty [Bransford, 2000]. Novices do not even know what questions to ask, let alone the answers. Furthermore, novices either content themselves with simplistic answers, or suspend their inquiry in the face of complexity. The challenges for engineering leaders include, “How can we help our young engineers more quickly learn to ask more expert questions of themselves and others?” Teach them a model of Critical Thinking.
The analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The intellect requires a voice. Richard Paul and his colleague, Linda Elder, from the Foundation for Critical Thinking, have proposed a critical thinking model documented in various sources [Paul & Elder], including over a dozen Thinkers' Guides that apply this model to diverse disciplines. Their Thinker’s Guide to Engineering Reasoning specifically adapts Paul’s model to the intellectual work of engineers, exemplifying the questions that experienced engineers ask of themselves and others [Paul, 2006].
Specifically, the authors sought to answer the following questions: “Does the Paul model of Critical Thinking provide a beneficial vocabulary and construct for evaluating complex technological case studies?” and, “Does the structure of Paul’s model enhance the portability of the lessons?”
This paper summarizes the Paul model including includes brief discussions of our approach in introducing the Paul model and vocabulary to students. Next, the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report are summarized for those who are not familiar with its contents [Gehman, 2003]. Importantly, we do not seek to re-analyze the CAIB’s findings or recommendations, nor further excoriate those whose mistakes may have contributed to the mishap. We cannot improve on what we regard as a masterful contribution to the literature describing high technology organizations. No, it is instead the Paul model which is under examination. Our question was solely whether the Paul model was adequate to the purpose of opening the CAIB report and its complexities to undergraduate students in ways that they could retain and apply. We’ve used the same approach for in-service engineers and faculty development.


A Critical Thinking Model For Engineering
Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Paul, Niewoehner and Elder apply a model to the way in which engineers think, an architecture whose purpose is aiding the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought.
The analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The model that follows is not unique to engineering; indeed, its real power is its portability, adapting to any domain of life and thought. In so far as an engineer masters the rudimentary skills of critical thinking in the context of engineering, they have really appropriated the skills of life-long learning for whatever domain of learning their professional and personal lives lead them.
We need a definition of Critical Thinking. We are particularly fond of David Moore’s: 
“Critical Thinking is a deliberate meta-cognitive (thinking about thinking) and cognitive (thinking) act whereby a person reflects on the quality of the reasoning process simultaneously while reasoning to a conclusion. The thinker has two equally important goals: coming to a solution and improving the way she or he reasons.” [Moore, 2006, italics in original]


Hence, critical thinking means much more than “Logic.” Metacognition is vital to this definition. “Meta” means above or beyond; hence, metacognition means “thinking that looks back on itself.” 
Consider a modern fighter, a system of systems, each of which is overseen by some microprocessor. Those computers constantly monitor the health of each system. Vital systems, such as flight controls, have up to four duplicate processors working in parallel.  The flight control computers do not simply process the next aileron deflection, they also constantly ask one another, “Do you agree? Are we all healthy?” If one disagrees, it’s “voted off.” These health management technologies have provided much of the astounding improvement in the maintainability of today’s airplanes and automobiles.


Likewise, a robust conception of critical thinking includes not only the process leading from information to a valid conclusion, it must also include the process by which we ask, in parallel, “Is my thinking healthy?”  Critical Thinking simultaneously assesses its own quality. Critical thinking certainly entails logic, but it must also necessarily entail health management for our thinking.
The CAIB report provides engineering leaders with a masterpiece analysis of high technology organizational behavior. In summary comments, the board described NASA as bereft of deliberate meta-cognition.


“NASA is not functioning as a learning organization.”[Gehman, 2003, pg 127]


“[NASA mission managers] were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency. The intellectual curiosity and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was al­most entirely absent. Shuttle managers did not embrace safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this in­stance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and reason.” [Gehman, 2003, pg 181]


A bright, hard-working, dedicated team proved dysfunctional because their organizational culture did not demand that they consciously monitor the health of their own thinking. We may also be leading a bright, hard-working, dedicated, dysfunctional team if we’ve not purposefully taught them how to monitor the health of their thinking. [If our team is high performing, then it’s likely we’ve inadvertently taught them metacognition.]
Figure 1 depicts Paul’s model. The goal, at the bottom, is the mature thinker, whose thinking skills and ethical dispositions act in concert, as evidenced by intellectual traits/virtues. The Elements of Thought comprise the tools by which we analyze intellectual work, our own and others, taking it apart to understand its constituent parts. Intellectual Standards are the criteria against which we evaluate the quality of intellectual work. Specifically, the model identifies the vital questions we should be asking ourselves and others. It’s all about the questions!


Exhibit 1:  Richard Paul’s Critical Thinking Model [adapted from Paul, 2006]
Effective Teams Manifest Intellectual Traits/Virtues


The engineer does not work in isolation, but in the context of enterprises, cultures and communities, each of which represents divergent interests and perspectives. Furthermore, no engineer can claim perfect objectivity; their work is unavoidably influenced by strengths and weaknesses, education, experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and self-interest. They avoid paths they associate with past mistakes and trudge down well worn paths that worked in the past. The profession engineer must cultivate personal and intellectual virtues. The leader must both model and foster these traits with those they lead.


These virtues are not radically distinct from those sought by any maturing thinker, regardless of the discipline. They determine the extent to which we think with insight and integrity, regardless of the subject. The engineering enterprise does however pose distinct questions for the engineer in pursuit of such virtues.
•Intellectual humility admits to ignorance, frankly sensitive to what you know and what you do not know. It implies being aware of your biases, prejudices, self-deceptive tendencies and the limitations of your viewpoint and experience.
•Intellectual courage is the disposition to question beliefs about which we feel strongly. It includes questioning the beliefs of our enterprise culture and any sub-culture to which we belong, and a willingness to express our views even when they are unpopular (with management, peers, subordinates or customers).
•Intellectual empathy is awareness of the need to actively entertain views that differ from our own, especially those with which we strongly disagree. It entails accurately reconstructing others’ viewpoints and to self-consciously reason from premises, assump­tions, and ideas other than our own.
•Intellectual integrity consists in holding ourselves to the same intel­lectual standards you expect others to honor (no double standards).
•Intellectual perseverance is the disposition to work our way through intellectual complexities despite the frustration inherent in the task.
•Confidence in reason is based on the belief that one’s own higher interests and those of humankind at large are best served by giving the freest play to reason. It means using standards of reasonability as the fundamental criteria by which to judge whether to accept or reject any proposition or position.
•Intellectual autonomy is thinking for oneself while adhering to standards of rationality. It means thinking through issues using one’s own thinking rather than uncritically accepting the viewpoints, opinions and judgments of others.
•Fairmindedness is being conscious of the need to treat all viewpoints alike, without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested interests of one's friends, company, community or nation; implies adherence to intellectual standards without reference to one's own advantage or the advantage of one's group.
•Intellectual Curiosity motivates intellectual perseverance (above), and manifests itself as discontentment with unanswered questions. Curiosity does not explicitly appear in Paul’s lists of intellectual virtues, though tacitly lauded in several of Paul and Elder’s papers. We include it here because it explicitly appears in the CAIB report multiple times, and none of the other traits above adequately capture this vital trait.


The intellectual traits/virtues were introduced in a Technical Leadership seminar using a workshop format. Individuals within groups of 3-4 were assigned a trait which they then studied briefly from the Engineering Reasoning Guide [Paul, 2006, pgs 6-8] and then explained to their teammates. Successful rounds of this reciprocal teaching were conducted until the list of traits was covered. Students were then asked to write down a vignette illustrating how they had personally witnessed the positive contribution of one of the traits to a team on which they’d served, and likewise one vignette exemplifying how a deficit in one trait had adversely affected a team. The entire class was then polled to nominate particularly noteworthy stories for the entire class. We’ve conducted similar workshops on this topic in several contexts. By the time they’re twenty, students have no shortage of applicable experiences from which to draw, whether athletic, academic, or extra-curricular, exemplifying virtue’s relevance. Older participants easily recall multiple stories.
All Thinking Builds Upon Eight Fundamental Elements


All thinking entails eight fundamental elements, whether it is about engineering, philosophy, cooking, sports, or business. These eight elements express eight questions that we can pose about any intellectual activity or subject. The eight elements, and their use in analyzing a document, were introduced by asking students to write out the purpose, point of view, data, etc. for the CAIB report [Paul, 2006, pgs 12-13]. These were then discussed Socratically as a class. The below summarizes/paraphrases students’ responses. Note that these questions and this activity work with any topic in any field.


Q- What was the purpose of the CAIB?
A- The CAIB sought to identify the causes of the Columbia’s loss and recommend actions for the resumption of U.S space flight activity.


Q- What questions did the CAIB principally try to answer?
A- What caused the loss of Columbia? What contributory factors may have been present? What actions should NASA and the U.S. government take in the future to reduce the likelihood of future mishaps.


Q- What point of view did the CAIB represent?
A- The CAIB was composed of senior engineers and leaders representing the military, government, academia, and industry. The report acknowledged other points of view, including the NASA workforce and astronaut office, the U.S. Congress, the aerospace industry.


Q- What did the CAIB assume?
A- All accident investigations take for granted that all accidents have causal factors traceable to both physical and cultural factors, and that understanding those factors can lead to improved safety in future operations. Additionally, the failures of complex systems are commonly traced to the complex interaction of many cultural and technological features surrounding that system. From the outset, the CAIB assumed that the answers wouldn’t be simple. Additionally, they assumed that their recommendations would be taken seriously and would form the basis for both a return to flight and the future vitality of U.S. space activities.


Q- What information did the CAIB report?
A- The CAIB report is very expansive in the nature of the information reported. It describes the history of the Space Shuttle Program, including the varying political/budgetary climates in which it was conceived and operated over 30 years time. Additionally, it reports specific technical details of the Columbia’s last flight and data from other previous flights bearing on the incident. It includes detailed transcripts of relevant team interactions (meetings, presentations, email) during the months leading to the accident. It analyzes the results of experiments conducted by the board to better understand the failure mechanism. Finally, the report details over a hundred pertinent “findings” and several dozen recommendations.


Q- What are the most significant concepts upon which the report rests?
A- The span of the report is very, very broad, including U.S. space policy and spending, program management, materials science, organizational behavior, government/contractor relations, flight mechanics, among many others. Particularly important concepts include risk management and accepted risk, failure trees, organizational behavior, safety, and leadership.


Q- What did the CAIB conclude?
A- The CAIB concluded that the shuttle’s loss was directly attributable to a breech in the left wing, caused by foam shed from the external tank during the shuttle’s ascent. That breech allowed a hot jet of air into the left wing’s structure which burned through the structure, causing its failure. Tragically, the loss of foam was acknowledged by NASA as a persistent problem, but not viewed as a threat to an orbiter’s safety. Consequently, the board concluded that the accident was attributable as much to poor organizational and leadership practices, as it was to foam. “It is the view of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that the Columbia accident is not a random event, but rather a product of the Space Shuttle Program’s history and current management processes.”[Gehman, 2003, pg. 21]


Q- What are the implications of the CAIB?
A- The CAIB provided a foundation for the return to shuttle service two years after the publication of their report, reestablishing U.S. confidence in manned space flight, and providing the means for resumption of the International Space Station’s construction.


Engineering Reasoning Applies Intellectual Standards


Universal intellectual standards must be applied to thinking whenever one is interested in checking the quality of reasoning about a problem, issue, or situation. To think professionally as an engineer entails having command of these standards. The standards are not unique to engineering, but are universal to all domains of thinking. They may however have particular meaning or significance which is contextual or disciplinary. While there are a number of universal standards, we focus here on some of the most significant to engineering. Unlike the elements above, this list is not necessarily comprehensive and lists found in Paul’s work do not always agree in detail.

Importantly, participants must be explicitly introduced to the notion of intellectual standards. High school and undergraduate students seem to recognize only two standards: “Did I get the right answer?” and “Am I done?” Defining intellectual standards, and helping students see that they are universal, helps them understand that good intellectual work is characterized by more than the right answer.
Clarity
Clarity is the gateway standard. If a statement is unclear, we cannot determine whether it is accurate or relevant. In fact, we cannot tell anything about it because we don’t yet know what it is saying. "Could you elaborate further on that point?" "Could you express that point in another way?" "Could you give me an illustration or example?"
Accuracy
A statement can be clear but not accurate, as in “Most creatures with a spine are over 300 pounds in weight.” "Is that really true?" "How could we check that?" "How could we find out if that is true?" "What is your confidence in that data?"


Precision
A statement can be both clear and accurate, but not precise, as in “The solution in the beaker is hot.” (We don’t know how hot it is. "Could you give me more details?" "Could you be more specific?") Engineers commonly express precision in quantitative terms associated with the calibration of our instrumentation. We can’t lose sight however that precision is also qualitative, bearing on the precision of our prose.
 Relevance
A statement can be clear, accurate, and precise, but not relevant to the question at issue. A technical report might mention the time of day and phase of the moon at which the test was conducted. This would be relevant if the system under test was a night vision device. It would be irrelevant if it had been a microwave oven. "How is that connected to the question?" "How does that bear on the issue?" 


Depth
A statement can be clear, accurate, precise, and relevant, but superficial. For example, the statement “Radioactive waste from nuclear reactors threatens the environment,” is clear, accurate, and relevant. Nevertheless, it lacks depth because it treats an extremely complex issue superficially. (It also lacks precision.) "How does your analysis address the complexities in the question?"
Breadth
A line of reasoning may be clear, accurate, precise, relevant, and deep, but lack breadth (as in an argument from either of two conflicting theories, both consistent with available evidence). Broad thinking suggests questions such as: "Do we need to consider another point of view?" "Is there another way to look at this question?" "What would this look like from the point of view of a conflicting theory, hypothesis or conceptual scheme?"
Logical Validity
When we think, we bring a variety of thoughts together into some order. The thinking is “logical” when the conclusion follows from the supporting data or propositions. The conclusion is “illogical” when it contradicts proffered evidence, or the arguments fail to cohere." Does this really make sense?" "How does that follow from what you said?" "But before you implied this and now you are saying that, I don’t see how both can be true." 


Fairness
Fairness is particularly at play where either a problem has multiple approaches (conflicting conceptual systems), or conflicting interests among stake-holders. Fairness gives all perspectives a voice, while recognizing that all perspectives may not be accurate or equally valuable.


The following three standards are not found either in Figure 1 above, nor in Paul and Elder’s writing. We have included them in our teaching because they have frequently caught our attention as defects in the work of our undergraduates.


Concision
The days are well past when great oratory meant hours, or great literature necessarily included chapter-long depictions of the field at Waterloo or the implements of the New England Whaling trade. Abraham Lincoln was derided for demeaning the fallen by his brevity at Gettysburg; his partner on the podium later confessed that the President had said more in several minutes than he had said in an hour. Concision does not connote short for brevity’s sake (the sound bite), but rather an economy of thoughts whereby the thinking is deep and significant, and clarity is enhanced by the economy of words and/or images. In the hours building to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, engineers understood the peril faced by launching at extremely low temperatures. Yet, they buried their management in insignificant detail such that their message was missed; their signal was obscured by self-generated noise [Tufte, 1997].


Suitability-
 Suitability applies largely to our written and oral communications, seeking to be “fitting”, “appropriate”, or “suited to the purpose.” Suitability entails selecting right tone and presentation for the audience. It is seldom easy to craft our speech or writing to squarely address the interests, knowledge, and abilities of our audience/readers.


The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report
The general facts surrounding the loss of the space shuttle Columbia on the morning of February 1, 2003, are well known. A piece of insulating foam broke away from the external fuel tank seconds after launch, puncturing the leading edge of the orbiter’s left wing. The crew then spent fifteen days on orbit conducting a host of very successful science experiments, unaware that their spacecraft had been catastrophically damaged. On re-entry, hot gas tore through the interior structure of the wing, leading to wing failure, disintegration of the vehicle, and the death of the crew.


Unfortunately, the board’s findings on organizational behavior have not been as broadly discussed. The technical story is fascinating; the CAIB’s discussion of organizational behavior is heart-rending. The real meat lies here for those who lead or will lead technical organizations, because it’s a tragic story of bright, devoted, hard-working professionals whose leaders allowed the team’s thinking to stray adrift, killing seven of their friends and scattering an irreplaceable national asset across the Southwestern United States. We regard the CAIB report as required reading for all leaders in high technology enterprises not because of what they might learn about the threat of insulating foam to spacecraft, but rather the threat that uncritical thinking poses to even the nation’s most successful, talented and hard-working teams.  We’ll briefly summarize the organizational piece for those unfamiliar with this second most disturbing facet of the Columbia mishap.
The CAIB’s most severe criticism of NASA sprang from their observation of the strong similarity between the loss of Columbia and the loss of Challenger. Neither the loss of foam (Columbia), nor O-ring erosion (Challenger), were new issues; both had been observed on numerous prior flights. In both mishaps, technical team members raised grave concerns about the safety of the mission during the week prior to each orbiter’s loss. In both events, leadership dismissed team member concerns, focused on keeping the schedule, and blithely inferred that past minor issues with O-rings/foam would remain minor. The “echoes of Challenger” led the CAIB to entitle an entire chapter, “History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger.” [Gehman, 2003, pgs. 195ff.] 


Surely in these grand tragedies we have the grist of poignant lessons for future leaders. Our issue as engineering educators and leaders is modeling consideration of the board’s findings in such a way that students can extract lessons about how to think about thinking in organizational contexts, rather than simply reiterating criticism of the actors’ mistakes. We want them to portage worthwhile, generalizable lessons from situation to situation, much as a canoe might be portaged from one body of water to another.


The pages that follow are extracted directly from the CAIB Report, Chapter 6, “Decision Making at NASA.” They summarize a very lengthy section 6.3, “Decision-Making During the Flight of STS-107,” which detailed the substance of multiple meetings and extensive correspondence within and between program teams as decisions were made regarding the condition of Columbia during its final mission. The left column is verbatim from the report; our  italicized remarks are to the right note, with vocabulary from Paul’s model underlined. 
We’ve chosen this section for emphasis because it describes the dysfunction of a specific team, involving small meetings and personal communications, rather than the report’s broader treatment of the dysfunction of an entire agency or U.S. space policy. The team setting is more accessible to the undergraduate who can more readily imagine themselves in a team setting than executive management, and it is for that setting that we seek to first prepare them.


Summary: Mission Management Decision Making [Gehman, 2003, pgs. 166-170]

Discovery and Initial Analysis of Debris Strike


 


In the course of examining film and video images of Columbia’s ascent, the Intercenter Photo Working Group identified, on the day after launch, a large debris strike to the leading edge of Columbia’s left wing. Alarmed at seeing so severe a hit so late in ascent, and at not hav­ing a clear view of damage the strike might have caused, Intercenter Photo Working Group members alerted senior Program managers by phone and sent a digitized clip of the strike to hundreds of NASA personnel via e-mail. These actions initiated a contingency plan that brought together an interdisciplinary group of experts from NASA, Boeing, and the United Space Alliance to analyze the strike. So concerned were Intercenter Photo Working Group personnel that on the day they discovered the debris strike, they tapped their Chair, Bob Page, to see through a request to image the left wing with Department of Defense assets in anticipa­tion of analysts needing these images to better determine potential damage. By the Board’s count, this would be the first of three requests to secure imagery of Columbia on-orbit during the 16-day mission.



Clear recognition of the need for better data.

Upon learning of the debris strike on Flight Day Two, the responsible system area manager from United Space Alliance and her NASA counterpart formed a team to analyze the debris strike in accordance with mission rules requiring the careful examination of any “out-of-fam­ily” event. Using film from the Intercenter Photo Working Group, Boeing systems integration analysts prepared a preliminary analysis that afternoon. (Initial estimates of debris size and speed, origin of debris, and point of impact would later prove remarkably accurate.)



Excellent initial inferences based upon scant preliminary data.
“out-of-family” meant out of NASA’s experience base.

As Flight Day Three and Four unfolded over the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend, en­gineers began their analysis. One Boeing analyst used Crater, a mathematical prediction tool, to assess possible damage to the Thermal Protection System. Analysis predicted tile damage deeper than the actual tile depth, and penetration of the RCC coating at impact angles above 15 degrees. This suggested the potential for a burn-through during re-entry. Debris Assessment Team members judged that the actual damage would not be as severe as predicted because of the inherent conservatism in the Crater model and because, in the case of tile, Crater does not take into account the tile’s stronger and more impact-resistant “densified” layer, and in the case of RCC, the lower density of foam would preclude penetration at impact angles under 21 degrees.



Gut-based judgment replaces engineering analysis. Inaccurate inference based on invalid logic, and unsubstantiated assumptions. (RCC= Reinforced Carbon-Carbon, from which the wing leading edges were made.)

On Flight Day Five, impact assessment results for tile and RCC were presented at an informal meeting of the Debris Assessment Team, which was operating without direct Shuttle Program or Mission Management leadership. Mission Control’s engineering support, the Mission Evalu­ation Room, provided no direction for team activities other than to request the team’s results by January 24. As the problem was being worked, Shuttle managers did not formally direct the actions of or consult with Debris Assessment Team leaders about the team’s assumptions, uncertainties, progress, or interim results, an unusual circumstance given that NASA managers are normally engaged in analyzing what they view as problems. At this meeting, participants agreed that an image of the area of the wing in question was essential to refine their analysis and reduce the uncertainties in their damage assessment.



Unchallenged working assumptions.
Conspicuous lack of intellectual curiosity on the part of leadership.
Some team-members continued to recognize the inadequacy of the data. 

Each member supported the idea to seek imagery from an outside source. Due in part to a lack of guidance from the Mission Management Team or Mission Evaluation Room managers, the Debris Assessment Team chose an unconventional route for its request. Rather than working the request up the normal chain of command – through the Mission Evaluation Room to the Mission Management Team for action to Mission Control – team members nominated Rodney Rocha, the team’s Co-Chair, to pursue the request through the Engineering Directorate at John­son Space Center. As a result, even after the accident the Debris Assessment Team’s request was viewed by Shuttle Program managers as a non-critical engineering desire rather than a critical operational need.





Insufficient clarity regarding the extent of team-member’s discomfort with lack of imagery (data).

When the team learned that the Mission Management Team was not pursuing on-orbit imag­ing, members were concerned. What Debris Assessment Team members did not realize was the negative response from the Program was not necessarily a direct and final response to their official request. Rather, the “no” was in part a response to requests for imagery initiated by the Intercenter Photo Working Group at Kennedy on Flight Day 2 in anticipation of analysts’ needs that had become by Flight Day 6 an actual engineering request by the Debris Assessment Team, made informally through Bob White to Lambert Austin, and formally through Rodney Rocha’s e-mail to Paul Shack. Even after learning that the Shuttle Program was not going to provide the team with imagery, some members sought information on how to obtain it anyway.



Leadership canceled photo requests because:
 a) inaccurate assumptions of the imaging capability,
 b) inaccurate assumptions regarding value of photos
d) unwillingness to disrupt mission to inspect orbiter (confused purpose)
e) inaccurate assumption that rescue was infeasible.
These assumptions were accepted as fact.

Some perseverance displayed by those willing to circumvent bureaucratic obstacles.



Debris Assessment Team members believed that imaging of potentially damaged areas was necessary even after the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting, where they had re­ported their results. Why they did not directly approach Shuttle Program managers and share their concern and uncertainty, and why Shuttle Program managers claimed to be isolated from engineers, are points that the Board labored to understand. Several reasons for this communica­tions failure relate to NASA’s internal culture and the climate established by Shuttle Program management, which are discussed in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8.



Other parts of the report attribute this behavior to lack of intellectual courage on the part of team-members, and lack of empathy on the part of management.


A Flawed Analysis


 


An inexperienced team, using a mathematical tool that was not designed to assess an impact of this estimated size, performed the analysis of the potential effect of the debris impact. Cra­ter was designed for “in-family” impact events and was intended for day-of-launch analysis of debris impacts. It was not intended for large projectiles like those observed on STS-107. Crater initially predicted possible damage, but the Debris Assessment Team assumed, without theoretical or experimental validation, that because Crater is a conservative tool – that is, it pre­dicts more damage than will actually occur – the debris would stop at the tile’s densified layer, even though their experience did not involve debris strikes as large as STS-107’s. Crater-like equations were also used as part of the analysis to assess potential impact damage to the wing leading edge RCC. Again, the tool was used for something other than that for which it was designed; again, it predicted possible penetration; and again, the Debris Assessment Team used engineering arguments and their experience to discount the results.



Inaccurate conclusions based on unjustified extrapolation of assumptions. The tool’s severe predictions were dismissed  not on the basis of logic, but on a history which showed that foam had never previously been a safety of flight issue.

As a result of a transition of responsibility for Crater analysis from the Boeing Huntington Beach facility to the Houston-based Boeing office, the team that conducted the Crater analyses had been formed fairly recently, and therefore could be considered less experienced when com­pared with the more senior Huntington Beach analysts. In fact, STS-107 was the first mission for which they were solely responsible for providing analysis with the Crater tool. Though post-ac­cident interviews suggested that the training for the Houston Boeing analysts was of high quality and adequate in substance and duration, communications and theoretical understandings of the Crater model among the Houston-based team members had not yet developed to the standard of a more senior team. Due in part to contractual arrangements related to the transition, the Hous­ton-based team did not take full advantage of the Huntington Beach engineers’ experience.



A new support team failed to admit when they were over their heads (Intellectual humility).

At the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting at which the “no safety-of-flight” con­clusion was presented, there was little engineering discussion about the assumptions made, and how the results would differ if other assumptions were used.



Unchallenged assumptions.
Lack of intellectual curiosity.



Engineering solutions presented to management should have included a quantifiable range of uncertainty and risk analysis. Those types of tools were readily available, routinely used, and would have helped management understand the risk involved in the decision. Management, in turn, should have demanded such information. The very absence of a clear and open discussion of uncertainties and assumptions in the analysis presented should have caused management to probe further.



Imprecise information.
Inadequate intellectual perseverance and curiosity. 

Shuttle Program Management’s Low Level of Concern


 


While the debris strike was well outside the activities covered by normal mission flight rules, Mission Management Team members and Shuttle Program managers did not treat the debris strike as an issue that required operational action by Mission Control. Program managers, from Ron Dittemore to individual Mission Management Team members, had, over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, gradually become inured to External Tank foam losses and on a funda­mental level did not believe foam striking the vehicle posed a critical threat to the Orbiter. In particular, Shuttle managers exhibited a belief that RCC panels are impervious to foam impacts. Even after seeing the video of Columbia’s debris impact, learning estimates of the size and location of the strike, and noting that a foam strike with sufficient kinetic energy could cause Thermal Protection System damage, management’s level of concern did not change.



Insufficient intellectual perseverance and curiosity. 

The opinions of Shuttle Program managers and debris and photo analysts on the potential severity of the debris strike diverged early in the mission and continued to diverge as the mis­sion progressed, making it increasingly difficult for the Debris Assessment Team to have their concerns heard by those in a decision-making capacity. In the face of Mission managers’ low level of concern and desire to get on with the mission, Debris Assessment Team members had to prove unequivocally that a safety-of-flight issue existed before Shuttle Program management would move to obtain images of the left wing. The engineers found themselves in the unusual position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe – a reversal of the usual requirement to prove that a situation is safe.



Insufficient intellectual fairness.
 Confused purpose (emphasis was justifying the safety of the next mission in lieu of recovering the current mission).



Other factors contributed to Mission management’s ability to resist the Debris Assessment Team’s concerns. A tile expert told managers during frequent consultations that strike damage was only a maintenance-level concern and that on-orbit imaging of potential wing damage was not necessary. Mission management welcomed this opinion and sought no others. This constant reinforcement of managers’ pre-existing beliefs added another block to the wall between deci­sion makers and concerned engineers.



Sociocentric blindness. No breadth of inquiry. No cultivation of dissenting points of view.

Another factor that enabled Mission management’s detachment from the concerns of their own engineers is rooted in the culture of NASA itself. The Board observed an unofficial hierarchy among NASA programs and directorates that hindered the flow of communications. The effects of this unofficial hierarchy are seen in the attitude that members of the Debris Assessment Team held. Part of the reason they chose the institutional route for their imagery request was that without direction from the Mission Evaluation Room and Mission Management Team, they felt more comfortable with their own chain of command, which was outside the Shuttle Program. Further, when asked by investigators why they were not more vocal about their concerns, De­bris Assessment Team members opined that by raising contrary points of view about Shuttle mission safety, they would be singled out for possible ridicule by their peers and managers.



Insufficient intellectual courage.

A Lack of Clear Communication
 


Communication did not flow effectively up to or down from Program managers. As it became clear during the mission that managers were not as concerned as others about the danger of the foam strike, the ability of engineers to challenge those beliefs greatly diminished. Managers’ ten­dency to accept opinions that agree with their own dams the flow of effective communications.



Sociocentric blindness.
No cultivation of dissenting points of view.

After the accident, Program managers stated privately and publicly that if engineers had a safe­ty concern, they were obligated to communicate their concerns to management. Managers did not seem to understand that as leaders they had a corresponding and perhaps greater obligation to create viable routes for the engineering community to express their views and receive infor­mation. This barrier to communications not only blocked the flow of information to managers, but it also prevented the downstream flow of information from managers to engineers, leaving Debris Assessment Team members no basis for understanding the reasoning behind Mission Management Team decisions.



Deficient Intellectual Fairness/Empathy

The January 27 to January 31, phone and e-mail exchanges, primarily between NASA engi­neers at Langley and Johnson, illustrate another symptom of the “cultural fence” that impairs open communications between mission managers and working engineers. These exchanges and the reaction to them indicated that during the evaluation of a mission contingency, the Mission Management Team failed to disseminate information to all system and technology experts who could be consulted. Issues raised by two Langley and Johnson engineers led to the development of “what-if” landing scenarios of the potential outcome if the main landing gear door sustained damaged. This led to behind-the-scenes networking by these engineers to use NASA facilities to make simulation runs of a compromised landing configuration. These engineers – who un­derstood their systems and related technology – saw the potential for a problem on landing and ran it down in case the unthinkable occurred. But their concerns never reached the managers on the Mission Management Team that had operational control over Columbia



Here’s a team that showed perseverance, running their questions to ground by end-running the bureaucracy. Their ad hoc study simulating landing with a blown tire showed the crew would survive, so they allayed their own concern.

A Lack of Effective Leadership


 


The Shuttle Program, the Mission Management Team, and through it the Mission Evaluation Room, were not actively directing the efforts of the Debris Assessment Team. These manage­ment teams were not engaged in scenario selection or discussions of assumptions and did not actively seek status, inputs, or even preliminary results from the individuals charged with analyzing the debris strike. They did not investigate the value of imagery, did not intervene to consult the more experienced Crater analysts at Boeing’s Huntington Beach facility, did not probe the assumptions of the Debris Assessment Team’s analysis, and did not consider actions to mitigate the effects of the damage on re-entry. Managers’ claims that they didn’t hear the engineers’ concerns were due in part to their not asking or listening.



This is a catalog of what’s already been said.

The Failure of Safety’s Role


 


As will be discussed in Chapter 7, safety personnel were present but passive and did not serve as a channel for the voicing of concerns or dissenting views. Safety representatives attended meetings of the Debris Assessment Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Mission Management Team, but were merely party to the analysis process and conclusions instead of an independent source of questions and challenges. Safety contractors in the Mission Evaluation Room were only marginally aware of the debris strike analysis. One contractor did question the Debris As­sessment Team safety representative about the analysis and was told that it was adequate. No additional inquiries were made. The highest-ranking safety representative at NASA headquar­ters deferred to Program managers when asked for an opinion on imaging of Columbia. The safety manager he spoke to also failed to follow up.



Deficient Intellectual Courage, Curiosity, and Perseverance.

Summary
 


Management decisions made during Columbia’s final flight reflect missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis, and ineffective leadership. Perhaps most striking is the fact that management – including Shuttle Program, Mission Man­agement Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Flight Director and Mission Control – displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications. Because managers failed to avail themselves of the wide range of expertise and opinion necessary to achieve the best answer to the debris strike question – “Was this a safety-of-flight concern?” –some Space Shuttle Program managers failed to fulfill the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew. In fact, their management techniques unknowingly imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views, and ultimately helped create “blind spots” that prevented them from seeing the danger the foam strike posed.



The most damning line in the report expresses dismay at the want of intellectual curiosity regarding implications [Emphasis added.]

The real tragedy- the Point of View of the crew and their families didn’t intrude (Intellectual Empathy and Fairness). The focus on keeping the program schedule (a confused purpose) trumped ensuring the safety of the mission in progress.



Because this chapter has focused on key personnel who participated in STS-107 bipod foam debris strike decisions, it is tempting to conclude that replacing them will solve all NASA’s problems. However, solving NASA’s problems is not quite so easily achieved. Peoples’ actions are influenced by the organizations in which they work, shaping their choices in directions that even they may not realize. The Board explores the organizational context of decision making more fully in Chapters 7 and 8.



Here the board hints at implications of their findings, yet to be discussed.

Throughout the above, vocabulary from all three parts of the Paul model—Standards, Elements, and Traits—are applicable to understanding the team’s thinking.

Another meaty paragraph, found in chapter 7, “The Accident’s Organizational Causes,” holistically evaluates the NASA leadership culture, and provides another condensed opportunity for applying the same methodology.


Conditioned by Success: Even after it was clear from the launch videos that foam had struck the Orbiter in a manner never before seen, Space Shuttle Program man­agers were not unduly alarmed. They could not imagine why anyone would want a photo of something that could be fixed after landing. More importantly, learned attitudes about foam strikes diminished management’s wariness of their danger. The Shuttle Program turned “the experience of failure into the memory of suc­cess.” Managers also failed to develop simple con­tingency plans for a re-entry emergency. They were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency. The intellectual curiosity and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was al­most entirely absent. Shuttle managers did not embrace safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this in­stance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and reason. [Gehman, 2003, pg. 181]

-Managers failed to follow the data through to the full range of implications (breadth).

- Though the foam was discussed repeated in team meetings, no decision-maker demanded, “Can you prove that Columbia has not been harmed?” This was the question at hand, but was not asked.
- A fact, “foam hasn’t hurt us badly yet,” became an tragically inaccurate conclusion, “foam is harmless.”

- An ungrounded assumption, “the crew can’t be rescued,” was confused as an inference which then justified inaction.
- Intellectual curiosity cited as an indispensable attribute of a solid safety culture.
- The organization was not metacognitive; it was not thinking about its thinking.

-In sum, the organization wasn’t thinking critically.



Conclusion
As with any case study, the goal is not preparing students for decisions identical to those faced by the Space Shuttle Program. The goal is instead fostering a recognition that organizations must not only think, but that they must also think about their thinking. A learning organization is necessarily meta-cognitive, both thinking and thinking about its thinking. This is true both for the team and the team-member.


But in order to think about their thinking, they must also recognize the key questions they’re to ask themselves. Paul’s model suggests broad classes (genera) of questions that critically thinking teams and team-members will ask themselves. Lastly, the teams will recognize and foster members’ growth in intellectual virtues: demanding integrity, honoring humility, cultivating fairness, praising empathy.


As we surveyed the CAIB report, we found that the board’s broadest findings all fit within the model’s bounds, once we’d added “Intellectual Curiosity” to the list of traits. Some findings did not fit due to the specialized discussion, such as those pertaining to centralized vs. decentralized organizations, or particulars with respect to safety management. These are surely beyond the goals of such a model.


More importantly, the model provided participants with a ready point of entry into a complicated story with numerous interwoven sub-plots. It permitted them to recognize the necessity of not only thinking, but thinking about thinking (metacognition). It permitted ready identification of broad classes of common organizational errors and the challenges facing leaders, without being mired in the details of NASA’s particular errors. This latter is what we hope they might portage.


Acknowledgement
Extracts of Paul, Niewoehner and Elder’s Engineering Reasoning are used with permission from the Foundation for Critical Thinking.


This is certified to be a work of the U.S. Government and may not be copyrighted under U.S. law.


References
Bransford, John D., Brown, Ann L., and Cocking, Rodney R. (editors), How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience, and School (expanded edition), National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 2000.


Gehman, H.W. et. al., Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1[CAIB], August 2003.
Moore, David T. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis, Joint Military Intelligence College, Occasional Paper 14, May 2006, pg. 2.


Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle, NJ, 2002.


Paul, R.W., Niewoehner, R.J., and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Engineering Reasoning, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2006.


Tufte, Edward R. Visual Explanations, (Graphics Press: Cheshire CT, 1997), pg. 45ff.






Purpose                     Question at Hand
Point of View             Assumptions
Information                Concepts
Conclusions               Implications





Elements of Thought





Intellectual Humility       Fairmindedness
Intellectual Autonomy    Confidence in Reason
Intellectual Integrity       Intellectual Empathy
Intellectual Courage      Intellectual Curiosity Intellectual Perseverance




Intellectual Traits



Applied
 to



To develop





Clarity              Precision          Accuracy   
Significance      Relevance        Fairness
Logical             Depth               Breadth     
Concision         Suitability         Beauty




Intellectual Standards


Exhibit 1.

Robert Niewoehner, U.S. Naval Academy
Captain Rob Niewoehner, USN, PhD is Director of Aeronautics at the US Naval Academy. Prior to joining the Naval Academy faculty, he served as a fleet F-14 pilot, and then as an experimental test pilot, including Chief Test Pilot for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, throughout its development.

Craig Steidle, US Naval Academy
Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, USN (ret) holds the Rogers Chair of Aeronautics at the U.S. Naval
Academy. In uniform, RADM Steidle served as a combat A-6 pilot, test pilot, F/A-18 Program
Manager, Joint Strike Fighter Program Manager, and Vice Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command. Prior to joining the Naval Academy’s faculty, he served as Associate Administrator of NASA for Deep Space Exploration.

This paper is adapted from a similar paper with the same title, by Niewoehner, Steidle and Johnson, which won “Best Paper” in the Engineering Management Division, and “Best Conference Papers” at the June 2008 Conference of the American Society of Engineering Educators. (http://www.asee.org/conferences/annual/2008/Highlights.cfm#Awards ).
This paper omits findings pertaining exclusively to the undergraduate setting.

Engineering Reasoning
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering


R. J. Niewoehner
United States Naval Academy, USA 
ABSTRACT
Richard Paul's critical thinking model was adapted to the challenge of engineering education, and published in July 2006 as a guide to Engineering Reasoning. Paul's model is briefly described and exemplified by questions engineers ask in practice. This paper describes classroom exercises employing the model which are suitable for undergraduate and graduate engineering program.

INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The intellect requires a voice. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, from the Foundation for Critical Thinking, have proposed a critical thinking model documented in various sources ([1], [2] and [3]), including over a dozen Thinkers’ Guides that apply this model to diverse disciplines (e.g.- [4]).
  
Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Here we apply a model to the way in which we think, an architecture whose purpose is aiding the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought. A new thinkers'  guide, Engineering Reasoning [5], applies this model to the engineering enterprise. This paper introduces this Thinkers’ Guide as a tool for engineering educators and students, summarizing its content and suggesting several exercises for its use in support of engineering course and project work.
The guide follows Paul's model, providing a framework for analyzing and evaluating engineering reports, designs, graphics, and entire disciplines. It articulates the questions that exemplify maturing engineering reasoning. Several examples are provided of both excellence and disaster in engineering reasoning. The model is also applied to areas which touch engineering such as creativity, craftsmanship, and ethics.
THE PROBLEM
Elder [6] cites a series of studies indicating that college faculty almost unanimously insist that promoting critical thinking ranks among the primary goals of their work. Lamentably, that same research indicates that few college professors can articulate a substantive understanding of critical thinking, and few can identify the elements of their teaching that specifically develop critical thinking. Reference [6] appeals for the development of a substantive view of critical thinking both within higher education.
A CRITICAL THINKING MODEL
To address Elder's observation above, the analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The model that follows is not unique to engineering; indeed, its real power is its flexibility in adapting to any domain of life and thought. Other Thinkers' Guides apply this model to other disciplines. Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Here we apply a model of the way in which we think, an architecture whose purpose aides the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought.
  
The model depicted in Figure 1 depicts Paul's model, which the guide develops, working from the base of the diagram up.


 
 
Figure 1: Richard Paul's Critical Thinking Model.


 ESSENTIAL INTELLECTUAL TRAITS
The engineer does not work in isolation, but in the context of enterprises, cultures and communities, each of which represents divergent interests and perspectives. Furthermore, no engineer can claim perfect objectivity; their work is unavoidably influenced by strengths and weaknesses, education, experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and self-interest. They avoid paths they associate with past mistakes and trudge down well worn paths that worked in the past. The profession engineer must cultivate personal and intellectual virtues.
  
These virtues are not radically distinct from those sought by any maturing thinker. They determine the extent to which we think with insight and integrity, regardless of the subject. The engineering enterprise does however pose distinct questions for the engineer in pursuit of such virtue.
The humble engineer asks: •Does my experience really qualify me to work this issue? Am I quick to admit when I’’m in domains beyond my expertise?
•To what extent do my prejudices, attitudes or experiences bias my judgment?
•Am I open to consider novel approaches to this problem, and willing to learn and study where warranted?
The empathetic engineer asks: •To what extent have I analyzed the beliefs I hold which may impede my ability to think critically?
•Do I demonstrate a willingness to yield my positions when sufficient evidence is presented against them?
•To what extent am I willing to stand my ground against the majority (despite ridicule)?
The intellectually courageous engineer asks: •Do I listen and seek to understand others’ reasoning?
•Do I accurately represent viewpoints with which I disagree? Do I accurately represent their views?
•Do I appreciate insights in the technical views of others and prejudices in my own?
Intellectual integrity asks: •To what extent do I expect of myself what I expect of others?
•Do what extent are there contradictions or inconsistencies in the way I deal with technical issues?
•To what extent do I strive to recognize and eliminate self-deception or self-interest when reasoning through engineering issues?
The persevering engineer asks: •Am I willing to work my way through complexities in an engineering issue or do I tend to give up when challenged?
•Can I think of a difficult engineering problem in which I have demonstrated patience and tenacity?
Engineers with confidence in reason ask: •Am I willing to change my position when the evidence leads to a more reasonable position?
•Do I adhere to technical principles and evidence when persuading others of my position or do I distort matters to support my position?
•Do I encourage others to come to their own technical conclusions or do I try to coerce agreement?
Engineers with intellectual autonomy ask: •Do I think through technical issues on my own or do I merely accept others’ conclusions or judgments?
•Am I willing to stand alone against irrational criticism?
The fair-minded engineer asks: •Am I giving dissenting opinions adequate consideration?
•Has self-interest or bias clouded my judgment?  
FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THINKING
All thinking entails eight elements, regardless of the domain or subject about which we're thinking. Those eight elements provide a framework for analyzing either our own thinking or the thinking of others (such as in technical reports or designs). The questions below exemplify those posed by the mature engineering thinker, grouped according to the element of thinking upon which they touch.
Purpose  •What’’s the purpose of this design?
Question at hand •What product/process will best satisfy the customer’s performance, cost and schedule requirements?
Point of View •A design and manufacturing point of view is typically presumed-What other Points of View deserve consideration? Stock-holders? component vendors/suppliers? marketing/sales? customers? maintenance/repair/parts? regulators? community affairs? politicians? environmentalists?
Point of View •What environmental or operating conditions are assumed?
•What programmatic, financial, market, or technical risks are being accepted?
•What market/economic/competitive environment is assumed?
•What maturity level or maturation timeline is assumed for emerging technologies?
•What happens if we relax or discard an assumption?
Information  •What is the source of supporting information?
•What information do we lack? How can we get it?
•What experiments should be conducted?
•Have we considered all relevant sources?
Concepts  •What concepts are applicable to this problem?
•Are there competing models?
•What emerging theory might provide insight?
•What available or emerging technologies are appropriate?
Inferences  •What is the set of viable candidate solutions?
•Is there another way to interpret the information?
•Is the conclusion practicable and affordable?
Implications  •What are the market implications of the technology?
•Are there disposal, or environmental issues?
•What are the implications of product failure?




APPLYING INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS
Universal intellectual standards must be applied to thinking whenever one is interested in checking the quality of reasoning about a problem, issue, or situation. The standards are not unique to engineering, but are universal to all domains of thinking. To think professionally as an engineer entails having command of these standards. While there are a number of universal standards, we focus here on some of the most significant.

Clarity
Specific clarity questions in engineering include: •Are the market/mission requirements clearly stated?
•Have terms and symbols been clearly defined?
•Have the assumptions been clearly stated?
•Do drawings/graphs/photos and supporting annotations clearly portray important relationships?
Accuracy
Specific accuracy questions include: •What is your confidence in that data?
•Has the test equipment been calibrated? How/when?
•How have simulation models been validated?
•Have assumptions been challenged for legitimacy?
Precision
Specific precision questions include: •What are acceptable tolerances for diverse pieces of information?
•Has the test equipment been calibrated? How/when?
•What are the error bars or confidence bounds on experimental, handbook or analytical data?
Relevance
Engineers might ask questions of relevance: •Have all relevant factors been weighed (e.g.- environmental, or marketplace)?
•Are there unnecessary details obscuring the dominant factors?
•Has irrelevant data been included?
•Have important interrelationships been identified and studied?
•Have features and capabilities (and hence cost) been included which the customer neither needs nor wants?
Depth
Specific depth questions include: •Do models have adequate complexity and detail?
•At what threshold does detail or additional features stop adding value?
Breadth
For the engineer, specific breadth questions include: •Have the full range of options been explored?
•Have interactions with other systems been fully considered?
•What if the environment is other than we had expected (e.g.- hotter, colder, dusty, humid)?
Logical Validity
For the engineer, specific logic questions include: •Are the design decisions supported by good analysis?
•Are there hidden or unstated assumptions which should be challenged?
Fairness
Appropriate fairness questions include: •Have other points of view been considered (stock holders, manufacturing, sales, customers, public citizens, community interests, etc.)?
•Are vested interests inappropriately influencing the design?
•Are divergent views given due consideration?
•Have the environmental/safety impacts been appropriately weighed?
THE MODEL IN ENGINEERING EDUCATION
The following critical thinking exercises can employ the Engineering Reasoning Mini-Guide [5] as an in class supplement (suggested).
 
Fostering Intellectual Traits
Engineering students are likely puzzled at first by the suggestion that personal virtues relate to their success as engineers. The criticality of these traits becomes prominent in their interactions as members of teams. Consequently, introducing the standards and using them to foster development, is most effectively done in the context of their efforts to make their teams succeed.
As an introduction to the standards, and prior to commencing team efforts, students should read the descriptions and then discuss ensemble the value of these diverse traits. The questions they specifically want to discuss are why any of these traits will be beneficial to their team’s success, and why the absence of these traits will likely hinder the team’s performance.

At the conclusion of team projects, or coincident with major milestones (long duration projects), team members can be assigned to write a paragraph in which they identify a vignette in which they saw one of the intellectual traits exhibited in a way that benefited the team, and a second example identifying a vignette in which an individual or team deficit in the intellectual traits hampered team performance. The faculty member or team manager should then collate the vignettes stripping contributors’ names (recognizing the team manager may be the subject of either positive or negative vignettes). A group discussion of the results should be included as part of technical debrief.
Employing the Elements of Reasoning
The real power in this taxonomy of thinking is its scalability. A topic as large as an entire course or as small as an editorial in the newspaper or a single lecture can be decomposed using the elements. The student can be asked to decompose a journal article, course topic, textbook chapter or technical report using this framework. Opportunities abound for using the eight elements both in class and outside course-work.
The eight elements can be introduced to the students in several ways. The guide includes a number of templates and examples. The most effective way for the students to become comfortable working with the elements is to review an example and then immediately apply the template to some subject area.
On the opening day of a class, the entire class can be asked to identify the eight elements associated with the prerequisite course, e.g.- "Identify the eight elements associated with the class you finished last semester in Aerodynamics. What was the purpose of Aerodynamics? What question was it trying to answer? What was the point of view? What assumptions were commonly made? What information was brought to bear? What concepts were key? What conclusions were formed? What were the implications of the material you learned?" Once students were given 6-8 minutes to do this individually, they could then share their answers either in small groups, or as a class. They could then be assigned to skim their new text’s Table of Contents and decompose the new course according to the same template.
The faculty member is indispensable in keeping the elements close to the surface of the students thinking. This is best done by Socratic interaction in which the questions posed by professor apply to one of the eight elements: "What were the assumptions constraining this approach?" "What implications follow from this development?" "When we started to derive this relationship, what question are we trying to answer?" "What’s the source of this insight? Was it theoretical or experimental? What empirical support do we have for this theoretical result?"
At the end of any course segment or at the end of the entire course, the students can be tasked to decompose that chapter’s content or the entire course using the 8 elements. At any point during the course, the content of a relevant article can be decomposed.
The value of this practice is helping the student to provide a context for that segment or course. It provides a framework for recalling the importance of assumptions, recalling the big picture question at hand, and moving beyond the direct content to wrestling with its implications.
Teaching the Intellectual Standards
An effective means of introducing the intellectual standards is by means of reciprocal teaching. Using the Engineering Reasoning guide, students should be assigned in pairs to read the descriptions and example questions associated with Clarity and Accuracy (one student assigned to each). They should be given 3-4 minutes to prepare to explain their assigned standard to their partner, including both examples of representative questions from the guide, as well as an example they’ve created themselves.
In class, the standards provide a template for developing good questions to be posed in Socratic fashion. In doing so, the professor is modelling the thinking of mature engineers through the questions they pose.
Many of us struggled as new faculty trying to identify the most valuable feedback we could provide our students. On technical reports, for example, many of us wonder, "What comments can I provide a student that will best promote their learning from this experience?" The standards provide a ready vocabulary for identifying the weaknesses in student work. Moreover, if the professor’s feedback consistently appeals to the standards either explicitly or implicitly, and holds students to those standards, students will be more inclined to embrace the standards as the goal they are striving to achieve.
Ancillary Material
Vignettes in the back of the guide are intended to illustrate both successes and failures in engineering in our critical thinking vocabulary. They are included to foster discussion portraying the results of both excellent and deficit engineering reasoning. Students can be encouraged to research other historical examples and specifically evaluate how the success or failure of a technical enterprise turned on the quality of thought. While we commonly dissect accidents for their technical and organizational flaws, it is also illuminating to evaluate the thinking present in these episodes.
CONCLUSIONS
Our students’ critical thinking implicitly undergirds all the desired skills found in any engineering syllabus. As with other engineering endeavours, models are invaluable in understanding and articulating the connections and interactions of systems and environments. This paper applied a model of critical thinking to the mind of the mature engineer, with the goal of helping us understand how to describe our own thinking and hence better develop the thinking of engineering students. It also provided a brief list of ideas for directly applying the content to the engineering classroom.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must necessarily thank Richard Paul and Linda Elder for their decades of work as champions of critical thinking in education. It's been a delight to learn from them and collaborate in the preparation of the Engineering Reasoning guide from which this paper has been adapted.

REFERENCES
1.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle, NJ, 2002

2.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: How To Prepare Students For A Rapidly Changing World, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 1995.

3.www.criticalthinking.org/resources [cited 10 May 2006]

4.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Scientific Thinking, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2003.

5.Paul, R.W., Niewoehner, R.J., and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Engineering Reasoning, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2006.

6.Elder, L. "The State of Critical Thinking Today: The Need for a Substantive Concept of Critical Thinking" The State of Critical Thinking Today [cited 10 May 2006]
Much of this article is a summary of what is included in the Thinker's Guide to Engineering Reasoning, which is under the copyright of the Foundation For Critical Thinking. Any remainder is declared to be a work of the U.S. Federal Government, and is therefore public domain and may not be copyrighted.

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Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
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Translate this page from English...


Select LanguageAfrikaansAlbanianArabicArmenianAzerbaijaniBasqueBelarusianBengaliBosnianBulgarianCatalanCebuanoChichewaChinese (Simplified)Chinese (Traditional)CroatianCzechDanishDutchEsperantoEstonianFilipinoFinnishFrenchGalicianGeorgianGermanGreekGujaratiHaitian CreoleHausaHebrewHindiHmongHungarianIcelandicIgboIndonesianIrishItalianJapaneseJavaneseKannadaKazakhKhmerKoreanLaoLatinLatvianLithuanianMacedonianMalagasyMalayMalayalamMalteseMaoriMarathiMongolianMyanmar (Burmese)NepaliNorwegianPersianPolishPortuguesePunjabiRomanianRussianSerbianSesothoSinhalaSlovakSlovenianSomaliSpanishSundaneseSwahiliSwedishTajikTamilTeluguThaiTurkishUkrainianUrduUzbekVietnameseWelshYiddishYorubaZulu
Powered by Google   
 *Machine translated pages not guaranteed for accuracy.
Click Here for our professional translations.

Print Page  Change Text Size: T T T
 
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering


R. J. Niewoehner
United States Naval Academy, USA 
ABSTRACT
Richard Paul's critical thinking model was adapted to the challenge of engineering education, and published in July 2006 as a guide to Engineering Reasoning. Paul's model is briefly described and exemplified by questions engineers ask in practice. This paper describes classroom exercises employing the model which are suitable for undergraduate and graduate engineering program.

INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The intellect requires a voice. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, from the Foundation for Critical Thinking, have proposed a critical thinking model documented in various sources ([1], [2] and [3]), including over a dozen Thinkers’ Guides that apply this model to diverse disciplines (e.g.- [4]).
  
Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Here we apply a model to the way in which we think, an architecture whose purpose is aiding the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought. A new thinkers'  guide, Engineering Reasoning [5], applies this model to the engineering enterprise. This paper introduces this Thinkers’ Guide as a tool for engineering educators and students, summarizing its content and suggesting several exercises for its use in support of engineering course and project work.
The guide follows Paul's model, providing a framework for analyzing and evaluating engineering reports, designs, graphics, and entire disciplines. It articulates the questions that exemplify maturing engineering reasoning. Several examples are provided of both excellence and disaster in engineering reasoning. The model is also applied to areas which touch engineering such as creativity, craftsmanship, and ethics.
THE PROBLEM
Elder [6] cites a series of studies indicating that college faculty almost unanimously insist that promoting critical thinking ranks among the primary goals of their work. Lamentably, that same research indicates that few college professors can articulate a substantive understanding of critical thinking, and few can identify the elements of their teaching that specifically develop critical thinking. Reference [6] appeals for the development of a substantive view of critical thinking both within higher education.
A CRITICAL THINKING MODEL
To address Elder's observation above, the analysis and evaluation of our thinking as engineers requires a vocabulary of thinking and reasoning. The model that follows is not unique to engineering; indeed, its real power is its flexibility in adapting to any domain of life and thought. Other Thinkers' Guides apply this model to other disciplines. Engineers and scientists are quite comfortable working within the context of conceptual models. We employ thermodynamic models, electrical models, mathematical models, computer models or even physical models fashioned from wood or clay. Here we apply a model of the way in which we think, an architecture whose purpose aides the analysis and evaluation of thought, that we might improve our thought.
  
The model depicted in Figure 1 depicts Paul's model, which the guide develops, working from the base of the diagram up.


 
 
Figure 1: Richard Paul's Critical Thinking Model.


 ESSENTIAL INTELLECTUAL TRAITS
The engineer does not work in isolation, but in the context of enterprises, cultures and communities, each of which represents divergent interests and perspectives. Furthermore, no engineer can claim perfect objectivity; their work is unavoidably influenced by strengths and weaknesses, education, experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and self-interest. They avoid paths they associate with past mistakes and trudge down well worn paths that worked in the past. The profession engineer must cultivate personal and intellectual virtues.
  
These virtues are not radically distinct from those sought by any maturing thinker. They determine the extent to which we think with insight and integrity, regardless of the subject. The engineering enterprise does however pose distinct questions for the engineer in pursuit of such virtue.
The humble engineer asks: •Does my experience really qualify me to work this issue? Am I quick to admit when I’’m in domains beyond my expertise?
•To what extent do my prejudices, attitudes or experiences bias my judgment?
•Am I open to consider novel approaches to this problem, and willing to learn and study where warranted?
The empathetic engineer asks: •To what extent have I analyzed the beliefs I hold which may impede my ability to think critically?
•Do I demonstrate a willingness to yield my positions when sufficient evidence is presented against them?
•To what extent am I willing to stand my ground against the majority (despite ridicule)?
The intellectually courageous engineer asks: •Do I listen and seek to understand others’ reasoning?
•Do I accurately represent viewpoints with which I disagree? Do I accurately represent their views?
•Do I appreciate insights in the technical views of others and prejudices in my own?
Intellectual integrity asks: •To what extent do I expect of myself what I expect of others?
•Do what extent are there contradictions or inconsistencies in the way I deal with technical issues?
•To what extent do I strive to recognize and eliminate self-deception or self-interest when reasoning through engineering issues?
The persevering engineer asks: •Am I willing to work my way through complexities in an engineering issue or do I tend to give up when challenged?
•Can I think of a difficult engineering problem in which I have demonstrated patience and tenacity?
Engineers with confidence in reason ask: •Am I willing to change my position when the evidence leads to a more reasonable position?
•Do I adhere to technical principles and evidence when persuading others of my position or do I distort matters to support my position?
•Do I encourage others to come to their own technical conclusions or do I try to coerce agreement?
Engineers with intellectual autonomy ask: •Do I think through technical issues on my own or do I merely accept others’ conclusions or judgments?
•Am I willing to stand alone against irrational criticism?
The fair-minded engineer asks: •Am I giving dissenting opinions adequate consideration?
•Has self-interest or bias clouded my judgment?  
FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THINKING
All thinking entails eight elements, regardless of the domain or subject about which we're thinking. Those eight elements provide a framework for analyzing either our own thinking or the thinking of others (such as in technical reports or designs). The questions below exemplify those posed by the mature engineering thinker, grouped according to the element of thinking upon which they touch.
Purpose  •What’’s the purpose of this design?
Question at hand •What product/process will best satisfy the customer’s performance, cost and schedule requirements?
Point of View •A design and manufacturing point of view is typically presumed-What other Points of View deserve consideration? Stock-holders? component vendors/suppliers? marketing/sales? customers? maintenance/repair/parts? regulators? community affairs? politicians? environmentalists?
Point of View •What environmental or operating conditions are assumed?
•What programmatic, financial, market, or technical risks are being accepted?
•What market/economic/competitive environment is assumed?
•What maturity level or maturation timeline is assumed for emerging technologies?
•What happens if we relax or discard an assumption?
Information  •What is the source of supporting information?
•What information do we lack? How can we get it?
•What experiments should be conducted?
•Have we considered all relevant sources?
Concepts  •What concepts are applicable to this problem?
•Are there competing models?
•What emerging theory might provide insight?
•What available or emerging technologies are appropriate?
Inferences  •What is the set of viable candidate solutions?
•Is there another way to interpret the information?
•Is the conclusion practicable and affordable?
Implications  •What are the market implications of the technology?
•Are there disposal, or environmental issues?
•What are the implications of product failure?




APPLYING INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS
Universal intellectual standards must be applied to thinking whenever one is interested in checking the quality of reasoning about a problem, issue, or situation. The standards are not unique to engineering, but are universal to all domains of thinking. To think professionally as an engineer entails having command of these standards. While there are a number of universal standards, we focus here on some of the most significant.

Clarity
Specific clarity questions in engineering include: •Are the market/mission requirements clearly stated?
•Have terms and symbols been clearly defined?
•Have the assumptions been clearly stated?
•Do drawings/graphs/photos and supporting annotations clearly portray important relationships?
Accuracy
Specific accuracy questions include: •What is your confidence in that data?
•Has the test equipment been calibrated? How/when?
•How have simulation models been validated?
•Have assumptions been challenged for legitimacy?
Precision
Specific precision questions include: •What are acceptable tolerances for diverse pieces of information?
•Has the test equipment been calibrated? How/when?
•What are the error bars or confidence bounds on experimental, handbook or analytical data?
Relevance
Engineers might ask questions of relevance: •Have all relevant factors been weighed (e.g.- environmental, or marketplace)?
•Are there unnecessary details obscuring the dominant factors?
•Has irrelevant data been included?
•Have important interrelationships been identified and studied?
•Have features and capabilities (and hence cost) been included which the customer neither needs nor wants?
Depth
Specific depth questions include: •Do models have adequate complexity and detail?
•At what threshold does detail or additional features stop adding value?
Breadth
For the engineer, specific breadth questions include: •Have the full range of options been explored?
•Have interactions with other systems been fully considered?
•What if the environment is other than we had expected (e.g.- hotter, colder, dusty, humid)?
Logical Validity
For the engineer, specific logic questions include: •Are the design decisions supported by good analysis?
•Are there hidden or unstated assumptions which should be challenged?
Fairness
Appropriate fairness questions include: •Have other points of view been considered (stock holders, manufacturing, sales, customers, public citizens, community interests, etc.)?
•Are vested interests inappropriately influencing the design?
•Are divergent views given due consideration?
•Have the environmental/safety impacts been appropriately weighed?
THE MODEL IN ENGINEERING EDUCATION
The following critical thinking exercises can employ the Engineering Reasoning Mini-Guide [5] as an in class supplement (suggested).
 
Fostering Intellectual Traits
Engineering students are likely puzzled at first by the suggestion that personal virtues relate to their success as engineers. The criticality of these traits becomes prominent in their interactions as members of teams. Consequently, introducing the standards and using them to foster development, is most effectively done in the context of their efforts to make their teams succeed.
As an introduction to the standards, and prior to commencing team efforts, students should read the descriptions and then discuss ensemble the value of these diverse traits. The questions they specifically want to discuss are why any of these traits will be beneficial to their team’s success, and why the absence of these traits will likely hinder the team’s performance.

At the conclusion of team projects, or coincident with major milestones (long duration projects), team members can be assigned to write a paragraph in which they identify a vignette in which they saw one of the intellectual traits exhibited in a way that benefited the team, and a second example identifying a vignette in which an individual or team deficit in the intellectual traits hampered team performance. The faculty member or team manager should then collate the vignettes stripping contributors’ names (recognizing the team manager may be the subject of either positive or negative vignettes). A group discussion of the results should be included as part of technical debrief.
Employing the Elements of Reasoning
The real power in this taxonomy of thinking is its scalability. A topic as large as an entire course or as small as an editorial in the newspaper or a single lecture can be decomposed using the elements. The student can be asked to decompose a journal article, course topic, textbook chapter or technical report using this framework. Opportunities abound for using the eight elements both in class and outside course-work.
The eight elements can be introduced to the students in several ways. The guide includes a number of templates and examples. The most effective way for the students to become comfortable working with the elements is to review an example and then immediately apply the template to some subject area.
On the opening day of a class, the entire class can be asked to identify the eight elements associated with the prerequisite course, e.g.- "Identify the eight elements associated with the class you finished last semester in Aerodynamics. What was the purpose of Aerodynamics? What question was it trying to answer? What was the point of view? What assumptions were commonly made? What information was brought to bear? What concepts were key? What conclusions were formed? What were the implications of the material you learned?" Once students were given 6-8 minutes to do this individually, they could then share their answers either in small groups, or as a class. They could then be assigned to skim their new text’s Table of Contents and decompose the new course according to the same template.
The faculty member is indispensable in keeping the elements close to the surface of the students thinking. This is best done by Socratic interaction in which the questions posed by professor apply to one of the eight elements: "What were the assumptions constraining this approach?" "What implications follow from this development?" "When we started to derive this relationship, what question are we trying to answer?" "What’s the source of this insight? Was it theoretical or experimental? What empirical support do we have for this theoretical result?"
At the end of any course segment or at the end of the entire course, the students can be tasked to decompose that chapter’s content or the entire course using the 8 elements. At any point during the course, the content of a relevant article can be decomposed.
The value of this practice is helping the student to provide a context for that segment or course. It provides a framework for recalling the importance of assumptions, recalling the big picture question at hand, and moving beyond the direct content to wrestling with its implications.
Teaching the Intellectual Standards
An effective means of introducing the intellectual standards is by means of reciprocal teaching. Using the Engineering Reasoning guide, students should be assigned in pairs to read the descriptions and example questions associated with Clarity and Accuracy (one student assigned to each). They should be given 3-4 minutes to prepare to explain their assigned standard to their partner, including both examples of representative questions from the guide, as well as an example they’ve created themselves.
In class, the standards provide a template for developing good questions to be posed in Socratic fashion. In doing so, the professor is modelling the thinking of mature engineers through the questions they pose.
Many of us struggled as new faculty trying to identify the most valuable feedback we could provide our students. On technical reports, for example, many of us wonder, "What comments can I provide a student that will best promote their learning from this experience?" The standards provide a ready vocabulary for identifying the weaknesses in student work. Moreover, if the professor’s feedback consistently appeals to the standards either explicitly or implicitly, and holds students to those standards, students will be more inclined to embrace the standards as the goal they are striving to achieve.
Ancillary Material
Vignettes in the back of the guide are intended to illustrate both successes and failures in engineering in our critical thinking vocabulary. They are included to foster discussion portraying the results of both excellent and deficit engineering reasoning. Students can be encouraged to research other historical examples and specifically evaluate how the success or failure of a technical enterprise turned on the quality of thought. While we commonly dissect accidents for their technical and organizational flaws, it is also illuminating to evaluate the thinking present in these episodes.
CONCLUSIONS
Our students’ critical thinking implicitly undergirds all the desired skills found in any engineering syllabus. As with other engineering endeavours, models are invaluable in understanding and articulating the connections and interactions of systems and environments. This paper applied a model of critical thinking to the mind of the mature engineer, with the goal of helping us understand how to describe our own thinking and hence better develop the thinking of engineering students. It also provided a brief list of ideas for directly applying the content to the engineering classroom.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must necessarily thank Richard Paul and Linda Elder for their decades of work as champions of critical thinking in education. It's been a delight to learn from them and collaborate in the preparation of the Engineering Reasoning guide from which this paper has been adapted.

REFERENCES
1.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle, NJ, 2002

2.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., Critical Thinking: How To Prepare Students For A Rapidly Changing World, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 1995.

3.www.criticalthinking.org/resources [cited 10 May 2006]

4.Paul, R.W. and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Scientific Thinking, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2003.

5.Paul, R.W., Niewoehner, R.J., and Elder, L., A Miniature Guide to Engineering Reasoning, Foundation for Critical Thinking, Sonoma, CA, 2006.

6.Elder, L. "The State of Critical Thinking Today: The Need for a Substantive Concept of Critical Thinking" The State of Critical Thinking Today [cited 10 May 2006]
Much of this article is a summary of what is included in the Thinker's Guide to Engineering Reasoning, which is under the copyright of the Foundation For Critical Thinking. Any remainder is declared to be a work of the U.S. Federal Government, and is therefore public domain and may not be copyrighted.

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Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship

Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


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Natural Egocentric Dispositions




The Human Mind Is Naturally Prone
 To the Following Egocentric Tendencies
egocentric memory (the natural tendency to "forget" evidence and information which does not support our thinking and to "remember" evidence and information which does)
egocentric myopia (the natural tendency to think in an absolutist way within an overly narrow point of view)
egocentric infallibility (the natural tendency to think that our beliefs are true because we believe them)
egocentric righteousness (the natural tendency to feel superior in the light of our confidence that we are in the possession of THE TRUTH)
egocentric hypocrisy (the natural tendency to ignore flagrant inconsistencies between what we profess to believe and the actual beliefs our behavior imply, or inconsistencies between the standards to which we hold ourselves and those to which we expect others to adhere)
egocentric oversimplification (the natural tendency to ignore real and important complexities in the world in favor of simplistic notions when consideration of those complexities would require us to modify our beliefs or values)
egocentric blindness (the natural tendency not to notice facts or evidence which contradict our favored beliefs or values)
egocentric immediacy (the natural tendency to over-generalize immediate feelings and experiences--so that when one event in our life is highly favorable or unfavorable, all of life seems favorable or unfavorable as well)
egocentric absurdity (the natural tendency to fail to notice thinking which has "absurd" consequences, when noticing them would force us to rethink our position)
Taken from The Miniature Guide to the Human Mind




 




 
 
 
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Ethics Without Indoctrination

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Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering

Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission

Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship

Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


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Natural Egocentric Dispositions




The Human Mind Is Naturally Prone
 To the Following Egocentric Tendencies
egocentric memory (the natural tendency to "forget" evidence and information which does not support our thinking and to "remember" evidence and information which does)
egocentric myopia (the natural tendency to think in an absolutist way within an overly narrow point of view)
egocentric infallibility (the natural tendency to think that our beliefs are true because we believe them)
egocentric righteousness (the natural tendency to feel superior in the light of our confidence that we are in the possession of THE TRUTH)
egocentric hypocrisy (the natural tendency to ignore flagrant inconsistencies between what we profess to believe and the actual beliefs our behavior imply, or inconsistencies between the standards to which we hold ourselves and those to which we expect others to adhere)
egocentric oversimplification (the natural tendency to ignore real and important complexities in the world in favor of simplistic notions when consideration of those complexities would require us to modify our beliefs or values)
egocentric blindness (the natural tendency not to notice facts or evidence which contradict our favored beliefs or values)
egocentric immediacy (the natural tendency to over-generalize immediate feelings and experiences--so that when one event in our life is highly favorable or unfavorable, all of life seems favorable or unfavorable as well)
egocentric absurdity (the natural tendency to fail to notice thinking which has "absurd" consequences, when noticing them would force us to rethink our position)
Taken from The Miniature Guide to the Human Mind




 




 
 
 
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher

Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education

Ethics Without Indoctrination

Engineering Reasoning

Accelerating Change

Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering

Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission

Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship

Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


Translate this page from English...


Select LanguageAfrikaansAlbanianArabicArmenianAzerbaijaniBasqueBelarusianBengaliBosnianBulgarianCatalanCebuanoChichewaChinese (Simplified)Chinese (Traditional)CroatianCzechDanishDutchEsperantoEstonianFilipinoFinnishFrenchGalicianGeorgianGermanGreekGujaratiHaitian CreoleHausaHebrewHindiHmongHungarianIcelandicIgboIndonesianIrishItalianJapaneseJavaneseKannadaKazakhKhmerKoreanLaoLatinLatvianLithuanianMacedonianMalagasyMalayMalayalamMalteseMaoriMarathiMongolianMyanmar (Burmese)NepaliNorwegianPersianPolishPortuguesePunjabiRomanianRussianSerbianSesothoSinhalaSlovakSlovenianSomaliSpanishSundaneseSwahiliSwedishTajikTamilTeluguThaiTurkishUkrainianUrduUzbekVietnameseWelshYiddishYorubaZulu
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Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission


And Why It Will Be Difficult to Achieve
Linda Elder, July 2000
Since the inception of the two-year college almost a hundred years ago, it has served a unique role in the fabric of American society. The community college has sometimes been hailed as the last best chance for many older "returning" students who, for whatever reason, never pursued college upon graduation from high school, and who need to find an employment niche with little time to spare. It has also been regarded as a "secure" starting point for fresh high school grads who want to "get their feet wet" before going on to four year colleges or universities.
These are undoubtedly only two among a variety of reasons why each fall approximately 5.6 million students now choose the two-year college in this country. But perhaps the greatest contribution of the community college has been its emphasis on teaching students what they will need to become competent employees upon graduation. To a large extent students enroll in two-year college programs to gain skills and abilities necessary for employment; and many, if not most, community college faculty have maintained classrooms which emphasize learning the technical skills that enable students to do just that.
Until recently, classroom structures which involve "hands on learning" with primary focus on teaching technical skills have, in general, provided specialized abilities students have needed to find gainful employment. However, as the economic structure of the world becomes more complex, as technology continues to transform itself, as the rate of change accelerates, and as we become increasingly more interdependent both at home and abroad, "training" students for job performance in narrowly defined skill areas no longer serves students well.
The Emergent Requirements of Work
The emergent job market holds a number of challenges, for which the average worker simply is not prepared, given current educational practices:
1.the definition and status of virtually every job is in a state of increasing flux

2.entire fields of work now disappear with greater and greater frequency (and unpredictability)

3.more and more jobs involve increasing complexity

4.it is increasingly common for employees to have to understand and work with abstract systems (which are themselves in a continual state of flux)

5.employees are increasingly expected not only to use established procedures but to suggest new ones and be open to change and self-assessment

6.there is increasing emphasis on the ability to clearly communicate with others about mutual problems and the interfacing of multiple systems.
Keenly aware of this reality, Robert Reich, the former United States Secretary of Labor, has pointed out that competent employees in the coming years must be able to think in ways not only not yet emphasized in most present instruction, but in ways that are unpredictable except in broad terms. In The Work of Nations (1992), Reich puts it this way
“...in the new economy--replete with unidentified problems, unknown solutions, and untried means of putting them together--mastery of old domains of knowledge isn’t nearly enough to guarantee a good income. Nor, importantly, is it even necessary...Facts, codes, formulae, and rules are easily accessible. What is much more valuable is the capacity to effectively and creatively use the knowledge (p. 182).”
Indeed successful workers of the future must possess intellectual tools which will render them mentally flexible and intellectually disciplined, and thus able to bring higher level thinking to bear on higher level problems. They must, in essence, be able to think critically, to do things with their minds that enable them to effectively handle complex intellectual tasks -- many of which they were not trained for.
 According to Reich, instruction which adequately prepares students to function well as high level thinkers,
"instead of emphasizing the transmission of information, the focus is on judgment and interpretation. The student is taught to get behind the data - to ask why certain facts have been selected, why they are assumed to be important, how they were deduced, and how they might be contradicted. The student learns to examine reality from many angles, in different lights, and thus to visualize new possibilities and choices (p. 230)."
Through such emphasis in the classroom, the mind, he says "is trained to be skeptical, curious, and creative (p. 230)."
The higher order thinking that will be required in successful workers of the future is best understood as disciplined reasoning that directs and redirects thinking along a problem solving path, clarifying and checking itself as it goes. To get a glimpse of such disciplined reasoning consider this hypothetical rendering of the inner voice of the critical thinker--reasoning through an issue:
Let’s see...what exactly is the problem? Is there another way to view it? Is this a question that requires judgment, or is there an established procedure for solving it? What information do I need to gather to address the problem? Have I gathered a sufficient amount of information? Is there another way to interpret this information? Do I need to consider some other points of view? What am I taking for granted? Am I making some assumptions I need to question? Have I considered all the possibilities? What are the implications if I make this decision? And if I make that?...
Sooner or later, employees of the future will be able to make intellectual moves such as these. After all, large amounts of money are made or lost:
•in virtue of attention to, or inattention to, accuracy and precision of information

•in virtue of recognizing, or failing to recognize, important implications

•in virtue of grasping, or failing to grasp, important assumptions

•of interpreting, or failing to interpret, information in alternative ways

•of seeing, or failing to see, a situation from alternative points of view

•of structuring thinking so that is clear and relevant, precise and logical, or failing to so structure thinking, resulting in thinking that it is sloppy, confused, irrelevant, imprecise or illogical
What Does This Mean for Our Conception of Instruction?
Given this reality, it is clear that we are faced with a serious problem. The swiftly changing economic world requires of our graduates intellectual capabilities which traditional instruction simply is not fostering. To effectively teach, we cannot merely make minor changes in classroom practices. The old model of education no longer serves us well. We need a radically new way of thinking about instruction that replaces instructional beliefs and practices out of alignment with economic reality and transforms our view of education itself.
In what follows I provide a foundation for beginning to understand the conceptual and theoretical changes that must take place in the mind of community college instructors if such a transformation is to be achieved. It should be noted, however, that I will not be dealing, except in passing, with the kinds of teaching strategies that these conceptual changes require. In this article I will simply draw some important contrasts between the thinking behind the present model and that required by the emergent future.
The Struggle of the Old and the New
Before we begin our brief journey, let’s get an overview of the path we shall follow. There are three dimensions I will delineate, though the reader should remember that the dimensions are non-linear in nature and hence do not describe a sequence in either teaching or learning. The sequence I present is one of convenience only.
In the first dimension, I sketch a new understanding of "content" and how it is to be "covered." Here we move from thinking about "covering" content through traditional lectures to thinking about how to challenge students to think through the content in a deeply engaged way. We no longer think of content as a collection of data, concepts, and procedures, but as a dynamic mode of thinking, which is truly comprehended only by an actively engaged thinker. "I don’t give you data to memorize about management, I expect you to think like a manager." In this model, history is taught as historical thinking, accounting as the art of thinking like an accountant, etc.
In the second dimension, the nature of thinking itself is re-thought. It is no longer enough to simply process the steps of an established procedure; one must learn how to use thinking to examine critically the procedures in use. In this dimension we are forced to another facet of the new model: a new and explicit understanding of the elemental components of reasoning--structures which students must learn to use explicitly. In the new model, we teach students how to manipulate these "structures" explicitly to improve their reasoning. Through this new mode of self-command students learn how to learn, how to internalize new systems and procedures. For example, in the new model students learn the discipline of distinguishing three kinds of questions: "one-system" questions, "no-system" questions, and "multi-system" questions. Understanding this distinction enables students to move from a primary focus on questions of simple fact to more challenging questions which require advanced reasoned judgment.
In the third dimension, there is a shift at the level of standards. We move from an emphasis on narrow or domain-specific technical criteria to an emphasis on teaching universal intellectual standards. In the new model, we teach students how to use universal standards that enable them to monitor their thinking, to adequately assess and improve it.
In general, you should note that all of the changes the new model of instruction requires are ones that reflect a fundamental re-orientation--from training a mind that simply follows established directions and procedures to educating a person who analyzes, evaluates, and produces new directions and new procedures. We move to an emphasis on effectively confronting the complexities inherent in a rapidly changing world.
Dimension One:
 Content as Thinking
In the old approach to instruction, content has been understood as information students assemble from textbooks and lectures, or as procedures detailed in a manual. The content is "given" to students. The students then "give it back" to the instructor in the same form they received it. Rote memorization is the dominant mode of learning. Regurgitation. Commit it to memory. Spit it back. When exam times come, students cram, cram, cram.
In the new model, content is thought through by the students in challenging activities. Content is treated as inseparable from thinking. In fact content is understood precisely as a mode of thinking. Geography is understood as geographical thinking; Anatomy as anatomical thinking; Chemistry as chemical thinking; etc.
For example, an instructor might begin a basic algebra class with the announcement that the course will focus on algebraic thinking. The students would then be coached in algebraic thinking in collaborative groups. The students would be expected to explain how they were using algebraic principles in their thinking. Seminal insights into basic principles of algebra would replace memorization of algorithms and fixed algebraic procedures. Instructors would ensure that genuine understanding was achieved before students would move to new concepts.
In a new model history class, for example, we would want students to reason historically in a multitude of ways, including being able to ask important questions that historians ask. But even more important we want students to be able to deal with the historical questions in their own lives and to develop question-analyzing skills that they can use in every subject they study. We want them, routinely, to be able to relate the questions they study in one class to questions in other classes, and to important questions in their lives. We want them thinking so that they are continually making connections and weaving important ideas together.
To sum up the first dimension, the new model our teaching is based on the assumption that to effectively learn content students must critically think it through. Thus, as instructors, we aim at the dual purpose of helping students develop their reasoning abilities (in general) while they are “thinking through” our content (in particular). In participating in a new model class, students are simultaneously learning highly transferable intellectual skills as they are approaching domain-specific problems. The domain-specific problems are approached with a view to how we can approach any problem in any context. Thus we use our content, not as an end in itself, but as a powerful academic means to the broader goal of teaching students how to clearly articulate problems, how to gather information to address those problems, and how to come up with feasible solutions--irrespective of the domain of the problems.
Dimension Two:
 Rethinking Thinking and Its Parts
In the second dimension, the very nature of thinking itself is re-thought. No longer is it enough to blindly follow the steps of a procedure, the student must now learn how to actively reason between and among conflicting procedures, to make decisions involving conflicting systems, to exercise conscious reasoned judgment.
 In the old model, reasoning was understood as a narrow set of skills students needed to learn to perform certain specific tasks on the job. "Follow this step by step procedure to solve these problems." "When this happens take this step."
"When that happens take this other step." Thinking is proceduralized. Reasoned judgment, involving the comparing of conflicting procedures, was minimized.
 The new model focuses on developing in the minds of students awareness of the possibility of their making a whole family of powerful intellectual moves, intellectual patterns which aid them in reasoning well with respect to any issue or problem they might face. In the new model, students to learn to go beyond strict procedures.
They learn to assess and improve procedures. To do this they need to know how to "orchestrate" intellectual acts in their minds while they are reasoning. They must learn a systematic way to take their thinking apart--irrespective of what they are thinking about. Such skills require an insight into how the intellect functions when it is reasoning well. Let’s look at those key functions briefly.
According to one of the best known authorities on critical thinking, Richard Paul (1995), whenever we reason, however well or poorly, we use eight structures. The structures include question, purpose, information, interpretation, assumptions, concepts, point of view, and implications. These "elements" are always embedded in our thinking, for:
•whenever we reason, we do so for a purpose

•our purpose requires us to settle or answer at least one question

•to answer our question, we need some information

•to use that information, we must interpret it

•to interpret it, we must use some concepts

•to use some concepts, we must make some assumptions

•to make some assumptions, we must think within a point of view

•however, we think our thinking has implications
Being able to take charge of our thinking in a broad and disciplined manner requires that we learn how to routinely take charge of these kinds of structures. How well we do so ultimately determines the quality of our reasoning in any given situation. For example, take the category of "question" as a case in point.
In the old model, problem-centered instruction primarily focused on questions of fact (one-system questions), questions for which there is only one right answer (because we have a system in place for answering them). And when facing a complicated question with better and worse answers, students often reasoned poorly. These "solutions" they came up with were often poorly supported because the students lacked perspective in reasoning whenever they did not have a fixed procedure to follow.
In contrast, the new model focuses, not on questions of fact (though of course students must master questions of fact), but primarily on questions that require students to make reasoned judgments (multi-system questions). Why? Because complex problems, the type they will face when they enter the workplace, inherently call for high quality judgments between conflicting systems or approaches.
In the new model, then, students learn to explicitly identify the kind of problem or question they are dealing with (Richard Paul, 1995). Is it a one-system question (with one correct answer)? Is it a no-system question (with every answer a matter of pure subjective preference)? Or is it a multi-system question (with better and worse answers)? Let us now look more closely at these three kinds of questions.
 The first type of question involves one established system or procedure for obtaining the answer. The objective when dealing with questions in this category is to determine what that established method is, and then to follow the identified method to the answer. These are questions of fact, or knowledge. Examples are: What is the boiling point of lead? What is the differential of this equation? What is the chemical composition of air? How does the motherboard on this type of computer work?"
The old mode of instruction focuses predominantly on these one-system questions and treats them as ends themselves. In the new model questions of fact are mastered in relation to questions that call for reasoned judgment. Thus students learn the value of being able to find information; they learn various ways to locate facts; but they learn to do so primarily as part of the reasoning process when dealing with complex questions.
The second type of question, questions involving preference, are questions for which there are as many right answers as there are individual responses. Examples of this sort of question include "What is your favorite color of cabinet? What type of food do you like best? Would you rather wear blue jeans or sweat pants? What kind of job do you enjoy best? Answers to this second type of question cannot be critiqued since they involve pure subjective taste. Thus in the new mode of instruction students learn that answers to such questions cannot be assessed. Any answer is as good as any other answer. As a result we avoid focusing attention on these dead-end questions. We set the purely subjective aside to deal with those matters where judgment and quality of reasoning are essential.
The third type of question is, as we have seen, that which is dominant in the new economic realities. These are questions to which there is no one right or wrong answer, though evidence and reasoning are essential to the plausible answering of them. There is no one established way of thinking about them, though how we think about them has important implications in our economic lives. These are questions which frequently call for crucial answers.
Our economic success often depends upon them. They are questions that require our best thinking--because they require thinking within multiple points of view and marshaling information in the best way we can. Questions in this category include: "What are the best methods for reducing crime in America? What is our best strategy for meeting the new product line introduced by our competitor? How can we best invest this capital? What is the best strategy for increasing our productivity level while also improving the quality of our products? How can we improve morale at the same time that we downsize?"
Being able to routinely distinguish one-system, non-system, and multi-system questions illustrates one important way in which students must learn to take command of the various component structures in their thought. If they don’t achieve intellectual control over the problem they are trying to solve, they will not be able to solve it. We cannot solve problems we don’t understand.
In the new model, then, we explicitly teach students to take their thinking apart, to take charge of the structures in which they are reasoning, and we do this in conjunction with students learning a set of universal standards for assessing thinking. Let us now turn to the question of standards.




Dimension Three:
 Teaching Students Universal Intellectual Standards
In the third dimension, we recognize the need for universal standards for thought. The old model of instruction emphasized domain-specific technical criteria. "Perform this procedure in this way." "Answer 90% of the test questions correctly." "Follow these directions." "Demonstrate that you can apply these mathematical formulas."
The new approach, concerned with holding students responsible for their thinking in a generalizable way emphasizes broad-based, not domain-specific intellectual standards. Thus students come to understand what it means to think and to act as persons who are intellectually responsible for their performance--in general, not just in standardized technical problems they can predict. For example, the new model emphasizes the following:
1.to think well, one must think clearly

2.to think well, one must think accurately

3.to think well, one must think precisely

4.to think well, one must think relevantly

5.to think well one must think deeply

6.to think well, one must think broad-mindedly

7.to think well, one must think logically.
In the old model students often learned how to function competently only in a narrow job and with standard problems, while their thinking in general remained largely undisciplined. Outside a narrow sphere of performance they often thought unclearly, inaccurately, imprecisely, irrelevantly, superficially, and illogically. Needless to say this did not auger well for their performance outside their special competence.
As long as much of student thinking remains subconscious--as it does for most students (since they lack the skills to bring it to their conscious minds for scrutiny)--it tends to operate with "standards" that cannot consciously be justified. In fact, if we pay special attention to how students decide to accept or reject ideas, we will find that most students use standards that are actually anti-intellectual in nature. They use standards that emerge from primitive human drives, standards that subconsciously control their thinking and leave their thinking deeply flawed.
Here are the most common standards that students use (unfortunately, they are precisely the ones most undisciplined thinkers use). They are:
1.believe an idea if it agrees with what you already believe (an egocentric standard)

2.believe an idea if it agrees with what your friends or associates believe (a sociocentric standard)

3.believe an idea if you want to believe it (an exercise in willful self-deception).
Think of the way the brass of Detroit auto reasoned during the 15 years that they were losing market share to the Japanese: "These Japanese cars are nothing but a fad. Americans don’t want small economic cars. They want style and size and comfort. We just need to outlast the fad, not change our basic manufacturing strategies." It wasn’t until Detroit went virtually bankrupt that they considered an alternative line of thought. Their agreement with each other, their tendency to believe what they wanted to believe, were the ruling standards for their thinking. They invested billions in lousy thinking. And the US economy suffered a severe blow because of it.
Obviously, these are not standards for thinking that we want to foster in our students. Yet the old model fails to teach students how to recognize when these standards are at work in their thinking.
In the new model, however, students are taught to guard against natural human tendencies to believe what agrees with them or what they want to believe. Instead they learn to how to maximize objectivity in assessment, however painful the "truth" might be. Without this discipline, students will be frustrated in complicated or messy problems and will retreat to comfortable beliefs. Accordingly, instead of exercising self-determination in their thinking, students become victims of their thinking. In the old model, students don’t control their thinking; their thinking controls them.
Conclusion
It is now undebatable that workers of tomorrow must have basic critical thinking abilities if they are to function well in the complex world of accelerating change that now faces them. They must have the intellectual skills to competently address new questions and problems inherent in the new emerging world of work. This involves the ability to take thinking apart and analyze it, as well as to consistently apply intellectual standards to it. They must be able to accurately and consistently assess their thinking, to determine, their own strengths and weaknesses and project strategies for continual improvement.
Since two-year colleges have historically led the higher education community in preparing students for the world of work, they are in a unique position to take the lead once again. But this involves commitment and leadership on the part of the faculty and the administration.
The shift from the old to the new model is not a casual or easy shift. It will be years before it occurs at most four-year colleges and universities--where teaching effectiveness is a secondary factor. It will not occur easily at any level of education.
It will certainly not occur at the community college level simply because community college faculty read a general argument for the new model such as this article constitutes. One might begin with such an article. But one does not end with it. Faculty need quality Inservice in the design of instruction based on new model criteria. They need paradigms. They need examples. They need practice. And they need to be encouraged and rewarded for designing new model classes.
If we are to make the changes necessary for our students to compete in a highly complex global market, the band-aid, quick fix approach to transforming our educational systems must be abandoned. With leadership and determination the new community college of the future can and will emerge. But that leadership and determination will not be successfully generated unless we are willing to do the intellectual work necessary to transform our own thinking. We need to think our own way into new conceptions about what teaching and learning are all about. We need bona fide critical thinking. As Richard Paul has said:
“What we can be sure of is that the persuasiveness of the argument for critical thinking will only grow year by year, day by day -- for the logic of the argument is simply the only prudent response to the accelerating change, to the increasing complexity of our world. No gimmick, no crafty substitute, can be found for the cultivation of quality thinking. The quality of our lives can only become more and more obviously the product of the quality of the thinking we use to create them (p. 16)...Our students deserve at least a fighting chance to compete, to rise to the challenge of the day (p.5).”
All quotes by Richard Paul in this article are taken from the book by Paul, R. (1995). Critical Thinking: How to Prepare Students for a Rapidly Changing World. Dillon Beach: Foundation For Critical Thinking
Go to top






Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Commun
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



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Natural Egocentric Dispositions

Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking

Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship

Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence


  


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Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission


And Why It Will Be Difficult to Achieve
Linda Elder, July 2000
Since the inception of the two-year college almost a hundred years ago, it has served a unique role in the fabric of American society. The community college has sometimes been hailed as the last best chance for many older "returning" students who, for whatever reason, never pursued college upon graduation from high school, and who need to find an employment niche with little time to spare. It has also been regarded as a "secure" starting point for fresh high school grads who want to "get their feet wet" before going on to four year colleges or universities.
These are undoubtedly only two among a variety of reasons why each fall approximately 5.6 million students now choose the two-year college in this country. But perhaps the greatest contribution of the community college has been its emphasis on teaching students what they will need to become competent employees upon graduation. To a large extent students enroll in two-year college programs to gain skills and abilities necessary for employment; and many, if not most, community college faculty have maintained classrooms which emphasize learning the technical skills that enable students to do just that.
Until recently, classroom structures which involve "hands on learning" with primary focus on teaching technical skills have, in general, provided specialized abilities students have needed to find gainful employment. However, as the economic structure of the world becomes more complex, as technology continues to transform itself, as the rate of change accelerates, and as we become increasingly more interdependent both at home and abroad, "training" students for job performance in narrowly defined skill areas no longer serves students well.
The Emergent Requirements of Work
The emergent job market holds a number of challenges, for which the average worker simply is not prepared, given current educational practices:
1.the definition and status of virtually every job is in a state of increasing flux

2.entire fields of work now disappear with greater and greater frequency (and unpredictability)

3.more and more jobs involve increasing complexity

4.it is increasingly common for employees to have to understand and work with abstract systems (which are themselves in a continual state of flux)

5.employees are increasingly expected not only to use established procedures but to suggest new ones and be open to change and self-assessment

6.there is increasing emphasis on the ability to clearly communicate with others about mutual problems and the interfacing of multiple systems.
Keenly aware of this reality, Robert Reich, the former United States Secretary of Labor, has pointed out that competent employees in the coming years must be able to think in ways not only not yet emphasized in most present instruction, but in ways that are unpredictable except in broad terms. In The Work of Nations (1992), Reich puts it this way
“...in the new economy--replete with unidentified problems, unknown solutions, and untried means of putting them together--mastery of old domains of knowledge isn’t nearly enough to guarantee a good income. Nor, importantly, is it even necessary...Facts, codes, formulae, and rules are easily accessible. What is much more valuable is the capacity to effectively and creatively use the knowledge (p. 182).”
Indeed successful workers of the future must possess intellectual tools which will render them mentally flexible and intellectually disciplined, and thus able to bring higher level thinking to bear on higher level problems. They must, in essence, be able to think critically, to do things with their minds that enable them to effectively handle complex intellectual tasks -- many of which they were not trained for.
 According to Reich, instruction which adequately prepares students to function well as high level thinkers,
"instead of emphasizing the transmission of information, the focus is on judgment and interpretation. The student is taught to get behind the data - to ask why certain facts have been selected, why they are assumed to be important, how they were deduced, and how they might be contradicted. The student learns to examine reality from many angles, in different lights, and thus to visualize new possibilities and choices (p. 230)."
Through such emphasis in the classroom, the mind, he says "is trained to be skeptical, curious, and creative (p. 230)."
The higher order thinking that will be required in successful workers of the future is best understood as disciplined reasoning that directs and redirects thinking along a problem solving path, clarifying and checking itself as it goes. To get a glimpse of such disciplined reasoning consider this hypothetical rendering of the inner voice of the critical thinker--reasoning through an issue:
Let’s see...what exactly is the problem? Is there another way to view it? Is this a question that requires judgment, or is there an established procedure for solving it? What information do I need to gather to address the problem? Have I gathered a sufficient amount of information? Is there another way to interpret this information? Do I need to consider some other points of view? What am I taking for granted? Am I making some assumptions I need to question? Have I considered all the possibilities? What are the implications if I make this decision? And if I make that?...
Sooner or later, employees of the future will be able to make intellectual moves such as these. After all, large amounts of money are made or lost:
•in virtue of attention to, or inattention to, accuracy and precision of information

•in virtue of recognizing, or failing to recognize, important implications

•in virtue of grasping, or failing to grasp, important assumptions

•of interpreting, or failing to interpret, information in alternative ways

•of seeing, or failing to see, a situation from alternative points of view

•of structuring thinking so that is clear and relevant, precise and logical, or failing to so structure thinking, resulting in thinking that it is sloppy, confused, irrelevant, imprecise or illogical
What Does This Mean for Our Conception of Instruction?
Given this reality, it is clear that we are faced with a serious problem. The swiftly changing economic world requires of our graduates intellectual capabilities which traditional instruction simply is not fostering. To effectively teach, we cannot merely make minor changes in classroom practices. The old model of education no longer serves us well. We need a radically new way of thinking about instruction that replaces instructional beliefs and practices out of alignment with economic reality and transforms our view of education itself.
In what follows I provide a foundation for beginning to understand the conceptual and theoretical changes that must take place in the mind of community college instructors if such a transformation is to be achieved. It should be noted, however, that I will not be dealing, except in passing, with the kinds of teaching strategies that these conceptual changes require. In this article I will simply draw some important contrasts between the thinking behind the present model and that required by the emergent future.
The Struggle of the Old and the New
Before we begin our brief journey, let’s get an overview of the path we shall follow. There are three dimensions I will delineate, though the reader should remember that the dimensions are non-linear in nature and hence do not describe a sequence in either teaching or learning. The sequence I present is one of convenience only.
In the first dimension, I sketch a new understanding of "content" and how it is to be "covered." Here we move from thinking about "covering" content through traditional lectures to thinking about how to challenge students to think through the content in a deeply engaged way. We no longer think of content as a collection of data, concepts, and procedures, but as a dynamic mode of thinking, which is truly comprehended only by an actively engaged thinker. "I don’t give you data to memorize about management, I expect you to think like a manager." In this model, history is taught as historical thinking, accounting as the art of thinking like an accountant, etc.
In the second dimension, the nature of thinking itself is re-thought. It is no longer enough to simply process the steps of an established procedure; one must learn how to use thinking to examine critically the procedures in use. In this dimension we are forced to another facet of the new model: a new and explicit understanding of the elemental components of reasoning--structures which students must learn to use explicitly. In the new model, we teach students how to manipulate these "structures" explicitly to improve their reasoning. Through this new mode of self-command students learn how to learn, how to internalize new systems and procedures. For example, in the new model students learn the discipline of distinguishing three kinds of questions: "one-system" questions, "no-system" questions, and "multi-system" questions. Understanding this distinction enables students to move from a primary focus on questions of simple fact to more challenging questions which require advanced reasoned judgment.
In the third dimension, there is a shift at the level of standards. We move from an emphasis on narrow or domain-specific technical criteria to an emphasis on teaching universal intellectual standards. In the new model, we teach students how to use universal standards that enable them to monitor their thinking, to adequately assess and improve it.
In general, you should note that all of the changes the new model of instruction requires are ones that reflect a fundamental re-orientation--from training a mind that simply follows established directions and procedures to educating a person who analyzes, evaluates, and produces new directions and new procedures. We move to an emphasis on effectively confronting the complexities inherent in a rapidly changing world.
Dimension One:
 Content as Thinking
In the old approach to instruction, content has been understood as information students assemble from textbooks and lectures, or as procedures detailed in a manual. The content is "given" to students. The students then "give it back" to the instructor in the same form they received it. Rote memorization is the dominant mode of learning. Regurgitation. Commit it to memory. Spit it back. When exam times come, students cram, cram, cram.
In the new model, content is thought through by the students in challenging activities. Content is treated as inseparable from thinking. In fact content is understood precisely as a mode of thinking. Geography is understood as geographical thinking; Anatomy as anatomical thinking; Chemistry as chemical thinking; etc.
For example, an instructor might begin a basic algebra class with the announcement that the course will focus on algebraic thinking. The students would then be coached in algebraic thinking in collaborative groups. The students would be expected to explain how they were using algebraic principles in their thinking. Seminal insights into basic principles of algebra would replace memorization of algorithms and fixed algebraic procedures. Instructors would ensure that genuine understanding was achieved before students would move to new concepts.
In a new model history class, for example, we would want students to reason historically in a multitude of ways, including being able to ask important questions that historians ask. But even more important we want students to be able to deal with the historical questions in their own lives and to develop question-analyzing skills that they can use in every subject they study. We want them, routinely, to be able to relate the questions they study in one class to questions in other classes, and to important questions in their lives. We want them thinking so that they are continually making connections and weaving important ideas together.
To sum up the first dimension, the new model our teaching is based on the assumption that to effectively learn content students must critically think it through. Thus, as instructors, we aim at the dual purpose of helping students develop their reasoning abilities (in general) while they are “thinking through” our content (in particular). In participating in a new model class, students are simultaneously learning highly transferable intellectual skills as they are approaching domain-specific problems. The domain-specific problems are approached with a view to how we can approach any problem in any context. Thus we use our content, not as an end in itself, but as a powerful academic means to the broader goal of teaching students how to clearly articulate problems, how to gather information to address those problems, and how to come up with feasible solutions--irrespective of the domain of the problems.
Dimension Two:
 Rethinking Thinking and Its Parts
In the second dimension, the very nature of thinking itself is re-thought. No longer is it enough to blindly follow the steps of a procedure, the student must now learn how to actively reason between and among conflicting procedures, to make decisions involving conflicting systems, to exercise conscious reasoned judgment.
 In the old model, reasoning was understood as a narrow set of skills students needed to learn to perform certain specific tasks on the job. "Follow this step by step procedure to solve these problems." "When this happens take this step."
"When that happens take this other step." Thinking is proceduralized. Reasoned judgment, involving the comparing of conflicting procedures, was minimized.
 The new model focuses on developing in the minds of students awareness of the possibility of their making a whole family of powerful intellectual moves, intellectual patterns which aid them in reasoning well with respect to any issue or problem they might face. In the new model, students to learn to go beyond strict procedures.
They learn to assess and improve procedures. To do this they need to know how to "orchestrate" intellectual acts in their minds while they are reasoning. They must learn a systematic way to take their thinking apart--irrespective of what they are thinking about. Such skills require an insight into how the intellect functions when it is reasoning well. Let’s look at those key functions briefly.
According to one of the best known authorities on critical thinking, Richard Paul (1995), whenever we reason, however well or poorly, we use eight structures. The structures include question, purpose, information, interpretation, assumptions, concepts, point of view, and implications. These "elements" are always embedded in our thinking, for:
•whenever we reason, we do so for a purpose

•our purpose requires us to settle or answer at least one question

•to answer our question, we need some information

•to use that information, we must interpret it

•to interpret it, we must use some concepts

•to use some concepts, we must make some assumptions

•to make some assumptions, we must think within a point of view

•however, we think our thinking has implications
Being able to take charge of our thinking in a broad and disciplined manner requires that we learn how to routinely take charge of these kinds of structures. How well we do so ultimately determines the quality of our reasoning in any given situation. For example, take the category of "question" as a case in point.
In the old model, problem-centered instruction primarily focused on questions of fact (one-system questions), questions for which there is only one right answer (because we have a system in place for answering them). And when facing a complicated question with better and worse answers, students often reasoned poorly. These "solutions" they came up with were often poorly supported because the students lacked perspective in reasoning whenever they did not have a fixed procedure to follow.
In contrast, the new model focuses, not on questions of fact (though of course students must master questions of fact), but primarily on questions that require students to make reasoned judgments (multi-system questions). Why? Because complex problems, the type they will face when they enter the workplace, inherently call for high quality judgments between conflicting systems or approaches.
In the new model, then, students learn to explicitly identify the kind of problem or question they are dealing with (Richard Paul, 1995). Is it a one-system question (with one correct answer)? Is it a no-system question (with every answer a matter of pure subjective preference)? Or is it a multi-system question (with better and worse answers)? Let us now look more closely at these three kinds of questions.
 The first type of question involves one established system or procedure for obtaining the answer. The objective when dealing with questions in this category is to determine what that established method is, and then to follow the identified method to the answer. These are questions of fact, or knowledge. Examples are: What is the boiling point of lead? What is the differential of this equation? What is the chemical composition of air? How does the motherboard on this type of computer work?"
The old mode of instruction focuses predominantly on these one-system questions and treats them as ends themselves. In the new model questions of fact are mastered in relation to questions that call for reasoned judgment. Thus students learn the value of being able to find information; they learn various ways to locate facts; but they learn to do so primarily as part of the reasoning process when dealing with complex questions.
The second type of question, questions involving preference, are questions for which there are as many right answers as there are individual responses. Examples of this sort of question include "What is your favorite color of cabinet? What type of food do you like best? Would you rather wear blue jeans or sweat pants? What kind of job do you enjoy best? Answers to this second type of question cannot be critiqued since they involve pure subjective taste. Thus in the new mode of instruction students learn that answers to such questions cannot be assessed. Any answer is as good as any other answer. As a result we avoid focusing attention on these dead-end questions. We set the purely subjective aside to deal with those matters where judgment and quality of reasoning are essential.
The third type of question is, as we have seen, that which is dominant in the new economic realities. These are questions to which there is no one right or wrong answer, though evidence and reasoning are essential to the plausible answering of them. There is no one established way of thinking about them, though how we think about them has important implications in our economic lives. These are questions which frequently call for crucial answers.
Our economic success often depends upon them. They are questions that require our best thinking--because they require thinking within multiple points of view and marshaling information in the best way we can. Questions in this category include: "What are the best methods for reducing crime in America? What is our best strategy for meeting the new product line introduced by our competitor? How can we best invest this capital? What is the best strategy for increasing our productivity level while also improving the quality of our products? How can we improve morale at the same time that we downsize?"
Being able to routinely distinguish one-system, non-system, and multi-system questions illustrates one important way in which students must learn to take command of the various component structures in their thought. If they don’t achieve intellectual control over the problem they are trying to solve, they will not be able to solve it. We cannot solve problems we don’t understand.
In the new model, then, we explicitly teach students to take their thinking apart, to take charge of the structures in which they are reasoning, and we do this in conjunction with students learning a set of universal standards for assessing thinking. Let us now turn to the question of standards.




Dimension Three:
 Teaching Students Universal Intellectual Standards
In the third dimension, we recognize the need for universal standards for thought. The old model of instruction emphasized domain-specific technical criteria. "Perform this procedure in this way." "Answer 90% of the test questions correctly." "Follow these directions." "Demonstrate that you can apply these mathematical formulas."
The new approach, concerned with holding students responsible for their thinking in a generalizable way emphasizes broad-based, not domain-specific intellectual standards. Thus students come to understand what it means to think and to act as persons who are intellectually responsible for their performance--in general, not just in standardized technical problems they can predict. For example, the new model emphasizes the following:
1.to think well, one must think clearly

2.to think well, one must think accurately

3.to think well, one must think precisely

4.to think well, one must think relevantly

5.to think well one must think deeply

6.to think well, one must think broad-mindedly

7.to think well, one must think logically.
In the old model students often learned how to function competently only in a narrow job and with standard problems, while their thinking in general remained largely undisciplined. Outside a narrow sphere of performance they often thought unclearly, inaccurately, imprecisely, irrelevantly, superficially, and illogically. Needless to say this did not auger well for their performance outside their special competence.
As long as much of student thinking remains subconscious--as it does for most students (since they lack the skills to bring it to their conscious minds for scrutiny)--it tends to operate with "standards" that cannot consciously be justified. In fact, if we pay special attention to how students decide to accept or reject ideas, we will find that most students use standards that are actually anti-intellectual in nature. They use standards that emerge from primitive human drives, standards that subconsciously control their thinking and leave their thinking deeply flawed.
Here are the most common standards that students use (unfortunately, they are precisely the ones most undisciplined thinkers use). They are:
1.believe an idea if it agrees with what you already believe (an egocentric standard)

2.believe an idea if it agrees with what your friends or associates believe (a sociocentric standard)

3.believe an idea if you want to believe it (an exercise in willful self-deception).
Think of the way the brass of Detroit auto reasoned during the 15 years that they were losing market share to the Japanese: "These Japanese cars are nothing but a fad. Americans don’t want small economic cars. They want style and size and comfort. We just need to outlast the fad, not change our basic manufacturing strategies." It wasn’t until Detroit went virtually bankrupt that they considered an alternative line of thought. Their agreement with each other, their tendency to believe what they wanted to believe, were the ruling standards for their thinking. They invested billions in lousy thinking. And the US economy suffered a severe blow because of it.
Obviously, these are not standards for thinking that we want to foster in our students. Yet the old model fails to teach students how to recognize when these standards are at work in their thinking.
In the new model, however, students are taught to guard against natural human tendencies to believe what agrees with them or what they want to believe. Instead they learn to how to maximize objectivity in assessment, however painful the "truth" might be. Without this discipline, students will be frustrated in complicated or messy problems and will retreat to comfortable beliefs. Accordingly, instead of exercising self-determination in their thinking, students become victims of their thinking. In the old model, students don’t control their thinking; their thinking controls them.
Conclusion
It is now undebatable that workers of tomorrow must have basic critical thinking abilities if they are to function well in the complex world of accelerating change that now faces them. They must have the intellectual skills to competently address new questions and problems inherent in the new emerging world of work. This involves the ability to take thinking apart and analyze it, as well as to consistently apply intellectual standards to it. They must be able to accurately and consistently assess their thinking, to determine, their own strengths and weaknesses and project strategies for continual improvement.
Since two-year colleges have historically led the higher education community in preparing students for the world of work, they are in a unique position to take the lead once again. But this involves commitment and leadership on the part of the faculty and the administration.
The shift from the old to the new model is not a casual or easy shift. It will be years before it occurs at most four-year colleges and universities--where teaching effectiveness is a secondary factor. It will not occur easily at any level of education.
It will certainly not occur at the community college level simply because community college faculty read a general argument for the new model such as this article constitutes. One might begin with such an article. But one does not end with it. Faculty need quality Inservice in the design of instruction based on new model criteria. They need paradigms. They need examples. They need practice. And they need to be encouraged and rewarded for designing new model classes.
If we are to make the changes necessary for our students to compete in a highly complex global market, the band-aid, quick fix approach to transforming our educational systems must be abandoned. With leadership and determination the new community college of the future can and will emerge. But that leadership and determination will not be successfully generated unless we are willing to do the intellectual work necessary to transform our own thinking. We need to think our own way into new conceptions about what teaching and learning are all about. We need bona fide critical thinking. As Richard Paul has said:
“What we can be sure of is that the persuasiveness of the argument for critical thinking will only grow year by year, day by day -- for the logic of the argument is simply the only prudent response to the accelerating change, to the increasing complexity of our world. No gimmick, no crafty substitute, can be found for the cultivation of quality thinking. The quality of our lives can only become more and more obviously the product of the quality of the thinking we use to create them (p. 16)...Our students deserve at least a fighting chance to compete, to rise to the challenge of the day (p.5).”
All quotes by Richard Paul in this article are taken from the book by Paul, R. (1995). Critical Thinking: How to Prepare Students for a Rapidly Changing World. Dillon Beach: Foundation For Critical Thinking
Go to top






Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Commun
Sublinks:
Critical Thinking and the Social Studies Teacher
Ethical Reasoning Essential to Education
Ethics Without Indoctrination
Engineering Reasoning
Accelerating Change
Applied Disciplines: A Critical Thinking Model for Engineering
Global Change: Why C.T. is Essential To the Community College Mission
Natural Egocentric Dispositions
Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity and Citizenship
Critical Thinking and Emotional Intelligence



P.O. BOX 196 • Tomales, CA 94971 • Toll Free 800.833.3645 • Fax 707.878.9111 • cct@criticalthinking.org
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Criticalthinking.org Copyright ©2013 Foundation for Critical Thinking
 















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The Critical Thinking Community


Join the Critical Thinking CommunityThe Foundation for Critical Thinking is pleased to announce
 the opening of the
 Critical Thinking Community Members Area.
Membership is Complimentary
CLICK TO JOIN* The Critical Thinking Community

*if you have attended our events or workshops, you already have a member account.

 For more than a quarter century, the Center and Foundation for Critical Thinking have been fostering fairminded critical thinking through books, thinker's guides, videos, events, professional development programs and our website.  In the past few months, we have been building a members section of our website, in part due to the growing number of people and institutions requesting affiliation with us.
 One unique strength of our community is that we are inclusive, inviting anyone interested in learning, developing, and fostering critical thinking, from every subject and discipline, from every grade level, from every sector in private life, from every country throughout the world to join us in creating more fairminded critical societies.
*If you have ordered from our bookstore or attended an event sponsored by the Foundation for Critical Thinking, your login account may already exist.  If you think you may have an existing account, Click Here to find out.

New Resources Available Only to Community Members
• Online Streaming Video
 View streaming video selections from our renowned presenters, including Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, Dr. Gerald Nosich and other Fellows of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. The videos are composed of interviews and clips from various seminars, workshops and conferences.  New videos will be added to the members' area frequently.  Previews of our various video titles for purchase will also be made available in this area.
• Online Critical Thinking Test and Learning Tools
Members may now take the Critical Thinking online Sample Test for Free.  This demonstration version of our online Critical Thinking Basic Concepts and Understandings Test has been made available to members of the Critical Thinking Community.  We are engaged in several ongoing development concerned with new ways to teach critical thinking using interactive media.  Explore our interactive graphical models for teaching and learning the concepts of critical thinking. Learn the Elements of Thought as well as how Intellectual Standards are applied to them. Once you have familiarized yourself with the basic concepts, you can apply them to the advanced model Analyzing the Logic of a Problem where you can enter in a sample problem and work through the logic of that problem using the Paulian model of critical thinking. You can then view the results of your analysis in a printable report.
• My Critical Thinking Library (with public/shared view)
Critical Thinking Reference Library Easily compile and share the critical thinking resources available on this website with others. As our website grows with articles, research, teaching strategies and other reference material, we have developed a way for you to easily collect and share them with your colleagues and students.  Members will see a special link on every page that saves the page name and link to your Member Library. You can also save your own notes or instructions about the reference. You are provided with a public link to your library that can be emailed or posted on your own website.
• FCT News Blogger
 Our newest feature for members allows you to comment on stories involving critical thinking in the  news and current events section of our website. We welcome you to add your reasoned assessment and commentary on the article. We would ask that you approach your analysis with sensitivity to the basic Elements and Standards of critical thinking.
• My Home Page
 Your own personalized member home page provides links to all your account settings, password and **profile. The My Library feature is displayed on your Home Page allowing you quick access to your favorite materials.  Your Critical Thinking Home Page keeps you up to date on our most recent articles and reviews of critical thinking in the news and media.  And on this page, we provide a thought provoking quote of the day from important thinkers throughout history.  Your Bookstore and Registration Desk account information is also available from your home page, giving you the ability to: ◦ View your order history and order payment status
◦ Track the shipping progress on orders (if trackable shipping method is selected),
◦ View your event registrations and select or modify your event session selections (where applicable).
◦ Easily contact and communicate with Foundation staff through our online directory.

Join the Critical Thinking Community  REGISTER FOR YOUR ACCOUNT TODAY!


 **The Foundation for Critical Thinking respects your privacy. Information you provide for your account will be not shared, sold or utilized by any entity other than The Foundation for Critical Thinking and its associated organizations.










P.O. BOX 196 • Tomales, CA 94971 • Toll Free 800.833.3645 • Fax 707.878.9111 • cct@criticalthinking.org
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Criticalthinking.org Copyright ©2013 Foundation for Critical Thinking
 















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The National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking


  


Translate this page from English...


Select LanguageAfrikaansAlbanianArabicArmenianAzerbaijaniBasqueBelarusianBengaliBosnianBulgarianCatalanCebuanoChichewaChinese (Simplified)Chinese (Traditional)CroatianCzechDanishDutchEsperantoEstonianFilipinoFinnishFrenchGalicianGeorgianGermanGreekGujaratiHaitian CreoleHausaHebrewHindiHmongHungarianIcelandicIgboIndonesianIrishItalianJapaneseJavaneseKannadaKazakhKhmerKoreanLaoLatinLatvianLithuanianMacedonianMalagasyMalayMalayalamMalteseMaoriMarathiMongolianMyanmar (Burmese)NepaliNorwegianPersianPolishPortuguesePunjabiRomanianRussianSerbianSesothoSinhalaSlovakSlovenianSomaliSpanishSundaneseSwahiliSwedishTajikTamilTeluguThaiTurkishUkrainianUrduUzbekVietnameseWelshYiddishYorubaZulu
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The Critical Thinking Community


Join the Critical Thinking CommunityThe Foundation for Critical Thinking is pleased to announce
 the opening of the
 Critical Thinking Community Members Area.
Membership is Complimentary
CLICK TO JOIN* The Critical Thinking Community

*if you have attended our events or workshops, you already have a member account.

 For more than a quarter century, the Center and Foundation for Critical Thinking have been fostering fairminded critical thinking through books, thinker's guides, videos, events, professional development programs and our website.  In the past few months, we have been building a members section of our website, in part due to the growing number of people and institutions requesting affiliation with us.
 One unique strength of our community is that we are inclusive, inviting anyone interested in learning, developing, and fostering critical thinking, from every subject and discipline, from every grade level, from every sector in private life, from every country throughout the world to join us in creating more fairminded critical societies.
*If you have ordered from our bookstore or attended an event sponsored by the Foundation for Critical Thinking, your login account may already exist.  If you think you may have an existing account, Click Here to find out.

New Resources Available Only to Community Members
• Online Streaming Video
 View streaming video selections from our renowned presenters, including Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, Dr. Gerald Nosich and other Fellows of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. The videos are composed of interviews and clips from various seminars, workshops and conferences.  New videos will be added to the members' area frequently.  Previews of our various video titles for purchase will also be made available in this area.
• Online Critical Thinking Test and Learning Tools
Members may now take the Critical Thinking online Sample Test for Free.  This demonstration version of our online Critical Thinking Basic Concepts and Understandings Test has been made available to members of the Critical Thinking Community.  We are engaged in several ongoing development concerned with new ways to teach critical thinking using interactive media.  Explore our interactive graphical models for teaching and learning the concepts of critical thinking. Learn the Elements of Thought as well as how Intellectual Standards are applied to them. Once you have familiarized yourself with the basic concepts, you can apply them to the advanced model Analyzing the Logic of a Problem where you can enter in a sample problem and work through the logic of that problem using the Paulian model of critical thinking. You can then view the results of your analysis in a printable report.
• My Critical Thinking Library (with public/shared view)
Critical Thinking Reference Library Easily compile and share the critical thinking resources available on this website with others. As our website grows with articles, research, teaching strategies and other reference material, we have developed a way for you to easily collect and share them with your colleagues and students.  Members will see a special link on every page that saves the page name and link to your Member Library. You can also save your own notes or instructions about the reference. You are provided with a public link to your library that can be emailed or posted on your own website.
• FCT News Blogger
 Our newest feature for members allows you to comment on stories involving critical thinking in the  news and current events section of our website. We welcome you to add your reasoned assessment and commentary on the article. We would ask that you approach your analysis with sensitivity to the basic Elements and Standards of critical thinking.
• My Home Page
 Your own personalized member home page provides links to all your account settings, password and **profile. The My Library feature is displayed on your Home Page allowing you quick access to your favorite materials.  Your Critical Thinking Home Page keeps you up to date on our most recent articles and reviews of critical thinking in the news and media.  And on this page, we provide a thought provoking quote of the day from important thinkers throughout history.  Your Bookstore and Registration Desk account information is also available from your home page, giving you the ability to: ◦ View your order history and order payment status
◦ Track the shipping progress on orders (if trackable shipping method is selected),
◦ View your event registrations and select or modify your event session selections (where applicable).
◦ Easily contact and communicate with Foundation staff through our online directory.

Join the Critical Thinking Community  REGISTER FOR YOUR ACCOUNT TODAY!


 **The Foundation for Critical Thinking respects your privacy. Information you provide for your account will be not shared, sold or utilized by any entity other than The Foundation for Critical Thinking and its associated organizations.










P.O. BOX 196 • Tomales, CA 94971 • Toll Free 800.833.3645 • Fax 707.878.9111 • cct@criticalthinking.org
Privacy |
Customer Services
Criticalthinking.org Copyright ©2013 Foundation for Critical Thinking
 

































































































































http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/the-critical-thinking-community/744










Login  
 Memberships 
 My Account 
 View Cart
  Bookmark this page 

 


begin here 
 bookstore 

Home
 Begin Here 
































 Bookstore
 About Us 



































 Library 





























 Professional Development 



































 Research 























 Conference/Events 























 Assessment & Testing 











 News 

















 Online Learning 














  

Page Menu

International Center for the Assessment of Higher Order Thinking

Our Mission

Our Team of Presenters

Fellows of the Foundation













Permission to Use Our Work

The Critical Thinking Community

Contributions to the Foundation for Critical Thinking

Contact Us - Office Information

Testimonials

Site Map

Center for Critical Thinking

The National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking


  


Translate this page from English...


Select LanguageAfrikaansAlbanianArabicArmenianAzerbaijaniBasqueBelarusianBengaliBosnianBulgarianCatalanCebuanoChichewaChinese (Simplified)Chinese (Traditional)CroatianCzechDanishDutchEsperantoEstonianFilipinoFinnishFrenchGalicianGeorgianGermanGreekGujaratiHaitian CreoleHausaHebrewHindiHmongHungarianIcelandicIgboIndonesianIrishItalianJapaneseJavaneseKannadaKazakhKhmerKoreanLaoLatinLatvianLithuanianMacedonianMalagasyMalayMalayalamMalteseMaoriMarathiMongolianMyanmar (Burmese)NepaliNorwegianPersianPolishPortuguesePunjabiRomanianRussianSerbianSesothoSinhalaSlovakSlovenianSomaliSpanishSundaneseSwahiliSwedishTajikTamilTeluguThaiTurkishUkrainianUrduUzbekVietnameseWelshYiddishYorubaZulu
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Center for Critical Thinking

The Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique   conducts advanced research and disseminates information on critical thinking.
 Each year it sponsors an annual International Conference on Critical Thinking and Educational Reform. It has worked with the College Board, the National Education Association, the U.S. Department of Education, as well as numerous colleges, universities, and school districts to facilitate the implementation of critical thinking instruction focused on intellectual standards.  The following studies demonstrate:
1.  the fact that, as a rule, critical thinking is not presently being effectively taught at the high school, college and university level, and yet  
2.  it is possible to do so.  
To assess students' understanding of critical thinking, we recommend use of the International Critical Thinking Test as well as the  Critical Thinking Interview Profile for College Students  . To assess faculty understanding of critical thinking and its importance to instruction, we recommend the  Critical Thinking Interview Profile For Teachers and Faculty  . By registering as a member of the community, you will have access to streaming video, which includes a sample student interview with Dr. Richard Paul and Rush Cosgrove. 


Research:




Effect of a Model for Critical Thinking on Student Achievement in Primary Source Document Analysis and Interpretation, Argumentative Reasoning, Critical Thinking Dispositions and History Content in a Community College History Course
 Abstract of the Study, conducted by Jenny Reed, in partial fulfillment for her dissertation (October 26, 1998)

 View Abstract    -   View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)



The Effect of Richard Paul's Universal Elements and Standards of Reasoning on Twelfth Grade Composition A Research Proposal Presented to the Faculty Of the School of Education Alliant International University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education: Teaching Study conducted by J. Stephen Scanlan, San Diego (2006) View Abstract   -   View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF) Study of 38 Public Universities and 28 Private Universities To Determine Faculty Emphasis on Critical Thinking In Instruction Principal Researchers: Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, and Dr. Ted Bartell View Abstract    -   View the full study A Research Proposal Presented to the Faculty Of the School of Education Alliant International University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education: Teaching

  Study conducted by J. Stephen Scanlan, San Diego (2006)

 View Abstract    -    View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)


 Study of 38 Public Universities and 28 Private Universities
 To Determine Faculty Emphasis on Critical Thinking In Instruction 

 Principal Researchers: Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, and Dr. Ted Bartell
 View Abstract     -    View the full study 








Executive Summary
(Complete Study is available for purchase.)  On September 29, 1994 Governor Wilson signed legislation authored by Senator Leroy Greene (SB1849) directing the Commission on Teacher Credentialing to conduct a study of teacher preparation programs to assess the extent to which these programs prepare candidates for teaching credentials to teach critical thinking and problem-solving skills in elementary and secondary schools.
 During the spring of 1995, Commission staff began to conceptualize a study design that would yield descriptive information on course content and teaching practices being employed by postsecondary faculty to train teacher candidates. With assistance from the Center for Critical Thinking at Sonoma State University, an interview protocol was designed for use in telephone interviews with a cross-section of education and subject matter faculty in both public and private colleges and universities in California.
 During the study planning process, a decision was made to design respondent selection procedures in such a way as to assure that information collected would be generalizable to all faculty preparing teachers across the state. To accomplish this objective, two statewide probability samples were designed: a sample of teacher education faculty, and a separate sample of Arts and Sciences faculty teaching courses in Commission-approved subject matter programs.
 There were three major objectives in this study. The first was to assess current teaching practices and knowledge of critical thinking among faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs in California. The second was to identify exemplary teaching practices that enhance critical thinking. The third was to develop policy recommendations based on the results of the study. The study included 38 public colleges and universities and 28 private ones.







The Concept of Critical Thinking and Problem Solving Used in the Study


The concept of critical thinking and problem solving used in this study is "minimalist," that is, one which captures the essential dimensions of the concept reflected in the following: its etymology and dictionary definition, major definitions and explanations in the literature, a brief history of the idea, major tests of critical thinking, and the basic values it presupposes.
 This minimalist concept of critical thinking is embedded not only in a core body of research over the last 30 to 50 years but is also derived from roots in ancient Greek. The word ’’critical’’ derives etymologically from two Greek roots: "kriticos" (meaning discerning judgment) and "kriterion" (meaning standards). Etymologically, then, the word implies the development of "discerning judgment based on standards." In Webster's New World Dictionary, the relevant entry reads "characterized by careful analysis and judgment" and is followed by the gloss: "critical, in its strictest sense, implies an attempt at objective judgment so as to determine both merits and faults." Applied to thinking, then, we might provisionally define critical thinking as thinking that explicitly aims at well-founded judgment and hence utilizes appropriate evaluative standards in the attempt to determine the true worth, merit, or value of something.
 The tradition of research into critical thinking reflects the common perception that human thinking left to itself often gravitates toward prejudice, over-generalization, common fallacies, self-deception, rigidity, and narrowness. The critical thinking tradition seeks ways of understanding the mind and then training the intellect so that such "errors", "blunders", and "distortions" of thought are minimized. It assumes that the capacity of humans for good reasoning can be nurtured and developed by an educational process aimed directly at that end. It assumes that sound critical thinking maximizes our ability to solve problems of importance to us by helping us both to avoid common mistakes and to proceed in the most rational and logical fashion.
 For example, those who think critically typically engage in intellectual practices of the following sort, monitoring, reviewing, and assessing: goals and purposes; the way issues and problems are formulated; the information, data, or evidence presented for acceptance, interpretations of such information, data, or evidence; the quality of reasoning presented or developed, basic concepts or ideas inherent in thinking, assumptions made, implications and consequences that may or may not follow; points of view and frames of reference. In monitoring, reviewing and assessing these intellectual constructs, those who think critically characteristically strive, for such intellectual ends as clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, and logicalness. Each of these modes of thinking help us to accomplish the ends for which we are thinking and hence to solve the problems inherent in pursuing those ends.







Current Teaching Practices and Knowledge of Critical Thinking

In-depth interviews were utilized to provide information on how faculty tend to think about critical thinking and the manner in which that thinking influences the design of their classes. Questions were designed to shed light on the extent to which students in teacher preparation programs in California are being taught in ways that facilitate skill in critical thinking and the ability to teach it to others.
 There were three goals of this component of the study. The first was to ensure that any faculty who had a developed notion of critical thinking (of any kind) would have a full opportunity and much encouragement to spell out that notion. We wanted to make sure that everyone interviewed was encouraged to express their actual views and to express them in detail.
 The second goal was to examine the views expressed to see: a) how many faculty actually had a developed view and b) how much internal coherence there was in any given faculty view. In other words, we sought to determine how many faculty had seriously thought through the concept of critical thinking--irrespective of how they defined it, and then, once we had a full expression of any given person's views, we examined what was said, not only for clarity but also for coherence.
 The third goal was to determine the extent to which the views expressed demonstrated an internalization of traditional "minimalist" elements of critical thinking. We sought to determine, in other words, how much of the common core of meaning now attached to the traditional concept by those working in the field of critical thinking research (and reflected in its semantics and history) has been internalized by faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs.
 Data collection included both closed-ended and open-ended questions. In addition, the coders of responses made judgments about some important global features of the responses made (using minimalist components of critical thinking as criteria). The open-ended questions, and the follow-up questions, were designed, as indicated above, to provide maximum opportunity for individuals to articulate virtually any concept of critical thinking that they favored. The follow-up questions’’ main function was that of ensuring that the most specific and precise views that could be obtained were obtained. Since the interviews lasted 45 minutes on average, the interviewees had ample opportunity to express their views.
 The same interview protocol was utilized for both education faculty and subject matter faculty. A total of 140 interviews were completed, representing a 78% response rate among those contacted for an interview. Since the samples were constructed so as to be representative in a statistical sense of all faculty involved in teacher preparation in California, the results can in fact be generalized to teacher preparation faculty in the state as a whole. The results of the analysis were as follows:
 1) Though the overwhelming majority (89%) claimed critical thinking to be a primary objective of their instruction, only a small minority (19%) could give a clear explanation of what critical thinking is. Furthermore, according to their answers, only 9% of the respondents were clearly teaching for critical thinking on a typical day in class.
 2) Though the overwhelming majority (78%) claimed that their students lacked appropriate intellectual standards (to use in assessing their thinking), and 73% considered that students learning to assess their own work was of primary importance, only a very small minority (8%) could enumerate any intellectual criteria or standards they required of students or could give an intelligible explanation of what those criteria and standards were.
 3) While 50% of those interviewed said that they explicitly distinguish critical thinking skills from traits, only 8% were able to provide a clear conception of the critical thinking skills they thought were most important for their students to develop. Furthermore the overwhelming majority (75%) provided either minimal or vague allusion (33%) or no allusion at all (42%) to intellectual traits of mind.
 4) When asked how they conceptualized truth, a surprising 41% of those who responded to the question said that knowledge, truth and sound judgment are fundamentally a matter of personal preference or subjective taste.
 5) Although the majority (67%) said that their concept of critical thinking is largely explicit in their thinking, only 19% could elaborate on their concept of thinking.
 6) Although the vast majority (89%) stated that critical thinking was of primary importance to their instruction, 77% of the respondents had little, limited or no conception of how to reconcile content coverage with the fostering of critical thinking.
 7) Although the overwhelming majority (81%) felt that their department’s graduates develop a good or high level of critical thinking ability while in their program, only 20% said that their departments had a shared approach to critical thinking, and only 9% were able to clearly articulate how they would assess the extent to which a faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking. The remaining respondents had a limited conception or no conception at all of how to do this.
 8) Although the vast majority (89%) stated that critical thinking was of primary importance to their instruction, only `a very small minority could clearly explain the meanings of basic terms in critical thinking. For example, only 8% could clearly differentiate between an assumption and an inference, and only 4% could differentiate between an inference and an implication.
 9) Only a very small minority (9%) mentioned the special and/or growing need for critical thinking today in virtue of the pace of change and the complexities inherent in human life. Not a single respondent elaborated on the issue.
 10) In explaining their views of critical thinking, the overwhelming majority (69%) made either no allusion at all, or a minimal allusion, to the need for greater emphasis on peer and student self-assessment in instruction.
 11) From either the quantitative data directly, or from minimal inference from those data, it is clear that a significant percentage of faculty interviewed (and, if representative, most faculty):

•do not understand the connection of critical thinking to intellectual standards.
•are not able to clarify major intellectual criteria and standards.
•inadvertently confuse the active involvement of students in classroom activities with critical thinking in those activities.
•are unable to give an elaborated articulation of their concept of critical thinking.
•cannot provide plausible examples of how they foster critical thinking in the classroom.
•are not able to name specific critical thinking skills they think are important for students to learn.
•are not able to plausibly explain how to reconcile covering content with fostering critical thinking.
•do not consider reasoning as a significant focus of critical thinking.
•do not think of reasoning within disciplines as a major focus of instruction.
•cannot specify basic structures essential to the analysis of reasoning.
•cannot give an intelligible explanation of basic abilities either in critical thinking or in reasoning .
•do not distinguish the psychological dimension of thought from the intellectual dimension.
•have had no involvement in research into critical thinking and have not attended any conferences on the subject.
•are unable to name a particular theory or theorist that has shaped their concept of critical thinking.
 Some differences were also observed between Education and Arts and Sciences faculty. These differences do not alter the overall findings but do suggest relative strengths and weaknesses for each group. The comparative results were as follows:
 1) Education faculty was slightly more likely ( 91%) to state that critical thinking is of primary importance to their instructional objectives than Arts and Sciences faculty ( 82%).
 2) Education faculty was somewhat more likely (55%) to include in their concept of critical thinking a distinction between critical thinking skills and traits than Arts and Sciences faculty (39%), though neither group effectively articulated that difference.
 3) Education faculty was somewhat better in articulating how they bring critical thinking into the curriculum on a typical class day (33% of the Arts and Sciences faculty had little or no conception of how to do this while only 15% of the Education faculty had the same lack of conception).
 4) Education faculty also was better able to reconcile covering content with fostering critical thinking (31% of Arts and Sciences faculty had little or no conception of how to reconcile the two, while only 11% of education faculty had little or no conception). What is more, education faculty were more likely to elaborate on how they would reconcile content coverage with fostering critical thinking (25% were able to elaborate on reconciliation of these, while only 8% of the Arts and Sciences faculty were able to elaborate on the same point).
 5) The Arts and Sciences faculty better articulated the basic skills of thought that students need to effectively address issues and concerns in their lives such as clarifying questions, gathering relevant data or information, formulating or reasoning to logical or valid conclusions, interpretations or solutions, etc. Of the Education faculty, 40% failed to mention any of these basic skills while only 5% of the non-education faculty failed to mention any.
 6) The Education faculty were somewhat less likely to ignore the importance of emphasizing problem solving in the classroom than the Arts and Sciences group. Only 10% of this group failed to mention its importance while 26% of the Arts and Sciences faculty failed to mention it.
 7) The Education faculty were somewhat less likely to ignore the special need for critical thinking today in virtue of such phenomena as accelerating change, intensifying complexity, and increasing interdependence (64% of the Arts and Sciences faculty failed to mention its importance, while 51% of the education group failed to mention it).
 8) The Education faculty were less likely to ignore the need for emphasis on peer and student self-assessment (33% percent of this group failed to mention it, while 55% of the Arts and Sciences group failed to mention it).
 Analysis of open-ended responses provided not only confirmation of the quantitative data, but also powerful support for significant qualitative generalizations. What is more, a close look at individual cases reveals that there is significant contrast between those faculty members who have a developed concept of critical thinking and those who do not. Profiles of individual faculty responses are presented in the full report to illustrate clearly the kind of differences which existed between those who were articulate in explaining how they approach critical thinking and those who were not.
 Most faculty answered open-ended questions with vague answers, rather than clear and precise answers. In many of their answers there were internal "tensions" and, in some cases, outright contradictions. The magic talisman were phrases like "constructivism", "Bloom's Taxonomy", "process-based", "inquiry-based", "beyond recall", "active learning", "meaning-centered" and similar phrases that under probing questions the majority of interviewees were unable to intelligibly explain in terms of critical thinking. The most common confusion, perhaps, was confusion between what is necessary (for critical thinking) and what is sufficient (for it). For example, active engagement is necessary to critical thinking, but one can be actively engaged and not think critically.
 Virtually all of those interviewed identified critical thinking and the learning of intellectual standards as primary objectives in instruction, yet few could give a clear explanation of what their concept of either was. Virtually all said that students lacked intellectual standards when they entered their classes, yet implied, at the same time, that they left with those intellectual standards in place. They also overwhelmingly stated or implied that their students left them with a good level of critical thinking as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 By direct statement or by implication, most claimed that they permeated their instruction with an emphasis on critical thinking and that the students internalized the concepts in their courses as a result. Yet, only the rare interviewee mentioned the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, or logically. Very few mentioned any of the basic skills of thought such as the ability to clarify questions; gather relevant data; reason to logical or valid conclusions; identify key assumptions; trace significant implications; or enter without distortion into alternative points of view. Intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and intellectual responsibility, are virtually unheard of by the interviewees.
 Careful analysis of the interviews indicates that, irrespective of the diversity of language used, the central problem is that most faculty have not carefully thought through any concept of critical thinking, have no sense of intellectual standards they can put into words, and are, therefore, by any reasonable interpretation, in no position to foster critical thinking in their own students or to help them to foster it in their future students-except to inculcate into their students the same vague views that they have.







Some Policy Recommendations

If it is essential for teachers to foster critical thinking, then it is essential for those who teach the teachers to have at least baseline knowledge of the concept of critical thinking. Those who teach prospective teachers must be sufficiently well-informed about critical thinking not only to be able to explain it in a general way to their students, they must also regularly model instruction for critical thinking in their own classroom procedures and policies. The design of their classes must reflect an explicit critical thinking orientation, so that students not only systematically think through the content of their courses, but also come to see how the design of a course can require and cultivate critical thinking and thoughtfulness — or fail to do so.
 On our view, four interventions are requisite for substantive change to occur. First, we must disseminate the information faculty need to change their perceptions. Second, we must provide for faculty skill-building through appropriate professional development. Third, we must establish a mandate to systematically teach critical thinking (and how to teach for it) in all programs of teacher education. And fourth, we must develop an exit examination in critical thinking for all prospective teachers. Let us look at each of these proposed interventions in turn.
 1) Information Dissemination: Sufficient awareness, grounded in intellectual humility, must be generated in those communities of faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs leading to the recognition a) that there is a general lack of knowledge on the part of the teaching faculty of the baseline concept of critical thinking, and b) that most students in teacher preparation programs are now graduating without knowledge of critical thinking or how to teach for it. There are seven forms of information that need wide dissemination. At present none of these categories of information are widely disseminated in the teaching community. The categories are as follows:

•We need to disseminate information that documents the problem at the k-12 teaching level.
•We need to disseminate information on teaching for critical thinking within particular disciplines (such as math).
•We need to disseminate information about the process that faculty go through as they initially develop their ability to bring critical thinking successfully into the classroom (especially regarding those who display intellectual humility).
•We need to disseminate information about exemplary teaching practices of individuals, as they reach high levels of success.
 2) Skill Building: Minimal inservicing in critical thinking must be provided for faculty in teacher preparation programs. If faculty is not provided with convenient ways to upgrade their knowledge of critical thinking and how to teach for it, very few will go out of their way to pursue it.







Qualitative Generalizations: Interpreting Responses to Open-Ended Questions

A close look at the open-ended responses obtained in the interviews provides a realistic sense of the empirical foundation for generalizations that go beyond purely quantitative data. Many of the samples from the interviews are vivid and deeply revealing. A full airing of these samples, with commentary, is contained in Appendix A.
 The data collected enabled us to present illustrative profiles of faculty who had a vague and or internally incoherent conception of critical thinking in contrast to those who had a developed notion of critical thinking (irrespective of their orientation toward it). If we assume that those who had a vague or internally contradictory concept of critical thinking simply haven't thought much on the subject, and those who had a clear, well-elaborated, and internally coherent concept had thought seriously about the subject, then we can infer that comparatively few faculty members have thought seriously about critical thinking. In other words, we were able to get a strong sense of how many faculty members had seriously thought through the concept of critical thinking--irrespective of how they defined it, and then, we were able to separate out those whose views were not only highly elaborated but coherent.
 From delving into the rich details of the open-ended responses, one finds not only confirmation of the quantitative data, but also powerful support for significant qualitative generalizations. What is more, a close look at individual cases reveals that there is significant contrast between those faculty members who have a developed concept of critical thinking and those who do not. The profiles of individual faculty that are summarized below illustrate clearly the kind of differences which existed between those who were articulate in explaining how they approach critical thinking and those who were not.
 It also confirmed what the quantitative data showed, namely, that many faculty members, without knowing it, are confused about the basic concepts and skills of critical thinking. Let us now look at some illustrative faculty profiles from the study
 Each profile represents one person from the study. Each profile is anonymous--in keeping with the commitment made to all of those who agreed to be interviewed.







Some Illustrative Profiles

The Basic Pattern
 What follows is a series of "profiles" which suggest some of the basic patterns of thinking found in particular faculty members who participated in the interviews.
 Most faculty answered open-ended questions with vague answers, rather than clear and precise answers. In many of their answers there were internal "tensions" and in some cases outright contradictions. The magic talisman were phrases like "constructivism", "Bloom's Taxonomy", "process-based", "inquiry-based", "beyond recall", "active learning", "meaning-centered" and such like — phrases that under probing questions the majority of interviewees were unable to intelligibly explain in terms of critical thinking. The most common confusion, perhaps, was confusion between what is necessary (for critical thinking) and what is sufficient (for it). For example, active engagement is necessary to critical thinking, but one can be actively engaged and NOT THINK CRITICALLY. To illustrate, many gang members are actively engaged in gang activities, but that does not make them critical thinkers. It is not THAT you are engaged but HOW you are engaged that matters.
 Virtually all of those interviewed identified critical thinking and the learning of intellectual standards as primary objectives in instruction, yet few could give a clear explanation of what their concept of either was. Virtually all said that students lacked intellectual standards when they entered their classes, yet implied, at the same time, that they left with those intellectual standards in place. They also overwhelmingly stated or implied that their students left them with a good level of critical thinking as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 By direct statement or by implication, most claimed that they permeated their instruction with an emphasis on critical thinking and that the students internalized the concepts in their courses as a result. Yet only the rare interviewee mentioned the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, or logically, etc.  Very few mentioned any of the basic skills of thought, such as the ability to clarify questions, gather relevant data, reason to logical or valid conclusions, identify key assumptions, trace significant implications, or enter without distortion into alternative points of view. Intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual responsibility, and so on, are virtually unheard of by the interviewees.
 After listening to the interviews it becomes obvious that irrespective of the diversity of language used, the central problem is that most faculty have not carefully thought through any concept of critical thinking, have no sense of intellectual standards they can put into words, and are, therefore, by any reasonable interpretation, in no position to foster critical thinking in their own students or to help them to foster it in their future students--except to inculcate into their students the same vague views that they have. Now let's look at some specific profiles.







Weak Profiles



Profile A
(8) Professor A thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as intuitive and a product of his own thinking. He does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students come to class with well-developed intellectual standards and graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that he hasn't in fact thought much about critical thinking. His explanation of critical thinking, for example, is vague and possibly self-contradictory:
 "Critical thinking means to think analytically and be aware that everyone thinks for himself. All thinking is critical to some extent. Anyone who thinks intelligently. Reflectiveness."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "I can't answer this. I can't identify skills."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, the vagueness of his thinking about critical thinking is again apparent when he says "You look at their publishing. And I'd hear from students. They'd be complaining. It takes time."
 When asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, it is clear that he does not have one: "That’s a hard question to answer. I don't think I see an answer to it."
 In addition to his general lack of clear thinking about critical thinking, it is apparent that he is also confused about the basic concepts in critical thinking. When asked to explain the difference between an assumption and an inference, he says, "An inference is something based on information. An assumption is based on feeling and a lack of thinking." (Ignoring the fact that we can make empirically well-founded assumptions and infer something based on prejudices or stereotypes.)
Profile B
 (10) Professor B thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of her own thinking. She does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to her, students come to class with well-developed intellectual standards and graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that she hasn't clarified the difference between "constructing beliefs" and "constructing knowledge." She in general assumes that if students are actively engaged and "thinking for themselves", they are ipso facto thinking critically. Nowhere does she mention that students actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking, she says:
 "Critical thinking consists in the active construction of knowledge and valuing social justice, a continuing examining of things as they are and might be..."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, she says, "I don't think in terms of critical thinking skills. To think critically is to be a competent observer of events and to have a disposition to ask questions about them, to classify and find patterns...". (Note that a person can have the disposition to ask superficial or loaded questions and that all persons, poor reasoners as well as good reasoners, classify and find patterns--merely in virtue of being language users).
 When asked how she would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, she equates critical thinking with active learning, saying:
 "Critical thinking is built into an active learning model. How are we supporting students in becoming active, autonomous learners. Active participation, reflection, a personal experience and the ability to make connection between their own views and others. Lively dialogue."
 When asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards, she looks to find a way to equate intellectual standards with active processing, saying:
 "A process conception. There is no finite set of standards to achieve but the learner engages in active dialogue with self and others with increasingly insightful learning..."
Profile C
 (14) Professor C thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as explicit and a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which he explicitly subscribes. He claims to distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards, but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and good ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that he assumes that critical thinking is an automatic by-product of the use of discipline-based procedures. It is evident, however, that he has not thought through what the differences are between, say, the "scientific method" and "Bloom's taxonomy." He nowhere discusses the standards and criteria implicit in sound scientific work. His explanation of critical thinking is: "Critical thinking is investigative inquiry, to observe, interpret, and predict."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "To analyze, predict, compare, observe... all of those listed by Bloom...all the science processes."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, he says "Ask them to compare a lecture approach with an investigative inquiry approach. Have them do a self-assessment after they did an inquiry unit."
 Though the above answer suggests that Professor C understands the importance of having students engage in self- and peer-assessment, it is also clear that he has not thought through the intellectual criteria or standards that students need to effectively do such self-assessment. To some extent, he appears to equate intellectual standards with intellectual autonomy (forgetting that I can think for myself and yet do a poor job of it). For example, when asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, he says: "All thoughts should be tentative. Are we using the processes and holding thoughts tentatively. In all cases, we should let the students develop their own level of understanding."
 In addition to his vague thinking about critical thinking, it is apparent that he is also confused about the basic concepts in critical thinking. When asked to explain the difference between an assumption and an inference, and says, "Assumptions don't have data behind them. Inferences do." In saying this, he of course fails to remember that assumptions can be well or poorly grounded and inferences are sometimes based on stereotypes or imagined facts.
 Nowhere in the interview does Professor C mention any of the basic skills of thought such as clarifying the question; gathering relevant data, reasoning to logical or valid conclusions; identifying key assumptions; tracing significant implications, or entering without distortion into alternative points of view, neither does he mention important intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual responsibility, etc...
Profile D
 (15) Professor D illustrates a person who seems torn between negating critical thinking and its importance while simultaneously claiming to permeate her teaching with it (as something vitally important). On the one hand, she says that critical thinking is of primary importance in her instructional objectives, but on the other hand, says that "it is not so much critical thinking (that students need) but information." On the one hand she says that critical thinking is explicit in her thinking and that it is a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which she explicitly subscribes, but she goes on to say that "I never read critical thinking books." She says that critical thinking "is embedded in everything I do," but cannot articulate any critical thinking skills or standards that she emphasizes.
 Profile E
 Professor E (16) illustrates a person who seems torn between a view in which critical thinking is based on objective standards and skills, on the one hand, and a subjective view, on the other (in which whatever satisfies the individual as an autonomous thinker is the only ultimate basis for critical thought). This tension is suggested in Professor E's explanation of his concept of critical thinking: "Information must be processed. To analyze and synthesize a viewpoint that is your own is critical thinking. Values come into it. We should have the capacity to look at things objectively." When he delineates skills that are important for students to develop, he names values and process, but does not clearly state any skill as such: "(They need to learn) objectivity, (to) weigh through information, balance views, accept new information and process it" When Professor E explains his conception of intellectual standards we see again him oscillating between the objective and subjective. He says that "...accuracy and truth are both relative. ... What is the truth at that moment? (But) be available to find that one is not accurate and that the truth is not comfortable," At the same time Professor E is one of the rare individuals who ranks program graduates as low both in critical thinking abilities and in knowledge of how to teach for critical thinking.
Profile F
 (19) Professor F thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of one or more theories to which she explicitly subscribes (though unable to cite any theory when asked). She says she does distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to her, students come to class without well-developed intellectual standards but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and in fostering critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are peppered with a diversity of responses (and it is not quite clear whether they add up to a coherent notion or represent confusion of thought). Nowhere does she mention that students actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking, she says:
 "Everyone has a different view of critical thinking. I think of it as thinking skills. I think of words like analytical, evaluative, judgmental and I think of my field and activities I would do with my students. Logic and patterns. For example, classifying skills. Looking at a set of buttons--which one is different. I'm thinking of open-endedness, unifying ideas, and problem-solving."
 She provides a similar answer when asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards:
 "Open-endedness, trying something new, analyze situations and problem solve, making estimates to see if your answers are reasonable, consider the viewpoint, judge the data, check their work."
 She is unable to give a coherent explanation of the difference between an assumption and an inference or between an inference and an implication.
Profile G
(76) Professor G is a good example of one who equates critical thinking with thinking for oneself and, beyond that, applies no discernible intellectual standards. She says critical thinking is of primary importance in her instructional objectives, that her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of her own thinking. She does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. On the other hand, she says that knowledge, truth, and sound judgment are not fundamentally a matter of one's personal preference or subjective taste. She says that it is of primary importance for students to acquire sound intellectual criteria or standards and to learn how to assess their own work. According to her, students come to class without well-developed intellectual standards but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking she says:
 "Critical thinking is being able to look at a situation and analyze what is going on and ask questions that enable you to get at alternatives. To be able to make up your mind by getting beyond the rhetoric."
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague and suggest that she hasn't clarified, for example, the difference between "constructing beliefs" and "constructing knowledge." She in general assumes that if students are actively engaged and "thinking for themselves", they are ipso facto thinking critically. Nowhere does she mention that students can actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to describe a typical day in class that fosters critical thinking she says:
 "I use a holistic, constructivist basis. Students construct their own meaning, working together, dynamic, in living and breathing class discussions and debates."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, she is quite vague. She says, "Being able to assess validity, to look at and assess their own work, what the next step ought to be, to be able to choose issues that are important."
 When asked how she would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, she equates critical thinking with active learning, saying:
 .
 "I would look at students' products. Look for originality. Going beyond the task."
 When asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards, she says: "(I would look for them to) take their own positions. I don't know that I would apply general standards."
 She is unclear about the differences between assumptions, inferences, and implications.
 Profile H
 Professor H (79) is representative of the many faculty members who equate the fact of students actively "processing" information with their thinking critically about it. Most of those who think this way tend to think in terms of Bloom's taxonomy. Hence, critical thinking then is viewed as going beyond "knowledge" acquisition. Knowledge acquisition is viewed essentially as lower order memorization and recall, while "processing" is viewed as going beyond recall to "internalization".
 Professor H thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as explicit and a product of his own thinking (as well as theory). He says he distinguishes critical thinking skills, traits, and values (though his subsequent answers do not support this claim). According to him, his students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards, but that it is "of primary importance" that they acquire such standards and learn thereby to assess their own work. He claims that students in the program graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are vague and suggest that he hasn't in fact thought much about critical thinking. He explains his concept of critical thinking as follows: "Critical thinking is analyzing an event before a decision is made." He says that "almost all" of his instruction is based on critical thinking because "as long as it is not knowledge acquisition, it is critical thinking. Students analyze and draw their own conclusions."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "The skills of analysis and recognition of multiple perspectives and then picking out the appropriate action."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, he says "Do they go beyond recall to have the students analyzing and putting it back together to make a decision on their own?"
 When asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, he says "Are they using all the information? (Are they considering) multiple viewpoints?"
 His understanding of basic critical thinking terms is vague. He explains the difference between an assumption and an inference as follows: "An assumption is something that takes place automatically. In an inference you are going in some direction." Concerning the difference between an inference and an implication, he says: "An inference is more biased. An implication is sounder judgments, something that would follow a chain of events." (Note, he is unaware that inferences can be valid or invalid, well or poorly supported, and an implication to thought follows whether or not we ever act upon it--and hence need not be related to any chain of events).





Strong Profiles

Profile J
 (26) Professor J thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which he explicitly subscribes. He does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are relatively clear and elaborated. He cites Paulo Friere and John Dewey as fundamental influences in his thinking about critical thinking. He says his main goal is the "empowerment" of students. He says he strives to model critical thinking with his students in a variety of ways, including evaluating various aspects of the course with the students (e.g., what structures being used are working and which are not having their designed effect). He is especially concerned with the intellectual and linguistic development of students and in encouraging students to begin to take charge of their minds and their lives. He develops special strategies to use in helping students to read critically and he challenges the students continually to examine their own presuppositions, as well as the presuppositions of the status quo, of society, of schooling--not excepting his own instructional design.
 Rather than focus on covering information, professor J helps students to learn skills of finding and assessing information. He concentrates his effort on key concepts which help students assimilate new information. He wants students to discover different modes of thinking that enable them to question dominant sources of information. He wants students to develop a critical understanding of the social context of education and often has students discuss the ultimate purpose of education. Gaining perspective, learning new frames of reference, questioning assumptions, evaluating information for its relevance to their values, involving students in more "authentic" modes of assessment--these are central goals and emphases.
 Professor J has a well-elaborated conception of intellectual standards. He emphasizes students clarifying their views, evaluating relevance, identifying implications, accurately recognizing presuppositions, determining the coherence of views presented, adhering to the rigors of the scientific method with its goals of accuracy and precision, evaluating reasoning for its validity, and striving for soundness in judgment.
Profile K
 (25) Professor K thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of one of more theories of critical thinking to which she explicitly subscribes. She cites Matthew Lipman as a fundamental source of theory. She does distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values.
 According to her, students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards but he thinks they do graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high good of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions are relatively clear and well-elaborated.
 She defines critical thinking as effective problem solving. She fosters it by systematically confronting students, contradicting them to get them to think. She models alternative views, plays devil's advocate, and holds students responsible for their thinking. Hence, though she is a "constructivist" she does not assume that students will automatically construct knowledge simply because they are actively engaged. She believes they must experience careful cultivation within an environment in which they are systematically challenged. She believes in "whole-hearted responsibility." Students must own their decisions and be accountable.
 She designs her classes so that students must evaluate each other's work. She uses a case study approach, but one in which students critique other students on their cases studies. She uses lecture to present theory, but then students are forced to critique their own understanding of the theories and apply them to their cases. She focuses 40% to 50% of class time on interactive activities, but she holds students responsible for a level of performance in those activities. She designs ways to hold students responsible to do their assigned reading so that they are prepared for the in-class work.
 She argues that students must continually go back and forth between experience and theory, and between thinking and reflecting on where that thinking is coming from. She argues that students must become conscious of their own theories and what they are based on. Theories must be considered with their objections.
 Professor K's conception of intellectual standards is framed in the context of the above remarks. Students must express and defend their views, hear objections and answer the objections, hear other views and learn from those views. They must consider alternatives and check their reasoning to make sure it is logical. They must also check their information sources.
Professor L
 (18) Professor L is important as a rare example of a professor whose answers regarding critical thinking reflect intellectual humility. She explicitly admits that her knowledge of critical thinking is limited. She tries to make critical thinking primary in her classes, but she freely admits that she has only her only critical thinking intuitions to go on.
 In her view critical thinking is the ability to define a problem and develop a solution to it. It includes recognizing strategies that are effective, using criteria for "correct" performance, and then assessing their own performance. Concerning reconciling content coverage with fostering critical thinking, she says that if you give students the material so fast that they are not able to learn it, then coverage makes no sense. She gives a good example from volleyball. She says it would do you no good to hear lectures on volleyball if you are not able to use them effectively in performance of the game.
 Concerning the component skills of critical thinking, she freely admits that she has never studied critical thinking intellectually, and so "I'm not sure how to explain it." Concerning her personal conception of intellectual standards, her refreshing answer is "This is something I haven't thought about." (The strength of this profile is in the intellectual humility that it displays. This is a professor who is clearly ready to learn.)
Professor M
 (92) Professor M thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance to his instructional objectives. He thinks of knowledge, truth and sound judgment as not fundamentally a matter of his own personal preference or subjective taste. He does not distinguish between critical thinking skills and traits. He was one of the few faculty members in the study to state that the students in his department develop only a low level ability to think critically.
 Professor M's responses to the open ended questions were relatively clear and elaborated. He sees critical thinking as "being able to reach the sensible conclusions on the basic of logic and evidence, the ability to perceive contradictions...to attempt to resolve them." He says that on a typical class day he focuses on "presenting problems to students as opposed to conclusions."
 In terms of the critical thinking skills he thinks are the most important for students to develop, he says they most need to develop the ability to seek and evaluate evidence, to use logic to reach defensible conclusions. Furthermore he says that they must be able to evaluate positions of their own and others, "to go beyond superficial understandings of reality."
 Professor M says that he places strong emphasis on helping students develop philosophical underpinnings of their eventual teaching procedures through a critical thinking approach. He goes on to say that he wants to students to "approach teaching as an intellectual task as opposed to a technical one.
 One of his primary objectives is to help students develop their ability to gather relevant points of view when dealing with broad, complex issues. Furthermore, he expresses the view that teachers should not present students with "finished answers." Rather they should help students construct their own meanings by teaching them to think through issues in a critical manner.
 In focusing on the philosophy of education, he presents the key concept as "a logically consistent interrelated set of principles about the nature of knowledge, learning, and teaching that generates practical solutions for the everyday problems of teaching." He makes it clear to students that they are responsible for forming their own philosophy, for determining the principles they think are important which will guide what they do in the classroom.
 Some questions he uses to guide their thinking are:
•What are the proper aims of education? (Not what works, but what purposes are worth working for?)
•What knowledge is worth knowing (teaching)?
•Who should decide what knowledge is worth knowing?
•What is an educated person?
•What kind of relationships should teachers establish with students?
•To what extent should teachers prepare students to be agents for change?
•To what extent should they prepare them to 'fit it'?"

 Before students write answers to these questions, Prof. M leads a discussion which explores all points of view relevant to the issues embedded in them. In these discussions, he tries to persuade them of each of the varying points of view. Then after exposure to these differing views, they write their philosophy of teaching, pointing out principles they believe are important in good teaching, and supporting their positions through reasoned judgment.
Professor N (104)
 Professor N thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance to his instructional objectives. He says that his concept of critical thinking is largely explicit in his thinking. Furthermore, in his concept of critical thinking he explicitly distinguishes critical thinking skills from traits.
 His responses to the open ended questions are relatively well elaborated. He describes his concept of critical thinking as gathering evidence, evaluating evidence, evaluating the sources of evidence, defining and dissecting the argument or thesis of any given piece of writing for its logic, identifying the points of view and question at issue, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of an argument. Professor N says that critical thinking involves being aware of one's value judgments and having the willingness to evaluate the evidence before coming to a conclusion.
 Professor N argues that "content without critical thinking is empty content." He believes that "content without the ability to evaluate it is content that will be mastered only for the length of the course." On the contrary, he says that teachers must organize content so that it is presented logically and so that students some to understand the connections between ideas.
 In his world history class, he encourages students to think critically about evidence, and what evidence reveals. In this class he uses multiple "primary sources" of information, dating from the time under investigation (e.g. Epic literature, pyramid tombs, Plato's Republic). He provides students with questions they should think through as they read and investigate the information, questions such as "What was the purpose of the author, or what was the purpose of a particular practice? What can this fragment from the past reveal about the culture under investigation? What pieces of information are relevant and why?
 For his exams, students are asked to develop and then compare arguments on both sides of an issue. They are to determine why certain arguments are more persuasive than others. He says that through his exams, students must demonstrate their ability to consider all points of view which are relevant to an issue, and to document their positions through reasoning.
Professor O (45)
 Professor O considers critical thinking as having primary importance to her instructional objectives. She says that critical thinking is explicit in her thinking, and that it is largely a product of one or more theories of critical thinking. She distinguishes critical thinking skills and traits in her concept of critical thinking.
 Her responses to the open ended questions, and to follow-up interview questions, were clear and relatively well-elaborated. She understands critical thinking as learning how to think at an in-depth level, to be able to identify and think about problems, situations, and resolutions in a precise and focused manner. She also says that critical thinking means carefully assessing alternatives, figuring out the pros and cons of each. She adds to her definition that critical thinking involves applying reasoning and logic to problems and circumstances in a critical, disciplined and thorough manner.
 To develop the critical thinking abilities of her students, she has them select a topic to analyze related to a complex problem in education. She then has them critically analyze the different sides to the issue, think through the implications of the possible solutions to the problem, and then come up with recommendations. They are then to turn in the final product (paper) as well as make a presentation to the class which focuses on the process they went through in reaching their final conclusions or recommendations. Furthermore, she says that she tries to combine informal lecture with group discussions, where there is "a lot of give and take." She says that she believes strongly in using Socratic questioning to "draw students out."
 Professor O requires students to develop their own philosophies of education throughout the course, by focusing on questions such as "What is the ultimate purpose of education? Who is to be educated? Is everyone to be educated? Or are only a privileged few to be educated? She asks students to answer these questions, providing their reasoning for each answer. She asks them to consider alternative ways of answering the question. In preparation for writing their philosophies of education, Professor O asks students to take on roles with respect to particular complex questions related to education, and then debate the issues with one another. She often asks them to take a point of view which differs from their own and to debate from that position.
 In her classes, professor O requires students to routinely critique each other's work. She does this by having them exchange papers and review one another's papers. She provides guidelines for the standards they are to focus on. Students are to use standards such as: What are the key questions in the paper? How well organized is the paper? How specific are the details? How in-depth are the ideas explored? To what extent are the ideas well thought through? How understandable are the ideas?







Overall Conclusions and Implications

Critical thinking is clearly an honorific phrase in the minds of most teacher educators such that they feel obliged to claim both familiarity with it and commitment to it in their teaching, despite the fact that few have had any in-depth exposure to the research on the concept and most have only a vague understanding of what it is and what is involved in bringing it successfully into instruction. Critical thinking is commonly confused with active involvement in learning (forgetting that active involvement alone is quite compatible with active "mis-learning"). A vague appeal to words from Bloom's Taxonomy (analysis, synthesis, evaluation) is often taken to be demonstrative of knowledge of critical thinking. Even faculty in the CSU, which has a formal policy on critical thinking instruction, is apparently largely unfamiliar with the "definition of critical thinking" and specifications of what minimal conditions for instruction in it are inherent in the policy.
 It is clear that virtually all departments represented in the study uncritically assume that instruction in critical thinking takes place--without any effort to verify this assumption. In fact, we found no evidence in these interviews of any systematic efforts that have been made to assess instruction for critical thinking within any of the schools of education studied. What is more, there is little understanding of how to assess it--should schools of education desire to do it. Most disturbingly, since the overwhelming majority assumes that the faculty already understand and emphasize critical thinking in their classes, any "in-house" assessment would doubtless be perceived as a pointless "political" process to be carried out with a minimum of effort (but with a clear sense of how to achieve the politically correct answer). In other words, since professors in schools of education assume that they understand critical thinking and how to teach for it, and that they are already successful in teaching their students both, it follows that it will be exceedingly difficult to produce substantial changes in teacher certification programs in these areas.
 It is clear from the results of the study that we are very far from a state of affairs in which critical thinking is a hallmark of instruction in teacher preparation programs. Present instruction is likely to produce teachers who, on the one hand, are confident that they not only understand critical thinking but also know how to teach for it, but who, in point of fact, understand neither. Many will equate critical thinking with mere active involvement or "cooperative learning." Others will believe that some acquaintance with the terms of Bloom's Taxonomy or Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intellegences is equivalent to understanding critical thinking. Some will equate it with an emphasis on learning styles or with concept maps or some other tool or facet or dimension of learning.
 Others will equate the whole of critical thinking with some component part of it. Some will therefore emphasize multiple points of view (and take that to be the whole of it). Some will emphasize recognizing one's assumptions. Some will emphasize questioning information sources. Some will emphasize analyzing concepts. But very few will have a comprehensive sense of the whole or a realistic idea of how to cultivate it while teaching the content of a subject or discipline.
 Using the criteria of the California State Universities and Colleges as an alternative reference point, it is clear that, based on the information we have gathered, the overwhelming number of those certified to teach have little understanding of how to teach so that students will understand "the relationship of language to logic,... (or have) the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief....(or acquire) the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought."
 Finally, given the information gathered in this study, it is highly likely that most of those certified to teach have, given present instruction, little understanding of what reasoning is, what assumptions are, what inferences are, what implications are, or what it is to reason with intellectual discipline within a subject field (historically, biologically, psychologically, ...).
 It appears likely that we are now certifying teachers who not only have little understanding of critical thinking, or how to teach it, but also wrongly and confidently think they do. The end result is that California classrooms are places in which both teachers and students lack explicit knowledge of how to reason in a disciplined way about serious subjects and questions. In the absence of that understanding, one can expect a drifting toward intellectual relativism (i.e., toward the view that all answers sincerely believed and defended are equally good since, as far as they can see, there is no final way to intellectually assess competing answers other than by degree of active involvement in their defense). Subjectivity of response, subjectivity of grading, intellectual undisciplined answers will in all likelihood be unconsciously encouraged. Open-mindedness will be confused with the willingness to accept everyone's answer to a complex question as equally "right" (for them).
 Given the facts revealed in this study, it is unlikely that students preparing to teach are being instructed in the basic structures of reasoning. Students studying history, biology, and mathematics will not recognize that historians, biologists, and mathematicians equally make assumptions, develop specialized concepts, reason to conclusions, make interpretations of data, trace implications and consequences, define problems, concerns, and issues, and think within a disciplinary frame of reference or point of view. Students studying English, Physics, and Chemistry will not recognize that thinking clearly, accurately, and precisely; thinking deeply, broadly, and logically; are equally important intellectual criteria in every subject. Students will continue to lack any insight into the fact that moral issues and problems require as much disciplined reasoning and clarity of definition as does reasoning in any other domain. Students will graduate, in short, without any plausible semblance of intellectual perspective and discipline.
 If we are interested in teachers certified in California having a reasonable grounding in the rudiments of critical thinking based on a rich, substantive concept of it, or at least a minimalist, baseline concept, then we have a major task facing us, not the least of which is persuading the majority of the faculty that they do not already know what they confidently assume that they do know.







Limitations of the Study

There were numerous limitations of our study. Some were limitations of time and resources. We were limited in the quantity of people we could interview. We were limited as to the length of the interview. We were limited in the time we had to collect exemplary practices, as well as in the time designated to assembling the report as a whole. There are therefore limitations in the richness of the data collected. With more time and financial support we could have conducted interviews in yet greater depth. We could have engaged in greater study of exemplary practices including, for example, classroom visitations. We could have broadened the net in soliciting exemplary practices and thereby obtained examples from even more disciplines. We could have interviewed teachers in the field, new graduates from teacher education programs, even students at the K-12 level. Very much more might have been done, had there been the time and dollars to do it.

 Nevertheless, despite the obvious limitations of the study, certain patterns in the data we did collect were so consistent across a wide variety of faculty that we believe the study unequivocally establishes some things beyond question, perhaps the main one being that most faculty teaching in teacher education programs have not thought systematically or deeply enough about critical thinking to express a clear, elaborated, and coherent conception of it. It is also beyond question, given the data of the study, that a high percentage of faculty members simply assume that they and their colleagues do understand critical thinking and do effectively teach it.
 It is also beyond question, from the data we gathered, that it is possible to identify college and university faculty who have devoted some significant portion of their time to developing a clear, well-elaborated, and coherent conception of critical thinking and are actively engaged in developing a variety of effective ways to cultivate critical thinking in their students.
 What remains to be seen is whether or not we develop the academic and political motivation to pursue a realistic, long-range solution to these problems. It is difficult to predict at this time the degree of resistance and denial that will emerge from education faculty, and the broader education community, to the results of this study. No professional group likes to hear that it has significantly failed to act effectively in fostering a basic value and in furthering an end importantly connected both to its prestige and mission. We can only point to the fact that there are a growing number of faculty nationally who are recognizing the failure of colleges and universities to effectively teach students to think critically and become effective problem solvers. Unfortunately, the history of education does not provide us with a similarly large problem that was solved in the education community by some set of strategies which we could now appropriate, which could be used in developing strategies to rectify the problems clearly documented in the study.












Critical Thinking Advisory Task Force



An Advisory Task Force was appointed consisting of teacher educators, subject matter faculty, and K-12 teachers and administrators to guide the study design, interpretation of data, and policy recommendations. The following individuals served as members of the Critical Thinking Advisory Task Force for this study:



Barclay Anderson, Teacher
 Edison High School Stockton
 Unified School District
Jerry Brunetti, Professor
 School of Education St. Mary's College
Willis Copeland, Professor
 Department of Education
 University of California, Santa Barbara
Webster Cotton, Professor
 School of Education
 California State University, Los Angeles
Connie DeCapite, Teacher
 Spurgeon Intermediate School
 Santa Ana Unified School District
Marilyn Draheim, Professor
 Jack Fraenkel, Professor College of Education
 San Francisco State University
Jane Willsen Lorand,
 President Lorand and Company, Inc.
 Richard Pope, Teacher
 Toyon Elementary School
 Berryessa Union Elementary School District
Ted Simonson, Principal
 Los Gatos High School
 Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union
 High School District
Yehudi Webster, Professor
 Department of Sociology
 California State University,
 Los Angeles School of Education

University of the Pacific



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Center for Critical Thinking

The Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique   conducts advanced research and disseminates information on critical thinking.
 Each year it sponsors an annual International Conference on Critical Thinking and Educational Reform. It has worked with the College Board, the National Education Association, the U.S. Department of Education, as well as numerous colleges, universities, and school districts to facilitate the implementation of critical thinking instruction focused on intellectual standards.  The following studies demonstrate:
1.  the fact that, as a rule, critical thinking is not presently being effectively taught at the high school, college and university level, and yet  
2.  it is possible to do so.  
To assess students' understanding of critical thinking, we recommend use of the International Critical Thinking Test as well as the  Critical Thinking Interview Profile for College Students  . To assess faculty understanding of critical thinking and its importance to instruction, we recommend the  Critical Thinking Interview Profile For Teachers and Faculty  . By registering as a member of the community, you will have access to streaming video, which includes a sample student interview with Dr. Richard Paul and Rush Cosgrove. 


Research:




Effect of a Model for Critical Thinking on Student Achievement in Primary Source Document Analysis and Interpretation, Argumentative Reasoning, Critical Thinking Dispositions and History Content in a Community College History Course
 Abstract of the Study, conducted by Jenny Reed, in partial fulfillment for her dissertation (October 26, 1998)

 View Abstract    -   View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)



The Effect of Richard Paul's Universal Elements and Standards of Reasoning on Twelfth Grade Composition A Research Proposal Presented to the Faculty Of the School of Education Alliant International University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education: Teaching Study conducted by J. Stephen Scanlan, San Diego (2006) View Abstract   -   View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF) Study of 38 Public Universities and 28 Private Universities To Determine Faculty Emphasis on Critical Thinking In Instruction Principal Researchers: Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, and Dr. Ted Bartell View Abstract    -   View the full study A Research Proposal Presented to the Faculty Of the School of Education Alliant International University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education: Teaching

  Study conducted by J. Stephen Scanlan, San Diego (2006)

 View Abstract    -    View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)


 Study of 38 Public Universities and 28 Private Universities
 To Determine Faculty Emphasis on Critical Thinking In Instruction 

 Principal Researchers: Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, and Dr. Ted Bartell
 View Abstract     -    View the full study 








Executive Summary
(Complete Study is available for purchase.)  On September 29, 1994 Governor Wilson signed legislation authored by Senator Leroy Greene (SB1849) directing the Commission on Teacher Credentialing to conduct a study of teacher preparation programs to assess the extent to which these programs prepare candidates for teaching credentials to teach critical thinking and problem-solving skills in elementary and secondary schools.
 During the spring of 1995, Commission staff began to conceptualize a study design that would yield descriptive information on course content and teaching practices being employed by postsecondary faculty to train teacher candidates. With assistance from the Center for Critical Thinking at Sonoma State University, an interview protocol was designed for use in telephone interviews with a cross-section of education and subject matter faculty in both public and private colleges and universities in California.
 During the study planning process, a decision was made to design respondent selection procedures in such a way as to assure that information collected would be generalizable to all faculty preparing teachers across the state. To accomplish this objective, two statewide probability samples were designed: a sample of teacher education faculty, and a separate sample of Arts and Sciences faculty teaching courses in Commission-approved subject matter programs.
 There were three major objectives in this study. The first was to assess current teaching practices and knowledge of critical thinking among faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs in California. The second was to identify exemplary teaching practices that enhance critical thinking. The third was to develop policy recommendations based on the results of the study. The study included 38 public colleges and universities and 28 private ones.







The Concept of Critical Thinking and Problem Solving Used in the Study


The concept of critical thinking and problem solving used in this study is "minimalist," that is, one which captures the essential dimensions of the concept reflected in the following: its etymology and dictionary definition, major definitions and explanations in the literature, a brief history of the idea, major tests of critical thinking, and the basic values it presupposes.
 This minimalist concept of critical thinking is embedded not only in a core body of research over the last 30 to 50 years but is also derived from roots in ancient Greek. The word ’’critical’’ derives etymologically from two Greek roots: "kriticos" (meaning discerning judgment) and "kriterion" (meaning standards). Etymologically, then, the word implies the development of "discerning judgment based on standards." In Webster's New World Dictionary, the relevant entry reads "characterized by careful analysis and judgment" and is followed by the gloss: "critical, in its strictest sense, implies an attempt at objective judgment so as to determine both merits and faults." Applied to thinking, then, we might provisionally define critical thinking as thinking that explicitly aims at well-founded judgment and hence utilizes appropriate evaluative standards in the attempt to determine the true worth, merit, or value of something.
 The tradition of research into critical thinking reflects the common perception that human thinking left to itself often gravitates toward prejudice, over-generalization, common fallacies, self-deception, rigidity, and narrowness. The critical thinking tradition seeks ways of understanding the mind and then training the intellect so that such "errors", "blunders", and "distortions" of thought are minimized. It assumes that the capacity of humans for good reasoning can be nurtured and developed by an educational process aimed directly at that end. It assumes that sound critical thinking maximizes our ability to solve problems of importance to us by helping us both to avoid common mistakes and to proceed in the most rational and logical fashion.
 For example, those who think critically typically engage in intellectual practices of the following sort, monitoring, reviewing, and assessing: goals and purposes; the way issues and problems are formulated; the information, data, or evidence presented for acceptance, interpretations of such information, data, or evidence; the quality of reasoning presented or developed, basic concepts or ideas inherent in thinking, assumptions made, implications and consequences that may or may not follow; points of view and frames of reference. In monitoring, reviewing and assessing these intellectual constructs, those who think critically characteristically strive, for such intellectual ends as clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, and logicalness. Each of these modes of thinking help us to accomplish the ends for which we are thinking and hence to solve the problems inherent in pursuing those ends.







Current Teaching Practices and Knowledge of Critical Thinking

In-depth interviews were utilized to provide information on how faculty tend to think about critical thinking and the manner in which that thinking influences the design of their classes. Questions were designed to shed light on the extent to which students in teacher preparation programs in California are being taught in ways that facilitate skill in critical thinking and the ability to teach it to others.
 There were three goals of this component of the study. The first was to ensure that any faculty who had a developed notion of critical thinking (of any kind) would have a full opportunity and much encouragement to spell out that notion. We wanted to make sure that everyone interviewed was encouraged to express their actual views and to express them in detail.
 The second goal was to examine the views expressed to see: a) how many faculty actually had a developed view and b) how much internal coherence there was in any given faculty view. In other words, we sought to determine how many faculty had seriously thought through the concept of critical thinking--irrespective of how they defined it, and then, once we had a full expression of any given person's views, we examined what was said, not only for clarity but also for coherence.
 The third goal was to determine the extent to which the views expressed demonstrated an internalization of traditional "minimalist" elements of critical thinking. We sought to determine, in other words, how much of the common core of meaning now attached to the traditional concept by those working in the field of critical thinking research (and reflected in its semantics and history) has been internalized by faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs.
 Data collection included both closed-ended and open-ended questions. In addition, the coders of responses made judgments about some important global features of the responses made (using minimalist components of critical thinking as criteria). The open-ended questions, and the follow-up questions, were designed, as indicated above, to provide maximum opportunity for individuals to articulate virtually any concept of critical thinking that they favored. The follow-up questions’’ main function was that of ensuring that the most specific and precise views that could be obtained were obtained. Since the interviews lasted 45 minutes on average, the interviewees had ample opportunity to express their views.
 The same interview protocol was utilized for both education faculty and subject matter faculty. A total of 140 interviews were completed, representing a 78% response rate among those contacted for an interview. Since the samples were constructed so as to be representative in a statistical sense of all faculty involved in teacher preparation in California, the results can in fact be generalized to teacher preparation faculty in the state as a whole. The results of the analysis were as follows:
 1) Though the overwhelming majority (89%) claimed critical thinking to be a primary objective of their instruction, only a small minority (19%) could give a clear explanation of what critical thinking is. Furthermore, according to their answers, only 9% of the respondents were clearly teaching for critical thinking on a typical day in class.
 2) Though the overwhelming majority (78%) claimed that their students lacked appropriate intellectual standards (to use in assessing their thinking), and 73% considered that students learning to assess their own work was of primary importance, only a very small minority (8%) could enumerate any intellectual criteria or standards they required of students or could give an intelligible explanation of what those criteria and standards were.
 3) While 50% of those interviewed said that they explicitly distinguish critical thinking skills from traits, only 8% were able to provide a clear conception of the critical thinking skills they thought were most important for their students to develop. Furthermore the overwhelming majority (75%) provided either minimal or vague allusion (33%) or no allusion at all (42%) to intellectual traits of mind.
 4) When asked how they conceptualized truth, a surprising 41% of those who responded to the question said that knowledge, truth and sound judgment are fundamentally a matter of personal preference or subjective taste.
 5) Although the majority (67%) said that their concept of critical thinking is largely explicit in their thinking, only 19% could elaborate on their concept of thinking.
 6) Although the vast majority (89%) stated that critical thinking was of primary importance to their instruction, 77% of the respondents had little, limited or no conception of how to reconcile content coverage with the fostering of critical thinking.
 7) Although the overwhelming majority (81%) felt that their department’s graduates develop a good or high level of critical thinking ability while in their program, only 20% said that their departments had a shared approach to critical thinking, and only 9% were able to clearly articulate how they would assess the extent to which a faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking. The remaining respondents had a limited conception or no conception at all of how to do this.
 8) Although the vast majority (89%) stated that critical thinking was of primary importance to their instruction, only `a very small minority could clearly explain the meanings of basic terms in critical thinking. For example, only 8% could clearly differentiate between an assumption and an inference, and only 4% could differentiate between an inference and an implication.
 9) Only a very small minority (9%) mentioned the special and/or growing need for critical thinking today in virtue of the pace of change and the complexities inherent in human life. Not a single respondent elaborated on the issue.
 10) In explaining their views of critical thinking, the overwhelming majority (69%) made either no allusion at all, or a minimal allusion, to the need for greater emphasis on peer and student self-assessment in instruction.
 11) From either the quantitative data directly, or from minimal inference from those data, it is clear that a significant percentage of faculty interviewed (and, if representative, most faculty):

•do not understand the connection of critical thinking to intellectual standards.
•are not able to clarify major intellectual criteria and standards.
•inadvertently confuse the active involvement of students in classroom activities with critical thinking in those activities.
•are unable to give an elaborated articulation of their concept of critical thinking.
•cannot provide plausible examples of how they foster critical thinking in the classroom.
•are not able to name specific critical thinking skills they think are important for students to learn.
•are not able to plausibly explain how to reconcile covering content with fostering critical thinking.
•do not consider reasoning as a significant focus of critical thinking.
•do not think of reasoning within disciplines as a major focus of instruction.
•cannot specify basic structures essential to the analysis of reasoning.
•cannot give an intelligible explanation of basic abilities either in critical thinking or in reasoning .
•do not distinguish the psychological dimension of thought from the intellectual dimension.
•have had no involvement in research into critical thinking and have not attended any conferences on the subject.
•are unable to name a particular theory or theorist that has shaped their concept of critical thinking.
 Some differences were also observed between Education and Arts and Sciences faculty. These differences do not alter the overall findings but do suggest relative strengths and weaknesses for each group. The comparative results were as follows:
 1) Education faculty was slightly more likely ( 91%) to state that critical thinking is of primary importance to their instructional objectives than Arts and Sciences faculty ( 82%).
 2) Education faculty was somewhat more likely (55%) to include in their concept of critical thinking a distinction between critical thinking skills and traits than Arts and Sciences faculty (39%), though neither group effectively articulated that difference.
 3) Education faculty was somewhat better in articulating how they bring critical thinking into the curriculum on a typical class day (33% of the Arts and Sciences faculty had little or no conception of how to do this while only 15% of the Education faculty had the same lack of conception).
 4) Education faculty also was better able to reconcile covering content with fostering critical thinking (31% of Arts and Sciences faculty had little or no conception of how to reconcile the two, while only 11% of education faculty had little or no conception). What is more, education faculty were more likely to elaborate on how they would reconcile content coverage with fostering critical thinking (25% were able to elaborate on reconciliation of these, while only 8% of the Arts and Sciences faculty were able to elaborate on the same point).
 5) The Arts and Sciences faculty better articulated the basic skills of thought that students need to effectively address issues and concerns in their lives such as clarifying questions, gathering relevant data or information, formulating or reasoning to logical or valid conclusions, interpretations or solutions, etc. Of the Education faculty, 40% failed to mention any of these basic skills while only 5% of the non-education faculty failed to mention any.
 6) The Education faculty were somewhat less likely to ignore the importance of emphasizing problem solving in the classroom than the Arts and Sciences group. Only 10% of this group failed to mention its importance while 26% of the Arts and Sciences faculty failed to mention it.
 7) The Education faculty were somewhat less likely to ignore the special need for critical thinking today in virtue of such phenomena as accelerating change, intensifying complexity, and increasing interdependence (64% of the Arts and Sciences faculty failed to mention its importance, while 51% of the education group failed to mention it).
 8) The Education faculty were less likely to ignore the need for emphasis on peer and student self-assessment (33% percent of this group failed to mention it, while 55% of the Arts and Sciences group failed to mention it).
 Analysis of open-ended responses provided not only confirmation of the quantitative data, but also powerful support for significant qualitative generalizations. What is more, a close look at individual cases reveals that there is significant contrast between those faculty members who have a developed concept of critical thinking and those who do not. Profiles of individual faculty responses are presented in the full report to illustrate clearly the kind of differences which existed between those who were articulate in explaining how they approach critical thinking and those who were not.
 Most faculty answered open-ended questions with vague answers, rather than clear and precise answers. In many of their answers there were internal "tensions" and, in some cases, outright contradictions. The magic talisman were phrases like "constructivism", "Bloom's Taxonomy", "process-based", "inquiry-based", "beyond recall", "active learning", "meaning-centered" and similar phrases that under probing questions the majority of interviewees were unable to intelligibly explain in terms of critical thinking. The most common confusion, perhaps, was confusion between what is necessary (for critical thinking) and what is sufficient (for it). For example, active engagement is necessary to critical thinking, but one can be actively engaged and not think critically.
 Virtually all of those interviewed identified critical thinking and the learning of intellectual standards as primary objectives in instruction, yet few could give a clear explanation of what their concept of either was. Virtually all said that students lacked intellectual standards when they entered their classes, yet implied, at the same time, that they left with those intellectual standards in place. They also overwhelmingly stated or implied that their students left them with a good level of critical thinking as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 By direct statement or by implication, most claimed that they permeated their instruction with an emphasis on critical thinking and that the students internalized the concepts in their courses as a result. Yet, only the rare interviewee mentioned the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, or logically. Very few mentioned any of the basic skills of thought such as the ability to clarify questions; gather relevant data; reason to logical or valid conclusions; identify key assumptions; trace significant implications; or enter without distortion into alternative points of view. Intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and intellectual responsibility, are virtually unheard of by the interviewees.
 Careful analysis of the interviews indicates that, irrespective of the diversity of language used, the central problem is that most faculty have not carefully thought through any concept of critical thinking, have no sense of intellectual standards they can put into words, and are, therefore, by any reasonable interpretation, in no position to foster critical thinking in their own students or to help them to foster it in their future students-except to inculcate into their students the same vague views that they have.







Some Policy Recommendations

If it is essential for teachers to foster critical thinking, then it is essential for those who teach the teachers to have at least baseline knowledge of the concept of critical thinking. Those who teach prospective teachers must be sufficiently well-informed about critical thinking not only to be able to explain it in a general way to their students, they must also regularly model instruction for critical thinking in their own classroom procedures and policies. The design of their classes must reflect an explicit critical thinking orientation, so that students not only systematically think through the content of their courses, but also come to see how the design of a course can require and cultivate critical thinking and thoughtfulness — or fail to do so.
 On our view, four interventions are requisite for substantive change to occur. First, we must disseminate the information faculty need to change their perceptions. Second, we must provide for faculty skill-building through appropriate professional development. Third, we must establish a mandate to systematically teach critical thinking (and how to teach for it) in all programs of teacher education. And fourth, we must develop an exit examination in critical thinking for all prospective teachers. Let us look at each of these proposed interventions in turn.
 1) Information Dissemination: Sufficient awareness, grounded in intellectual humility, must be generated in those communities of faculty teaching in teacher preparation programs leading to the recognition a) that there is a general lack of knowledge on the part of the teaching faculty of the baseline concept of critical thinking, and b) that most students in teacher preparation programs are now graduating without knowledge of critical thinking or how to teach for it. There are seven forms of information that need wide dissemination. At present none of these categories of information are widely disseminated in the teaching community. The categories are as follows:

•We need to disseminate information that documents the problem at the k-12 teaching level.
•We need to disseminate information on teaching for critical thinking within particular disciplines (such as math).
•We need to disseminate information about the process that faculty go through as they initially develop their ability to bring critical thinking successfully into the classroom (especially regarding those who display intellectual humility).
•We need to disseminate information about exemplary teaching practices of individuals, as they reach high levels of success.
 2) Skill Building: Minimal inservicing in critical thinking must be provided for faculty in teacher preparation programs. If faculty is not provided with convenient ways to upgrade their knowledge of critical thinking and how to teach for it, very few will go out of their way to pursue it.







Qualitative Generalizations: Interpreting Responses to Open-Ended Questions

A close look at the open-ended responses obtained in the interviews provides a realistic sense of the empirical foundation for generalizations that go beyond purely quantitative data. Many of the samples from the interviews are vivid and deeply revealing. A full airing of these samples, with commentary, is contained in Appendix A.
 The data collected enabled us to present illustrative profiles of faculty who had a vague and or internally incoherent conception of critical thinking in contrast to those who had a developed notion of critical thinking (irrespective of their orientation toward it). If we assume that those who had a vague or internally contradictory concept of critical thinking simply haven't thought much on the subject, and those who had a clear, well-elaborated, and internally coherent concept had thought seriously about the subject, then we can infer that comparatively few faculty members have thought seriously about critical thinking. In other words, we were able to get a strong sense of how many faculty members had seriously thought through the concept of critical thinking--irrespective of how they defined it, and then, we were able to separate out those whose views were not only highly elaborated but coherent.
 From delving into the rich details of the open-ended responses, one finds not only confirmation of the quantitative data, but also powerful support for significant qualitative generalizations. What is more, a close look at individual cases reveals that there is significant contrast between those faculty members who have a developed concept of critical thinking and those who do not. The profiles of individual faculty that are summarized below illustrate clearly the kind of differences which existed between those who were articulate in explaining how they approach critical thinking and those who were not.
 It also confirmed what the quantitative data showed, namely, that many faculty members, without knowing it, are confused about the basic concepts and skills of critical thinking. Let us now look at some illustrative faculty profiles from the study
 Each profile represents one person from the study. Each profile is anonymous--in keeping with the commitment made to all of those who agreed to be interviewed.







Some Illustrative Profiles

The Basic Pattern
 What follows is a series of "profiles" which suggest some of the basic patterns of thinking found in particular faculty members who participated in the interviews.
 Most faculty answered open-ended questions with vague answers, rather than clear and precise answers. In many of their answers there were internal "tensions" and in some cases outright contradictions. The magic talisman were phrases like "constructivism", "Bloom's Taxonomy", "process-based", "inquiry-based", "beyond recall", "active learning", "meaning-centered" and such like — phrases that under probing questions the majority of interviewees were unable to intelligibly explain in terms of critical thinking. The most common confusion, perhaps, was confusion between what is necessary (for critical thinking) and what is sufficient (for it). For example, active engagement is necessary to critical thinking, but one can be actively engaged and NOT THINK CRITICALLY. To illustrate, many gang members are actively engaged in gang activities, but that does not make them critical thinkers. It is not THAT you are engaged but HOW you are engaged that matters.
 Virtually all of those interviewed identified critical thinking and the learning of intellectual standards as primary objectives in instruction, yet few could give a clear explanation of what their concept of either was. Virtually all said that students lacked intellectual standards when they entered their classes, yet implied, at the same time, that they left with those intellectual standards in place. They also overwhelmingly stated or implied that their students left them with a good level of critical thinking as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 By direct statement or by implication, most claimed that they permeated their instruction with an emphasis on critical thinking and that the students internalized the concepts in their courses as a result. Yet only the rare interviewee mentioned the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, or logically, etc.  Very few mentioned any of the basic skills of thought, such as the ability to clarify questions, gather relevant data, reason to logical or valid conclusions, identify key assumptions, trace significant implications, or enter without distortion into alternative points of view. Intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual responsibility, and so on, are virtually unheard of by the interviewees.
 After listening to the interviews it becomes obvious that irrespective of the diversity of language used, the central problem is that most faculty have not carefully thought through any concept of critical thinking, have no sense of intellectual standards they can put into words, and are, therefore, by any reasonable interpretation, in no position to foster critical thinking in their own students or to help them to foster it in their future students--except to inculcate into their students the same vague views that they have. Now let's look at some specific profiles.







Weak Profiles



Profile A
(8) Professor A thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as intuitive and a product of his own thinking. He does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students come to class with well-developed intellectual standards and graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that he hasn't in fact thought much about critical thinking. His explanation of critical thinking, for example, is vague and possibly self-contradictory:
 "Critical thinking means to think analytically and be aware that everyone thinks for himself. All thinking is critical to some extent. Anyone who thinks intelligently. Reflectiveness."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "I can't answer this. I can't identify skills."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, the vagueness of his thinking about critical thinking is again apparent when he says "You look at their publishing. And I'd hear from students. They'd be complaining. It takes time."
 When asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, it is clear that he does not have one: "That’s a hard question to answer. I don't think I see an answer to it."
 In addition to his general lack of clear thinking about critical thinking, it is apparent that he is also confused about the basic concepts in critical thinking. When asked to explain the difference between an assumption and an inference, he says, "An inference is something based on information. An assumption is based on feeling and a lack of thinking." (Ignoring the fact that we can make empirically well-founded assumptions and infer something based on prejudices or stereotypes.)
Profile B
 (10) Professor B thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of her own thinking. She does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to her, students come to class with well-developed intellectual standards and graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that she hasn't clarified the difference between "constructing beliefs" and "constructing knowledge." She in general assumes that if students are actively engaged and "thinking for themselves", they are ipso facto thinking critically. Nowhere does she mention that students actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking, she says:
 "Critical thinking consists in the active construction of knowledge and valuing social justice, a continuing examining of things as they are and might be..."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, she says, "I don't think in terms of critical thinking skills. To think critically is to be a competent observer of events and to have a disposition to ask questions about them, to classify and find patterns...". (Note that a person can have the disposition to ask superficial or loaded questions and that all persons, poor reasoners as well as good reasoners, classify and find patterns--merely in virtue of being language users).
 When asked how she would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, she equates critical thinking with active learning, saying:
 "Critical thinking is built into an active learning model. How are we supporting students in becoming active, autonomous learners. Active participation, reflection, a personal experience and the ability to make connection between their own views and others. Lively dialogue."
 When asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards, she looks to find a way to equate intellectual standards with active processing, saying:
 "A process conception. There is no finite set of standards to achieve but the learner engages in active dialogue with self and others with increasingly insightful learning..."
Profile C
 (14) Professor C thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as explicit and a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which he explicitly subscribes. He claims to distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards, but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and good ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague in general and suggest that he assumes that critical thinking is an automatic by-product of the use of discipline-based procedures. It is evident, however, that he has not thought through what the differences are between, say, the "scientific method" and "Bloom's taxonomy." He nowhere discusses the standards and criteria implicit in sound scientific work. His explanation of critical thinking is: "Critical thinking is investigative inquiry, to observe, interpret, and predict."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "To analyze, predict, compare, observe... all of those listed by Bloom...all the science processes."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, he says "Ask them to compare a lecture approach with an investigative inquiry approach. Have them do a self-assessment after they did an inquiry unit."
 Though the above answer suggests that Professor C understands the importance of having students engage in self- and peer-assessment, it is also clear that he has not thought through the intellectual criteria or standards that students need to effectively do such self-assessment. To some extent, he appears to equate intellectual standards with intellectual autonomy (forgetting that I can think for myself and yet do a poor job of it). For example, when asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, he says: "All thoughts should be tentative. Are we using the processes and holding thoughts tentatively. In all cases, we should let the students develop their own level of understanding."
 In addition to his vague thinking about critical thinking, it is apparent that he is also confused about the basic concepts in critical thinking. When asked to explain the difference between an assumption and an inference, and says, "Assumptions don't have data behind them. Inferences do." In saying this, he of course fails to remember that assumptions can be well or poorly grounded and inferences are sometimes based on stereotypes or imagined facts.
 Nowhere in the interview does Professor C mention any of the basic skills of thought such as clarifying the question; gathering relevant data, reasoning to logical or valid conclusions; identifying key assumptions; tracing significant implications, or entering without distortion into alternative points of view, neither does he mention important intellectual traits of mind, such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual responsibility, etc...
Profile D
 (15) Professor D illustrates a person who seems torn between negating critical thinking and its importance while simultaneously claiming to permeate her teaching with it (as something vitally important). On the one hand, she says that critical thinking is of primary importance in her instructional objectives, but on the other hand, says that "it is not so much critical thinking (that students need) but information." On the one hand she says that critical thinking is explicit in her thinking and that it is a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which she explicitly subscribes, but she goes on to say that "I never read critical thinking books." She says that critical thinking "is embedded in everything I do," but cannot articulate any critical thinking skills or standards that she emphasizes.
 Profile E
 Professor E (16) illustrates a person who seems torn between a view in which critical thinking is based on objective standards and skills, on the one hand, and a subjective view, on the other (in which whatever satisfies the individual as an autonomous thinker is the only ultimate basis for critical thought). This tension is suggested in Professor E's explanation of his concept of critical thinking: "Information must be processed. To analyze and synthesize a viewpoint that is your own is critical thinking. Values come into it. We should have the capacity to look at things objectively." When he delineates skills that are important for students to develop, he names values and process, but does not clearly state any skill as such: "(They need to learn) objectivity, (to) weigh through information, balance views, accept new information and process it" When Professor E explains his conception of intellectual standards we see again him oscillating between the objective and subjective. He says that "...accuracy and truth are both relative. ... What is the truth at that moment? (But) be available to find that one is not accurate and that the truth is not comfortable," At the same time Professor E is one of the rare individuals who ranks program graduates as low both in critical thinking abilities and in knowledge of how to teach for critical thinking.
Profile F
 (19) Professor F thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of one or more theories to which she explicitly subscribes (though unable to cite any theory when asked). She says she does distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to her, students come to class without well-developed intellectual standards but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and in fostering critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are peppered with a diversity of responses (and it is not quite clear whether they add up to a coherent notion or represent confusion of thought). Nowhere does she mention that students actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking, she says:
 "Everyone has a different view of critical thinking. I think of it as thinking skills. I think of words like analytical, evaluative, judgmental and I think of my field and activities I would do with my students. Logic and patterns. For example, classifying skills. Looking at a set of buttons--which one is different. I'm thinking of open-endedness, unifying ideas, and problem-solving."
 She provides a similar answer when asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards:
 "Open-endedness, trying something new, analyze situations and problem solve, making estimates to see if your answers are reasonable, consider the viewpoint, judge the data, check their work."
 She is unable to give a coherent explanation of the difference between an assumption and an inference or between an inference and an implication.
Profile G
(76) Professor G is a good example of one who equates critical thinking with thinking for oneself and, beyond that, applies no discernible intellectual standards. She says critical thinking is of primary importance in her instructional objectives, that her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of her own thinking. She does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. On the other hand, she says that knowledge, truth, and sound judgment are not fundamentally a matter of one's personal preference or subjective taste. She says that it is of primary importance for students to acquire sound intellectual criteria or standards and to learn how to assess their own work. According to her, students come to class without well-developed intellectual standards but graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 When asked to explain her concept of critical thinking she says:
 "Critical thinking is being able to look at a situation and analyze what is going on and ask questions that enable you to get at alternatives. To be able to make up your mind by getting beyond the rhetoric."
 Her responses to the open-ended questions, however, are quite vague and suggest that she hasn't clarified, for example, the difference between "constructing beliefs" and "constructing knowledge." She in general assumes that if students are actively engaged and "thinking for themselves", they are ipso facto thinking critically. Nowhere does she mention that students can actively construct prejudice as well as knowledge, poor thinking as well as sound thinking. Nowhere does she mention the importance of students thinking clearly, accurately, precisely, relevantly, logically, etc...
 When asked to describe a typical day in class that fosters critical thinking she says:
 "I use a holistic, constructivist basis. Students construct their own meaning, working together, dynamic, in living and breathing class discussions and debates."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, she is quite vague. She says, "Being able to assess validity, to look at and assess their own work, what the next step ought to be, to be able to choose issues that are important."
 When asked how she would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, she equates critical thinking with active learning, saying:
 .
 "I would look at students' products. Look for originality. Going beyond the task."
 When asked for her personal conception of intellectual standards, she says: "(I would look for them to) take their own positions. I don't know that I would apply general standards."
 She is unclear about the differences between assumptions, inferences, and implications.
 Profile H
 Professor H (79) is representative of the many faculty members who equate the fact of students actively "processing" information with their thinking critically about it. Most of those who think this way tend to think in terms of Bloom's taxonomy. Hence, critical thinking then is viewed as going beyond "knowledge" acquisition. Knowledge acquisition is viewed essentially as lower order memorization and recall, while "processing" is viewed as going beyond recall to "internalization".
 Professor H thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as explicit and a product of his own thinking (as well as theory). He says he distinguishes critical thinking skills, traits, and values (though his subsequent answers do not support this claim). According to him, his students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards, but that it is "of primary importance" that they acquire such standards and learn thereby to assess their own work. He claims that students in the program graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability as well as a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are vague and suggest that he hasn't in fact thought much about critical thinking. He explains his concept of critical thinking as follows: "Critical thinking is analyzing an event before a decision is made." He says that "almost all" of his instruction is based on critical thinking because "as long as it is not knowledge acquisition, it is critical thinking. Students analyze and draw their own conclusions."
 When asked what critical thinking skills are most important for students to develop, he says, "The skills of analysis and recognition of multiple perspectives and then picking out the appropriate action."
 When asked how he would assess the extent to which another faculty member was or was not fostering critical thinking in their classes, he says "Do they go beyond recall to have the students analyzing and putting it back together to make a decision on their own?"
 When asked for his personal conception of intellectual standards, he says "Are they using all the information? (Are they considering) multiple viewpoints?"
 His understanding of basic critical thinking terms is vague. He explains the difference between an assumption and an inference as follows: "An assumption is something that takes place automatically. In an inference you are going in some direction." Concerning the difference between an inference and an implication, he says: "An inference is more biased. An implication is sounder judgments, something that would follow a chain of events." (Note, he is unaware that inferences can be valid or invalid, well or poorly supported, and an implication to thought follows whether or not we ever act upon it--and hence need not be related to any chain of events).





Strong Profiles

Profile J
 (26) Professor J thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in his instructional objectives. He identifies his concept of critical thinking as a product of one or more theories of critical thinking to which he explicitly subscribes. He does not distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values. According to him, his students graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a good level of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 His responses to the open-ended questions, however, are relatively clear and elaborated. He cites Paulo Friere and John Dewey as fundamental influences in his thinking about critical thinking. He says his main goal is the "empowerment" of students. He says he strives to model critical thinking with his students in a variety of ways, including evaluating various aspects of the course with the students (e.g., what structures being used are working and which are not having their designed effect). He is especially concerned with the intellectual and linguistic development of students and in encouraging students to begin to take charge of their minds and their lives. He develops special strategies to use in helping students to read critically and he challenges the students continually to examine their own presuppositions, as well as the presuppositions of the status quo, of society, of schooling--not excepting his own instructional design.
 Rather than focus on covering information, professor J helps students to learn skills of finding and assessing information. He concentrates his effort on key concepts which help students assimilate new information. He wants students to discover different modes of thinking that enable them to question dominant sources of information. He wants students to develop a critical understanding of the social context of education and often has students discuss the ultimate purpose of education. Gaining perspective, learning new frames of reference, questioning assumptions, evaluating information for its relevance to their values, involving students in more "authentic" modes of assessment--these are central goals and emphases.
 Professor J has a well-elaborated conception of intellectual standards. He emphasizes students clarifying their views, evaluating relevance, identifying implications, accurately recognizing presuppositions, determining the coherence of views presented, adhering to the rigors of the scientific method with its goals of accuracy and precision, evaluating reasoning for its validity, and striving for soundness in judgment.
Profile K
 (25) Professor K thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance in her instructional objectives. She says her concept of critical thinking is explicit and a product of one of more theories of critical thinking to which she explicitly subscribes. She cites Matthew Lipman as a fundamental source of theory. She does distinguish critical thinking skills, traits, and values.
 According to her, students do not come to class with well-developed intellectual standards but he thinks they do graduate with a good level of critical thinking ability and a high good of ability to foster critical thinking in their future students.
 Her responses to the open-ended questions are relatively clear and well-elaborated.
 She defines critical thinking as effective problem solving. She fosters it by systematically confronting students, contradicting them to get them to think. She models alternative views, plays devil's advocate, and holds students responsible for their thinking. Hence, though she is a "constructivist" she does not assume that students will automatically construct knowledge simply because they are actively engaged. She believes they must experience careful cultivation within an environment in which they are systematically challenged. She believes in "whole-hearted responsibility." Students must own their decisions and be accountable.
 She designs her classes so that students must evaluate each other's work. She uses a case study approach, but one in which students critique other students on their cases studies. She uses lecture to present theory, but then students are forced to critique their own understanding of the theories and apply them to their cases. She focuses 40% to 50% of class time on interactive activities, but she holds students responsible for a level of performance in those activities. She designs ways to hold students responsible to do their assigned reading so that they are prepared for the in-class work.
 She argues that students must continually go back and forth between experience and theory, and between thinking and reflecting on where that thinking is coming from. She argues that students must become conscious of their own theories and what they are based on. Theories must be considered with their objections.
 Professor K's conception of intellectual standards is framed in the context of the above remarks. Students must express and defend their views, hear objections and answer the objections, hear other views and learn from those views. They must consider alternatives and check their reasoning to make sure it is logical. They must also check their information sources.
Professor L
 (18) Professor L is important as a rare example of a professor whose answers regarding critical thinking reflect intellectual humility. She explicitly admits that her knowledge of critical thinking is limited. She tries to make critical thinking primary in her classes, but she freely admits that she has only her only critical thinking intuitions to go on.
 In her view critical thinking is the ability to define a problem and develop a solution to it. It includes recognizing strategies that are effective, using criteria for "correct" performance, and then assessing their own performance. Concerning reconciling content coverage with fostering critical thinking, she says that if you give students the material so fast that they are not able to learn it, then coverage makes no sense. She gives a good example from volleyball. She says it would do you no good to hear lectures on volleyball if you are not able to use them effectively in performance of the game.
 Concerning the component skills of critical thinking, she freely admits that she has never studied critical thinking intellectually, and so "I'm not sure how to explain it." Concerning her personal conception of intellectual standards, her refreshing answer is "This is something I haven't thought about." (The strength of this profile is in the intellectual humility that it displays. This is a professor who is clearly ready to learn.)
Professor M
 (92) Professor M thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance to his instructional objectives. He thinks of knowledge, truth and sound judgment as not fundamentally a matter of his own personal preference or subjective taste. He does not distinguish between critical thinking skills and traits. He was one of the few faculty members in the study to state that the students in his department develop only a low level ability to think critically.
 Professor M's responses to the open ended questions were relatively clear and elaborated. He sees critical thinking as "being able to reach the sensible conclusions on the basic of logic and evidence, the ability to perceive contradictions...to attempt to resolve them." He says that on a typical class day he focuses on "presenting problems to students as opposed to conclusions."
 In terms of the critical thinking skills he thinks are the most important for students to develop, he says they most need to develop the ability to seek and evaluate evidence, to use logic to reach defensible conclusions. Furthermore he says that they must be able to evaluate positions of their own and others, "to go beyond superficial understandings of reality."
 Professor M says that he places strong emphasis on helping students develop philosophical underpinnings of their eventual teaching procedures through a critical thinking approach. He goes on to say that he wants to students to "approach teaching as an intellectual task as opposed to a technical one.
 One of his primary objectives is to help students develop their ability to gather relevant points of view when dealing with broad, complex issues. Furthermore, he expresses the view that teachers should not present students with "finished answers." Rather they should help students construct their own meanings by teaching them to think through issues in a critical manner.
 In focusing on the philosophy of education, he presents the key concept as "a logically consistent interrelated set of principles about the nature of knowledge, learning, and teaching that generates practical solutions for the everyday problems of teaching." He makes it clear to students that they are responsible for forming their own philosophy, for determining the principles they think are important which will guide what they do in the classroom.
 Some questions he uses to guide their thinking are:
•What are the proper aims of education? (Not what works, but what purposes are worth working for?)
•What knowledge is worth knowing (teaching)?
•Who should decide what knowledge is worth knowing?
•What is an educated person?
•What kind of relationships should teachers establish with students?
•To what extent should teachers prepare students to be agents for change?
•To what extent should they prepare them to 'fit it'?"

 Before students write answers to these questions, Prof. M leads a discussion which explores all points of view relevant to the issues embedded in them. In these discussions, he tries to persuade them of each of the varying points of view. Then after exposure to these differing views, they write their philosophy of teaching, pointing out principles they believe are important in good teaching, and supporting their positions through reasoned judgment.
Professor N (104)
 Professor N thinks of critical thinking as of primary importance to his instructional objectives. He says that his concept of critical thinking is largely explicit in his thinking. Furthermore, in his concept of critical thinking he explicitly distinguishes critical thinking skills from traits.
 His responses to the open ended questions are relatively well elaborated. He describes his concept of critical thinking as gathering evidence, evaluating evidence, evaluating the sources of evidence, defining and dissecting the argument or thesis of any given piece of writing for its logic, identifying the points of view and question at issue, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of an argument. Professor N says that critical thinking involves being aware of one's value judgments and having the willingness to evaluate the evidence before coming to a conclusion.
 Professor N argues that "content without critical thinking is empty content." He believes that "content without the ability to evaluate it is content that will be mastered only for the length of the course." On the contrary, he says that teachers must organize content so that it is presented logically and so that students some to understand the connections between ideas.
 In his world history class, he encourages students to think critically about evidence, and what evidence reveals. In this class he uses multiple "primary sources" of information, dating from the time under investigation (e.g. Epic literature, pyramid tombs, Plato's Republic). He provides students with questions they should think through as they read and investigate the information, questions such as "What was the purpose of the author, or what was the purpose of a particular practice? What can this fragment from the past reveal about the culture under investigation? What pieces of information are relevant and why?
 For his exams, students are asked to develop and then compare arguments on both sides of an issue. They are to determine why certain arguments are more persuasive than others. He says that through his exams, students must demonstrate their ability to consider all points of view which are relevant to an issue, and to document their positions through reasoning.
Professor O (45)
 Professor O considers critical thinking as having primary importance to her instructional objectives. She says that critical thinking is explicit in her thinking, and that it is largely a product of one or more theories of critical thinking. She distinguishes critical thinking skills and traits in her concept of critical thinking.
 Her responses to the open ended questions, and to follow-up interview questions, were clear and relatively well-elaborated. She understands critical thinking as learning how to think at an in-depth level, to be able to identify and think about problems, situations, and resolutions in a precise and focused manner. She also says that critical thinking means carefully assessing alternatives, figuring out the pros and cons of each. She adds to her definition that critical thinking involves applying reasoning and logic to problems and circumstances in a critical, disciplined and thorough manner.
 To develop the critical thinking abilities of her students, she has them select a topic to analyze related to a complex problem in education. She then has them critically analyze the different sides to the issue, think through the implications of the possible solutions to the problem, and then come up with recommendations. They are then to turn in the final product (paper) as well as make a presentation to the class which focuses on the process they went through in reaching their final conclusions or recommendations. Furthermore, she says that she tries to combine informal lecture with group discussions, where there is "a lot of give and take." She says that she believes strongly in using Socratic questioning to "draw students out."
 Professor O requires students to develop their own philosophies of education throughout the course, by focusing on questions such as "What is the ultimate purpose of education? Who is to be educated? Is everyone to be educated? Or are only a privileged few to be educated? She asks students to answer these questions, providing their reasoning for each answer. She asks them to consider alternative ways of answering the question. In preparation for writing their philosophies of education, Professor O asks students to take on roles with respect to particular complex questions related to education, and then debate the issues with one another. She often asks them to take a point of view which differs from their own and to debate from that position.
 In her classes, professor O requires students to routinely critique each other's work. She does this by having them exchange papers and review one another's papers. She provides guidelines for the standards they are to focus on. Students are to use standards such as: What are the key questions in the paper? How well organized is the paper? How specific are the details? How in-depth are the ideas explored? To what extent are the ideas well thought through? How understandable are the ideas?







Overall Conclusions and Implications

Critical thinking is clearly an honorific phrase in the minds of most teacher educators such that they feel obliged to claim both familiarity with it and commitment to it in their teaching, despite the fact that few have had any in-depth exposure to the research on the concept and most have only a vague understanding of what it is and what is involved in bringing it successfully into instruction. Critical thinking is commonly confused with active involvement in learning (forgetting that active involvement alone is quite compatible with active "mis-learning"). A vague appeal to words from Bloom's Taxonomy (analysis, synthesis, evaluation) is often taken to be demonstrative of knowledge of critical thinking. Even faculty in the CSU, which has a formal policy on critical thinking instruction, is apparently largely unfamiliar with the "definition of critical thinking" and specifications of what minimal conditions for instruction in it are inherent in the policy.
 It is clear that virtually all departments represented in the study uncritically assume that instruction in critical thinking takes place--without any effort to verify this assumption. In fact, we found no evidence in these interviews of any systematic efforts that have been made to assess instruction for critical thinking within any of the schools of education studied. What is more, there is little understanding of how to assess it--should schools of education desire to do it. Most disturbingly, since the overwhelming majority assumes that the faculty already understand and emphasize critical thinking in their classes, any "in-house" assessment would doubtless be perceived as a pointless "political" process to be carried out with a minimum of effort (but with a clear sense of how to achieve the politically correct answer). In other words, since professors in schools of education assume that they understand critical thinking and how to teach for it, and that they are already successful in teaching their students both, it follows that it will be exceedingly difficult to produce substantial changes in teacher certification programs in these areas.
 It is clear from the results of the study that we are very far from a state of affairs in which critical thinking is a hallmark of instruction in teacher preparation programs. Present instruction is likely to produce teachers who, on the one hand, are confident that they not only understand critical thinking but also know how to teach for it, but who, in point of fact, understand neither. Many will equate critical thinking with mere active involvement or "cooperative learning." Others will believe that some acquaintance with the terms of Bloom's Taxonomy or Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intellegences is equivalent to understanding critical thinking. Some will equate it with an emphasis on learning styles or with concept maps or some other tool or facet or dimension of learning.
 Others will equate the whole of critical thinking with some component part of it. Some will therefore emphasize multiple points of view (and take that to be the whole of it). Some will emphasize recognizing one's assumptions. Some will emphasize questioning information sources. Some will emphasize analyzing concepts. But very few will have a comprehensive sense of the whole or a realistic idea of how to cultivate it while teaching the content of a subject or discipline.
 Using the criteria of the California State Universities and Colleges as an alternative reference point, it is clear that, based on the information we have gathered, the overwhelming number of those certified to teach have little understanding of how to teach so that students will understand "the relationship of language to logic,... (or have) the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief....(or acquire) the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought."
 Finally, given the information gathered in this study, it is highly likely that most of those certified to teach have, given present instruction, little understanding of what reasoning is, what assumptions are, what inferences are, what implications are, or what it is to reason with intellectual discipline within a subject field (historically, biologically, psychologically, ...).
 It appears likely that we are now certifying teachers who not only have little understanding of critical thinking, or how to teach it, but also wrongly and confidently think they do. The end result is that California classrooms are places in which both teachers and students lack explicit knowledge of how to reason in a disciplined way about serious subjects and questions. In the absence of that understanding, one can expect a drifting toward intellectual relativism (i.e., toward the view that all answers sincerely believed and defended are equally good since, as far as they can see, there is no final way to intellectually assess competing answers other than by degree of active involvement in their defense). Subjectivity of response, subjectivity of grading, intellectual undisciplined answers will in all likelihood be unconsciously encouraged. Open-mindedness will be confused with the willingness to accept everyone's answer to a complex question as equally "right" (for them).
 Given the facts revealed in this study, it is unlikely that students preparing to teach are being instructed in the basic structures of reasoning. Students studying history, biology, and mathematics will not recognize that historians, biologists, and mathematicians equally make assumptions, develop specialized concepts, reason to conclusions, make interpretations of data, trace implications and consequences, define problems, concerns, and issues, and think within a disciplinary frame of reference or point of view. Students studying English, Physics, and Chemistry will not recognize that thinking clearly, accurately, and precisely; thinking deeply, broadly, and logically; are equally important intellectual criteria in every subject. Students will continue to lack any insight into the fact that moral issues and problems require as much disciplined reasoning and clarity of definition as does reasoning in any other domain. Students will graduate, in short, without any plausible semblance of intellectual perspective and discipline.
 If we are interested in teachers certified in California having a reasonable grounding in the rudiments of critical thinking based on a rich, substantive concept of it, or at least a minimalist, baseline concept, then we have a major task facing us, not the least of which is persuading the majority of the faculty that they do not already know what they confidently assume that they do know.







Limitations of the Study

There were numerous limitations of our study. Some were limitations of time and resources. We were limited in the quantity of people we could interview. We were limited as to the length of the interview. We were limited in the time we had to collect exemplary practices, as well as in the time designated to assembling the report as a whole. There are therefore limitations in the richness of the data collected. With more time and financial support we could have conducted interviews in yet greater depth. We could have engaged in greater study of exemplary practices including, for example, classroom visitations. We could have broadened the net in soliciting exemplary practices and thereby obtained examples from even more disciplines. We could have interviewed teachers in the field, new graduates from teacher education programs, even students at the K-12 level. Very much more might have been done, had there been the time and dollars to do it.

 Nevertheless, despite the obvious limitations of the study, certain patterns in the data we did collect were so consistent across a wide variety of faculty that we believe the study unequivocally establishes some things beyond question, perhaps the main one being that most faculty teaching in teacher education programs have not thought systematically or deeply enough about critical thinking to express a clear, elaborated, and coherent conception of it. It is also beyond question, given the data of the study, that a high percentage of faculty members simply assume that they and their colleagues do understand critical thinking and do effectively teach it.
 It is also beyond question, from the data we gathered, that it is possible to identify college and university faculty who have devoted some significant portion of their time to developing a clear, well-elaborated, and coherent conception of critical thinking and are actively engaged in developing a variety of effective ways to cultivate critical thinking in their students.
 What remains to be seen is whether or not we develop the academic and political motivation to pursue a realistic, long-range solution to these problems. It is difficult to predict at this time the degree of resistance and denial that will emerge from education faculty, and the broader education community, to the results of this study. No professional group likes to hear that it has significantly failed to act effectively in fostering a basic value and in furthering an end importantly connected both to its prestige and mission. We can only point to the fact that there are a growing number of faculty nationally who are recognizing the failure of colleges and universities to effectively teach students to think critically and become effective problem solvers. Unfortunately, the history of education does not provide us with a similarly large problem that was solved in the education community by some set of strategies which we could now appropriate, which could be used in developing strategies to rectify the problems clearly documented in the study.












Critical Thinking Advisory Task Force



An Advisory Task Force was appointed consisting of teacher educators, subject matter faculty, and K-12 teachers and administrators to guide the study design, interpretation of data, and policy recommendations. The following individuals served as members of the Critical Thinking Advisory Task Force for this study:



Barclay Anderson, Teacher
 Edison High School Stockton
 Unified School District
Jerry Brunetti, Professor
 School of Education St. Mary's College
Willis Copeland, Professor
 Department of Education
 University of California, Santa Barbara
Webster Cotton, Professor
 School of Education
 California State University, Los Angeles
Connie DeCapite, Teacher
 Spurgeon Intermediate School
 Santa Ana Unified School District
Marilyn Draheim, Professor
 Jack Fraenkel, Professor College of Education
 San Francisco State University
Jane Willsen Lorand,
 President Lorand and Company, Inc.
 Richard Pope, Teacher
 Toyon Elementary School
 Berryessa Union Elementary School District
Ted Simonson, Principal
 Los Gatos High School
 Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union
 High School District
Yehudi Webster, Professor
 Department of Sociology
 California State University,
 Los Angeles School of Education

University of the Pacific



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A History of Freedom of Thought


  


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A History of Freedom of Thought
 Project Gutenberg's A History of Freedom of Thought, by John Bagnell Bury
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Title: A History of Freedom of Thought
Author: John Bagnell Bury
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Home University Library of Modern Knowledge No. 69
Editors:
HERBERT FISHER, M.A., F.B.A.
 Prof. GILBERT MURRAY, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A.
 Prof. J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A.
 Prof. WILLIAM T. BREWSTER, M.A.

A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

BY

J. B. BURY, M.A., F.B.A
HON. D.LITT. OF OXFORD, DURHAM, AND DUBLIN, AND HON. LL.D. OF EDINBURGH, GLASGOW, AND ABERDEEN UNIVERSITIES; REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
AUTHOR OF “HISTORY OF THE LATTER ROMAN EMPIRE,” “HISTORY OF GREECE,” “HISTORY OF THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE,” ETC.
[IV]
Copyright, 1913,
 by
 HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.
[V] 
CONTENTS
CHAP.  
I Introductory
II Reason Free (Greece And Rome)
III Reason in Prison (The Middle Ages)
IV Prospect of Deliverance (The Renaissance and the Reformation)
V Religious Toleration
VI The Growth of Rationalism (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)
VII The Progress of Rationalism (Nineteenth Century)
VIII The Justification of Liberty of Thought
  Bibliography
  Index
[7]
A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

CHAPTER I
FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND THE FORCES AGAINST IT
(INTRODUCTORY)
IT is a common saying that thought is free. A man can never be hindered from thinking whatever he chooses so long as he conceals what he thinks. The working of his mind is limited only by the bounds of his experience and the power of his imagination. But this natural liberty of private thinking is of little value. It is unsatisfactory and even painful to the thinker himself, if he is not permitted to communicate his thoughts to others, and it is obviously of no value to his neighbours. Moreover it is extremely difficult to hide thoughts that have any power over the mind. If a man’s thinking leads him to call in question ideas and customs which regulate the behaviour of those about him, to reject beliefs which they hold, to see better ways of life than those they follow, it is almost [8] impossible for him, if he is convinced of the truth of his own reasoning, not to betray by silence, chance words, or general attitude that he is different from them and does not share their opinions. Some have preferred, like Socrates, some would prefer to-day, to face death rather than conceal their thoughts. Thus freedom of thought, in any valuable sense, includes freedom of speech.
At present, in the most civilized countries, freedom of speech is taken as a matter of course and seems a perfectly simple thing. We are so accustomed to it that we look on it as a natural right. But this right has been acquired only in quite recent times, and the way to its attainment has lain through lakes of blood. It has taken centuries to persuade the most enlightened peoples that liberty to publish one’s opinions and to discuss all questions is a good and not a bad thing. Human societies (there are some brilliant exceptions) have been generally opposed to freedom of thought, or, in other words, to new ideas, and it is easy to see why.
The average brain is naturally lazy and tends to take the line of least resistance. The mental world of the ordinary man consists of beliefs which he has accepted without questioning and to which he is firmly attached; he is instinctively hostile to anything which [9] would upset the established order of this familiar world. A new idea, inconsistent with some of the beliefs which he holds, means the necessity of rearranging his mind; and this process is laborious, requiring a painful expenditure of brain-energy. To him and his fellows, who form the vast majority, new ideas, and opinions which cast doubt on established beliefs and institutions, seem evil because they are disagreeable.
The repugnance due to mere mental laziness is increased by a positive feeling of fear. The conservative instinct hardens into the conservative doctrine that the foundations of society are endangered by any alterations in the structure. It is only recently that men have been abandoning the belief that the welfare of a state depends on rigid stability and on the preservation of its traditions and institutions unchanged. Wherever that belief prevails, novel opinions are felt to be dangerous as well as annoying, and any one who asks inconvenient questions about the why and the wherefore of accepted principles is considered a pestilent person.
The conservative instinct, and the conservative doctrine which is its consequence, are strengthened by superstition. If the social structure, including the whole body of customs and opinions, is associated intimately [10] with religious belief and is supposed to be under divine patronage, criticism of the social order savours of impiety, while criticism of the religious belief is a direct challenge to the wrath of supernatural powers.
The psychological motives which produce a conservative spirit hostile to new ideas are reinforced by the active opposition of certain powerful sections of the community, such as a class, a caste, or a priesthood, whose interests are bound up with the maintenance of the established order and the ideas on which it rests.
Let us suppose, for instance, that a people believes that solar eclipses are signs employed by their Deity for the special purpose of communicating useful information to them, and that a clever man discovers the true cause of eclipses. His compatriots in the first place dislike his discovery because they find it very difficult to reconcile with their other ideas; in the second place, it disturbs them, because it upsets an arrangement which they consider highly advantageous to their community; finally, it frightens them, as an offence to their Divinity. The priests, one of whose functions is to interpret the divine signs, are alarmed and enraged at a doctrine which menaces their power.
In prehistoric days, these motives, operating [11] strongly, must have made change slow in communities which progressed, and hindered some communities from progressing at all. But they have continued to operate more or less throughout history, obstructing knowledge and progress. We can observe them at work to-day even in the most advanced societies, where they have no longer the power to arrest development or repress the publication of revolutionary opinions. We still meet people who consider a new idea an annoyance and probably a danger. Of those to whom socialism is repugnant, how many are there who have never examined the arguments for and against it, but turn away in disgust simply because the notion disturbs their mental universe and implies a drastic criticism on the order of things to which they are accustomed? And how many are there who would refuse to consider any proposals for altering our imperfect matrimonial institutions, because such an idea offends a mass of prejudice associated with religious sanctions? They may be right or not, but if they are, it is not their fault. They are actuated by the same motives which were a bar to progress in primitive societies. The existence of people of this mentality, reared in an atmosphere of freedom, side by side with others who are always looking out for new ideas and [12] regretting that there are not more about, enables us to realize how, when public opinion was formed by the views of such men, thought was fettered and the impediments to knowledge enormous.
Although the liberty to publish one’s opinions on any subject without regard to authority or the prejudices of one’s neighbours is now a well-established principle, I imagine that only the minority of those who would be ready to fight to the death rather than surrender it could defend it on rational grounds. We are apt to take for granted that freedom of speech is a natural and inalienable birthright of man, and perhaps to think that this is a sufficient answer to all that can be said on the other side. But it is difficult to see how such a right can be established.
If a man has any “natural rights,” the right to preserve his life and the right to reproduce his kind are certainly such. Yet human societies impose upon their members restrictions in the exercise of both these rights. A starving man is prohibited from taking food which belongs to somebody else. Promiscuous reproduction is restricted by various laws or customs. It is admitted that society is justified in restricting these elementary rights, because without such restrictions an ordered society could not exist. If then we [13] concede that the expression of opinion is a right of the same kind, it is impossible to contend that on this ground it can claim immunity from interference or that society acts unjustly in regulating it. But the concession is too large. For whereas in the other cases the limitations affect the conduct of every one, restrictions on freedom of opinion affect only the comparatively small number who have any opinions, revolutionary or unconventional, to express. The truth is that no valid argument can be founded on the conception of natural rights, because it involves an untenable theory of the relations between society and its members.
On the other hand, those who have the responsibility of governing a society can argue that it is as incumbent on them to prohibit the circulation of pernicious opinions as to prohibit any anti-social actions. They can argue that a man may do far more harm by propagating anti-social doctrines than by stealing his neighbour’s horse or making love to his neighbour’s wife. They are responsible for the welfare of the State, and if they are convinced that an opinion is dangerous, by menacing the political, religious, or moral assumptions on which the society is based, it is their duty to protect society against it, as against any other danger.
[14]
The true answer to this argument for limiting freedom of thought will appear in due course. It was far from obvious. A long time was needed to arrive at the conclusion that coercion of opinion is a mistake, and only a part of the world is yet convinced. That conclusion, so far as I can judge, is the most important ever reached by men. It was the issue of a continuous struggle between authority and reason—the subject of this volume. The word authority requires some comment.
If you ask somebody how he knows something, he may say, “I have it on good authority,” or, “I read it in a book,” or, “It is a matter of common knowledge,” or, “I learned it at school.” Any of these replies means that he has accepted information from others, trusting in their knowledge, without verifying their statements or thinking the matter out for himself. And the greater part of most men’s knowledge and beliefs is of this kind, taken without verification from their parents, teachers, acquaintances, books, newspapers. When an English boy learns French, he takes the conjugations and the meanings of the words on the authority of his teacher or his grammar. The fact that in a certain place, marked on the map, there is a populous city called Calcutta, is for most [15] people a fact accepted on authority. So is the existence of Napoleon or Julius Caesar. Familiar astronomical facts are known only in the same way, except by those who have studied astronomy. It is obvious that every one’s knowledge would be very limited indeed, if we were not justified in accepting facts on the authority of others.
But we are justified only under one condition. The facts which we can safely accept must be capable of demonstration or verification. The examples I have given belong to this class. The boy can verify when he goes to France or is able to read a French book that the facts which he took on authority are true. I am confronted every day with evidence which proves to me that, if I took the trouble, I could verify the existence of Calcutta for myself. I cannot convince myself in this way of the existence of Napoleon, but if I have doubts about it, a simple process of reasoning shows me that there are hosts of facts which are incompatible with his non-existence. I have no doubt that the earth is some 93 millions of miles distant from the sun, because all astronomers agree that it has been demonstrated, and their agreement is only explicable on the supposition that this has been demonstrated and that, if I took the trouble to work out the calculation, I should reach the same result.
[16]
But all our mental furniture is not of this kind. The thoughts of the average man consist not only of facts open to verification, but also of many beliefs and opinions which he has accepted on authority and cannot verify or prove. Belief in the Trinity depends on the authority of the Church and is clearly of a different order from belief in the existence of Calcutta. We cannot go behind the authority and verify or prove it. If we accept it, we do so because we have such implicit faith in the authority that we credit its assertions though incapable of proof.
The distinction may seem so obvious as to be hardly worth making. But it is important to be quite clear about it. The primitive man who had learned from his elders that there were bears in the hills and likewise evil spirits, soon verified the former statement by seeing a bear, but if he did not happen to meet an evil spirit, it did not occur to him, unless he was a prodigy, that there was a distinction between the two statements; he would rather have argued, if he argued at all, that as his tribesmen were right about the bears they were sure to be right also about the spirits. In the Middle Ages a man who believed on authority that there is a city called Constantinople and that comets are portents signifying divine wrath, would not [17] distinguish the nature of the evidence in the two cases. You may still sometimes hear arguments amounting to this: since I believe in Calcutta on authority, am I not entitled to believe in the Devil on authority?
Now people at all times have been commanded or expected or invited to accept on authority alone—the authority, for instance, of public opinion, or a Church, or a sacred book—doctrines which are not proved or are not capable of proof. Most beliefs about nature and man, which were not founded on scientific observation, have served directly or indirectly religious and social interests, and hence they have been protected by force against the criticisms of persons who have the inconvenient habit of using their reason. Nobody minds if his neighbour disbelieves a demonstrable fact. If a sceptic denies that Napoleon existed, or that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, he causes amusement or ridicule. But if he denies doctrines which cannot be demonstrated, such as the existence of a personal God or the immortality of the soul, he incurs serious disapprobation and at one time he might have been put to death. Our mediaeval friend would have only been called a fool if he doubted the existence of Constantinople, but if he had questioned the significance of comets he [18] might have got into trouble. It is possible that if he had been so mad as to deny the existence of Jerusalem he would not have escaped with ridicule, for Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible.
In the Middle Ages a large field was covered by beliefs which authority claimed to impose as true, and reason was warned off the ground. But reason cannot recognize arbitrary prohibitions or barriers, without being untrue to herself. The universe of experience is her province, and as its parts are all linked together and interdependent, it is impossible for her to recognize any territory on which she may not tread, or to surrender any of her rights to an authority whose credentials she has not examined and approved.
The uncompromising assertion by reason of her absolute rights throughout the whole domain of thought is termed rationalism, and the slight stigma which is still attached to the word reflects the bitterness of the struggle between reason and the forces arrayed against her. The term is limited to the field of theology, because it was in that field that the self-assertion of reason was most violently and pertinaciously opposed. In the same way free thought, the refusal of thought to be controlled by any authority but its own, has a definitely theological reference. Throughout [19] the conflict, authority has had great advantages. At any time the people who really care about reason have been a small minority, and probably will be so for a long time to come. Reason’s only weapon has been argument. Authority has employed physical and moral violence, legal coercion and social displeasure. Sometimes she has attempted to use the sword of her adversary, thereby wounding herself. Indeed the weakest point in the strategical position of authority was that her champions, being human, could not help making use of reasoning processes and the result was that they were divided among themselves. This gave reason her chance. Operating, as it were, in the enemy’s camp and professedly in the enemy’s cause, she was preparing her own victory.
It may be objected that there is a legitimate domain for authority, consisting of doctrines which lie outside human experience and therefore cannot be proved or verified, but at the same time cannot be disproved. Of course, any number of propositions can be invented which cannot be disproved, and it is open to any one who possesses exuberant faith to believe them; but no one will maintain that they all deserve credence so long as their falsehood is not demonstrated. And if only some deserve credence, who, except reason, [20] is to decide which? If the reply is, Authority, we are confronted by the difficulty that many beliefs backed by authority have been finally disproved and are universally abandoned. Yet some people speak as if we were not justified in rejecting a theological doctrine unless we can prove it false. But the burden of proof does not lie upon the rejecter. I remember a conversation in which, when some disrespectful remark was made about hell, a loyal friend of that establishment said triumphantly, “But, absurd as it may seem, you cannot disprove it.” If you were told that in a certain planet revolving round Sirius there is a race of donkeys who talk the English language and spend their time in discussing eugenics, you could not disprove the statement, but would it, on that account, have any claim to be believed? Some minds would be prepared to accept it, if it were reiterated often enough, through the potent force of suggestion. This force, exercised largely by emphatic repetition (the theoretical basis, as has been observed, of the modern practice of advertising), has played a great part in establishing authoritative opinions and propagating religious creeds. Reason fortunately is able to avail herself of the same help.
The following sketch is confined to Western [21] civilization. It begins with Greece and attempts to indicate the chief phases. It is the merest introduction to a vast and intricate subject, which, treated adequately, would involve not only the history of religion, of the Churches, of heresies, of persecution, but also the history of philosophy, of the natural sciences and of political theories. From the sixteenth century to the French Revolution nearly all important historical events bore in some way on the struggle for freedom of thought. It would require a lifetime to calculate, and many books to describe, all the directions and interactions of the intellectual and social forces which, since the fall of ancient civilization, have hindered and helped the emancipation of reason. All one can do, all one could do even in a much bigger volume than this, is to indicate the general course of the struggle and dwell on some particular aspects which the writer may happen to have specially studied.

A History of Freedom of Thought: CHAPTER II

REASON FREE
(GREECE AND ROME)
WHEN we are asked to specify the debt which civilization owes to the Greeks, their [22] achievements in literature and art naturally occur to us first of all. But a truer answer may be that our deepest gratitude is due to them as the originators of liberty of thought and discussion. For this freedom of spirit was not only the condition of their speculations in philosophy, their progress in science, their experiments in political institutions; it was also a condition of their literary and artistic excellence. Their literature, for instance, could not have been what it is if they had been debarred from free criticism of life. But apart from what they actually accomplished, even if they had not achieved the wonderful things they did in most of the realms of human activity, their assertion of the principle of liberty would place them in the highest rank among the benefactors of the race; for it was one of the greatest steps in human progress.
We do not know enough about the earliest history of the Greeks to explain how it was that they attained their free outlook upon the world and came to possess the will and courage to set no bounds to the range of their criticism and curiosity. We have to take this character as a fact. But it must be remembered that the Greeks consisted of a large number of separate peoples, who varied largely in temper, customs and traditions, [23] though they had important features common to all. Some were conservative, or backward, or unintellectual compared with others. In this chapter “the Greeks” does not mean all the Greeks, but only those who count most in the history of civilization, especially the Ionians and Athenians.
Ionia in Asia Minor was the cradle of free speculation. The history of European science and European philosophy begins in Ionia. Here (in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.) the early philosophers by using their reason sought to penetrate into the origin and structure of the world. They could not of course free their minds entirely from received notions, but they began the work of destroying orthodox views and religious faiths. Xenophanes may specially be named among these pioneers of thought (though he was not the most important or the ablest), because the toleration of his teaching illustrates the freedom of the atmosphere in which these men lived. He went about from city to city, calling in question on moral grounds the popular beliefs about the gods and goddesses, and ridiculing the anthropomorphic conceptions which the Greeks had formed of their divinities. “If oxen had hands and the capacities of men, they would make gods in the shape of oxen.” This attack on received [24] theology was an attack on the veracity of the old poets, especially Homer, who was considered the highest authority on mythology. Xenophanes criticized him severely for ascribing to the gods acts which, committed by men, would be considered highly disgraceful. We do not hear that any attempt was made to restrain him from thus assailing traditional beliefs and branding Homer as immoral. We must remember that the Homeric poems were never supposed to be the word of God. It has been said that Homer was the Bible of the Greeks. The remark exactly misses the truth. The Greeks fortunately had no Bible, and this fact was both an expression and an important condition of their freedom. Homer’s poems were secular, not religious, and it may be noted that they are freer from immorality and savagery than sacred books that one could mention. Their authority was immense; but it was not binding like the authority of a sacred book, and so Homeric criticism was never hampered like Biblical criticism.
In this connexion, notice may be taken of another expression and condition of freedom, the absence of sacerdotalism. The priests of the temples never became powerful castes, tyrannizing over the community in their own interests and able to silence voices raised against religious beliefs. The civil authorities [25] kept the general control of public worship in their own hands, and, if some priestly families might have considerable influence, yet as a rule the priests were virtually State servants whose voice carried no weight except concerning the technical details of ritual.
To return to the early philosophers, who were mostly materialists, the record of their speculations is an interesting chapter in the history of rationalism. Two great names may be selected, Heraclitus and Democritus, because they did more perhaps than any of the others, by sheer hard thinking, to train reason to look upon the universe in new ways and to shock the unreasoned conceptions of common sense. It was startling to be taught, for the first time, by Heraclitus, that the appearance of stability and permanence which material things present to our senses is a false appearance, and that the world and everything in it are changing every instant. Democritus performed the amazing feat of working out an atomic theory of the universe, which was revived in the seventeenth century and is connected, in the history of speculation, with the most modern physical and chemical theories of matter. No fantastic tales of creation, imposed by sacred authority, hampered these powerful brains.
All this philosophical speculation prepared [26] the way for the educationalists who were known as the Sophists. They begin to appear after the middle of the fifth century. They worked here and there throughout Greece, constantly travelling, training young men for public life, and teaching them to use their reason. As educators they had practical ends in view. They turned away from the problems of the physical universe to the problems of human life—morality and polities. Here they were confronted with the difficulty of distinguishing between truth and error, and the ablest of them investigated the nature of knowledge, the method of reason—logic— and the instrument of reason—speech. Whatever their particular theories might be, their general spirit was that of free inquiry and discussion. They sought to test everything by reason. The second half of the fifth century might be called the age of Illumination.
It may be remarked that the knowledge of foreign countries which the Greeks had acquired had a considerable effect in promoting a sceptical attitude towards authority. When a man is acquainted only with the habits of his own country, they seem so much a matter of course that he ascribes them to nature, but when he travels abroad and finds totally different habits and standards of conduct prevailing, he begins to understand [27] the power of custom; and learns that morality and religion are matters of latitude. This discovery tends to weaken authority, and to raise disquieting reflections, as in the case of one who, brought up as a Christian, comes to realize that, if he had been born on the Ganges or the Euphrates, he would have firmly believed in entirely different dogmas.
Of course these movements of intellectual freedom were, as in all ages, confined to the minority. Everywhere the masses were exceedingly superstitious. They believed that the safety of their cities depended on the good-will of their gods. If this superstitious spirit were alarmed, there was always a danger that philosophical speculations might be persecuted. And this occurred in Athens. About the middle of the fifth century Athens had not only become the most powerful State in Greece, but was also taking the highest place in literature and art. She was a full-fledged democracy. Political discussion was perfectly free. At this time she was guided by the statesman Pericles, who was personally a freethinker, or at least was in touch with all the subversive speculations of the day. He was especially intimate with the philosopher Anaxagoras who had come from Ionia to teach at Athens. In regard to the popular gods Anaxagoras was a thorough-going [28] unbeliever. The political enemies of Pericles struck at him by attacking his friend. They introduced and carried a blasphemy law, to the effect that unbelievers and those who taught theories about the celestial world might be impeached. It was easy to prove that Anaxagoras was a blasphemer who taught that the gods were abstractions and that the sun, to which the ordinary Athenian said prayers morning and evening, was a mass of flaming matter. The influence of Pericles saved him from death; he was heavily fined and left Athens for Lampsacus, where he was treated with consideration and honour.
Other cases are recorded which show that anti-religious thought was liable to be persecuted. Protagoras, one of the greatest of the Sophists, published a book On the Gods, the object of which seems to have been to prove that one cannot know the gods by reason. The first words ran: “Concerning the gods, I cannot say that they exist nor yet that they do not exist. There are more reasons than one why we cannot know. There is the obscurity of the subject and there is the brevity of human life.” A charge of blasphemy was lodged against him and he fled from Athens. But there was no systematic policy of suppressing free thought. Copies of the work of Protagoras were collected and [29] burned, but the book of Anaxagoras setting forth the views for which he had been condemned was for sale on the Athenian book-stalls at a popular price. Rationalistic ideas moreover were venturing to appear on the stage, though the dramatic performances, at the feasts of the god Dionysus, were religious solemnities. The poet Euripides was saturated with modern speculation, and, while different opinions may be held as to the tendencies of some of his tragedies, he often allows his characters to express highly unorthodox views. He was prosecuted for impiety by a popular politician. We may suspect that during the last thirty years of the fifth century unorthodoxy spread considerably among the educated classes. There was a large enough section of influential rationalists to render impossible any organized repression of liberty, and the chief evil of the blasphemy law was that it could be used for personal or party reasons. Some of the prosecutions, about which we know, were certainly due to such motives, others may have been prompted by genuine bigotry and by the fear lest sceptical thought should extend beyond the highly educated and leisured class. It was a generally accepted principle among the Greeks, and afterwards among the Romans, that religion was a good and necessary thing [30] for the common people. Men who did not believe in its truth believed in its usefulness as a political institution, and as a rule philosophers did not seek to diffuse disturbing “truth” among the masses. It was the custom, much more than at the present day, for those who did not believe in the established cults to conform to them externally. Popular higher education was not an article in the programme of Greek statesmen or thinkers. And perhaps it may be argued that in the circumstances of the ancient world it would have been hardly practicable.
There was, however, one illustrious Athenian, who thought differently—Socrates, the philosopher. Socrates was the greatest of the educationalists, but unlike the others he taught gratuitously, though he was a poor man. His teaching always took the form of discussion; the discussion often ended in no positive result, but had the effect of showing that some received opinion was untenable and that truth is difficult to ascertain. He had indeed certain definite views about knowledge and virtue, which are of the highest importance in the history of philosophy, but for our present purpose his significance lies in his enthusiasm for discussion and criticism. He taught those with whom he conversed—and he conversed indiscriminately [31] with all who would listen to him—to bring all popular beliefs before the bar of reason, to approach every inquiry with an open mind, and not to judge by the opinion of majorities or the dictate of authority; in short to seek for other tests of the truth of an opinion than the fact that it is held by a great many people. Among his disciples were all the young men who were to become the leading philosophers of the next generation and some who played prominent parts in Athenian history.
If the Athenians had had a daily press, Socrates would have been denounced by the journalists as a dangerous person. They had a comic drama, which constantly held up to ridicule philosophers and sophists and their vain doctrines. We possess one play (the Clouds of Aristophanes) in which Socrates is pilloried as a typical representative of impious and destructive speculations. Apart from annoyances of this kind, Socrates reached old age, pursuing the task of instructing his fellow-citizens, without any evil befalling him. Then, at the age of seventy, he was prosecuted as an atheist and corrupter of youth and was put to death (399 B.C.). It is strange that if the Athenians really thought him dangerous they should have suffered him so long. There can, I think, be [32] little doubt that the motives of the accusation were political. [1] Socrates, looking at things as he did, could not be sympathetic with unlimited democracy, or approve of the principle that the will of the ignorant majority was a good guide. He was probably known to sympathize with those who wished to limit the franchise. When, after a struggle in which the constitution had been more than once overthrown, democracy emerged triumphant (403 B.C.), there was a bitter feeling against those who had not been its friends, and of these disloyal persons Socrates was chosen as a victim. If he had wished, he could easily have escaped. If he had given an undertaking to teach no more, he would almost certainly have been acquitted. As it was, of the 501 ordinary Athenians who were his judges, a very large minority voted for his acquittal. Even then, if he had adopted a different tone, he would not have been condemned to death.
He rose to the great occasion and vindicated freedom of discussion in a wonderful unconventional speech. The Apology of Socrates, which was composed by his most brilliant pupil, Plato the philosopher, reproduces [33] the general tenor of his defence. It is clear that he was not able to meet satisfactorily the charge that he did not acknowledge the gods worshipped by the city, and his explanations on this point are the weak part of his speech. But he met the accusation that he corrupted the minds of the young by a splendid plea for free discussion. This is the most valuable section of the Apology; it is as impressive to-day as ever. I think the two principal points which he makes are these—
(1) He maintains that the individual should at any cost refuse to be coerced by any human authority or tribunal into a course which his own mind condemns as wrong. That is, he asserts the supremacy of the individual conscience, as we should say, over human law. He represents his own life-work as a sort of religious quest; he feels convinced that in devoting himself to philosophical discussion he has done the bidding of a super-human guide; and he goes to death rather than be untrue to this personal conviction. “If you propose to acquit me,” he says, “on condition that I abandon my search for truth, I will say: I thank you, O Athenians, but I will obey God, who, as I believe, set me this task, rather than you, and so long as I have breath and strength I will never [34] cease from my occupation with philosophy. I will continue the practice of accosting whomever I meet and saying to him, ‘Are you not ashamed of setting your heart on wealth and honours while you have no care for wisdom and truth and making your soul better?’ I know not what death is—it may be a good thing, and I am not afraid of it. But I do know that it is a bad thing to desert one’s post and I prefer what may be good to what I know to be bad.”
(2) He insists on the public value of free discussion. “In me you have a stimulating critic, persistently urging you with persuasion and reproaches, persistently testing your opinions and trying to show you that you are really ignorant of what you suppose you know. Daily discussion of the matters about which you hear me conversing is the highest good for man. Life that is not tested by such discussion is not worth living.”
Thus in what we may call the earliest justification of liberty of thought we have two significant claims affirmed: the indefeasible right of the conscience of the individual —a claim on which later struggles for liberty were to turn; and the social importance of discussion and criticism. The former claim is not based on argument but on intuition; it rests in fact on the assumption [35] of some sort of superhuman moral principle, and to those who, not having the same personal experience as Socrates, reject this assumption, his pleading does not carry weight. The second claim, after the experience of more than 2,000 years, can be formulated more comprehensively now with bearings of which he did not dream.
The circumstances of the trial of Socrates illustrate both the tolerance and the intolerance which prevailed at Athens. His long immunity, the fact that he was at last indicted from political motives and perhaps personal also, the large minority in his favour, all show that thought was normally free, and that the mass of intolerance which existed was only fitfully invoked, and perhaps most often to serve other purposes. I may mention the case of the philosopher Aristotle, who some seventy years later left Athens because he was menaced by a prosecution for blasphemy, the charge being a pretext for attacking one who belonged to a certain political party. The persecution of opinion was never organized.
It may seem curious that to find the persecuting spirit in Greece we have to turn to the philosophers. Plato, the most brilliant disciple of Socrates, constructed in his later years an ideal State. In this State he instituted [36] a religion considerably different from the current religion, and proposed to compel all the citizens to believe in his gods on pain of death or imprisonment. All freedom of discussion was excluded under the cast-iron system which he conceived. But the point of interest in his attitude is that he did not care much whether a religion was true, but only whether it was morally useful; he was prepared to promote morality by edifying fables; and he condemned the popular mythology not because it was false, but because it did not make for righteousness.
The outcome of the large freedom permitted at Athens was a series of philosophies which had a common source in the conversations of Socrates. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Sceptics—it may be maintained that the efforts of thought represented by these names have had a deeper influence on the progress of man than any other continuous intellectual movement, at least until the rise of modern science in a new epoch of liberty.
The doctrines of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics all aimed at securing peace and guidance for the individual soul. They were widely propagated throughout the Greek world from the third century B.C., and we may say that from this time onward most [37] well-educated Greeks were more or less rationalists. The teaching of Epicurus had a distinct anti-religious tendency. He considered fear to be the fundamental motive of religion, and to free men’s minds from this fear was a principal object of his teaching. He was a Materialist, explaining the world by the atomic theory of Democritus and denying any divine government of the universe. [2] He did indeed hold the existence of gods, but, so far as men are concerned, his gods are as if they were not—living in some remote abode and enjoying a “sacred and everlasting calm.” They just served as an example of the realization of the ideal Epicurean life.
There was something in this philosophy which had the power to inspire a poet of singular genius to expound it in verse. The Roman Lucretius (first century B.C.) regarded Epicurus as the great deliverer of the human race and determined to proclaim the glad tidings of his philosophy in a poem On the Nature of the World. [3] With all the fervour [38] of a religious enthusiast he denounces religion, sounding every note of defiance, loathing, and contempt, and branding in burning words the crimes to which it had urged man on. He rides forth as a leader of the hosts of atheism against the walls of heaven. He explains the scientific arguments as if they were the radiant revelation of a new world; and the rapture of his enthusiasm is a strange accompaniment of a doctrine which aimed at perfect calm. Although the Greek thinkers had done all the work and the Latin poem is a hymn of triumph over prostrate deities, yet in the literature of free thought it must always hold an eminent place by the sincerity of its audacious, defiant spirit. In the history of rationalism its interest would be greater if it had exploded in the midst of an orthodox community. But the educated Romans in the days of Lucretius were sceptical in religious matters, some of them were Epicureans, and we may suspect that not many of those who read it were shocked or influenced by the audacities of the champion of irreligion.
The Stoic philosophy made notable contributions to the cause of liberty and could hardly have flourished in an atmosphere where discussion was not free. It asserted the rights of individuals against public [39] authority. Socrates had seen that laws may be unjust and that peoples may go wrong, but he had found no principle for the guidance of society. The Stoics discovered it in the law of nature, prior and superior to all the customs and written laws of peoples, and this doctrine, spreading outside Stoic circles, caught hold of the Roman world and affected Roman legislation.
These philosophies have carried us from Greece to Rome. In the later Roman Republic and the early Empire, no restrictions were imposed on opinion, and these philosophies, which made the individual the first consideration, spread widely. Most of the leading men were unbelievers in the official religion of the State, but they considered it valuable for the purpose of keeping the uneducated populace in order. A Greek historian expresses high approval of the Roman policy of cultivating superstition for the benefit of the masses. This was the attitude of Cicero, and the view that a false religion is indispensable as a social machine was general among ancient unbelievers. It is common, in one form or another, to-day; at least, religions are constantly defended on the ground not of truth but of utility. This defence belongs to the statecraft of Machiavelli, who taught that religion is necessary for government, [40] and that it may be the duty of a ruler to support a religion which he believes to be false.
A word must be said of Lucian (second century A.D.), the last Greek man of letters whose writings appeal to everybody. He attacked the popular mythology with open ridicule. It is impossible to say whether his satires had any effect at the time beyond affording enjoyment to educated infidels who read them. Zeus in a Tragedy Part is one of the most effective. The situation which Lucian imagined here would be paralleled if a modern writer were blasphemously to represent the Persons of the Trinity with some eminent angels and saints discussing in a celestial smoke-room the alarming growth of unbelief in England and then by means of a telephonic apparatus overhearing a dispute between a freethinker and a parson on a public platform in London. The absurdities of anthropomorphism have never been the subject of more brilliant jesting than in Lucian’s satires.
The general rule of Roman policy was to tolerate throughout the Empire all religions and all opinions. Blasphemy was not punished. The principle was expressed in the maxim of the Emperor Tiberius: “If the gods are insulted, let them see to it themselves.” An exception to the rule of tolerance [41] was made in the case of the Christian sect, and the treatment of this Oriental religion may be said to have inaugurated religious persecution in Europe. It is a matter of interest to understand why Emperors who were able, humane, and not in the least fanatical, adopted this exceptional policy.
For a long time the Christians were only known to those Romans who happened to hear of them, as a sect of the Jews. The Jewish was the one religion which, on account of its exclusiveness and intolerance, was regarded by the tolerant pagans with disfavour and suspicion. But though it sometimes came into collision with the Roman authorities and some ill-advised attacks upon it were made, it was the constant policy of the Emperors to let it alone and to protect the Jews against the hatred which their own fanaticism aroused. But while the Jewish religion was endured so long as it was confined to those who were born into it, the prospect of its dissemination raised a new question. Grave misgivings might arise in the mind of a ruler at seeing a creed spreading which was aggressively hostile to all the other creeds of the world—creeds which lived together in amity—and had earned for its adherents the reputation of being the enemies of the human race. Might not its expansion [42] beyond the Israelites involve ultimately a danger to the Empire? For its spirit was incompatible with the traditions and basis of Roman society. The Emperor Domitian seems to have seen the question in this light, and he took severe measures to hinder the proselytizing of Roman citizens. Some of those whom he struck may have been Christians, but if he was aware of the distinction, there was from his point of view no difference. Christianity resembled Judaism, from which it sprang, in intolerance and in hostility towards Roman society, but it differed by the fact that it made many proselytes while Judaism made few.
Under Trajan we find that the principle has been laid down that to be a Christian is an offence punishable by death. Henceforward Christianity remained an illegal religion. But in practice the law was not applied rigorously or logically. The Emperors desired, if possible, to extirpate Christianity without shedding blood. Trajan laid down that Christians were not to be sought out, that no anonymous charges were to be noticed, and that an informer who failed to make good his charge should be liable to be punished under the laws against calumny. Christians themselves recognized that this edict practically protected them. There were [43] some executions in the second century—not many that are well attested—and Christians courted the pain and glory of martyrdom. There is evidence to show that when they were arrested their escape was often connived at. In general, the persecution of the Christians was rather provoked by the populace than desired by the authorities. The populace felt a horror of this mysterious Oriental sect which openly hated all the gods and prayed for the destruction of the world. When floods, famines, and especially fires occurred they were apt to be attributed to the black magic of the Christians.
When any one was accused of Christianity, he was required, as a means of testing the truth of the charge, to offer incense to the gods or to the statues of deified Emperors. His compliance at once exonerated him. The objection of the Christians—they and the Jews were the only objectors—to the worship of the Emperors was, in the eyes of the Romans, one of the most sinister signs that their religion was dangerous. The purpose of this worship was to symbolize the unity and solidarity of an Empire which embraced so many peoples of different beliefs and different gods; its intention was political, to promote union and loyalty; and it is not surprising that those who denounced it should [44] be suspected of a disloyal spirit. But it must be noted that there was no necessity for any citizen to take part in this worship. No conformity was required from any inhabitants of the Empire who were not serving the State as soldiers or civil functionaries. Thus the effect was to debar Christians from military and official careers.
The Apologies for Christianity which appeared at this period (second century) might have helped, if the Emperors (to whom some of them were addressed) had read them, to confirm the view that it was a political danger. It would have been easy to read between the lines that, if the Christians ever got the upper hand, they would not spare the cults of the State. The contemporary work of Tatian (A Discourse to the Greeks) reveals what the Apologists more or less sought to disguise, invincible hatred towards the civilization in which they lived. Any reader of the Christian literature of the time could not fail to see that in a State where Christians had the power there would be no tolerance of other religious practices. [4] If the Emperors made an exception to their tolerant policy in the case of Christianity, their purpose was to safeguard tolerance.
[45]
In the third century the religion, though still forbidden, was quite openly tolerated; the Church organized itself without concealment; ecclesiastical councils assembled without interference. There were some brief and local attempts at repression, there was only one grave persecution (begun by Decius, A.D. 250, and continued by Valerian). In fact, throughout this century, there were not many victims, though afterwards the Christians invented a whole mythology of martyrdoms. Many cruelties were imputed to Emperors under whom we know that the Church enjoyed perfect peace.
A long period of civil confusion, in which the Empire seemed to be tottering to its fall, had been terminated by the Emperor Diocletian, who, by his radical administrative reforms, helped to preserve the Roman power in its integrity for another century. He desired to support his work of political consolidation by reviving the Roman spirit, and he attempted to infuse new life into the official religion. To this end he determined to suppress the growing influence of the Christians, who, though a minority, were very numerous, and he organized a persecution. It was long, cruel and bloody; it was the most whole-hearted, general and systematic effort to crush the forbidden faith. It was a [46] failure, the Christians were now too numerous to be crushed. After the abdication of Diocletian, the Emperors who reigned in different parts of the realm did not agree as to the expediency of his policy, and the persecution ended by edicts of toleration (A.D. 311 and 313). These documents have an interest for the history of religious liberty.
The first, issued in the eastern provinces, ran as follows:—
“We were particularly desirous of reclaiming into the way of reason and nature the deluded Christians, who had renounced the religion and ceremonies instituted by their fathers and, presumptuously despising the practice of antiquity, had invented extravagant laws and opinions according to the dictates of their fancy, and had collected a various society from the different provinces of our Empire. The edicts which we have published to enforce the worship of the gods, having exposed many of the Christians to danger and distress, many having suffered death and many more, who still persist in their impious folly, being left destitute of any public exercise of religion, we are disposed to extend to those unhappy men the effects of our wonted clemency. We permit them, therefore, freely to profess their private opinions, and to assemble in their conventicles [47] without fear or molestation, provided always that they preserve a due respect to the established laws and government.” [5]
The second, of which Constantine was the author, known as the Edict of Milan, was to a similar effect, and based toleration on the Emperor’s care for the peace and happiness of his subjects and on the hope of appeasing the Deity whose seat is in heaven.
The relations between the Roman government and the Christians raised the general question of persecution and freedom of conscience. A State, with an official religion, but perfectly tolerant of all creeds and cults, finds that a society had arisen in its midst which is uncompromisingly hostile to all creeds but its own and which, if it had the power, would suppress all but its own. The government, in self-defence, decides to check the dissemination of these subversive ideas and makes the profession of that creed a crime, not on account of its particular tenets, but on account of the social consequences of those tenets. The members of the society cannot without violating their consciences and incurring damnation abandon their exclusive doctrine. The principle of freedom of conscience is asserted as superior to all obligations to the State, and the State, confronted [48] by this new claim, is unable to admit it. Persecution is the result.
Even from the standpoint of an orthodox and loyal pagan the persecution of the Christians is indefensible, because blood was shed uselessly. In other words, it was a great mistake because it was unsuccessful. For persecution is a choice between two evils. The alternatives are violence (which no reasonable defender of persecution would deny to be an evil in itself) and the spread of dangerous opinions. The first is chosen simply to avoid the second, on the ground that the second is the greater evil. But if the persecution is not so devised and carried out as to accomplish its end, then you have two evils instead of one, and nothing can justify this. From their point of view, the Emperors had good reasons for regarding Christianity as dangerous and anti-social, but they should either have let it alone or taken systematic measures to destroy it. If at an early stage they had established a drastic and systematic inquisition, they might possibly have exterminated it. This at least would have been statesmanlike. But they had no conception of extreme measures, and they did not understand —they had no experience to guide them —the sort of problem they had to deal with. They hoped to succeed by intimidation. [49] Their attempts at suppression were vacillating, fitful, and ridiculously ineffectual. The later persecutions (of A.D. 250 and 303) had no prospect of success. It is particularly to be observed that no effort was made to suppress Christian literature.
The higher problem whether persecution, even if it attains the desired end, is justifiable, was not considered. The struggle hinged on antagonism between the conscience of the individual and the authority and supposed interests of the State. It was the question which had been raised by Socrates, raised now on a wider platform in a more pressing and formidable shape: what is to happen when obedience to the law is inconsistent with obedience to an invisible master? Is it incumbent on the State to respect the conscience of the individual at all costs, or within what limits? The Christians did not attempt a solution, the general problem did not interest them. They claimed the right of freedom exclusively for themselves from a non-Christian government; and it is hardly going too far to suspect that they would have applauded the government if it had suppressed the Gnostic sects whom they hated and calumniated. In any case, when a Christian State was established, they would completely forget the principle which they [50] had invoked. The martyrs died for conscience, but not for liberty. To-day the greatest of the Churches demands freedom of conscience in the modern States which she does not control, but refuses to admit that, where she had the power, it would be incumbent on her to concede it.
If we review the history of classical antiquity as a whole, we may almost say that freedom of thought was like the air men breathed. It was taken for granted and nobody thought about it. If seven or eight thinkers at Athens were penalized for heterodoxy, in some and perhaps in most of these cases heterodoxy was only a pretext. They do not invalidate the general facts that the advance of knowledge was not impeded by prejudice, or science retarded by the weight of unscientific authority. The educated Greeks were tolerant because they were friends of reason and did not set up any authority to overrule reason. Opinions were not imposed except by argument; you were not expected to receive some “kingdom of heaven” like a little child, or to prostrate your intellect before an authority claiming to be infallible.
But this liberty was not the result of a conscious policy or deliberate conviction, and therefore it was precarious. The problems [51] of freedom of thought, religious liberty, toleration, had not been forced upon society and were never seriously considered. When Christianity confronted the Roman government, no one saw that in the treatment of a small, obscure, and, to pagan thinkers, uninteresting or repugnant sect, a principle of the deepest social importance was involved. A long experience of the theory and practice of persecution was required to base securely the theory of freedom of thought. The lurid policy of coercion which the Christian Church adopted, and its consequences, would at last compel reason to wrestle with the problem and discover the justification of intellectual liberty. The spirit of the Greeks and Romans, alive in their works, would, after a long period of obscuration, again enlighten the world and aid in re-establishing the reign of reason, which they had carelessly enjoyed without assuring its foundations.

[1] This has been shown very clearly by Professor Jackson in the article on “Socrates” in the Encyclopoedia Britannica, last edition.
[2] He stated the theological difficulty as to the origin of evil in this form: God either wishes to abolish evil and cannot, or can and will not, or neither can nor will, or both can and will. The first three are unthinkable, if he is a God worthy of the name; therefore the last alternative must be true. Why then does evil exist? The inference is that there is no God, in the sense of a governor of the world.
[3] An admirable appreciation of the poem will be found in R. V. Tyrrell’s Lectures on Latin Poetry.
[4] For the evidence of the Apologists see A. Bouché-Leclercq, Religious Intolerance and Politics (French, 1911) —a valuable review of the whole subject.
[5] This is Gibbon’s translation.







A History of Freedom of Thought: CHAPTER III

REASON IN PRISON
(THE MIDDLE AGES)
ABOUT ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great adopted Christianity. This momentous decision inaugurated [52] a millennium in which reason was enchained, thought was enslaved, and knowledge made no progress.
During the two centuries in which they had been a forbidden sect the Christians had claimed toleration on the ground that religious belief is voluntary and not a thing which can be enforced. When their faith became the predominant creed and had the power of the State behind it, they abandoned this view. They embarked on the hopeful enterprise of bringing about a complete uniformity in men’s opinions on the mysteries of the universe, and began a more or less definite policy of coercing thought. This policy was adopted by Emperors and Governments partly on political grounds; religious divisions, bitter as they were, seemed dangerous to the unity of the State. But the fundamental principle lay in the doctrine that salvation is to be found exclusively in the Christian Church. The profound conviction that those who did not believe in its doctrines would be damned eternally, and that God punishes theological error as if it were the most heinous of crimes, led naturally to persecution. It was a duty to impose on men the only true doctrine, seeing that their own eternal interests were at stake, and to hinder errors from spreading. Heretics were more [53] than ordinary criminals and the pains that man could inflict on them were as nothing to the tortures awaiting them in hell. To rid the earth of men who, however virtuous, were, through their religious errors, enemies of the Almighty, was a plain duty. Their virtues were no excuse. We must remember that, according to the humane doctrine of the Christians, pagan, that is, merely human, virtues were vices, and infants who died unbaptized passed the rest of time in creeping on the floor of hell. The intolerance arising from such views could not but differ in kind and intensity from anything that the world had yet witnessed.
Besides the logic of its doctrines, the character of its Sacred Book must also be held partly accountable for the intolerant principles of the Christian Church. It was unfortunate that the early Christians had included in their Scripture the Jewish writings which reflect the ideas of a low stage of civilization and are full of savagery. It would be difficult to say how much harm has been done, in corrupting the morals of men, by the precepts and examples of inhumanity, violence, and bigotry which the reverent reader of the Old Testament, implicitly believing in its inspiration, is bound to approve. It furnished an armoury for the theory of [54] persecution. The truth is that Sacred Books are an obstacle to moral and intellectual progress, because they consecrate the ideas of a given epoch, and its customs, as divinely appointed. Christianity, by adopting books of a long past age, placed in the path of human development a particularly nasty stumbling-block. It may occur to one to wonder how history might have been altered —altered it surely would have been—if the Christians had cut Jehovah out of their programme and, content with the New Testament, had rejected the inspiration of the Old.
Under Constantine the Great and his successors, edict after edict fulminated against the worship of the old pagan gods and against heretical Christian sects. Julian the Apostate, who in his brief reign (A.D. 361–3) sought to revive the old order of things, proclaimed universal toleration, but he placed Christians at a disadvantage by forbidding them to teach in schools. This was only a momentary check. Paganism was finally shattered by the severe laws of Theodosius I (end of fourth century). It lingered on here and there for more than another century, especially at Rome and Athens, but had little importance. The Christians were more concerned in striving among themselves than in [55] crushing the prostrate spirit of antiquity. The execution of the heretic Priscillian in Spain (fourth century) inaugurated the punishment of heresy by death. It is interesting to see a non-Christian of this age teaching the Christian sects that they should suffer one another. Themistius in an address to the Emperor Valens urged him to repeal his edicts against the Christians with whom he did not agree, and expounded a theory of toleration. “The religious beliefs of individuals are a field in which the authority of a government cannot be effective; compliance can only lead to hypocritical professions. Every faith should be allowed; the civil government should govern orthodox and heterodox to the common good. God himself plainly shows that he wishes various forms of worship; there are many roads by which one can reach him.”
No father of the Church has been more esteemed or enjoyed higher authority than St. Augustine (died A.D. 410). He formulated the principle of persecution for the guidance of future generations, basing it on the firm foundation of Scripture—on words used by Jesus Christ in one of his parables, “Compel them to come in.” Till the end of the twelfth century the Church worked hard to suppress heterodoxies. There was much [56] persecution, but it was not systematic. There is reason to think that in the pursuit of heresy the Church was mainly guided by considerations of its temporal interest, and was roused to severe action only when the spread of false doctrine threatened to reduce its revenues or seemed a menace to society. At the end of the twelfth century Innocent III became Pope and under him the Church of Western Europe reached the height of its power. He and his immediate successors are responsible for imagining and beginning an organized movement to sweep heretics out of Christendom. Languedoc in Southwestern France was largely populated by heretics, whose opinions were considered particularly offensive, known as the Albigeois. They were the subjects of the Count of Toulouse, and were an industrious and respectable people. But the Church got far too little money out of this anti-clerical population, and Innocent called upon the Count to extirpate heresy from his dominion. As he would not obey, the Pope announced a Crusade against the Albigeois, and offered to all who would bear a hand the usual rewards granted to Crusaders, including absolution from all their sins. A series of sanguinary wars followed in which the Englishman, Simon de Montfort, took part. There were [57] wholesale burnings and hangings of men, women and children. The resistance of the people was broken down, though the heresy was not eradicated, and the struggle ended in 1229 with the complete humiliation of the Count of Toulouse. The important point of the episode is this: the Church introduced into the public law of Europe the new principle that a sovran held his crown on the condition that he should extirpate heresy. If he hesitated to persecute at the command of the Pope, he must be coerced; his lands were forfeited; and his dominions were thrown open to be seized by any one whom the Church could induce to attack him. The Popes thus established a theocratic system in which all other interests were to be subordinated to the grand duty of maintaining the purity of the Faith.
But in order to root out heresy it was necessary to discover it in its most secret retreats. The Albigeois had been crushed, but the poison of their doctrine was not yet destroyed. The organized system of searching out heretics known as the Inquisition was founded by Pope Gregory IX about A.D. 1233, and fully established by a Bull of Innocent IV (A.D. 1252) which regulated the machinery of persecution “as an integral part of the social edifice in every city and every [58] State.” This powerful engine for the suppression of the freedom of men’s religious opinions is unique in history.
The bishops were not equal to the new talk undertaken by the Church, and in every ecclesiastical province suitable monks were selected and to them was delegated the authority of the Pope for discovering heretics. These inquisitors had unlimited authority, they were subject to no supervision and responsible to no man. It would not have been easy to establish this system but for the fact that contemporary secular rulers had inaugurated independently a merciless legislation against heresy. The Emperor Frederick II, who was himself undoubtedly a freethinker, made laws for his extensive dominions in Italy and Germany (between 1220 and 1235), enacting that all heretics should be outlawed, that those who did not recant should be burned, those who recanted should be imprisoned, but if they relapsed should be executed; that their property should be confiscated, their houses destroyed, and their children, to the second generation, ineligible to positions of emolument unless they had betrayed their father or some other heretic.
Frederick’s legislation consecrated the stake as the proper punishment for heresy. This [59] cruel form of death for that crime seems to have been first inflicted on heretics by a French king (1017). We must remember that in the Middle Ages, and much later, crimes of all kinds were punished with the utmost cruelty. In England in the reign of Henry VIII there is a case of prisoners being boiled to death. Heresy was the foulest of all crimes; and to prevail against it was to prevail against the legions of hell. The cruel enactments against heretics were strongly supported by the public opinion of the masses.
When the Inquisition was fully developed it covered Western Christendom with a net from the meshes of which it was difficult for a heretic to escape. The inquisitors in the various kingdoms co-operated, and communicated information; there was “a chain of tribunals throughout continental Europe.” England stood outside the system, but from the age of Henry IV and Henry V the government repressed heresy by the stake under a special statute (A.D. 1400; repealed 1533; revived under Mary; finally repealed in 1676).
In its task of imposing unity of belief the Inquisition was most successful in Spain. Here towards the end of the fifteenth century a system was instituted which had peculiarities of its own and was very jealous of [60] Roman interference. One of the achievements of the Spanish Inquisition (which was not abolished till the nineteenth century) was to expel the Moriscos or converted Moors, who retained many of their old Mohammedan opinions and customs. It is also said to have eradicated Judaism and to have preserved the country from the zeal of Protestant missionaries. But it cannot be proved that it deserves the credit of having protected Spain against Protestantism, for it is quite possible that if the seeds of Protestant opinion had been sown they would, in any case, have fallen dead on an uncongenial soil. Freedom of thought however was entirely suppressed.
One of the most efficacious means for hunting down heresy was the “Edict of Faith,” which enlisted the people in the service of the Inquisition and required every man to be an informer. From time to time a certain district was visited and an edict issued commanding those who knew anything of any heresy to come forward and reveal it, under fearful penalties temporal and spiritual. In consequence, no one was free from the suspicion of his neighbours or even of his own family. “No more ingenious device has been invented to subjugate a whole population, to paralyze its intellect, and to reduce it [61] to blind obedience. It elevated delation to the rank of high religious duty.”
The process employed in the trials of those accused of heresy in Spain rejected every reasonable means for the ascertainment of truth. The prisoner was assumed to be guilty, the burden of proving his innocence rested on him; his judge was virtually his prosecutor. All witnesses against him, however infamous, were admitted. The rules for allowing witnesses for the prosecution were lax; those for rejecting witnesses for the defence were rigid. Jews, Moriscos, and servants could give evidence against the prisoner but not for him, and the same rule applied to kinsmen to the fourth degree. The principle on which the Inquisition proceeded was that better a hundred innocent should suffer than one guilty person escape. Indulgences were granted to any one who contributed wood to the pile. But the tribunal of the Inquisition did not itself condemn to the stake, for the Church must not be guilty of the shedding of blood. The ecclesiastical judge pronounced the prisoner to be a heretic of whose conversion there was no hope, and handed him over (“relaxed” him was the official term) to the secular authority, asking and charging the magistrate “to treat him benignantly and mercifully.” But this [62] formal plea for mercy could not be entertained by the civil power; it had no choice but to inflict death; if it did otherwise, it was a promoter of heresy. All princes and officials, according to the Canon Law, must punish duly and promptly heretics handed over to them by the Inquisition, under pain of excommunication. It is to be noted that the number of deaths at the stake has been much over-estimated by popular imagination; but the sum of suffering caused by the methods of the system and the punishments that fell short of death can hardly be exaggerated.
The legal processes employed by the Church in these persecutions exercised a corrupting influence on the criminal jurisprudence of the Continent. Lea, the historian of the Inquisition, observes: “Of all the curses which the Inquisition brought in its train, this perhaps was the greatest—that, until the closing years of the eighteenth century, throughout the greater part of Europe, the inquisitorial process, as developed for the destruction of heresy, became the customary method of dealing with all who were under any accusation.”
The Inquisitors who, as Gibbon says, “defended nonsense by cruelties,” are often regarded as monsters. It may be said for them and for the kings who did their will that [63] they were not a bit worse than the priests and monarchs of primitive ages who sacrificed human beings to their deities. The Greek king, Agamemnon, who immolated his daughter Iphigenia to obtain favourable winds from the gods, was perhaps a most affectionate father, and the seer who advised him to do so may have been a man of high integrity. They acted according to their beliefs. And so in the Middle Ages and afterwards men of kindly temper and the purest zeal for morality were absolutely devoid of mercy where heresy was suspected. Hatred of heresy was a sort of infectious germ, generated by the doctrine of exclusive salvation.
It has been observed that this dogma also injured the sense of truth. As man’s eternal fate was at stake, it seemed plainly legitimate or rather imperative to use any means to enforce the true belief—even falsehood and imposture. There was no scruple about the invention of miracles or any fictions that were edifying. A disinterested appreciation of truth will not begin to prevail till the seventeenth century.
While this principle, with the associated doctrines of sin, hell, and the last judgment, led to such consequences, there were other doctrines and implications in Christianity which, forming a solid rampart against the [64] advance of knowledge, blocked the paths of science in the Middle Ages, and obstructed its progress till the latter half of the nineteenth century. In every important field of scientific research, the ground was occupied by false views which the Church declared to be true on the infallible authority of the Bible. The Jewish account of Creation and the Fall of Man, inextricably bound up with the Christian theory of Redemption, excluded from free inquiry geology, zoology, and anthropology. The literal interpretation of the Bible involved the truth that the sun revolves round the earth. The Church condemned the theory of the antipodes. One of the charges against Servetus (who was burned in the sixteenth century; see below, p. 79) was that he believed the statement of a Greek geographer that Judea is a wretched barren country in spite of the fact that the Bible describes it as a land flowing with milk and honey. The Greek physician Hippocrates had based the study of medicine and disease on experience and methodical research. In the Middle Ages men relapsed to the primitive notions of a barbarous age. Bodily ailments were ascribed to occult agencies—the malice of the Devil or the wrath of God. St. Augustine said that the diseases of Christians were caused by demons, [65] and Luther in the same way attributed them to Satan. It was only logical that supernatural remedies should be sought to counteract the effects of supernatural causes. There was an immense traffic in relics with miraculous virtues, and this had the advantage of bringing in a large revenue to the Church. Physicians were often exposed to suspicions of sorcery and unbelief. Anatomy was forbidden, partly perhaps on account of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The opposition of ecclesiastics to inoculation in the eighteenth century was a survival of the mediaeval view of disease. Chemistry (alchemy) was considered a diabolical art and in 1317 was condemned by the Pope. The long imprisonment of Roger Bacon (thirteenth century) who, while he professed zeal for orthodoxy, had an inconvenient instinct for scientific research, illustrates the mediaeval distrust of science.
It is possible that the knowledge of nature would have progressed little, even if this distrust of science on theological grounds had not prevailed. For Greek science had ceased to advance five hundred years before Christianity became powerful. After about 200 B.C. no important discoveries were made. The explanation of this decay is not easy, but we may be sure that it is to be sought in the [66] social conditions of the Greek and Roman world. And we may suspect that the social conditions of the Middle Ages would have proved unfavourable to the scientific spirit— the disinterested quest of facts—even if the controlling beliefs had not been hostile. We may suspect that the rebirth of science would in any case have been postponed till new social conditions, which began to appear in the thirteenth century (see next Chapter), had reached a certain maturity. Theological prejudice may have injured knowledge principally by its survival after the Middle Ages had passed away. In other words, the harm done by Christian doctrines, in this respect, may lie less in the obscurantism of the dark interval between ancient and modern civilization, than in the obstructions which they offered when science had revived in spite of them and could no longer be crushed.
The firm belief in witchcraft, magic, and demons was inherited by the Middle Ages from antiquity, but it became far more lurid and made the world terrible. Men believed that they were surrounded by fiends watching for every opportunity to harm them, that pestilences, storms, eclipses, and famines were the work of the Devil; but they believed as firmly that ecclesiastical rites were capable of coping with these enemies. Some of the [67] early Christian Emperors legislated against magic, but till the fourteenth century there was no systematic attempt to root out witchcraft. The fearful epidemic, known as the Black Death, which devastated Europe in that century, seems to have aggravated the haunting terror of the invisible world of demons. Trials for witchcraft multiplied, and for three hundred years the discovery of witchcraft and the destruction of those who were accused of practising it, chiefly women, was a standing feature of European civilization. Both the theory and the persecution were supported by Holy Scripture. “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live” was the clear injunction of the highest authority. Pope Innocent VIII issued a Bull on the matter (1484) in which he asserted that plagues and storms are the work of witches, and the ablest minds believed in the reality of their devilish powers.
No story is more painful than the persecution of witches, and nowhere was it more atrocious than in England and Scotland. I mention it because it was the direct result of theological doctrines, and because, as we shall see, it was rationalism which brought the long chapter of horrors to an end.
In the period, then, in which the Church exercised its greatest influence, reason was [68] enchained in the prison which Christianity had built around the human mind. It was not indeed inactive, but its activity took the form of heresy; or, to pursue the metaphor, those who broke chains were unable for the most part to scale the walls of the prison; their freedom extended only so far as to arrive at beliefs, which, like orthodoxy itself, were based on Christian mythology. There were some exceptions to the rule. At the end of the twelfth century a stimulus from another world began to make itself felt. The philosophy of Aristotle became known to learned men in Western Christendom; their teachers were Jews and Mohammedans. Among the Mohammedans there was a certain amount of free thought, provoked by their knowledge of ancient Greek speculation. The works of the freethinker Averroes (twelfth century) which were based on Aristotle’s philosophy, propagated a small wave of rationalism in Christian countries. Averroes held the eternity of matter and denied the immortality of the soul; his general view may be described as pantheism. But he sought to avoid difficulties with the orthodox authorities of Islam by laying down the doctrine of double truth, that is the coexistence of two independent and contradictory truths, the one philosophical, and the other religious. This [69] did not save him from being banished from the court of the Spanish caliph. In the University of Paris his teaching produced a school of freethinkers who held that the Creation, the resurrection of the body, and other essential dogmas, might be true from the standpoint of religion but are false from the standpoint of reason. To a plain mind this seems much as if one said that the doctrine of immortality is true on Sundays but not on week-days, or that the Apostles’ Creed is false in the drawing-room and true in the kitchen. This dangerous movement was crushed, and the saving principle of double truth condemned, by Pope John XXI. The spread of Averroistic and similar speculations called forth the Theology of Thomas, of Aquino in South Italy (died 1274), a most subtle thinker, whose mind had a natural turn for scepticism. He enlisted Aristotle, hitherto the guide of infidelity, on the side of orthodoxy, and constructed an ingenious Christian philosophy which is still authoritative in the Roman Church. But Aristotle and reason are dangerous allies for faith, and the treatise of Thomas is perhaps more calculated to unsettle a believing mind by the doubts which it powerfully states than to quiet the scruples of a doubter by its solutions.
There must always have been some private [70] and underground unbelief here and there, which did not lead to any serious consequences. The blasphemous statement that the world had been deceived by three impostors, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, was current in the thirteenth century. It was attributed to the freethinking Emperor Frederick II (died 1250), who has been described as “the first modern man.” The same idea, in a milder form, was expressed in the story of the Three Rings, which is at least as old. A Mohammedan ruler, desiring to extort money from a rich Jew, summoned him to his court and laid a snare for him. “My friend,” he said, “I have often heard it reported that thou art a very wise man. Tell me therefore which of the three religions, that of the Jews, that of the Mohammedans, and that of the Christians, thou believest to be the truest.” The Jew saw that a trap was laid for him and answered as follows: “My lord, there was once a rich man who among his treasures had a ring of such great value that he wished to leave it as a perpetual heirloom to his successors. So he made a will that whichever of his sons should be found in possession of this ring after his death should be considered his heir. The son to whom he gave the ring acted in the same way as his father, and so the ring passed from hand to [71] hand. At last it came into the possession of a man who had three sons whom he loved equally. Unable to make up his mind to which of them he should leave the ring, he promised it to each of them privately, and then in order to satisfy them all caused a goldsmith to make two other rings so closely resembling the true ring that he was unable to distinguish them himself. On his death-bed he gave each of them a ring, and each claimed to be his heir, but no one could prove his title because the rings were indistinguishable, and the suit at law lasts till this day. It is even so, my lord, with the three religions, given by God to the three peoples. They each think they have the true religion, but which of them really has it, is a question, like that of the rings, still undecided.” This sceptical story became famous in the eighteenth century, when the German poet, Lessing, built upon it his drama Nathan the Sage, which was intended to show the unreasonableness of intolerance.







A History of Freedom of Thought: CHAPTER IV

PROSPECT OF DELIVERANCE
(THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION)
THE intellectual and social movement which was to dispel the darkness of the [72] Middle Ages and prepare the way for those who would ultimately deliver reason from her prison, began in Italy in the thirteenth century. The misty veil woven of credulity and infantile naïveté which had hung over men’s souls and protected them from understanding either themselves or their relation to the world began to lift. The individual began to feel his separate individuality, to be conscious of his own value as a person apart from his race or country (as in the later ages of Greece and Rome); and the world around him began to emerge from the mists of mediaeval dreams. The change was due to the political and social conditions of the little Italian States, of which some were republics and others governed by tyrants.
To the human world, thus unveiling itself, the individual who sought to make it serve his purposes required a guide; and the guide was found in the ancient literature of Greece and Rome. Hence the whole transformation, which presently extended from Italy to Northern Europe, is known as the Renaissance, or rebirth of classical antiquity. But the awakened interest in classical literature while it coloured the character and stimulated the growth of the movement, supplying new ideals and suggesting new points of view, was only the form in which the change of spirit [73] began to express itself in the fourteenth century. The change might conceivably have taken some other shape. Its true name is Humanism.
At the time men hardly felt that they were passing into a new age of civilization, nor did the culture of the Renaissance immediately produce any open or general intellectual rebellion against orthodox beliefs. The world was gradually assuming an aspect decidedly unfriendly to the teaching of mediaeval orthodoxy; but there was no explosion of hostility; it was not till the seventeenth century that war between religion and authority was systematically waged. The humanists were not hostile to theological authority or to the claims of religious dogma; but they had discovered a purely human curiosity about this world and it absorbed their interest. They idolized pagan literature which abounded in poisonous germs; the secular side of education became all-important; religion and theology were kept in a separate compartment. Some speculative minds, which were sensitive to the contradiction, might seek to reconcile the old religion with new ideas; but the general tendency of thinkers in the Renaissance period was to keep the two worlds distinct, and to practise outward conformity to the creed without any real intellectual submission.
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I may illustrate this double-facedness of the Renaissance by Montaigne (second half of sixteenth century). His Essays make for rationalism, but contain frequent professions of orthodox Catholicism, in which he was perfectly sincere. There is no attempt to reconcile the two points of view; in fact, he takes the sceptical position that there is no bridge between reason and religion. The human intellect is incapable in the domain of theology, and religion must be placed aloft, out of reach and beyond the interference of reason; to be humbly accepted. But while he humbly accepted it, on sceptical grounds which would have induced him to accept Mohammadanism if he had been born in Cairo, his soul was not in its dominion. It was the philosophers and wise men of antiquity, Cicero, and Seneca, and Plutarch, who moulded and possessed his mind. It is to them, and not to the consolations of Christianity, that he turns when he discusses the problem of death. The religious wars in France which he witnessed and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day (1572) were calculated to confirm him in his scepticism. His attitude to persecution is expressed in the remark that “it is setting a high value on one’s opinions to roast men on account of them.”
The logical results of Montaigne’s scepticism [75] were made visible by his friend Charron, who published a book On Wisdom in 1601. Here it is taught that true morality is not founded on religion, and the author surveys the history of Christianity to show the evils which it had produced. He says of immortality that it is the most generally received doctrine, the most usefully believed, and the most weakly established by human reasons; but he modified this and some other passages in a second edition. A contemporary Jesuit placed Charron in the catalogue of the most dangerous and wicked atheists. He was really a deist; but in those days, and long after, no one scrupled to call a non-Christian deist an atheist. His book would doubtless have been suppressed and he would have suffered but for the support of King Henry IV. It has a particular interest because it transports us directly from the atmosphere of the Renaissance, represented by Montaigne, into the new age of more or less aggressive rationalism.
What Humanism did in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, at first in Italy, then in other countries, was to create an intellectual atmosphere in which the emancipation of reason could begin and knowledge could resume its progress. The period saw the invention of printing and [76] the discovery of new parts of the globe, and these things were to aid powerfully in the future defeat of authority.
But the triumph of freedom depended on other causes also; it was not to be brought about by the intellect alone. The chief political facts of the period were the decline of the power of the Pope in Europe, the decay of the Holy Roman Empire, and the growth of strong monarchies, in which worldly interests determined and dictated ecclesiastical policy, and from which the modern State was to develop. The success of the Reformation was made possible by these conditions. Its victory in North Germany was due to the secular interest of the princes, who profited by the confiscation of Church lands. In England there was no popular movement; the change was carried through by the government for its own purposes.
The principal cause of the Reformation was the general corruption of the Church and the flagrancy of its oppression. For a long time the Papacy had had no higher aim than to be a secular power exploiting its spiritual authority for the purpose of promoting its worldly interests, by which it was exclusively governed. All the European States based their diplomacy on this assumption. Since the fourteenth century every one acknowledged [77] the need of reforming the Church, and reform had been promised, but things went from bad to worse, and there was no resource but rebellion. The rebellion led by Luther was the result not of a revolt of reason against dogmas, but of widely spread anti-clerical feeling due to the ecclesiastical methods of extorting money, particularly by the sale of Indulgences, the most glaring abuse of the time. It was his study of the theory of Papal Indulgences that led Luther on to his theological heresies.
It is an elementary error, but one which is still shared by many people who have read history superficially, that the Reformation established religious liberty and the right of private judgment. What it did was to bring about a new set of political and social conditions, under which religious liberty could ultimately be secured, and, by virtue of its inherent inconsistencies, to lead to results at which its leaders would have shuddered. But nothing was further from the minds of the leading Reformers than the toleration of doctrines differing from their own. They replaced one authority by another. They set up the authority of the Bible instead of that of the Church, but it was the Bible according to Luther or the Bible according to Calvin. So far as the spirit of intolerance went, there [78] was nothing to choose between the new and the old Churches. The religious wars were not for the cause of freedom, but for particular sets of doctrines; and in France, if the Protestants had been victorious, it is certain that they would not have given more liberal terms to the Catholics than the Catholics gave to them.
Luther was quite opposed to liberty of conscience and worship, a doctrine which was inconsistent with Scripture as he read it. He might protest against coercion and condemn the burning of heretics, when he was in fear that he and his party might be victims, but when he was safe and in power, he asserted his real view that it was the duty of the State to impose the true doctrine and exterminate heresy, which was an abomination, that unlimited obedience to their prince in religious as in other matters was the duty of subjects, and that the end of the State was to defend the faith. He held that Anabaptists should be put to the sword. With Protestants and Catholics alike the dogma of exclusive salvation led to the same place.
Calvin’s fame for intolerance is blackest. He did not, like Luther, advocate the absolute power of the civil ruler; he stood for the control of the State by the Church—a form of government which is commonly called theocracy; [79] and he established a theocracy at Geneva. Here liberty was completely crushed; false doctrines were put down by imprisonment, exile, and death. The punishment of Servetus is the most famous exploit of Calvin’s warfare against heresy. The Spaniard Servetus, who had written against the dogma of the Trinity, was imprisoned at Lyons (partly through the machinations of Calvin) and having escaped came rashly to Geneva. He was tried for heresy and committed to the flames (1553), though Geneva had no jurisdiction over him. Melanchthon, who formulated the principles of persecution, praised this act as a memorable example to posterity. Posterity however was one day to be ashamed of that example. In 1903 the Calvinists of Geneva felt impelled to erect an expiatory monument, in which Calvin “our great Reformer” is excused as guilty of an error “which was that of his century.”
Thus the Reformers, like the Church from which they parted, cared nothing for freedom, they only cared for “truth.” If the mediaeval ideal was to purge the world of heretics, the object of the Protestant was to exclude all dissidents from his own land. The people at large were to be driven into a fold, to accept their faith at the command of their sovran. This was the principle laid down in the [80] religious peace which (1555) composed the struggle between the Catholic Emperor and the Protestant German princes. It was recognized by Catherine de’ Medici when she massacred the French Protestants and signified to Queen Elizabeth that she might do likewise with English Catholics.
Nor did the Protestant creeds represent enlightenment. The Reformation on the Continent was as hostile to enlightenment as it was to liberty; and science, if it seemed to contradict the Bible, has as little chance with Luther as with the Pope. The Bible, interpreted by the Protestants or the Roman Church, was equally fatal to witches. In Germany the development of learning received a long set-back.
Yet the Reformation involuntarily helped the cause of liberty. The result was contrary to the intentions of its leaders, was indirect, and long delayed. In the first place, the great rent in Western Christianity, substituting a number of theological authorities instead of one—several gods, we may say, instead of one God—produced a weakening of ecclesiastical authority in general. The religious tradition was broken. In the second place, in the Protestant States, the supreme ecclesiastical power was vested in the sovran; the sovran had other interests besides those of [81] the Church to consider; and political reasons would compel him sooner or later to modify the principle of ecclesiastical intolerance. Catholic States in the same way were forced to depart from the duty of not suffering heretics. The religious wars in France ended in a limited toleration of Protestants. The policy of Cardinal Richelieu, who supported the Protestant cause in Germany, illustrates how secular interests obstructed the cause of faith.
Again, the intellectual justification of the Protestant rebellion against the Church had been the right of private judgment, that is, the principle of religious liberty. But the Reformers had asserted it only for themselves, and as soon as they had framed their own articles of faith, they had practically repudiated it. This was the most glaring inconsistency in the Protestant position; and the claim which they had thrust aside could not be permanently suppressed. Once more, the Protestant doctrines rested on an insecure foundation which no logic could defend, and inevitably led from one untenable position to another. If we are to believe on authority, why should we prefer the upstart dictation of the Lutheran Confession of Augsburg or the English Thirty-nine Articles to the venerable authority of the Church of Rome? If we decide against Rome, we must do so by means [82] of reason; but once we exercise reason in the matter, why should we stop where Luther or Calvin or any of the other rebels stopped, unless we assume that one of them was inspired? If we reject superstitions which they rejected, there is nothing except their authority to prevent us from rejecting all or some of the superstitions which they retained. Moreover, their Bible-worship promoted results which they did not foresee. [1] The inspired record on which the creeds depend became an open book. Public attention was directed to it as never before, though it cannot be said to have been universally read before the nineteenth century. Study led to criticism, the difficulties of the dogma of inspiration were appreciated, and the Bible was ultimately to be submitted to a remorseless dissection which has altered at least the quality of its authority in the eyes of intelligent believers. This process of Biblical criticism has been conducted mainly in a Protestant atmosphere and the new position in which the Bible was placed by the Reformation must be held partly accountable. In these ways, Protestantism was adapted to be a stepping-stone to rationalism, and thus served the cause of freedom.
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That cause however was powerfully and directly promoted by one sect of Reformers, who in the eyes of all the others were blasphemers and of whom most people never think when they talk of the Reformation. I mean the Socinians. Of their far-reaching influence something will be said in the next chapter.
Another result of the Reformation has still to be mentioned, its renovating effect on the Roman Church, which had now to fight for its existence. A new series of Popes who were in earnest about religion began with Paul III (1534) and reorganized the Papacy and its resources for a struggle of centuries. [2] The institution of the Jesuit order, the establishment of the Inquisition at Rome, the Council of Trent, the censorship of the Press (Index of Forbidden Books) were the expression of the new spirit and the means to cope with the new situation. The reformed Papacy was good fortune for believing children of the Church, but what here concerns us is that one of its chief objects was to repress freedom more effectually. Savonarola who preached right living at Florence had been executed (1498) under Pope Alexander VI who was a notorious profligate. If Savonarola had lived [84] in the new era he might have been canonized, but Giordano Bruno was burned.
Giordano Bruno had constructed a religious philosophy, based partly upon Epicurus, from whom he took the theory of the infinity of the universe. But Epicurean materialism was transformed into a pantheistic mysticism by the doctrine that God is the soul of matter. Accepting the recent discovery of Copernicus, which Catholics and Protestants alike rejected, that the earth revolves round the sun, Bruno took the further step of regarding the fixed stars as suns, each with its invisible satellites. He sought to come to an understanding with the Bible, which (he held) being intended for the vulgar had to accommodate itself to their prejudices. Leaving Italy, because he was suspected of heresy, he lived successively in Switzerland, France, England, and Germany, and in 1592, induced by a false friend to return to Venice he was seized by order of the Inquisition. Finally condemned in Rome, he was burned (1600) in the Campo de’ Fiori, where a monument now stands in his honour, erected some years ago, to the great chagrin of the Roman Church.
Much is made of the fate of Bruno because he is one of the world’s famous men. No country has so illustrious a victim of that era to commemorate as Italy, but in other lands [85] blood just as innocent was shed for heterodox opinions. In France there was rather more freedom than elsewhere under the relatively tolerant government of Henry IV and of the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, till about 1660. But at Toulouse (1619) Lucilio Vanini, a learned Italian who like Bruno wandered about Europe, was convicted as an atheist and blasphemer; his tongue was torn out and he was burned. Protestant England, under Elizabeth and James I, did not lag behind the Roman Inquisition, but on account of the obscurity of the victims her zeal for faith has been unduly forgotten. Yet, but for an accident, she might have covered herself with the glory of having done to death a heretic not less famous than Giordano Bruno. The poet Marlowe was accused of atheism, but while the prosecution was hanging over him he was killed in a sordid quarrel in a tavern (1593). Another dramatist (Kyd) who was implicated in the charge was put to the torture. At the same time Sir Walter Raleigh was prosecuted for unbelief but not convicted. Others were not so fortunate. Three or four persons were burned at Norwich in the reign of Elizabeth for unchristian doctrines, among them Francis Kett who had been a Fellow of Corpus Christi, Cambridge. Under James I, who [86] interested himself personally in such matters, Bartholomew Legate was charged with holding various pestilent opinions. The king summoned him to his presence and asked him whether he did not pray daily to Jesus Christ. Legate replied he had prayed to Christ in the days of his ignorance, but not for the last seven years. “Away, base fellow,” said James, spurning him with his foot, “it shall never be said that one stayeth in my palace that hath never prayed to our Saviour for seven years together.” Legate, having been imprisoned for some time in Newgate, was declared an incorrigible heretic and burned at Smithfield (1611). Just a month later, one Wightman was burned at Lichfield, by the Bishop of Coventry, for heterodox doctrines. It is possible that public opinion was shocked by these two burnings. They were the last cases in England of death for unbelief. Puritan intolerance, indeed, passed an ordinance in 1648, by which all who denied the Trinity, Christ’s divinity, the inspiration of Scripture, or a future state, were liable to death, and persons guilty of other heresies, to imprisonment. But this did not lead to any executions.
The Renaissance age saw the first signs of the beginning of modern science, but the mediaeval prejudices against the investigation [87] of nature were not dissipated till the seventeenth century, and in Italy they continued to a much later period. The history of modern astronomy begins in 1543, with the publication of the work of Copernicus revealing the truth about the motions of the earth. The appearance of this work is important in the history of free thought, because it raised a clear and definite issue between science and Scripture; and Osiander, who edited it (Copernicus was dying), forseeing the outcry it would raise, stated untruly in the preface that the earth’s motion was put forward only as a hypothesis. The theory was denounced by Catholics and Reformers, and it did not convince some men (e.g. Bacon) who were not influenced by theological prejudice. The observations of the Italian astronomer Galileo de’ Galilei demonstrated the Copernican theory beyond question. His telescope discovered the moons of Jupiter, and his observation of the spots in the sun confirmed the earth’s rotation. In the pulpits of Florence, where he lived under the protection of the Grand Duke, his sensational discoveries were condemned. “Men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven?” He was then denounced to the Holy Office of the Inquisition by two Dominican monks. Learning that his investigations were being considered [88] at Rome, Galileo went thither, confident that he would be able to convince the ecclesiastical authorities of the manifest truth of Copernicanism. He did not realize what theology was capable of. In February 1616 the Holy Office decided that the Copernican system was in itself absurd, and, in respect of Scripture, heretical. Cardinal Bellarmin, by the Pope’s direction, summoned Galileo and officially admonished him to abandon his opinion and cease to teach it, otherwise the Inquisition would proceed against him. Galileo promised to obey. The book of Copernicus was placed on the Index. It has been remarked that Galileo’s book on Solar Spots contains no mention of Scripture, and thus the Holy Office, in its decree which related to that book, passed judgment on a scientific, not a theological, question.
Galileo was silenced for a while, but it was impossible for him to be mute for ever. Under a new Pope (Urban VIII) he looked for greater liberty, and there were many in the Papal circle who were well disposed to him. He hoped to avoid difficulties by the device of placing the arguments for the old and the new theories side by side, and pretending not to judge between them. He wrote a treatise on the two systems (the Ptolemaic and the Copernican) in the form [89] of Dialogues, of which the preface declares that the purpose is to explain the pros and cons of the two views. But the spirit of the work is Copernican. He received permission, quite definite as he thought, from Father Riccardi (master of the Sacred Palace) to print it, and it appeared in 1632. The Pope however disapproved of it, the book was examined by a commission, and Galileo was summoned before the Inquisition. He was old and ill, and the humiliations which he had to endure are a painful story. He would probably have been more severely treated, if one of the members of the tribunal had not been a man of scientific training (Macolano, a Dominican), who was able to appreciate his ability. Under examination, Galileo denied that he had upheld the motion of the earth in the Dialogues, and asserted that he had shown the reasons of Copernicus to be inconclusive. This defence was in accordance with the statement in his preface, but contradicted his deepest conviction. In struggling with such a tribunal, it was the only line which a man who was not a hero could take. At a later session, he forced himself ignominiously to confess that some of the arguments on the Copernican side had been put too strongly and to declare himself ready to confute the [90] theory. In the final examination, he was threatened with torture. He said that before the decree of 1616 he had held the truth of the Copernican system to be arguable, but since then he had held the Ptolemaic to be true. Next day, he publicly abjured the scientific truth which he had demonstrated. He was allowed to retire to the country, on condition that he saw no one. In the last months of his life he wrote to a friend to this effect: “The falsity of the Copernican system cannot be doubted, especially by us Catholics. It is refuted by the irrefragable authority of Scripture. The conjectures of Copernicus and his disciples were all disposed of by the one solid argument: God’s omnipotence can operate in infinitely various ways. If something appears to our observation to happen in one particular way, we must not curtail God’s arm, and sustain a thing in which we may be deceived.” The irony is evident.
Rome did not permit the truth about the solar system to be taught till after the middle of the eighteenth century, and Galileo’s books remained on the Index till 1835. The prohibition was fatal to the study of natural science in Italy.
The Roman Index reminds us of the significance of the invention of printing in the struggle for freedom of thought, by making [91] it easy to propagate new ideas far and wide. Authority speedily realized the danger, and took measures to place its yoke on the new contrivance, which promised to be such a powerful ally of reason. Pope Alexander VI inaugurated censorship of the Press by his Bull against unlicensed printing (1501). In France King Henry II made printing without official permission punishable by death. In Germany, censorship was introduced in 1529. In England, under Elizabeth, books could not be printed without a license, and printing presses were not allowed except in London, Oxford, and Cambridge; the regulation of the Press was under the authority of the Star Chamber. Nowhere did the Press become really free till the nineteenth century.
While the Reformation and the renovated Roman Church meant a reaction against the Renaissance, the vital changes which the Renaissance signified—individualism, a new intellectual attitude to the world, the cultivation of secular knowledge—were permanent and destined to lead, amid the competing intolerances of Catholic and Protestant powers, to the goal of liberty. We shall see how reason and the growth of knowledge undermined the bases of theological authority. At each step in this process, in which philosophical speculation, historical [92] criticism, natural science have all taken part, the opposition between reason and faith deepened; doubt, clear or vague, increased; and secularism, derived from the Humanists, and always implying scepticism, whether latent or conscious, substituted an interest in the fortunes of the human race upon earth for the interest in a future world. And along with this steady intellectual advance, toleration gained ground and freedom won more champions. In the meantime the force of political circumstances was compelling governments to mitigate their maintenance of one religious creed by measures of relief to other Christian sects, and the principle of exclusiveness was broken down for reasons of worldly expediency. Religious liberty was an important step towards complete freedom of opinion.

[1] The danger, however, was felt in Germany, and in the seventeenth century the study of Scripture was not encouraged at German Universities.
[2] See Barry, Papacy and Modern Times (in this series), 113 seq.







A History of the Freedom of Thought (cont.)



CHAPTER V
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION
IN the third century B.C. the Indian king Asoka, a man of religious zeal but of tolerant spirit, confronted by the struggle between two hostile religions (Brahmanism and Buddhism), decided that both should be equally privileged and honoured in his dominions. His ordinances on the matter are memorable [93] as the earliest existing Edicts of toleration. In Europe, as we saw, the principle of toleration was for the first time definitely expressed in the Roman Imperial Edicts which terminated the persecution of the Christians.
The religious strife of the sixteenth century raised the question in its modern form, and for many generations it was one of the chief problems of statesmen and the subject of endless controversial pamphlets. Toleration means incomplete religious liberty, and there are many degrees of it. It might be granted to certain Christian sects; it might be granted to Christian sects, but these alone; it might be granted to all religions, but not to freethinkers; or to deists, but not to atheists. It might mean the concession of some civil rights, but not of others; it might mean the exclusion of those who are tolerated from public offices or from certain professions. The religious liberty now enjoyed in Western lands has been gained through various stages of toleration.
We owe the modern principle of toleration to the Italian group of Reformers, who rejected the doctrine of the Trinity and were the fathers of Unitarianism. The Reformation movement had spread to Italy, but Rome was successful in suppressing it, and many heretics fled to Switzerland. The anti-Trinitarian [94] group were forced by the intolerance of Calvin to flee to Transylvania and Poland where they propagated their doctrines. The Unitarian creed was moulded by Fausto Sozzini, generally known as Socinus, and in the catechism of his sect (1574) persecution is condemned. This repudiation of the use of force in the interest of religion is a consequence of the Socinian doctrines. For, unlike Luther and Calvin, the Socinians conceded such a wide room to individual judgment in the interpretation of Scripture that to impose Socinianism would have been inconsistent with its principles. In other words, there was a strong rationalistic element which was lacking in the Trinitarian creeds.
It was under the influence of the Socinian spirit that Castellion of Savoy sounded the trumpet of toleration in a pamphlet denouncing the burning of Servetus, whereby he earned the malignant hatred of Calvin. He maintained the innocence of error and ridiculed the importance which the Churches laid on obscure questions such as predestination and the Trinity. “To discuss the difference between the Law and the Gospel, gratuitous remission of sins or imputed righteousness, is as if a man were to discuss whether a prince was to come on horseback, [95] or in a chariot, or dressed in white or in red.” [1] Religion is a curse if persecution is a necessary part of it.
For a long time the Socinians and those who came under their influence when, driven from Poland, they passed into Germany and Holland, were the only sects which advocated toleration. It was adopted from them by the Anabaptists and by the Arminian section of the Reformed Church of Holland. And in Holland, the founder of the English Congregationalists, who (under the name of Independents) played such an important part in the history of the Civil War and the Commonwealth, learned the principle of liberty of conscience. Socinus thought that this principle could be realized without abolishing the State Church. He contemplated a close union between the State and the prevailing Church, combined with complete toleration for other sects. It is under this system (which has been called jurisdictional) that religious liberty has been realized in European States. But there is another and simpler method, that of separating Church from State and placing all religions on an equality. This was the solution which the Anabaptists would have preferred. They detested the State; and the doctrine of religious liberty was not [96] precious to them. Their ideal system would have been an Anabaptist theocracy; separation was the second best.
In Europe, public opinion was not ripe for separation, inasmuch as the most powerful religious bodies were alike in regarding toleration as wicked indifference. But it was introduced in a small corner of the new world beyond the Atlantic in the seventeenth century. The Puritans who fled from the intolerance of the English Church and State and founded colonies in New England, were themselves equally intolerant, not only to Anglicans and Catholics, but to Baptists and Quakers. They set up theocratical governments from which all who did not belong to their own sect were excluded. Roger Williams had imbibed from the Dutch Arminians the idea of separation of Church from State. On account of this heresy he was driven from Massachusetts, and he founded Providence to be a refuge for those whom the Puritan colonists persecuted. Here he set up a democratic constitution in which the magistrates had power only in civil matters and could not interfere with religion. Other towns were presently founded in Rhode Island, and a charter of Charles II (1663) confirmed the constitution, which secured to all citizens professing Christianity, of whatever [97] form, the full enjoyment of political rights. Non-Christians were tolerated, but were not admitted to the political rights of Christians. So far, the new State fell short of perfect liberty. But the fact that Jews were soon admitted, notwithstanding, to full citizenship shows how free the atmosphere was. To Roger Williams belongs the glory of having founded the first modern State which was really tolerant and was based on the principle of taking the control of religious matters entirely out of the hands of the civil government.
Toleration was also established in the Roman Catholic colony of Maryland, but in a different way. Through the influence of Lord Baltimore an Act of Toleration was passed in 1649, notable as the first decree, voted by a legal assembly, granting complete freedom to all Christians. No one professing faith in Christ was to be molested in regard to his religion. But the law was heavy on all outside this pale. Any one who blasphemed God or attacked the Trinity or any member of the Trinity was threatened by the penalty of death. The tolerance of Maryland attracted so many Protestant settlers from Virginia that the Protestants became a majority, and as soon as they won political preponderance, they introduced an Act (1654) [98] excluding Papists and Prelatists from toleration. The rule of the Baltimores was restored after 1660, and the old religious freedom was revived, but with the accession of William III the Protestants again came into power and the toleration which the Catholics had instituted in Maryland came to an end.
It will be observed that in both these cases freedom was incomplete; but it was much larger and more fundamental in Rhode Island, where it had been ultimately derived from the doctrine of Socinus. [2] When the colonies became independent of England the Federal Constitution which they set up was absolutely secular, but it was left to each member of the Union to adopt Separation or not (1789). If separation has become the rule in the American States, it may be largely due to the fact that on any other system the governments would have found it difficult to impose mutual tolerance on the sects. It must be added that in Maryland and a few southern States atheists still suffer from some political disabilities.
In England, the experiment of Separation would have been tried under the Commonwealth, if the Independents had had their way. This policy was overruled by Cromwell. [99] The new national Church included Presbyterians, Independents, and Baptists, but liberty of worship was granted to all Christian sects, except Roman Catholics and Anglicans. If the parliament had had the power, this toleration would have been a mere name. The Presbyterians regarded toleration as a work of the Devil, and would have persecuted the Independents if they could. But under Cromwell’s autocratic rule even the Anglicans lived in peace, and toleration was extended to the Jews. In these days, voices were raised from various quarters advocating toleration on general grounds. [3] The most illustrious advocate was Milton, the poet, who was in favour of the severance of Church from State.
In Milton’s Areopagitica: a speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing (1644), the freedom of the Press is eloquently sustained by arguments which are valid for freedom of thought in general. It is shown that the censorship will conduce “to the discouragement of all learning and the stop of truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might be yet further made, both in religious [100] and civil wisdom.” For knowledge is advanced through the utterance of new opinions, and truth is discovered by free discussion. If the waters of truth “flow not in a perpetual progression they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.” Books which are authorized by the licensers are apt to be, as Bacon said, “but the language of the times,” and do not contribute to progress. The examples of the countries where the censorship is severe do not suggest that it is useful for morals: “look into Italy and Spain, whether those places be one scruple the better, the honester, the wiser, the chaster, since all the inquisitional rigour that hath been executed upon books.” Spain indeed could reply, “We are, what is more important, more orthodox.” It is interesting to notice that Milton places freedom of thought above civil liberty: “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties.”
With the restoration of the Monarchy and the Anglican Church, religious liberty was extinguished by a series of laws against Dissenters. To the Revolution we owe the Act of Toleration (1689) from which the religious freedom which England enjoys at present is derived. It granted freedom of worship to Presbyterians, Congregationalists, [101] Baptists and Quakers, but only to these; Catholics and Unitarians were expressly excepted and the repressive legislation of Charles II remained in force against them. It was a characteristically English measure, logically inconsistent and absurd, a mixture of tolerance and intolerance, but suitable to the circumstances and the state of public opinion at the time.
In the same year John Locke’s famous (first) Letter concerning Toleration appeared in Latin. Three subsequent letters developed and illustrated his thesis. The main argument is based on the principle that the business of civil government is quite distinct from that of religion, that the State is a society constituted only for preserving and promoting the civil interests of its members —civil interests meaning life, liberty, health, and the possession of property. The care of souls is not committed to magistrates more than to other men. For the magistrate can only use outward force; but true religion means the inward persuasion of the mind, and the mind is so made that force cannot compel it to believe. So too it is absurd for a State to make laws to enforce a religion, for laws are useless without penalties, and penalties are impertinent because they cannot convince.
Moreover, even if penalties could change [102] men’s beliefs, this would not conduce to the salvation of souls. Would more men be saved if all blindly resigned themselves to the will of their rulers and accepted the religion of their country? For as the princes of the world are divided in religion, one country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world would have to follow their princes to destruction; “and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a deity, men would owe their eternal happiness or their eternal misery to the places of their nativity.” This is a principle on which Locke repeatedly insists. If a State is justified in imposing a creed, it follows that in all the lands, except the one or few in which the true faith prevails, it is the duty of the subjects to embrace a false religion. If Protestantism is promoted in England, Popery by the same rule will be promoted in France. “What is true and good in England will be true and good at Rome too, in China, or Geneva.” Toleration is the principle which gives to the true faith the best chance of prevailing.
Locke would concede full liberty to idolaters, by whom he means the Indians of North America, and he makes some scathing remarks on the ecclesiastical zeal which forced these “innocent pagans” to forsake [103] their ancient religion. But his toleration, though it extends beyond the Christian pale, is not complete. He excepts in the first place Roman Catholics, not on account of their theological dogmas but because they “teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics,” that “kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms,” and because they deliver themselves up to the protection and service of a foreign prince—the Pope. In other words, they are politically dangerous. His other exception is atheists. “Those are not all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion to challenge the privilege of a Toleration.”
Thus Locke is not free from the prejudices of his time. These exceptions contradict his own principle that “it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true does not depend upon our will.” This applies to Roman Catholics as to Protestants, to atheists as to deists. Locke, however, perhaps thought [104] that the speculative opinion of atheism, which was uncommon in his day, does depend on the will. He would have excluded from his State his great contemporary Spinoza.
But in spite of its limitations Locke’s Toleration is a work of the highest value, and its argument takes us further than its author went. It asserts unrestrictedly the secular principle, and its logical issue is Disestablishment. A Church is merely “a free and voluntary society.” I may notice the remark that if infidels were to be converted by force, it was easier for God to do it “with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.” This is a polite way of stating a maxim analogous to that of the Emperor Tiberius (above, p. 41). If false beliefs are an offence to God, it is, really, his affair.
The toleration of Nonconformists was far from pleasing extreme Anglicans, and the influence of this party at the beginning of the eighteenth century menaced the liberty of Dissenters. The situation provoked Defoe, who was a zealous Nonconformist, to write his pamphlet, The Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1702), an ironical attack upon the principle of toleration. It pretends to show that the Dissenters are at heart incorrigible rebels, that a gentle policy is useless, and suggests [105] that all preachers at conventicles should be hanged and all persons found attending such meetings should be banished. This exceedingly amusing but terribly earnest caricature of the sentiments of the High Anglican party at first deceived and alarmed the Dissenters themselves. But the High Churchmen were furious. Defoe was fined, exposed in the pillory three times, and sent to Newgate prison.
But the Tory reaction was only temporary. During the eighteenth century a relatively tolerant spirit prevailed among the Christian sects and new sects were founded. The official Church became less fanatical; many of its leading divines were influenced by rationalistic thought. If it had not been for the opposition of King George III, the Catholics might have been freed from their disabilities before the end of the century. This measure, eloquently advocated by Burke and desired by Pitt, was not carried till 1829, and then under the threat of a revolution in Ireland. In the meantime legal toleration had been extended to the Unitarians in 1813, but they were not relieved from all disabilities till the forties. Jews were not admitted to the full rights of citizenship till 1858.
The achievement of religious liberty in England in the nineteenth century has been mainly the work of Liberals. The Liberal [106] party has been moving towards the ultimate goal of complete secularization and the separation of the Church from the State— the logical results of Locke’s theory of civil government. The Disestablishment of the Church in Ireland in 1869 partly realized this ideal, and now more than forty years later the Liberal party is seeking to apply the principle to Wales. It is highly characteristic of English politics and English psychology that the change should be carried out in this piecemeal fashion. In the other countries of the British Empire the system of Separation prevails; there is no connection between the State and any sect; no Church is anything more than a voluntary society. But secularization has advanced under the State Church system. It is enough to mention the Education Act of 1870 and the abolition of religious tests at Universities (1871). Other gains for freedom will be noticed when I come to speak in another chapter of the progress of rationalism.
If we compare the religious situation in France in the seventeenth with that in the eighteenth century, it seems to be sharply contrasted with the development in England. In England there was a great advance towards religious liberty, in France there was a falling away. Until 1676 the French Protestants [107] (Huguenots) were tolerated; for the next hundred years they were outlaws. But the toleration, which their charter (the Edict of Nantes, 1598) secured them, was of a limited kind. They were excluded, for instance, from the army; they were excluded from Paris and other cities and districts. And the liberty which they enjoyed was confined to them; it was not granted to any other sect. The charter was faithfully maintained by the two great Cardinals (Richelieu and Mazarin) who governed France under Louis XIII and Louis XIV, but when the latter assumed the active power in 1661 he began a series of laws against the Protestants which culminated in the revoking of the charter (1676) and the beginning of a Protestant persecution.
The French clergy justified this policy by the notorious text “Compel them to come in,” and appealed to St. Augustine. Their arguments evoked a defence of toleration by Bayle, a French Protestant who had taken refuge in Holland. It was entitled a Philosophical Commentary on the text “Compel them to come in” (1686) and in importance stands beside Locke’s work which was being composed at the same time. Many of the arguments urged by the two writers are identical. They agreed, and for the same reasons, in excluding Roman Catholics. The [108] most characteristic thing in Bayle’s treatise is his sceptical argument that, even if it were a right principle to suppress error by force, no truth is certain enough to justify us in applying the theory. We shall see (next chapter) this eminent scholar’s contribution to rationalism.
Though there was an immense exodus of Protestants from France, Louis did not succeed in his design of extirpating heresy from his lands. In the eighteenth century, under Louis XV, the presence of Protestants was tolerated though they were outlaws; their marriages were not recognized as legal, and they were liable at any moment to persecution. About the middle of the century a literary agitation began, conducted mainly by rationalists, but finally supported by enlightened Catholics, to relieve the affliction of the oppressed sect. It resulted at last in an Edict of Toleration (1787), which made the position of the Protestants endurable, though it excluded them from certain careers.
The most energetic and forceful leader in the campaign against intolerance was Voltaire (see next chapter), and his exposure of some glaring cases of unjust persecution did more than general arguments to achieve the object. The most infamous case was that of Jean Calas, a Protestant merchant of Toulouse, whose son committed suicide. A report [109] was set abroad that the young man had decided to join the Catholic Church, and that his father, mother, and brother, filled with Protestant bigotry, killed him, with the help of a friend. They were all put in irons, tried, and condemned, though there were no arguments for their guilt, except the conjecture of bigotry. Jean Calas was broken on the wheel, his son and daughter cast into convents, his wife left to starve. Through the activity of Voltaire, then living near Geneva, the widow was induced to go to Paris, where she was kindly received, and assisted by eminent lawyers; a judicial inquiry was made; the Toulouse sentence was reversed and the King granted pensions to those who had suffered. This scandal could only have happened in the provinces, according to Voltaire: “at Paris,” he says, “fanaticism, powerful though it may be, is always controlled by reason.”
The case of Sirven, though it did not end tragically, was similar, and the government of Toulouse was again responsible. He was accused of having drowned his daughter in a well to hinder her from becoming a Catholic, and was, with his wife, sentenced to death. Fortunately he and his family had escaped to Switzerland, where they persuaded Voltaire of their innocence. To get the sentence reversed was the work of nine years, and this [110] time it was reversed at Toulouse. When Voltaire visited Paris in 1778 he was acclaimed by crowds as the “defender of Calas and the Sirvens.” His disinterested practical activity against persecution was of far more value than the treatise on Toleration which he wrote in connexion with the Calas episode. It is a poor work compared with those of Locke and Bayle. The tolerance which he advocates is of a limited kind; he would confine public offices and dignities to those who belong to the State religion.
But if Voltaire’s system of toleration is limited, it is wide compared with the religious establishment advocated by his contemporary, Rousseau. Though of Swiss birth, Rousseau belongs to the literature and history of France; but it was not for nothing that he was brought up in the traditions of Calvinistic Geneva. His ideal State would, in its way, have been little better than any theocracy. He proposed to establish a “civil religion” which was to be a sort of undogmatic Christianity. But certain dogmas, which he considered essential, were to be imposed on all citizens on pain of banishment. Such were the existence of a deity, the future bliss of the good and punishment of the bad, the duty of tolerance towards all those who accepted the fundamental [111] articles of faith. It may be said that a State founded on this basis would be fairly inclusive—that all Christian sects and many deists could find a place in it. But by imposing indispensable beliefs, it denies the principle of toleration. The importance of Rousseau’s idea lies in the fact that it inspired one of the experiments in religious policy which were made during the French Revolution.
The Revolution established religious liberty in France. Most of the leaders were unorthodox. Their rationalism was naturally of the eighteenth-century type, and in the preamble to the Declaration of Rights (1789) deism was asserted by the words “in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being” (against which only one voice protested). The Declaration laid down that no one was to be vexed on account of his religious opinions provided he did not thereby trouble public order. Catholicism was retained as the “dominant” religion; Protestants (but not Jews) were admitted to public office. Mirabeau, the greatest statesman of the day, protested strongly against the use of words like “tolerance” and “dominant.” He said: “The most unlimited liberty of religion is in my eyes a right so sacred that to express it by the word ‘toleration’ seems to me itself a sort of tyranny, [112] since the authority which tolerates might also not tolerate.” The same protest was made in Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man which appeared two years later: “Toleration is not the opposite of Intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it.” Paine was an ardent deist, and he added: “Were a bill brought into any parliament, entitled ‘An Act to tolerate or grant liberty to the Almighty to receive the worship of a Jew or a Turk,’ or ‘to prohibit the Almighty from receiving it,’ all men would startle and call it blasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in religious matters would then present itself unmasked.”
The Revolution began well, but the spirit of Mirabeau was not in the ascendant throughout its course. The vicissitudes in religious policy from 1789 to 1801 have a particular interest, because they show that the principle of liberty of conscience was far from possessing the minds of the men who were proud of abolishing the intolerance of the government which they had overthrown. The State Church was reorganized by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), by which French citizens were forbidden to acknowledge the authority of the Pope and [113] the appointment of Bishops was transferred to the Electors of the Departments, so that the commanding influence passed from the Crown to the nation. Doctrine and worship were not touched. Under the democratic Republic which succeeded the fall of the monarchy (1792–5) this Constitution was maintained, but a movement to dechristianize France was inaugurated, and the Commune of Paris ordered the churches of all religions to be closed. The worship of Reason, with rites modelled on the Catholic, was organized in Paris and the provinces. The government, violently anti-Catholic, did not care to use force against the prevalent faith; direct persecution would have weakened the national defence and scandalized Europe. They naïvely hoped that the superstition would disappear by degrees. Robespierre declared against the policy of unchristianizing France, and when he had the power (April, 1795), he established as a State religion the worship of the Supreme Being. “The French people recognizes the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the Soul”; the liberty of other cults was maintained. Thus, for a few months, Rousseau’s idea was more or less realized. It meant intolerance. Atheism was regarded as a vice, and “all were atheists who did not think like Robespierre.” [114] The democratic was succeeded by the middle-class Republic (1795–9), and the policy of its government was to hinder the preponderance of any one religious group; to hold the balance among all the creeds, but with a certain partiality against the strongest, the Catholic, which threatened, as was thought, to destroy the others or even the Republic. The plan was to favour the growth of new rationalistic cults, and to undermine revealed religion by a secular system of education. Accordingly the Church was separated from the State by the Constitution of 1795, which affirmed the liberty of all worship and withdrew from the Catholic clergy the salaries which the State had hitherto paid. The elementary schools were laicized. The Declaration of Rights, the articles of the Constitution, and republican morality were taught instead of religion. An enthusiast declared that “the religion of Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero would soon be the religion of the world.”
A new rationalistic religion was introduced under the name of Theophilanthropy. It was the “natural religion” of the philosophers and poets of the century, of Voltaire and the English deists—not the purified Christianity of Rousseau, but anterior and superior to Christianity. Its doctrines, briefly formulated, [115] were: God, immortality, fraternity, humanity; no attacks on other religions, but respect and honour towards all; gatherings in a family, or in a temple, to encourage one another to practise morality. Protected by the government sometimes secretly, sometimes openly, it had a certain success among the cultivated classes.
The idea of the lay State was popularized under this rule, and by the end of the century there was virtually religious peace in France. Under the Consulate (from 1799) the same system continued, but Napoleon ceased to protect Theophilanthropy. In 1801, though there seems to have been little discontent with the existing arrangement, Napoleon decided to upset it and bring the Pope upon the scene. The Catholic religion, as that of the majority, was again taken under the special protection of the State, the salaries of the clergy again paid by the nation, and the Papal authority over the Church again recognized within well-defined limits; while full toleration of other religions was maintained. This was the effect of the Concordat between the French Republic and the Pope. It is the judgment of a high authority that the nation, if it had been consulted, would have pronounced against the change. It may be doubted whether this is true. But Napoleon’s policy [116] seems to have been prompted by the calculation that, using the Pope as an instrument, he could control the consciences of men, and more easily carry out his plans of empire.
Apart from its ecclesiastical policies and its experiments in new creeds based on the principles of rationalistic thinkers, the French Revolution itself has an interest, in connexion with our subject, as an example of the coercion of reason by an intolerant faith.
The leaders believed that, by applying certain principles, they could regenerate France and show the world how the lasting happiness of mankind can be secured. They acted in the name of reason, but their principles were articles of faith, which were accepted just as blindly and irrationally as the dogmas of any supernatural creed. One of these dogmas was the false doctrine of Rousseau that man is a being who is naturally good and loves justice and order. Another was the illusion that all men are equal by nature. The puerile conviction prevailed that legislation could completely blot out the past and radically transform the character of a society. “Liberty, equality, and fraternity” was as much a creed as the Creed of the Apostles; it hypnotized men’s minds like a revelation from on high; and reason had as little part in its propagation as in the spread [117] of Christianity or of Protestantism. It meant anything but equality, fraternity, or liberty, especially liberty, when it was translated into action by the fanatical apostles of “Reason,” who were blind to the facts of human nature and defied the facts of econnomics. Terror, the usual instrument in propagating religions, was never more mercilessly applied. Any one who questioned the doctrines was a heretic and deserved a heretic’s fate. And, as in most religious movements, the milder and less unreasonable spirits succumbed to the fanatics. Never was the name of reason more grievously abused than by those who believed they were inaugurating her reign.
Religious liberty, however, among other good things, did emerge from the Revolution, at first in the form of Separation, and then under the Concordat. The Concordat lasted for more than a century, under monarchies and republics, till it was abolished in December, 1905, when the system of Separation was introduced again.
In the German States the history of religious liberty differs in many ways, but it resembles the development in France in so far as toleration in a limited form was at first brought about by war. The Thirty Years’ War, which divided Germany in the first half [118] of the seventeenth century, and in which, as in the English Civil War, religion and politics were mixed, was terminated by the Peace of Westphalia (1648). By this act, three religions, the Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Reformed [4] were legally recognized by the Holy Roman Empire, and placed on an equality; all other religious were excluded. But it was left to each of the German States, of which the Empire consisted, to tolerate or not any religion it pleased. That is, every prince could impose on his subjects whichever of the three religions he chose, and refuse to tolerate the others in his territory. But he might also admit one or both of the others, and he might allow the followers of other creeds to reside in his dominion, and practise their religion within the precincts of their own houses. Thus toleration varied, from State to State, according to the policy of each particular prince.
As elsewhere, so in Germany, considerations of political expediency promoted the growth of toleration, especially in Prussia; and as elsewhere, theoretical advocates exercised great influence on public opinion. But the case for toleration was based by its German defenders chiefly on legal, not, as in [119] England and France, on moral and intellectual grounds. They regarded it as a question of law, and discussed it from the point of view of the legal relations between State and Church. It had been considered long ago from this standpoint by an original Italian thinker, Marsilius of Padua (thirteenth century), who had maintained that the Church had no power to employ physical coercion, and that if the lay authority punished heretics, the punishment was inflicted for the violation not of divine ordinances but of the law of the State, which excluded heretics from its territory.
Christian Thomasius may be taken as a leading exponent of the theory that religious liberty logically follows from a right conception of law. He laid down in a series of pamphlets (1693–1697) that the prince, who alone has the power of coercion, has no right to interfere in spiritual matters, while the clergy step beyond their province if they interfere in secular matters or defend their faith by any other means than teaching. But the secular power has no legal right to coerce heretics unless heresy is a crime. And heresy is not a crime, but an error; for it is not a matter of will. Thomasius, moreover, urges the view that the public welfare has nothing to gain from unity of faith, that it makes no [120] difference what faith a man professes so long as he is loyal to the State. His toleration indeed is not complete. He was much influenced by the writings of his contemporary Locke, and he excepts from the benefit of toleration the same classes which Locke excepted.
Besides the influence of the jurists, we may note that the Pietistic movement—a reaction of religious enthusiasm against the formal theology of the Lutheran divines—was animated by a spirit favourable to toleration; and that the cause was promoted by the leading men of letters, especially by Lessing, in the second half of the eighteenth century.
But perhaps the most important fact of all in hastening the realization of religious liberty in Germany was the accession of a rationalist to the throne of Prussia, in the person of Frederick the Great. A few months after his accession (1740) he wrote in the margin of a State paper, in which a question of religious policy occurred, that every one should be allowed to get to heaven in his own way. His view that morality was independent of religion and therefore compatible with all religions, and that thus a man could be a good citizen—the only thing which the State was entitled to demand—whatever faith he might profess, led to the logical consequence of complete religious liberty. Catholics [121] were placed on an equality with Protestants, and the Treaty of Westphalia was violated by the extension of full toleration to all the forbidden sects. Frederick even conceived the idea of introducing Mohammedan settlers into some parts of his realm. Contrast England under George III, France under Louis XV, Italy under the shadow of the Popes. It is an important fact in history, which has hardly been duly emphasized, that full religious liberty was for the first time, in any country in modern Europe, realized under a free-thinking ruler, the friend of the great “blasphemer” Voltaire.
The policy and principles of Frederick were formulated in the Prussian Territorial Code of 1794, by which unrestricted liberty of conscience was guaranteed, and the three chief religions, the Lutheran, the Reformed, and the Catholic, were placed on the same footing and enjoyed the same privileges. The system is “jurisdictional”; only, three Churches here occupy the position which the Anglican Church alone occupies in England. The rest of Germany did not begin to move in the direction pointed out by Prussia until, by one of the last acts of the Holy Roman Empire (1803), the Westphalian settlement had been modified. Before the foundation of the new Empire (1870), freedom was established throughout Germany.
[122]
In Austria, the Emperor Joseph II issued an Edict of Toleration in 1781, which may be considered a broad measure for a Catholic State at that time. Joseph was a sincere Catholic, but he was not impervious to the enlightened ideas of his age; he was an admirer of Frederick, and his edict was prompted by a genuinely tolerant spirit, such as had not inspired the English Act of 1689. It extended only to the Lutheran and Reformed sects and the communities of the Greek Church which had entered into union with Rome, and it was of a limited kind. Religious liberty was not established till 1867.
The measure of Joseph applied to the Austrian States in Italy, and helped to prepare that country for the idea of religious freedom. It is notable that in Italy in the eighteenth century toleration found its advocate, not in a rationalist or a philosopher, but in a Catholic ecclesiastic, Tamburinni, who (under the name of his friend Trautmansdorf) published a work On Ecclesiastical and Civil Toleration (1783). A sharp line is drawn between the provinces of the Church and the State, persecution and the Inquisition are condemned, coercion of conscience is declared inconsistent with the Christian spirit, and the principle is laid down that the sovran should only exercise coercion where [123] the interests of public safety are concerned. Like Locke, the author thinks that atheism is a legitimate case for such coercion.
The new States which Napoleon set up in Italy exhibited toleration in various degrees, but real liberty was first introduced in Piedmont by Cavour (1848), a measure which prepared the way for the full liberty which was one of the first-fruits of the foundation of the Italian kingdom in 1870. The union of Italy, with all that it meant, is the most signal and dramatic act in the triumph of the ideas of the modern State over the traditional principles of the Christian Church. Rome, which preserved those principles most faithfully, has offered a steadfast, we may say a heroic, resistance to the liberal ideas which swept Europe in the nineteenth century. The guides of her policy grasped thoroughly the danger which liberal thought meant for an institution which, founded in a remote past, claimed to be unchangeable and never out of date. Gregory XVI issued a solemn protest maintaining authority against freedom, the mediaeval against the modern ideal, in an Encyclical Letter (1832), which was intended as a rebuke to some young French Catholics (Lamennais and his friends) who had conceived the promising idea of transforming the Church by the Liberal spirit [124] of the day. The Pope denounces “the absurd and erroneous maxim, or rather insanity, that liberty of conscience should be procured and guaranteed to every one. The path to this pernicious error is prepared by that full and unlimited liberty of thought which is spread abroad to the misfortune of Church and State and which certain persons, with excessive impudence, venture to represent as an advantage for religion. Hence comes the corruption of youth, contempt for religion and for the most venerable laws, and a general mental change in the world—in short the most deadly scourge of society; since the experience of history has shown that the States which have shone by their wealth and power and glory have perished just by this evil— immoderate freedom of opinion, licence of conversation, and love of novelties. With this is connected the liberty of publishing any writing of any kind. This is a deadly and execrable liberty for which we cannot feel sufficient horror, though some men dare to acclaim it noisily and enthusiastically.” A generation later Pius IX was to astonish the world by a similar manifesto—his Syllabus of Modern Errors (1864). Yet, notwithstanding the fundamental antagonism between the principles of the Church and the drift of modern civilization, the Papacy survives, [125] powerful and respected, in a world where the ideas which it condemned have become the commonplace conditions of life.
The progress of Western nations from the system of unity which prevailed in the fifteenth, to the system of liberty which was the rule in the nineteenth century, was slow and painful, illogical and wavering, generally dictated by political necessities, seldom inspired by deliberate conviction. We have seen how religious liberty has been realized, so far as the law is concerned, under two distinct systems, “Jurisdiction” and “Separation.” But legal toleration may coexist with much practical intolerance, and liberty before the law is compatible with serious disabilities of which the law cannot take account. For instance, the expression of unorthodox opinions may exclude a man from obtaining a secular post or hinder his advancement. The question has been asked, which of the two systems is more favourable to the creation of a tolerant social atmosphere? Ruffini (of whose excellent work on Religious Liberty I have made much use in this chapter) decides in favour of Jurisdiction. He points out that while Socinus, a true friend of liberty of thought, contemplated this system, the Anabaptists, whose spirit was intolerant, sought Separation. More important [126] is the observation that in Germany, England, and Italy, where the most powerful Church or Churches are under the control of the State, there is more freedom, more tolerance of opinion, than in many of the American States where Separation prevails. A hundred years ago the Americans showed appalling ingratitude to Thomas Paine, who had done them eminent service in the War of Independence, simply because he published a very unorthodox book. It is notorious that free thought is still a serious hindrance and handicap to an American, even in most of the Universities. This proves that Separation is not an infallible receipt for producing tolerance. But I see no reason to suppose that public opinion in America would be different, if either the Federal Republic or the particular States had adopted Jurisdiction. Given legal liberty under either system, I should say that the tolerance of public opinion depends on social conditions and especially on the degree of culture among the educated classes.
From this sketch it will be seen that toleration was the outcome of new political circumstances and necessities, brought about by the disunion of the Church through the Reformation. But it meant that in those States which granted toleration the opinion of [127] a sufficiently influential group of the governing class was ripe for the change, and this new mental attitude was in a great measure due to the scepticism and rationalism which were diffused by the Renaissance movement, and which subtly and unconsciously had affected the minds of many who were sincerely devoted to rigidly orthodox beliefs; so effective is the force of suggestion. In the next two chapters the advance of reason at the expense of faith will be traced through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.

[1] Translated by Lecky.
[2] Complete toleration was established by Penn in the Quaker Colony of Pennsylvania in 1682.
[3] Especially Chillingworth’s Religion of Protestants, (1637), and Jeremy Taylor’s Liberty of Prophesying (1646).
[4] The Reformed Church consists of the followers of Calvin and Zwingli.







A History of Freedom of Thought: CHAPTER VI



THE GROWTH OF RATIONALISM
(SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES)
DURING the last three hundred years reason has been slowly but steadily destroying Christian mythology and exposing the pretensions of supernatural revelation. The progress of rationalism falls naturally into two periods. (1) In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries those thinkers who rejected Christian theology and the book on which it relies were mainly influenced by the inconsistencies, contradictions, and absurdities which they discovered in the evidence, and by the moral [128] difficulties of the creed. Some scientific facts were known which seemed to reflect on the accuracy of Revelation, but arguments based on science were subsidiary. (2) In the nineteenth century the discoveries of science in many fields bore with full force upon fabrics which had been constructed in a naïve and ignorant age; and historical criticism undermined methodically the authority of the sacred documents which had hitherto been exposed chiefly to the acute but unmethodical criticisms of common sense.
A disinterested love of facts, without any regard to the bearing which those facts may have on one’s hopes or fears or destiny, is a rare quality in all ages, and it had been very rare indeed since the ancient days of Greece and Rome. It means the scientific spirit. Now in the seventeenth century we may say (without disrespect to a few precursors) that the modern study of natural science began, and in the same period we have a series of famous thinkers who were guided by a disinterested love of truth. Of the most acute minds some reached the conclusion that the Christian scheme of the world is irrational, and according to their temperament some rejected it, whilst others, like the great Frenchman Pascal, fell back upon an unreasoning act of faith. Bacon, who professed [129] orthodoxy, was perhaps at heart a deist, but in any case the whole spirit of his writings was to exclude authority from the domain of scientific investigation which he did so much to stimulate. Descartes, illustrious not only as the founder of modern metaphysics but also by his original contributions to science, might seek to conciliate the ecclesiastical authorities—his temper was timid— but his philosophical method was a powerful incentive to rationalistic thought. The general tendency of superior intellects was to exalt reason at the expense of authority; and in England this principle was established so firmly by Locke, that throughout the theological warfare of the eighteenth century both parties relied on reason, and no theologian of repute assumed faith to be a higher faculty.
A striking illustration of the gradual encroachments of reason is the change which was silently wrought in public opinion on the subject of witchcraft. The famous efforts of James I to carry out the Biblical command, “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live,” were outdone by the zeal of the Puritans under the Commonwealth to suppress the wicked old women who had commerce with Satan. After the Restoration, the belief in witchcraft declined among educated people—though [130] some able writers maintained it—and there were few executions. The last trial of a witch was in 1712, when some clergymen in Hertfordshire prosecuted Jane Wenham. The jury found her guilty, but the judge, who had summed up in her favour, was able to procure the remission of her sentence; and the laws against witchcraft were repealed in 1735. John Wesley said with perfect truth that to disbelieve in witchcraft is to disbelieve in the Bible. In France and in Holland the decline of belief and interest in this particular form of Satan’s activity was simultaneous. In Scotland, where theology was very powerful, a woman was burnt in 1722. It can be no mere coincidence that the general decline of this superstition belongs to the age which saw the rise of modern science and modern philosophy.
Hobbes, who was perhaps the most brilliant English thinker of the seventeenth century, was a freethinker and materialist. He had come under the influence of his friend the French philosopher Gassendi, who had revived materialism in its Epicurean shape. Yet he was a champion not of freedom of conscience but of coercion in its most uncompromising form. In the political theory which he expounded in Leviathan, the sovran has autocratic power in the domain of doctrine, [131] as in everything else, and it is the duty of subjects to conform to the religion which the sovran imposes. Religious persecution is thus defended, but no independent power is left to the Church. But the principles on which Hobbes built up his theory were rationalistic. He separated morality from religion and identified “the true moral philosophy” with the “true doctrine of the laws of nature.” What he really thought of religion could be inferred from his remark that the fanciful fear of things invisible (due to ignorance) is the natural seed of that feeling which, in himself, a man calls religion, but, in those who fear or worship the invisible power differently, superstition. In the reign of Charles II Hobbes was silenced and his books were burned.
Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher of Holland, owed a great deal to Descartes and (in political speculation) to Hobbes, but his philosophy meant a far wider and more open breach with orthodox opinion than either of his masters had ventured on. He conceived ultimate reality, which he called God, as an absolutely perfect, impersonal Being, a substance whose nature is constituted by two “attributes”— thought and spatial extension. When Spinoza speaks of love of God, in which he considered happiness to consist, he means knowledge [132] and contemplation of the order of nature, including human nature, which is subject to fixed, invariable laws. He rejects free-will and the “superstition,” as he calls it, of final causes in nature. If we want to label his philosophy, we may say that it is a form of pantheism. It has often been described as atheism. If atheism means, as I suppose in ordinary use it is generally taken to mean, rejection of a personal God, Spinoza was an atheist. It should be observed that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries atheist was used in the wildest way as a term of abuse for freethinkers, and when we read of atheists (except in careful writers) we may generally assume that the persons so stigmatized were really deists, that is, they believed in a personal God but not in Revelation. [1]
Spinoza’s daring philosophy was not in harmony with the general trend of speculation at the time, and did not exert any profound influence on thought till a much later period. The thinker whose writings appealed most to the men of his age and were most opportune and effective was John Locke, who professed more or less orthodox Anglicanism. His great contribution to philosophy is equivalent to a very powerful defence [133] of reason against the usurpations of authority. The object of his Essay on the Human Understanding (1690) is to show that all knowledge is derived from experience. He subordinated faith completely to reason. While he accepted the Christian revelation, he held that revelation if it contradicted the higher tribunal of reason must be rejected, and that revelation cannot give us knowledge as certain as the knowledge which reason gives. “He that takes away reason to make room for revelation puts out the light of both; and does much what the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.” He wrote a book to show that the Christian revelation is not contrary to reason, and its title, The Reasonableness of Christianity, sounds the note of all religious controversy in England during the next hundred years. Both the orthodox and their opponents warmly agreed that reasonableness was the only test of the claims of revealed religion. It was under the direct influence of Locke that Toland, an Irishman who had been converted from Roman Catholicism, composed a sensational book, Christianity Not Mysterious (1696). He assumes that Christianity is true and argues that there can be no mysteries in it, because mysteries, that [134] is, unintelligible dogmas, cannot be accepted by reason. And if a reasonable Deity gave a revelation, its purpose must be to enlighten, not to puzzle. The assumption of the truth of Christianity was a mere pretence, as an intelligent reader could not fail to see. The work was important because it drew the logical inference from Locke’s philosophy, and it had a wide circulation. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu met a Turkish Effendi at Belgrade who asked her for news of Mr. Toland.
It is characteristic of this stage of the struggle between reason and authority that (excepting the leading French thinkers in the eighteenth century) the rationalists, who attacked theology, generally feigned to acknowledge the truth of the ideas which they were assailing. They pretended that their speculations did not affect religion; they could separate the domains of reason and of faith; they could show that Revelation was superfluous without questioning it; they could do homage to orthodoxy and lay down views with which orthodoxy was irreconcilable. The errors which they exposed in the sphere of reason were ironically allowed to be truths in the sphere of theology. The mediaeval principle of double truth and other shifts were resorted to, in self-protection [135] against the tyranny of orthodoxy—though they did not always avail; and in reading much of the rationalistic literature of this period we have to read between the lines. Bayle is an interesting instance.
If Locke’s philosophy, by setting authority in its place and deriving all knowledge from experience, was a powerful aid to rationalism, his contemporary Bayle worked in the same direction by the investigation of history. Driven from France (see above, p. 107), he lived at Amsterdam, where he published his Philosophical Dictionary. He was really a freethinker, but he never dropped the disguise of orthodoxy, and this lends a particular piquancy to his work. He takes a delight in marshalling all the objections which heretics had made to essential Christian dogmas. He exposed without mercy the crimes and brutalities of David, and showed that this favourite of the Almighty was a person with whom one would refuse to shake hands. There was a great outcry at this unedifying candour. Bayle, in replying, adopted the attitude of Montaigne and Pascal, and opposed faith to reason.
The theological virtue of faith, he said, consists in believing revealed truths simply and solely on God’s authority. If you believe in the immortality of the soul for [136] philosophical reasons, you are orthodox, but you have no part in faith. The merit of faith becomes greater, in proportion as the revealed truth surpasses all the powers of our mind; the more incomprehensible the truth and the more repugnant to reason, the greater is the sacrifice we make in accepting it, the deeper our submission to God. Therefore a merciless inventory of the objections which reason has to urge against fundamental doctrines serves to exalt the merits of faith.
The Dictionary was also criticized for the justice done to the moral excellencies of persons who denied the existence of God. Bayle replies that if he had been able to find any atheistical thinkers who lived bad lives, he would have been delighted to dwell on their vices, but he knew of none such. As for the criminals you meet in history, whose abominable actions make you tremble, their impieties and blasphemies prove they believed in a Divinity. This is a natural consequence of the theological doctrine that the Devil, who is incapable of atheism, is the instigator of all the sins of men. For man’s wickedness must clearly resemble that of the Devil and must therefore be joined to a belief in God’s existence, since the Devil is not an atheist. And is it not a proof of the infinite wisdom of God that the worst criminals [137] are not atheists, and that most of the atheists whose names are recorded have been honest men? By this arrangement Providence sets bounds to the corruption of man; for if atheism and moral wickedness were united in the same persons, the societies of earth would be exposed to a fatal inundation of sin.
There was much more in the same vein; and the upshot was, under the thin veil of serving faith, to show that the Christian dogmas were essentially unreasonable.
Bayle’s work, marked by scholarship and extraordinary learning, had a great influence in England as well as in France. It supplied weapons to assailants of Christianity in both countries. At first the assault was carried on with most vigour and ability by the English deists, who, though their writings are little read now, did memorable work by their polemic against the authority of revealed religion.
The controversy between the deists and their orthodox opponents turned on the question whether the Deity of natural religion —the God whose existence, as was thought, could be proved by reason—can be identified with the author of the Christian revelation. To the deists this seemed impossible. The nature of the alleged revelation seemed inconsistent with the character [138] of the God to whom reason pointed. The defenders of revelation, at least all the most competent, agreed with the deists in making reason supreme, and through this reliance on reason some of them fell into heresies. Clarke, for instance, one of the ablest, was very unsound on the dogma of the Trinity. It is also to be noticed that with both sections the interest of morality was the principal motive. The orthodox held that the revealed doctrine of future rewards and punishments is necessary for morality; the deists, that morality depends on reason alone, and that revelation contains a great deal that is repugnant to moral ideals. Throughout the eighteenth century morality was the guiding consideration with Anglican Churchmen, and religious emotion, finding no satisfaction within the Church, was driven, as it were, outside, and sought an outlet in the Methodism of Wesley and Whitefield.
Spinoza had laid down the principle that Scripture must be interpreted like any other book (1670), [2] and with the deists this principle was fundamental. In order to avoid persecution they generally veiled their conclusions [139] under sufficiently thin disguises. Hitherto the Press Licensing Act (1662) had very effectually prevented the publication of heterodox works, and it is from orthodox works denouncing infidel opinions that we know how rationalism was spreading. But in 1695, the Press Law was allowed to drop, and immediately deistic literature began to appear. There was, however, the danger of prosecution under the Blasphemy laws. There were three legal weapons for coercing those who attacked Christianity: (1) The Ecclesiastical Courts had and have the power of imprisoning for a maximum term of six months, for atheism, blasphemy, heresy, and damnable opinions. (2) The common law as interpreted by Lord Chief Justice Hale in 1676, when a certain Taylor was charged with having said that religion was a cheat and blasphemed against Christ. The accused was condemned to a fine and the pillory by the Judge, who ruled that the Court of King’s Bench has jurisdiction in such a case, inasmuch as blasphemous words of the kind are an offence against the laws and the State, and to speak against Christianity is to speak in subversion of the law, since Christianity is “parcel of the laws of England.” (3) The statute of 1698 enacts that if any person educated in the Christian religion “shall by [140] writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking deny any one of the persons in the Holy Trinity to be God, or shall assert or maintain there are more gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be true, or shall deny the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of divine authority,” is convicted, he shall for the first offence be adjudged incapable to hold any public offices or employments, and on the second shall lose his civil rights and be imprisoned for three years. This Statute expressly states as its motive the fact that “many persons have of late years openly avowed and published many blasphemous and impious opinions contrary to the doctrine and principles of the Christian religion.”
As a matter of fact, most trials for blasphemy during the past two hundred years fall under the second head. But the new Statute of 1698 was very intimidating, and we can easily understand how it drove heterodox writers to ambiguous disguises. One of these disguises was allegorical interpretation of Scripture. They showed that literal interpretation led to absurdities or to inconsistencies with the wisdom and justice of God, and pretended to infer that allegorical interpretation must be substituted. But they meant the reader to reject their pretended [141] solution and draw a conclusion damaging to Revelation.
Among the arguments used in favour of the truth of Revelation the fulfilment of prophecies and the miracles of the New Testament were conspicuous. Anthony Collins, a country gentleman who was a disciple of Locke, published in 1733 his Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, in which he drastically exposed the weakness of the evidence for fulfilment of prophecy, depending as it does on forced and unnatural figurative interpretations. Twenty years before he had written a Discourse of Free-thinking (in which Bayle’s influence is evident) pleading for free discussion and the reference of all religious questions to reason. He complained of the general intolerance which prevailed; but the same facts which testify to intolerance testify also to the spread of unbelief.
Collins escaped with comparative impunity, but Thomas Woolston, a Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, who wrote six aggressive Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour (1727—1730) paid the penalty for his audacity. Deprived of his Fellowship, he was prosecuted for libel, and sentenced to a fine of £100 and a year’s imprisonment. Unable to pay, he died in prison. He does [142] not adopt the line of arguing that miracles are incredible or impossible. He examines the chief miracles related in the Gospels, and shows with great ability and shrewd common sense that they are absurd or unworthy of the performer. He pointed out, as Huxley was to point out in a controversy with Gladstone, that the miraculous driving of devils into a herd of swine was an unwarrantable injury to somebody’s property. On the story of the Divine blasting of the fig tree, he remarks: “What if a yeoman of Kent should go to look for pippins in his orchard at Easter (the supposed time that Jesus sought for these figs) and because of a disappointment cut down his trees? What then would his neighbours make of him? Nothing less than a laughing-stock; and if the story got into our Publick News, he would be the jest and ridicule of mankind.”
Or take his comment on the miracle of the Pool of Bethesda, where an angel used to trouble the waters and the man who first entered the pool was cured of his infirmity. “An odd and a merry way of conferring a Divine mercy. And one would think that the angels of God did this for their own diversion more than to do good to mankind. Just as some throw a bone among a kennel of hounds for the pleasure of seeing them [143] quarrel for it, or as others cast a piece of money among a company of boys for the sport of seeing them scramble for it, so was the pastime of the angels here.” In dealing with the healing of the woman who suffered from a bloody flux, he asks: “What if we had been told of the Pope’s curing an haemorrhage like this before us, what would Protestants have said to it? Why, ‘that a foolish, credulous, and superstitious woman had fancied herself cured of some slight indisposition, and the crafty Pope and his adherents, aspiring after popular applause, magnified the presumed cure into a miracle.’ The application of such a supposed story of a miracle wrought by the Pope is easy; and if Infidels, Jews, and Mahometans, who have no better opinion of Jesus than we have of the Pope, should make it, there’s no help for it.”
Woolston professed no doubts of the inspiration of Scripture. While he argued that it was out of the question to suppose the miracles literally true, he pretended to believe in the fantastic theory that they were intended allegorically as figures of Christ’s mysterious operations in the soul of man. Origen, a not very orthodox Christian Father, had employed the allegorical method, and Woolston quotes him in his favour. His [144] vigorous criticisms vary in value, but many of them hit the nail on the head, and the fashion of some modern critics to pass over Woolston’s productions as unimportant because they are “ribald” or coarse, is perfectly unjust. The pamphlets had an enormous sale, and Woolston’s notoriety is illustrated by the anecdote of the “jolly young woman” who met him walking abroad and accosted him with “You old rogue, are you not hanged yet?” Mr. Woolston answered, “Good woman, I know you not; pray what have I done to offend you?” “You have writ against my Saviour,” she said; “what would become of my poor sinful soul if it was not for my dear Saviour?”
About the same time, Matthew Tindal (a Fellow of All Souls) attacked Revelation from a more general point of view. In his Christianity as old as the Creation (1730) he undertook to show that the Bible as a revelation is superfluous, for it adds nothing to natural religion, which God revealed to man from the very first by the sole light of reason. He argues that those who defend Revealed religion by its agreement with Natural religion, and thus set up a double government of reason and authority, fall between the two. “It ’s an odd jumble,” he observes, “to prove the truth of a book by the truth [145] of the doctrines it contains, and at the same time conclude those doctrines to be true because contained in that book.” He goes on to criticize the Bible in detail. In order to maintain its infallibility, without doing violence to reason, you have, when you find irrational statements, to torture them and depart from the literal sense. Would you think that a Mohammedan was governed by his Koran, who on all occasions departed from the literal sense? “Nay, would you not tell him that his inspired book fell infinitely short of Cicero’s uninspired writings, where there is no such occasion to recede from the letter?”
As to chronological and physical errors, which seemed to endanger the infallibility of the Scriptures, a bishop had met the argument by saying, reasonably enough, that in the Bible God speaks according to the conceptions of those to whom he speaks, and that it is not the business of Revelation to rectify their opinions in such matters. Tindal made this rejoinder:—
“Is there no difference between God’s not rectifying men’s sentiments in those matters and using himself such sentiments as needs be rectified; or between God’s not mending men’s logic and rhetoric where ’t is defective and using such himself; or between God’s [146] not contradicting vulgar notions and confirming them by speaking according to them? Can infinite wisdom despair of gaining or keeping people’s affections without having recourse to such mean acts?”
He exposes with considerable effect the monstrosity of the doctrine of exclusive salvation. Must we not consider, he asks, whether one can be said to be sent as a Saviour of mankind, if he comes to shut Heaven’s gate against those to whom, before he came, it was open provided they followed the dictates of their reason? He criticizes the inconsistency of the impartial and universal goodness of God, known to us by the light of nature, with acts committed by Jehovah or his prophets. Take the cases in which the order of nature is violated to punish men for crimes of which they were not guilty, such as Elijah’s hindering rain from falling for three years and a half. If God could break in upon the ordinary rules of his providence to punish the innocent for the guilty, we have no guarantee that if he deals thus with us in this life, he will not act in the same way in the life to come, “since if the eternal rules of justice are once broken how can we imagine any stop?” But the ideals of holiness and justice in the Old Testament are strange indeed. The holier men [147] are represented to be, the more cruel they seem and the more addicted to cursing. How surprising to find the holy prophet Elisha cursing in the name of the Lord little children for calling him Bald-pate! And, what is still more surprising, two she-bears immediately devoured forty-two little children.
I have remarked that theologians at this time generally took the line of basing Christianity on reason and not on faith. An interesting little book, Christianity not founded on Argument, couched in the form of a letter to a young gentleman at Oxford, by Henry Dodwell (Junior), appeared in 1741, and pointed out the dangers of such confidence in reason. It is an ironical development of the principle of Bayle, working out the thesis that Christianity is essentially unreasonable, and that if you want to believe, reasoning is fatal. The cultivation of faith and reasoning produce contrary effects; the philosopher is disqualified for Divine influences by his very progress in carnal wisdom; the Gospel must be received with all the obsequious submission of a babe who has no other disposition but to learn his lesson. Christ did not propose his doctrines to investigation; he did not lay the arguments for his mission before his disciples and give them time to consider [148] calmly of their force, and liberty to determine as their reason should direct them; the apostles had no qualifications for the task, being the most artless and illiterate persons living. Dodwell exposes the absurdity of the Protestant position. To give all men liberty to judge for themselves and to expect at the same time that they shall be of the Preacher’s mind is such a scheme for unanimity as one would scarcely imagine any one could be weak enough to devise in speculation and much less that any could ever be found hardy enough to avow and propose it to practice. The men of Rome “shall rise up in the judgment (of all considering persons) against this generation and shall condemn it; for they invented but the one absurdity of infallibility, and behold a greater absurdity than infallibility is here.”
I have still to speak of the (Third) Earl of Shaftesbury, whose style has rescued his writings from entire neglect. His special interest was ethics. While the valuable work of most of the heterodox writers of this period lay in their destructive criticism of supernatural religion, they clung, as we have seen, to what was called natural religion— the belief in a kind and wise personal God, who created the world, governs it by natural laws, and desires our happiness. The idea [149] was derived from ancient philosophers and had been revived by Lord Herbert of Cherbury in his Latin treatise On Truth (in the reign of James I). The deists contended that this was a sufficient basis for morality and that the Christian inducements to good behaviour were unnecessary. Shaftesbury in his Inquiry concerning Virtue (1699) debated the question and argued that the scheme of heaven and hell, with the selfish hopes and fears which they inspire, corrupts morality and that the only worthy motive for conduct is the beauty of virtue in itself. He does not even consider deism a necessary assumption for a moral code; he admits that the opinion of atheists does not undermine ethics. But he thinks that the belief in a good governor of the universe is a powerful support to the practice of virtue. He is a thorough optimist, and is perfectly satisfied with the admirable adaptation of means to ends, whereby it is the function of one animal to be food for another. He makes no attempt to reconcile the red claws and teeth of nature with the beneficence of its powerful artist. “In the main all things are kindly and well disposed.” The atheist might have said that he preferred to be at the mercy of blind chance than in the hands of an autocrat who, if he pleased Lord Shaftesbury’s sense [150] of order, had created flies to be devoured by spiders. But this was an aspect of the universe which did not much trouble thinkers in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, the character of the God of the Old Testament roused Shaftesbury’s aversion. He attacks Scripture not directly, but by allusion or with irony. He hints that if there is a God, he would be less displeased with atheists than with those who accepted him in the guise of Jehovah. As Plutarch said, “I had rather men should say of me that there neither is nor ever was such a one as Plutarch, than they should say ‘There was a Plutarch, an unsteady, changeable, easily provokable and revengeful man.’ ” Shaftesbury’s significance is that he built up a positive theory of morals, and although it had no philosophical depth, his influence on French and German thinkers of the eighteenth century was immense.
In some ways perhaps the ablest of the deists, and certainly the most scholarly, was Rev. Conyers Middleton, who remained within the Church. He supported Christianity on grounds of utility. Even if it is an imposture, he said, it would be wrong to destroy it. For it is established by law and it has a long tradition behind it. Some traditional religion is necessary and it would [151] be hopeless to supplant Christianity by reason. But his writings contain effective arguments which go to undermine Revelation. The most important was his Free Inquiry into Christian miracles (1748), which put in a new and dangerous light an old question: At what time did the Church cease to have the power of performing miracles? We shall see presently how Gibbon applied Middleton’s method.
The leading adversaries of the deists appealed, like them, to reason, and, in appealing to reason, did much to undermine authority. The ablest defence of the faith, Bishop Butler’s Analogy (1736), is suspected of having raised more doubts than it appeased. This was the experience of William Pitt the Younger, and the Analogy made James Mill (the utilitarian) an unbeliever. The deists, argued that the unjust and cruel God of Revelation could not be the God of nature; Butler pointed to nature and said, There you behold cruelty and injustice. The argument was perfectly good against the optimism of Shaftesbury, but it plainly admitted of the conclusion—opposite to that which Butler wished to establish—that a just and beneficent God does not exist. Butler is driven to fall back on the sceptical argument that we are extremely ignorant; that all things [152] are possible, even eternal hell fire; and that therefore the safe and prudent course is to accept the Christian doctrine. It may be remarked that this reasoning, with a few modifications, could be used in favour of other religions, at Mecca or at Timbuctoo. He has, in effect, revived the argument used by Pascal that if there is one chance in any very large number that Christianity is true, it is a man’s interest to be a Christian; for, if it prove false, it will do him no harm to have believed it; if it prove true, he will be infinitely the gainer. Butler seeks indeed to show that the chances in favour amount to a probability, but his argument is essentially of the same intellectual and moral value as Pascal’s. It has been pointed out that it leads by an easy logical step from the Anglican to the Roman Church. Catholics and Protestants (as King Henry IV of France argued) agree that a Catholic may be saved; the Catholics assert that a Protestant will be damned; therefore the safe course is to embrace Catholicism. [3]
I have dwelt at some length upon some of the English deists, because, while they occupy an important place in the history of [153] rationalism in England, they also supplied, along with Bayle, a great deal of the thought which, manipulated by brilliant writers on the other side of the Channel, captured the educated classes in France. We are now in the age of Voltaire. He was a convinced deist. He considered that the nature of the universe proved that it was made by a conscious architect, he held that God was required in the interests of conduct, and he ardently combated atheism. His great achievements were his efficacious labour in the cause of toleration, and his systematic warfare against superstitions. He was profoundly influenced by English thinkers, especially Locke and Bolingbroke. This statesman had concealed his infidelity during his lifetime except from his intimates; he had lived long as an exile in France; and his rationalistic essays were published (1754) after his death. Voltaire, whose literary genius converted the work of the English thinkers into a world-force, did not begin his campaign against Christianity till after the middle of the century, when superstitious practices and religious persecutions were becoming a scandal in his country. He assailed the Catholic Church in every field with ridicule and satire. In a little work called The Tomb of Fanaticism (written 1736, [154] published 1767), he begins by observing that a man who accepts his religion (as most people do) without examining it is like an ox which allows itself to be harnessed, and proceeds to review the difficulties in the Bible, the rise of Christianity, and the course of Church history; from which he concludes that every sensible man should hold the Christian sect in horror. “Men are blind to prefer an absurd and sanguinary creed, supported by executioners and surrounded by fiery faggots, a creed which can only be approved by those to whom it gives power and riches, a particular creed only accepted in a small part of the world—to a simple and universal religion.” In the Sermon of the Fifty and the Questions of Zapata we can see what he owed to Bayle and English critics, but his touch is lighter and his irony more telling. His comment on geographical mistakes in the Old Testament is: “God was evidently not strong in geography.” Having called attention to the “horrible crime” of Lot’s wife in looking backward, and her conversion into a pillar of salt, he hopes that the stories of Scripture will make us better, if they do not make us more enlightened. One of his favourite methods is to approach Christian doctrines as a person who had just heard of the existence of Christians or Jews for the first time in his life. [155] His drama, Saul (1763), which the police tried to suppress, presents the career of David, the man after God’s own heart, in all its naked horror. The scene in which Samuel reproves Saul for not having slain Agag will give an idea of the spirit of the piece.

SAMUEL: God commands me to tell you that he repents of having made you king.
SAUL: God repents! Only they who commit errors repent. His eternal wisdom cannot be unwise. God cannot commit errors.
SAMUEL: He can repent of having set on the throne those who do.
SAUL: Well, who does not? Tell me, what is my fault?
SAMUEL: You have pardoned a king.
AGAG: What! Is the fairest of virtues considered a crime in Judea?
SAMUEL (to Agag): Silence! do not blaspheme. (To Saul). Saul, formerly king of the Jews, did not God command you by my mouth to destroy all the Amalekites, without sparing women, or maidens, or children at the breast?
AGAG: Your god—gave such a command! You are mistaken, you meant to say, your devil.
SAMUEL: Saul, did you obey God?
SAUL: I did not suppose such a command [156] was positive. I thought that goodness was the first attribute of the Supreme Being, and that a compassionate heart could not displease him.
SAMUEL: You are mistaken, unbeliever. God reproves you, your sceptre will pass into other hands.
Perhaps no writer has ever roused more hatred in Christendom than Voltaire. He was looked on as a sort of anti-Christ. That was natural; his attacks were so tremendously effective at the time. But he has been sometimes decried on the ground that he only demolished and made no effort to build up where he had pulled down. This is a narrow complaint. It might be replied that when a sewer is spreading plague in a town, we cannot wait to remove it till we have a new system of drains, and it may fairly be said that religion as practised in contemporary France was a poisonous sewer. But the true answer is that knowledge, and therefore civilization, are advanced by criticism and negation, as well as by construction and positive discovery. When a man has the talent to attack with effect falsehood, prejudice, and imposture, it is his duty, if there are any social duties, to use it.
For constructive thinking we must go to the other great leader of French thought, [157] Rousseau, who contributed to the growth of freedom in a different way. He was a deist, but his deism, unlike that of Voltaire, was religious and emotional. He regarded Christianity with a sort of reverent scepticism. But his thought was revolutionary and repugnant to orthodoxy; it made against authority in every sphere; and it had an enormous influence. The clergy perhaps dreaded his theories more than the scoffs and negations of Voltaire. For some years he was a fugitive on the face of the earth. Émile, his brilliant contribution to the theory of education, appeared in 1762. It contains some remarkable pages on religion, “the profession of faith of a Savoyard vicar,” in which the author’s deistic faith is strongly affirmed and revelation and theology rejected. The book was publicly burned in Paris and an order issued for Rousseau’s arrest. Forced by his friends to flee, he was debarred from returning to Geneva, for the government of that canton followed the example of Paris. He sought refuge in the canton of Bern and was ordered to quit. He then fled to the principality of Neufchâtel which belonged to Prussia. Frederick the Great, the one really tolerant ruler of the age, gave him protection, but he was persecuted and calumniated by the local clergy, who but for Frederick would [158] have expelled him, and he went to England for a few months (1766), then returning to France, where he was left unmolested till his death. The religious views of Rousseau are only a minor point in his heretical speculations. It was by his daring social and political theories that he set the world on fire. His Social Contract in which these theories were set forth was burned at Geneva. Though his principles will not stand criticism for a moment, and though his doctrine worked mischief by its extraordinary power of turning men into fanatics, yet it contributed to progress, by helping to discredit privilege and to establish the view that the object of a State is to secure the wellbeing of all its members.
Deism—whether in the semi-Christian form of Rousseau or the anti-Christian form of Voltaire—was a house built on the sand, and thinkers arose in France, England, and Germany to shatter its foundations. In France, it proved to be only a half-way inn to atheism. In 1770, French readers were startled by the appearance of Baron D’Holbach’s System of Nature, in which God’s existence and the immortality of the soul were denied and the world declared to be matter spontaneously moving.
Holbach was a friend of Diderot, who had also come to reject deism. All the leading [159] ideas in the revolt against the Church had a place in Diderot’s great work, the Encyclopedia, in which a number of leading thinkers collaborated with him. It was not merely a scientific book of reference. It was representative of the whole movement of the enemies of faith. It was intended to lead men from Christianity with its original sin to a new conception of the world as a place which can be made agreeable and in which the actual evils are due not to radical faults of human nature but to perverse institutions and perverse education. To divert interest from the dogmas of religion to the improvement of society, to persuade the world that man’s felicity depends not on Revelation but on social transformation—this was what Diderot and Rousseau in their different ways did so much to effect. And their work influenced those who did not abandon orthodoxy; it affected the spirit of the Church itself. Contrast the Catholic Church in France in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century. Without the work of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and their fellow-combatants, would it have been reformed? “The Christian Churches” (I quote Lord Morley) “are assimilating as rapidly as their formulae will permit, the new light and the more generous moral ideas and the higher spirituality of [160] teachers who have abandoned all churches and who are systematically denounced as enemies of the souls of men.”
In England the prevalent deistic thought did not lead to the same intellectual consequences as in France; yet Hume, the greatest English philosopher of the century, showed that the arguments commonly adduced for a personal God were untenable. I may first speak of his discussion on miracles in his Essay on Miracles and in his philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). Hitherto the credibility of miracles had not been submitted to a general examination independent of theological assumptions. Hume, pointing out that there must be a uniform experience against every miraculous event (otherwise it would not merit the name of miracle), and that it will require stronger testimony to establish a miracle than an event which is not contrary to experience, lays down the general maxim that “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony is of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.” But, as a matter of fact, no testimony exists of which the falsehood would be a prodigy. We cannot find in history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestionable good [161] sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood, and at the same time attesting facts performed in such a public manner as to render detection unavoidable —all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.
In the Dialogues on Natural Religion which were not published till after his death (1776), Hume made an attack on the “argument from design,” on which deists and Christians alike relied to prove the existence of a Deity. The argument is that the world presents clear marks of design, endless adaptation of means to ends, which can only be explained as due to the deliberate plan of a powerful intelligence. Hume disputes the inference on the ground that a mere intelligent being is not a sufficient cause to explain the effect. For the argument must be that the system of the material world demands as a cause a corresponding system of interconnected ideas; but such a mental system would demand an explanation of its existence just as much as the material world; and thus we find ourselves [162] committed to an endless series of causes. But in any case, even if the argument held, it would prove only the existence of a Deity whose powers, though superior to man’s, might be very limited and whose workmanship might be very imperfect. For this world may be very faulty, compared to a superior standard. It may be the first rude experiment “of some infant Deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance”; or the work of some inferior Deity at which his superior would scoff; or the production of some old superannuated Deity which since his death has pursued an adventurous career from the first impulse which he gave it. An argument which leaves such deities in the running is worse than useless for the purposes of Deism or of Christianity.
The sceptical philosophy of Hume had less influence on the general public than Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Of the numerous freethinking books that appeared in England in the eighteenth century, this is the only one which is still a widely read classic. In what a lady friend of Dr. Johnson called “the two offensive chapters” (XV and XVI) the causes of the rise and success of Christianity are for the first time critically investigated as a simple historical phenomenon. Like most freethinkers of the [163] time Gibbon thought it well to protect himself and his work against the possibility of prosecution by paying ironical lip-homage to the orthodox creed. But even if there had been no such danger, he could not have chosen a more incisive weapon for his merciless criticism of orthodox opinion than the irony which he wielded with superb ease. Having pointed out that the victory of Christianity is obviously and satisfactorily explained by the convincing evidence of the doctrine and by the ruling providence of its great Author, he proceeds “with becoming submission” to inquire into the secondary causes. He traces the history of the faith up to the time of Constantine in such a way as clearly to suggest that the hypothesis of divine interposition is superfluous and that we have to do with a purely human development. He marshals, with ironical protests, the obvious objections to the alleged evidence for supernatural control. He does not himself criticize Moses and the prophets, but he reproduces the objections which were made against their authority by “the vain science of the gnostics.” He notes that the doctrine of immortality is omitted in the law of Moses, but this doubtless was a mysterious dispensation of Providence. We cannot entirely remove “the imputation of ignorance and [164] obscurity which has been so arrogantly cast on the first proselytes of Christianity,” but we must “convert the occasion of scandal into a subject of edification” and remember that “the lower we depress the temporal condition of the first Christians, the more reason we shall find to admire their merit and success.”
Gibbon’s treatment of miracles from the purely historical point of view (he owed a great deal to Middleton, see above, p. 150) was particularly disconcerting. In the early age of Christianity “the laws of nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the Church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and, pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberius the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman Empire, was involved in a praeternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence, of the prodigy. Each of these [165] philosophers in a laborious work has recorded all the great phenomena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe.” How “shall we excuse the supine inattention of the pagan and philosophic world to those evidences which were presented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their reason, but to their senses?”
Again, if every believer is convinced of the reality of miracles, every reasonable man is convinced of their cessation. Yet every age bears testimony to miracles, and the testimony seems no less respectable than that of the preceding generation. When did they cease? How was it that the generation which saw the last genuine miracles performed could not distinguish them from the impostures which followed? Had men so soon forgotten “the style of the divine artist”? The inference is that genuine and spurious miracles are indistinguishable. But the credulity or “softness of temper” among early believers was beneficial to the cause of truth and religion. “In modern times, a latent and even involuntary scepticism adheres to the most pious dispositions. Their [166] admission of supernatural truths is much less an active consent than a cold and passive acquiescence. Accustomed long since to observe and to respect the invariable order of nature, our reason, or at least our imagination, is not sufficiently prepared to sustain the visible action of the Deity.”
Gibbon had not the advantage of the minute critical labours which in the following century were expended on his sources of information, but his masterly exposure of the conventional history of the early Church remains in many of its most important points perfectly valid to-day. I suspect that his artillery has produced more effect on intelligent minds in subsequent generations than the archery of Voltaire. For his book became indispensable as the great history of the Middle Ages; the most orthodox could not do without it; and the poison must have often worked.
We have seen how theological controversy in the first half of the eighteenth century had turned on the question whether the revealed religion was consistent and compatible with natural religion. The deistic attacks, on this line, were almost exhausted by the middle of the century, and the orthodox thought that they had been satisfactorily answered. But it was not enough to show that the revelation [167] is reasonable; it was necessary to prove that it is real and rests on a solid historical basis. This was the question raised in an acute form by the criticisms of Hume and Middleton (1748) on miracles. The ablest answer was given by Paley in his Evidences of Christianity (1794), the only one of the apologies of that age which is still read, though it has ceased to have any value. Paley’s theology illustrates how orthodox opinions are coloured, unconsciously, by the spirit of the time. He proved (in his Natural Theology) the existence of God by the argument from design —without taking any account of the criticisms of Hume on that argument. Just as a watchmaker is inferred from a watch, so a divine workman is inferred from contrivances in nature. Paley takes his instances of such contrivance largely from the organs and constitution of the human body. His idea of God is that of an ingenious contriver dealing with rather obstinate material. Paley’s “God” (Mr. Leslie Stephen remarked) “has been civilized like man; he has become scientific and ingenious; he is superior to Watt or Priestley in devising mechanical and chemical contrivances, and is therefore made in the image of that generation of which Watt and Priestley were conspicuous lights.” When a God of this kind [168] is established there is no difficulty about miracles, and it is on miracles that Paley bases the case for Christianity—all other arguments are subsidiary. And his proof of the New Testament miracles is that the apostles who were eye-witnesses believed in them, for otherwise they would not have acted and suffered in the cause of their new religion. Paley’s defence is the performance of an able legal adviser to the Almighty.
The list of the English deistic writers of the eighteenth century closes with one whose name is more familiar than any of his predecessors, Thomas Paine. A Norfolk man, he migrated to America and played a leading part in the Revolution. Then he returned to England and in 1791 published his Rights of Man in two parts. I have been considering, almost exclusively, freedom of thought in religion, because it may be taken as the thermometer for freedom of thought in general. At this period it was as dangerous to publish revolutionary opinions in politics as in theology. Paine was an enthusiastic admirer of the American Constitution and a supporter of the French Revolution (in which also he was to play a part). His Rights of Man is an indictment of the monarchical form of government, and a plea for representative democracy. It had an enormous [169] sale, a cheap edition was issued, and the government, finding that it was accessible to the poorer classes, decided to prosecute. Paine escaped to France, and received a brilliant ovation at Calais, which returned him as deputy to the National Convention. His trial for high treason came on at the end of 1792. Among the passages in his book, on which the charge was founded, were these: “All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny.” “The time is not very distant when England will laugh at itself for sending to Holland, Hanover, Zell, or Brunswick for men” [meaning King William III and King George I] “at the expense of a million a year who understood neither her laws, her language, nor her interest, and whose capacities would scarcely have fitted them for the office of a parish constable. If government could be trusted to such hands, it must be some easy and simple thing indeed, and materials fit for all the purposes may be found in every town and village in England.” Erskine was Paine’s counsel, and he made a fine oration in defence of freedom of speech.
“Constraint,” he said, “is the natural parent of resistance, and a pregnant proof that reason is not on the side of those who use it. You must all remember, gentlemen, Lucian’s pleasant story: Jupiter and a countryman [170] were walking together, conversing with great freedom and familiarity upon the subject of heaven and earth. The countryman listened with attention and acquiescence while Jupiter strove only to convince him; but happening to hint a doubt, Jupiter turned hastily around and threatened him with his thunder. ‘Ah, ha!’ says the countryman, ‘now, Jupiter, I know that you are wrong; you are always wrong when you appeal to your thunder.’ This is the case with me. I can reason with the people of England, but I cannot fight against the thunder of authority.”
Paine was found guilty and outlawed. He soon committed a new offence by the publication of an anti-Christian work, The Age of Reason (1794 and 1796), which he began to write in the Paris prison into which he had been thrown by Robespierre. This book is remarkable as the first important English publication in which the Christian scheme of salvation and the Bible are assailed in plain language without any disguise or reserve. In the second place it was written in such a way as to reach the masses. And, thirdly, while the criticisms on the Bible are in the same vein as those of the earlier deists, Paine is the first to present with force the incongruity of the Christian scheme with the conception of the universe attained by astronomical science.
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“Though it is not a direct article of the Christian system that this world that we inhabit is the whole of the inhabitable globe, yet it is so worked up therewith—from what is called the Mosaic account of the creation, the story of Eve and the apple, and the counterpart of that story, the death of the Son of God—that to believe otherwise (that is, to believe that God created a plurality of worlds at least as numerous as what we call stars) renders the Christian system of faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind; and he who thinks that he believes both has thought but little of either.”
As an ardent deist, who regarded nature as God’s revelation, Paine was able to press this argument with particular force. Referring to some of the tales in the Old Testament, he says: “When we contemplate the immensity of that Being who directs and governs the incomprehensible Whole, of which the utmost ken of human sight can discover but a part, we ought to feel shame at calling such paltry stories the Word of God.”
The book drew a reply from Bishop Watson, one of those admirable eighteenth-century divines, who admitted the right of private judgment and thought that argument [172] should be met by argument and not by force. His reply had the rather significant title, An Apology for the Bible. George III remarked that he was not aware that any apology was needed for that book. It is a weak defence, but is remarkable for the concessions which it makes to several of Paine’s criticisms of Scripture—admissions which were calculated to damage the doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible.
It was doubtless in consequence of the enormous circulation of the Age of Reason that a Society for the Suppression of Vice decided to prosecute the publisher. Unbelief was common among the ruling class, but the view was firmly held that religion was necessary for the populace and that any attempt to disseminate unbelief among the lower classes must be suppressed. Religion was regarded as a valuable instrument to keep the poor in order. It is notable that of the earlier rationalists (apart from the case of Woolston) the only one who was punished was Peter Annet, a schoolmaster, who tried to popularize freethought and was sentenced for diffusing “diabolical” opinions to the pillory and hard labour (1763). Paine held that the people at large had the right of access to all new ideas, and he wrote so as to reach the people. Hence his book must be suppressed. [173] At the trial (1797) the judge placed every obstacle in the way of the defence. The publisher was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment.
This was not the end of Paine prosecutions. In 1811 a Third Part of the Age of Reason appeared, and Eaton the publisher was condemned to eighteen months’ imprisonment and to stand in the pillory once a month. The judge, Lord Ellenborough, said in his charge, that “to deny the truths of the book which is the foundation of our faith has never been permitted.” The poet Shelley addressed to Lord Ellenborough a scathing letter. “Do you think to convert Mr. Eaton to your religion by embittering his existence? You might force him by torture to profess your tenets, but he could not believe them except you should make them credible, which perhaps exceeds your power. Do you think to please the God you worship by this exhibition of your zeal? If so, the demon to whom some nations offer human hecatombs is less barbarous than the deity of civilized society!” In 1819 Richard Carlisle was prosecuted for publishing the Age of Reason and sentenced to a large fine and three years’ imprisonment. Unable to pay the fine he was kept in prison for three years. His wife and sister, who carried on the business [174] and continued to sell the book, were fined and imprisoned soon afterwards and a whole host of shop assistants.
If his publishers suffered in England, the author himself suffered in America where bigotry did all it could to make the last years of his life bitter.
The age of enlightenment began in Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century. In most of the German States, thought was considerably less free than in England. Under Frederick the Great’s father, the philosopher Wolff was banished from Prussia for according to the moral teachings of the Chinese sage Confucius a praise which, it was thought, ought to be reserved for Christianity. He returned after the accession of Frederick, under whose tolerant rule Prussia was an asylum for those writers who suffered for their opinions in neighbouring States. Frederick, indeed, held the view which was held by so many English rationalists of the time, and is still held widely enough, that freethought is not desirable for the multitude, because they are incapable of understanding philosophy. Germany felt the influence of the English Deists, of the French freethinkers, and of Spinoza; but in the German rationalistic propaganda of this period there is nothing very original or interesting. [175] The names of Edelmann and Bahrdt may be mentioned. The works of Edelmann, who attacked the inspiration of the Bible, were burned in various cities, and he was forced to seek Frederick’s protection at Berlin. Bahrdt was more aggressive than any other writer of the time. Originally a preacher, it was by slow degrees that he moved away from the orthodox faith. His translation of the New Testament cut short his ecclesiastical career. His last years were spent as an inn-keeper. His writings, for instance his popular Letters on the Bible, must have had a considerable effect, if we may judge by the hatred which he excited among theologians.
It was not, however, in direct rationalistic propaganda, but in literature and philosophy, that the German enlightenment of this century expressed itself. The most illustrious men of letters, Goethe (who was profoundly influenced by Spinoza) and Schiller, stood outside the Churches, and the effect of their writings and of the whole literary movement of the time made for the freest treatment of human experience.
One German thinker shook the world—the philosopher Kant. His Critic of Pure Reason demonstrated that when we attempt to prove by the fight of the intellect the existence of [176] God and the immortality of the Soul, we fall helplessly into contradictions. His destructive criticism of the argument from design and all natural theology was more complete than that of Hume; and his philosophy, different though his system was, issued in the same practical result as that of Locke, to confine knowledge to experience. It is true that afterwards, in the interest of ethics, he tried to smuggle in by a back-door the Deity whom he had turned out by the front gate, but the attempt was not a success. His philosophy—while it led to new speculative systems in which the name of God was used to mean something very different from the Deistic conception—was a significant step further in the deliverance of reason from the yoke of authority.

[1] For the sake of simplicity I use “deist” in this sense throughout, though “theist” is now the usual term.
[2] Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise, which deals with the interpretation of Scripture, was translated into English in 1689.
[3] See Benn, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, vol. i, p. 138 seq., for a good exposure of the fallacies and sophistries of Butler.







A History of Freedom of Thought: CHAPTER VII



THE PROGRESS OF RATIONALISM
(NINETEENTH CENTURY)
MODERN science, heralded by the researches of Copernicus, was founded in the seventeenth century, which saw the demonstration of the Copernican theory, the discovery of gravitation, the discovery of the circulation of the blood, and the foundation [177] of modern chemistry and physics. The true nature of comets was ascertained, and they ceased to be regarded as signs of heavenly wrath. But several generations were to pass before science became, in Protestant countries, an involuntary arch-enemy of theology. Till the nineteenth century, it was only in minor points, such as the movement of the earth, that proved scientific facts seemed to conflict with Scripture, and it was easy enough to explain away these inconsistencies by a new interpretation of the sacred texts. Yet remarkable facts were accumulating which, though not explained by science, seemed to menace the credibility of Biblical history. If the story of Noah’s Ark and the Flood is true, how was it that beasts unable to swim or fly inhabit America and the islands of the Ocean? And what about the new species which were constantly being found in the New World and did not exist in the Old? Where did the kangaroos of Australia drop from? The only explanation compatible with received theology seemed to be the hypothesis of innumerable new acts of creation, later than the Flood. It was in the field of natural history that scientific men of the eighteenth century suffered most from the coercion of authority. Linnaeus felt it in Sweden, Buffon [178] in France. Buffon was compelled to retract hypotheses which he put forward about the formation of the earth in his Natural History (1749), and to state that he believed implicitly in the Bible account of Creation.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Laplace worked out the mechanics of the universe, on the nebular hypothesis. His results dispensed, as he said to Napoleon, with the hypothesis of God, and were duly denounced. His theory involved a long physical process before the earth and solar system came to be formed; but this was not fatal, for a little ingenuity might preserve the credit of the first chapter of Genesis. Geology was to prove a more formidable enemy to the Biblical story of the Creation and the Deluge. The theory of a French naturalist (Cuvier) that the earth had repeatedly experienced catastrophes, each of which necessitated a new creative act, helped for a time to save the belief in divine intervention, and Lyell, in his Principles of Geology (1830), while he undermined the assumption of catastrophes, by showing that the earth’s history could be explained by the ordinary processes which we still see in operation, yet held fast to successive acts of creation. It was not till 1863 that he presented fully, in his Antiquity of Man, the [179] evidence which showed that the human race had inhabited the earth for a far longer period than could be reconciled with the record of Scripture. That record might be adapted to the results of science in regard not only to the earth itself but also to the plants and lower animals, by explaining the word “day” in the Jewish story of creation to signify some long period of time. But this way out was impossible in the case of the creation of man, for the sacred chronology is quite definite. An English divine of the seventeenth century ingeniously calculated that man was created by the Trinity on October 23, B.C. 4004, at 9 o’clock in the morning, and no reckoning of the Bible dates could put the event much further back. Other evidence reinforced the conclusions from geology, but geology alone was sufficient to damage irretrievably the historical truth of the Jewish legend of Creation. The only means of rescuing it was to suppose that God had created misleading evidence for the express purpose of deceiving man.
Geology shook the infallibility of the Bible, but left the creation of some prehistoric Adam and Eve a still admissible hypothesis. Here however zoology stepped in, and pronounced upon the origin of man. It was an old conjecture that the higher forms of life, including [180] man, had developed out of lower forms, and advanced thinkers had been reaching the conclusion that the universe, as we find it, is the result of a continuous process, unbroken by supernatural interference, and explicable by uniform natural laws. But while the reign of law in the world of non-living matter seemed to be established, the world of life could be considered a field in which the theory of divine intervention is perfectly valid, so long as science failed to assign satisfactory causes for the origination of the various kinds of animals and plants. The publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859 is, therefore, a landmark not only in science but in the war between science and theology. When this book appeared, Bishop Wilberforce truly said that “the principle of natural selection is incompatible with the word of God,” and theologians in Germany and France as well as in England cried aloud against the threatened dethronement of the Deity. The appearance of the Descent of Man (1871), in which the evidence for the pedigree of the human race from lower animals was marshalled with masterly force, renewed the outcry. The Bible said that God created man in his own image, Darwin said that man descended from an ape. The feelings of the orthodox world may be [181] expressed in the words of Mr. Gladstone: “Upon the grounds of what is called evolution God is relieved of the labour of creation, and in the name of unchangeable laws is discharged from governing the world.” It was a discharge which, as Spencer observed, had begun with Newton’s discovery of gravitation. If Darwin did not, as is now recognized, supply a complete explanation of the origin of species, his researches shattered the supernatural theory and confirmed the view to which many able thinkers had been led that development is continuous in the living as in the non-living world. Another nail was driven into the coffin of Creation and the Fall of Adam, and the doctrine of redemption could only be rescued by making it independent of the Jewish fable on which it was founded.
Darwinism, as it is called, has had the larger effect of discrediting the theory of the adaptation of means to ends in nature by an external and infinitely powerful intelligence. The inadequacy of the argument from design, as a proof of God’s existence, had been shown by the logic of Hume and Kant; but the observation of the life-processes of nature shows that the very analogy between nature and art, on which the argument depends, breaks down. The impropriety of the analogy has been [182] pointed out, in a telling way, by a German writer (Lange). If a man wants to shoot a hare which is in a certain field, he does not procure thousands of guns, surround the field, and cause them all to be fired off; or if he wants a house to live in, he does not build a whole town and abandon to weather and decay all the houses but one. If he did either of these things we should say he was mad or amazingly unintelligent; his actions certainly would not be held to indicate a powerful mind, expert in adapting means to ends. But these are the sort of things that nature does. Her wastefulness in the propagation of life is reckless. For the production of one life she sacrifices innumerable germs. The “end” is achieved in one case out of thousands; the rule is destruction and failure. If intelligence had anything to do with this bungling process, it would be an intelligence infinitely low. And the finished product, if regarded as a work of design, points to incompetence in the designer. Take the human eye. An illustrious man of science (Helmholtz) said, “If an optician sent it to me as an instrument, I should send it back with reproaches for the carelessness of his work and demand the return of my money. Darwin showed how the phenomena might be explained as events not brought about [183] intentionally, but due to exceptional concurrences of circumstances.
The phenomena of nature are a system of things which co-exist and follow each other according to invariable laws. This deadly proposition was asserted early in the nineteenth century to be an axiom of science. It was formulated by Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) as the foundation on which scientific induction rests. It means that at any moment the state of the whole universe is the effect of its state at the preceding moment; the casual sequence between two successive states is not broken by any arbitrary interference suppressing or altering the relation between cause and effect. Some ancient Greek philosophers were convinced of this principle; the work done by modern science in every field seems to be a verification of it. But it need not be stated in such an absolute form. Recently, scientific men have been inclined to express the axiom with more reserve and less dogmatically. They are prepared to recognize that it is simply a postulate without which the scientific comprehension of the universe would be impossible, and they are inclined to state it not as a law of causation—for the idea of causation leads into metaphysics—but rather as uniformity of experience. But they are not [184] readier to admit exceptions to this uniformity than their predecessors were to admit exceptions to the law of causation.
The idea of development has been applied not only to nature, but to the mind of man and to the history of civilization, including thought and religion. The first who attempted to apply this idea methodically to the whole universe was not a student of natural science, but a metaphysician, Hegel. His extremely difficult philosophy had such a wide influence on thought that a few words must be said about its tendency. He conceived the whole of existence as what he called the Absolute Idea, which is not in space or time and is compelled by the laws of its being to manifest itself in the process of the world, first externalizing itself in nature, and then becoming conscious of itself as spirit in individual minds. His system is hence called Absolute Idealism. The attraction which it exercised has probably been in great measure due to the fact that it was in harmony with nineteenth-century thought, in so far as it conceived the process of the world, both in nature and spirit, as a necessary development from lower to higher stages. In this respect indeed Hegel’s vision was limited. He treats the process as if it were practically complete already, and does not take into account [185] the probability of further development in the future, to which other thinkers of his own time were turning their attention. But what concerns us here is that, while Hegel’s system is “idealistic,” finding the explanation of the universe in thought and not in matter, it tended as powerfully as any materialistic system to subvert orthodox beliefs. It is true that some have claimed it as supporting Christianity. A certain colour is lent to this by Hegel’s view that the Christian creed, as the highest religion, contains doctrines which express imperfectly some of the ideas of the highest philosophy—his own; along with the fact that he sometimes speaks of the Absolute Idea as if it were a person, though personality would be a limitation inconsistent with his conception of it. But it is sufficient to observe that, whatever value be assigned to Christianity, he regarded it from the superior standpoint of a purely intellectual philosophy, not as a special revelation of truth, but as a certain approximation to the truth which philosophy alone can reach; and it may be said with some confidence that any one who comes under Hegel’s spell feels that he is in possession of a theory of the universe which relieves him from the need or desire of any revealed religion. His influence in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere has entirely made for highly unorthodox thought.
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Hegel was not aggressive, he was superior. His French contemporary, Comte, who also thought out a comprehensive system, aggressively and explicitly rejected theology as an obsolete way of explaining the universe. He rejected metaphysics likewise, and all that Hegel stood for, as equally useless, on the ground that metaphysicians explain nothing, but merely describe phenomena in abstract terms, and that questions about the origin of the world and why it exists are quite beyond the reach of reason. Both theology and metaphysics are superseded by science—the investigation of causes and effects and coexistences; and the future progress of society will be guided by the scientific view of the world which confines itself to the positive data of experience. Comte was convinced that religion is a social necessity, and, to supply the place of the theological religions which he pronounced to be doomed, he invented a new religion—the religion of Humanity. It differs from the great religions of the world in having no supernatural or non-rational articles of belief, and on that account he had few adherents. But the “Positive Philosophy” of Comte has exercised great influence, not least in England, where its principles have been promulgated especially by Mr. Frederic Harrison, who in the latter [187] half of the nineteenth century has been one of the most indefatigable workers in the cause of reason against authority.
Another comprehensive system was worked out by an Englishman, Herbert Spencer. Like Comte’s, it was based on science, and attempts to show how, starting with a nebular universe, the whole knowable world, psychical and social as well as physical, can be deduced. His Synthetic Philosophy perhaps did more than anything else to make the idea of evolution familiar in England.
I must mention one other modern explanation of the world, that of Haeckel, the zoologist, professor at Jena, who may be called the prophet of evolution. His Creation of Man (1868) covered the same ground as Darwin’s Descent, had an enormous circulation, and was translated, I believe, into fourteen languages. His World-riddles (1899) enjoys the same popularity. He has taught, like Spencer, that the principle of evolution applies not only to the history of nature, but also to human civilization and human thought. He differs from Spencer and Comte in not assuming any unknowable reality behind natural phenomena. His adversaries commonly stigmatize his theory as materialism, but this is a mistake. Like Spinoza he recognizes matter and mind, body and thought, as [188] two inseparable sides of ultimate reality, which he calls God; in fact, he identifies his philosophy with that of Spinoza. And he logically proceeds to conceive material atoms as thinking. His idea of the physical world is based on the old mechanical conception of matter, which in recent years has been discredited. But Haeckel’s Monism, [1] as he called his doctrine, has lately been reshaped and in its new form promises to exercise wide influence on thoughtful people in Germany. I will return later to this Monistic movement.
It had been a fundamental principle of Comte that human actions and human history are as strictly subject as nature is, to the law of causation. Two psychological works appeared in England in 1855 (Bain’s Senses and Intellect and Spencer’s Principles of Psychology), which taught that our volitions are completely determined, being the inevitable consequences of chains of causes and effects. But a far deeper impression was produced two years later by the first volume of Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (a work of much less permanent value), which attempted to apply this principle to history. Men act in consequence of motives; their motives are the results of preceding facts; so that “if we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents [189] and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.” Thus history is an unbroken chain of causes and effects. Chance is excluded; it is a mere name for the defects of our knowledge. Mysterious and providential interference is excluded. Buckle maintained God’s existence, but eliminated him from history; and his book dealt a resounding blow at the theory that human actions are not submitted to the law of universal causation.
The science of anthropology has in recent years aroused wide interest. Inquiries into the condition of early man have shown (independently of Darwinism) that there is nothing to be said for the view that he fell from a higher to a lower state; the evidence points to a slow rise from mere animality. The origin of religious beliefs has been investigated, with results disquieting for orthodoxy. The researches of students of anthropology and comparative religion—such as Tylor, Robertson Smith, and Frazer—have gone to show that mysterious ideas and dogma and rites which were held to be peculiar to the Christian revelation are derived from the crude ideas of primitive religions. That the mystery of the Eucharist comes from the common savage rite of eating a dead god, [190] that the death and resurrection of a god in human form, which form the central fact of Christianity, and the miraculous birth of a Saviour are features which it has in common with pagan religions—such conclusions are supremely unedifying. It may be said that in themselves they are not fatal to the claims of the current theology. It may be held, for instance, that, as part of Christian revelation, such ideas acquired a new significance and that God wisely availed himself of familiar beliefs—which, though false and leading to cruel practices, he himself had inspired and permitted—in order to construct a scheme of redemption which should appeal to the prejudices of man. Some minds may find satisfaction in this sort of explanation, but it may be suspected that most of the few who study modern researches into the origin of religious beliefs will feel the lines which were supposed to mark off the Christian from all other faiths dissolving before their eyes.
The general result of the advance of science, including anthropology, has been to create a coherent view of the world, in which the Christian scheme, based on the notions of an unscientific age and on the arrogant assumption that the universe was made for man, has no suitable or reasonable place. If Paine felt this a hundred years ago, it is far [191] more apparent now. All minds however are not equally impressed with this incongruity. There are many who will admit the proofs furnished by science that the Biblical record as to the antiquity of man is false, but are not affected by the incongruity between the scientific and theological conceptions of the world.
For such minds science has only succeeded in carrying some entrenchments, which may be abandoned without much harm. It has made the old orthodox view of the infallibility of the Bible untenable, and upset the doctrine of the Creation and Fall. But it would still be possible for Christianity to maintain the supernatural claim, by modifying its theory of the authority of the Bible and revising its theory of redemption, if the evidence of natural science were the only group of facts with which it collided. It might be argued that the law of universal causation is a hypothesis inferred from experience, but that experience includes the testimonies of history and must therefore take account of the clear evidence of miraculous occurrences in the New Testament (evidence which is valid, even if that book was not inspired). Thus, a stand could be taken against the generalization of science on the firm ground of historical fact. That solid ground, however, has given [192] way, undermined by historical criticism, which has been more deadly than the common-sense criticism of the eighteenth century.
The methodical examination of the records contained in the Bible, dealing with them as if they were purely human documents, is the work of the nineteenth century. Something, indeed, had already been done. Spinoza, for instance (above, p. 138), and Simon, a Frenchman whose books were burnt, were pioneers; and the modern criticism of the Old Testament was begun by Astruc (professor of medicine at Paris), who discovered an important clue for distinguishing different documents used by the compiler of the Book of Genesis (1753). His German contemporary, Reimarus, a student of the New Testament, anticipated the modern conclusion that Jesus had no intention of founding a new religion, and saw that the Gospel of St. John presents a different figure from the Jesus of the other evangelists.
But in the nineteenth century the methods of criticism, applied by German scholars to Homer and to the records of early Roman history, were extended to the investigation of the Bible. The work has been done principally in Germany. The old tradition that the Pentateuch was written by Moses has been completely discredited. It is now [193] agreed unanimously by all who have studied the facts that the Pentateuch was put together from a number of different documents of different ages, the earliest dating from the ninth, the last from the fifth, century B.C.; and there are later minor additions. An important, though undesigned, contribution was made to this exposure by an Englishman, Colenso, Bishop of Natal. It had been held that the oldest of the documents which had been distinguished was a narrative which begins in Genesis, Chapter I, but there was the difficulty that this narrative seemed to be closely associated with the legislation of Leviticus which could be proved to belong to the fifth century. In 1862 Colenso published the first part of his Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua Critically Examined. His doubts of the truth of Old Testament history had been awakened by a converted Zulu who asked the intelligent question whether he could really believe in the story of the Flood, “that all the beasts and birds and creeping things upon the earth, large and small, from hot countries and cold, came thus by pairs and entered into the ark with Noah? And did Noah gather food for them all, for the beasts and birds of prey as well as the rest?” The Bishop then proceeded to test the accuracy of the inspired books by examining [194] the numerical statements which they contain. The results were fatal to them as historical records. Quite apart from miracles (the possibility of which he did not question), he showed that the whole story of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt and the wilderness was full of absurdities and impossibilities. Colenso’s book raised a storm of indignation in England—he was known as “the wicked bishop”; but on the Continent its reception was very different. The portions of the Pentateuch and Joshua, which he proved to be unhistorical, belonged precisely to the narrative which had caused perplexity; and critics were led by his results to conclude that, like the Levitical laws with which it was connected, it was as late as the fifth century.
One of the most striking results of the researches on the Old Testament has been that the Jews themselves handled their traditions freely. Each of the successive documents, which were afterwards woven together, was written by men who adopted a perfectly free attitude towards the older traditions, and having no suspicion that they were of divine origin did not bow down before their authority. It was reserved for the Christians to invest with infallible authority the whole indiscriminate lump of these Jewish documents, inconsistent not [195] only in their tendencies (since they reflect the spirit of different ages), but also in some respects in substance. The examination of most of the other Old Testament books has led to conclusions likewise adverse to the orthodox view of their origin and character. New knowledge on many points has been derived from the Babylonian literature which has been recovered during the last half century. One of the earliest (1872) and most sensational discoveries was that the Jews got their story of the Flood from Babylonian mythology.
Modern criticism of the New Testament began with the stimulating works of Baur and of Strauss, whose Life of Jesus (1835), in which the supernatural was entirely rejected, had an immense success and caused furious controversy. Both these rationalists were influenced by Hegel. At the same time a classical scholar, Lachmann, laid the foundations of the criticism of the Greek text of the New Testament, by issuing the first scientific edition. Since then seventy years of work have led to some certain results which are generally accepted.
In the first place, no intelligent person who has studied modern criticism holds the old view that each of the four biographies of Jesus is an independent work and an independent [196] testimony to the facts which are related. It is acknowledged that those portions which are common to more than one and are written in identical language have the same origin and represent only one testimony. In the second place, it is allowed that the first Gospel is not the oldest and that the apostle Matthew was not its author. There is also a pretty general agreement that Mark’s book is the oldest. The authorship of the fourth Gospel, which like the first was supposed to have been written by an eye-witness, is still contested, but even those who adhere to the tradition admit that it represents a theory about Jesus which is widely different from the view of the three other biographers.
The result is that it can no longer be said that for the life of Jesus there is the evidence of eye-witnesses. The oldest account (Mark) was composed at the earliest some thirty years after the Crucifixion. If such evidence is considered good enough to establish the supernatural events described in that document, there are few alleged supernatural occurrences which we shall not be equally entitled to believe. As a matter of fact, an interval of thirty years makes little difference, for we know that legends require little time to grow. In the East, you will hear of miracles which happened the day before [197] yesterday. The birth of religions is always enveloped in legend, and the miraculous thing would be, as M. Salomon Reinach has observed, if the story of the birth of Christianity were pure history.
Another disturbing result of unprejudiced examination of the first three Gospels is that, if you take the recorded words of Jesus to be genuine tradition, he had no idea of founding a new religion. And he was fully persuaded that the end of the world was at hand. At present, the chief problem of advanced criticism seems to be whether his entire teaching was not determined by this delusive conviction.
It may be said that the advance of knowledge has thrown no light on one of the most important beliefs that we are asked to accept on authority, the doctrine of immortality. Physiology and psychology have indeed emphasized the difficulties of conceiving a thinking mind without a nervous system. Some are sanguine enough to think that, by scientific examination of psychical phenomena, we may possibly come to know whether the “spirits” of dead people exist. If the existence of such a world of spirits were ever established, it would possibly be the greatest blow ever sustained by Christianity. For the great appeal of this and of some other religions [198] lies in the promise of a future life of which otherwise we should have no knowledge. If existence after death were proved and became a scientific fact like the law of gravitation, a revealed religion might lose its power. For the whole point of a revealed religion is that it is not based on scientific facts. So far as I know, those who are convinced, by spiritualistic experiments, that they have actual converse with spirits of the dead, and for whom this converse, however delusive the evidence may be, is a fact proved by experience, cease to feel any interest in religion. They possess knowledge and can dispense with faith.
The havoc which science and historical criticism have wrought among orthodox beliefs during the last hundred years was not tamely submitted to, and controversy was not the only weapon employed. Strauss was deprived of his professorship at Tübingen, and his career was ruined. Renan, whose sensational Life of Jesus also rejected the supernatural, lost his chair in the Collège de France. Büchner was driven from Tübingen (1855) for his book on Force and Matter, which, appealing to the general public, set forth the futility of supernatural explanations of the universe. An attempt was made to chase Haeckel from Jena. In recent years, [199] a French Catholic, the Abbé Loisy, has made notable contributions to the study of the New Testament and he was rewarded by major excommunication in 1907.
Loisy is the most prominent figure in a growing movement within the Catholic Church known as Modernism—a movement which some think is the gravest crisis in the history of the Church since the thirteenth century. The Modernists do not form an organized party; they have no programme. They are devoted to the Church, to its traditions and associations, but they look on Christianity as a religion which has developed, and whose vitality depends upon its continuing to develop. They are bent on reinterpreting the dogmas in the light of modern science and criticism. The idea of development had already been applied by Cardinal Newman to Catholic theology. He taught that it was a natural, and therefore legitimate, development of the primitive creed. But he did not draw the conclusion which the Modernists draw that if Catholicism is not to lose its power of growth and die, it must assimilate some of the results of modern thought. This is what they are attempting to do for it.
Pope Pius X has made every effort to suppress the Modernists. In 1907 (July) he [200] issued a decree denouncing various results of modern Biblical criticism which are defended in Loisy’s works. The two fundamental propositions that “the organic constitution of the Church is not immutable, but that Christian society is subject, like every human society, to a perpetual evolution,” and that “the dogmas which the Church regards as revealed are not fallen from heaven but are an interpretation of religious facts at which the human mind laboriously arrived”—both of which might be deduced from Newman’s writings—are condemned. Three months later the Pope issued a long Encyclical letter, containing an elaborate study of Modernist opinions, and ordaining various measures for stamping out the evil. No Modernist would admit that this document represents his views fairly. Yet some of the remarks seem very much to the point. Take one of their books: “one page might be signed by a Catholic; turn over and you think you are reading the work of a rationalist. In writing history, they make no mention of Christ’s divinity; in the pulpit, they proclaim it loudly.”
A plain man may be puzzled by these attempts to retain the letter of old dogmas emptied of their old meaning, and may think it natural enough that the head of the Catholic [201] Church should take a clear and definite stand against the new learning which, seems fatal to its fundamental doctrines. For many years past, liberal divines in the Protestant Churches have been doing what the Modernists are doing. The phrase “Divinity of Christ” is used, but is interpreted so as not to imply a miraculous birth. The Resurrection is preached, but is interpreted so as not to imply a miraculous bodily resurrection. The Bible is said to be an inspired book, but inspiration is used in a vague sense, much as when one says that Plato was inspired; and the vagueness of this new idea of inspiration is even put forward as a merit. Between the extreme views which discard the miraculous altogether, and the old orthodoxy, there are many gradations of belief. In the Church of England to-day it would be difficult to say what is the minimum belief required either from its members or from its clergy. Probably every leading ecclesiastic would give a different answer.
The rise of rationalism within the English Church is interesting and illustrates the relations between Church and State.
The pietistic movement known as Evangelicalism, which Wilberforce’s Practical View of Christianity (1797) did much to make popular, introduced the spirit of Methodism [202] within the Anglican Church, and soon put an end to the delightful type of eighteenth-century divine, who, as Gibbon says, “subscribed with a sigh or a smile” the articles of faith. The rigorous taboo of the Sabbath was revived, the theatre was denounced, the corruption of human nature became the dominant theme, and the Bible more a fetish than ever. The success of this religious “reaction,” as it is called, was aided, though not caused, by the common belief that the French Revolution had been mainly due to infidelity; the Revolution was taken for an object lesson showing the value of religion for keeping the people in order. There was also a religious “reaction” in France itself. But in both cases this means not that free thought was less prevalent, but that the beliefs of the majority were more aggressive and had powerful spokesmen, while the eighteenth-century form of rationalism fell out of fashion. A new form of rationalism, which sought to interpret orthodoxy in such a liberal way as to reconcile it with philosophy, was represented by Coleridge, who was influenced by German philosophers. Coleridge was a supporter of the Church, and he contributed to the foundation of a school of liberal theology which was to make itself felt after the middle of the century. [203] Newman, the most eminent of the new High Church party, said that he indulged in a liberty of speculation which no Christian could tolerate. The High Church movement which marked the second quarter of the century was as hostile as Evangelicalism to the freedom of religious thought.
The change came after the middle of the century, when the effects of the philosophies of Hegel and Comte, and of foreign Biblical criticism, began to make themselves felt within the English Church. Two remarkable freethinking books appeared at this period which were widely read, F. W. Newman’s Phases of Faith and W. R. Greg’s Creed of Christendom (both in 1850). Newman (brother of Cardinal Newman) entirely broke with Christianity, and in his book he describes the mental process by which he came to abandon the beliefs he had once held. Perhaps the most interesting point he makes is the deficiency of the New Testament teaching as a system of morals. Greg was a Unitarian. He rejected dogma and inspiration, but he regarded himself as a Christian. Sir J. F. Stephen wittily described his position as that of a disciple “who had heard the Sermon on the Mount, whose attention had not been called to the Miracles, and who died before the Resurrection.”
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There were a few English clergymen (chiefly Oxford men) who were interested in German criticism and leaned to broad views, which to the Evangelicals and High Churchmen seemed indistinguishable from infidelity. We may call them the Broad Church—though the name did not come in till later. In 1855 Jowett (afterwards Master of Balliol) published an edition of some of St. Paul’s Epistles, in which he showed the cloven hoof. It contained an annihilating criticism of the doctrine of the Atonement, an explicit rejection of original sin, and a rationalistic discussion of the question of God’s existence. But this and some other unorthodox works of liberal theologians attracted little public attention, though their authors had to endure petty persecution. Five years later, Jowett and some other members of the small liberal group decided to defy the “abominable system of terrorism which prevents the statement of the plainest fact,” and issued a volume of Essays and Reviews (1860) by seven writers of whom six were clergymen. The views advocated in these essays seem mild enough to-day, and many of them would be accepted by most well-educated clergymen, but at the time they produced a very painful impression. The authors were called the “Seven against Christ.” It was [205] laid down that the Bible is to be interpreted like any other book. “It is not a useful lesson for the young student to apply to Scripture principles which he would hesitate to apply to other books; to make formal reconcilements of discrepancies which he would not think of reconciling in ordinary history; to divide simple words into double meanings; to adopt the fancies or conjectures of Fathers and Commentators as real knowledge.” It is suggested that the Hebrew prophecies do not contain the element of prediction. Contradictory accounts, or accounts which can only be reconciled by conjecture, cannot possibly have been dictated by God. The discrepancies between the genealogies of Jesus in Matthew and Luke, or between the accounts of the Resurrection, can be attributed “neither to any defect in our capacities nor to any reasonable presumption of a hidden wise design, nor to any partial spiritual endowments in the narrators.” The orthodox arguments which lay stress on the assertion of witnesses as the supreme evidence of fact, in support of miraculous occurrences, are set aside on the ground that testimony is a blind guide and can avail nothing against reason and the strong grounds we have for believing in permanent order. It is argued that, under the Thirty-nine [206] Articles, it is permissible to accept as “parable or poetry or legend” such stories as that of an ass speaking with a man’s voice, of waters standing in a solid heap, of witches and a variety of apparitions, and to judge for ourselves of such questions as the personality of Satan or the primeval institution of the Sabbath. The whole spirit of this volume is perhaps expressed in the observation that if any one perceives “to how great an extent the origin itself of Christianity rests upon probable evidence, his principle will relieve him from many difficulties which might otherwise be very disturbing. For relations which may repose on doubtful grounds as matters of history, and, as history, be incapable of being ascertained or verified, may yet be equally suggestive of true ideas with facts absolutely certain”—that is, they may have a spiritual significance although they are historically false.
The most daring Essay was the Rev. Baden Powell’s Study of the Evidences of Christianity. He was a believer in evolution, who accepted Darwinism, and considered miracles impossible. The volume was denounced by the Bishops, and in 1862 two of the contributors, who were beneficed clergymen and thus open to a legal attack, were prosecuted and tried in the Ecclesiastical Court. Condemned on [207] certain points, acquitted on others, they were sentenced to be suspended for a year, and they appealed to the Privy Council. Lord Westbury (Lord Chancellor) pronounced the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Council, which reversed the decision of the Ecclesiastical Court. The Committee held, among other things, that it is not essential for a clergyman to believe in eternal punishment. This prompted the following epitaph on Lord Westbury: “Towards the close of his earthly career he dismissed Hell with costs and took away from Orthodox members of the Church of England their last hope of everlasting damnation.”
This was a great triumph for the Broad Church party, and it is an interesting event in the history of the English State-Church. Laymen decided (overruling the opinion of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York) what theological doctrines are and are not binding on a clergyman, and granted within the Church a liberty of opinion which the majority of the Church’s representatives regarded as pernicious. This liberty was formally established in 1865 by an Act of Parliament, which altered the form in which clergymen were required to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles. The episode of Essays and Reviews is a landmark in the history of religious thought in England.
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The liberal views of the Broad Churchmen and their attitude to the Bible gradually produced some effect upon those who differed most from them; and nowadays there is probably no one who would not admit, at least, that such a passage as Genesis, Chapter XIX, might have been composed without the direct inspiration of the Deity.
During the next few years orthodox public opinion was shocked or disturbed by the appearance of several remarkable books which criticized, ignored, or defied authority—Lyell’s Antiquity of Man, Seeley’s Ecce Homo (which the pious Lord Shaftesbury said was “vomited from the jaws of hell”), Lecky’s History of Rationalism. And a new poet of liberty arose who did not fear to sound the loudest notes of defiance against all that authority held sacred. All the great poets of the nineteenth century were more or less unorthodox; Wordsworth in the years of his highest inspiration was a pantheist; and the greatest of all, Shelley, was a declared atheist. In fearless utterance, in unfaltering zeal against the tyranny of Gods and Governments, Swinburne was like Shelley. His drama Atalanta in Calydon (1865), even though a poet is strictly not answerable for what the persons in his drama say, yet with its denunciation of “the supreme evil, God,” heralded the coming [209] of a new champion who would defy the fortresses of authority. And in the following year his Poems and Ballads expressed the spirit of a pagan who flouted all the prejudices and sanctities of the Christian world.
But the most intense and exciting period of literary warfare against orthodoxy in England began about 1869, and lasted for about a dozen years, during which enemies of dogma, of all complexions, were less reticent and more aggressive than at any other time in the century. Lord Morley has observed that “the force of speculative literature always hangs on practical opportuneness,” and this remark is illustrated by the rationalistic literature of the seventies. It was a time of hope and fear, of progress and danger. Secularists and rationalists were encouraged by the Disestablishment of the Church in Ireland (1869), by the Act which allowed atheists to give evidence in a court of justice (1869), by the abolition of religious tests at all the universities (a measure frequently attempted in vain) in 1871. On the other hand, the Education Act of 1870, progressive though it was, disappointed the advocates of secular education, and was an unwelcome sign of the strength of ecclesiastical influence. Then there was the general alarm felt in Europe by all outside the Roman Church, [210] and by some within it, at the decree of the infallibility of the Pope (by the Vatican Council 1869–70), and an Englishman (Cardinal Manning) was one of the most active spirits in bringing about this decree. It would perhaps have caused less alarm if the Pope’s denunciation of modern errors had not been fresh in men’s memories. At the end of 1864 he startled the world by issuing a Syllabus “embracing the principal errors of our age.” Among these were the propositions, that every man is free to adopt and profess the religion he considers true, according to the light of reason; that the Church has no right to employ force; that metaphysics can and ought to be pursued without reference to divine and ecclesiastical authority; that Catholic states are right to allow foreign immigrants to exercise their own religion in public; that the Pope ought to make terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization. The document was taken as a declaration of war against enlightenment, and the Vatican Council as the first strategic move of the hosts of darkness. It seemed that the powers of obscurantism were lifting up their heads with a new menace, and there was an instinctive feeling that all the forces of reason should be brought into the field. The history of the last forty years shows that the theory of [211] Infallibility, since it has become a dogma, is not more harmful than it was before. But the efforts of the Catholic Church in the years following the Council to overthrow the French Republic and to rupture the new German Empire were sufficiently disquieting. Against this was to be set the destruction of the temporal power of the Popes and the complete freedom of Italy. This event was the sunrise of Swinburne’s Songs before Sunrise (which appeared in 1871), a seedplot of atheism and revolution, sown with implacable hatred of creeds and tyrants. The most wonderful poem in the volume, the Hymn of Man, was written while the Vatican Council was sitting. It is a song of triumph over the God of the priests, stricken by the doom of the Pope’s temporal power. The concluding verses will show the spirit.

“By thy name that in hellfire was written, and burned at the point of thy sword,
Thou art smitten, thou God, thou art smitten; thy death is upon thee, O Lord.
And the lovesong of earth as thou diest resounds through the wind of her wings—
Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things.”
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The fact that such a volume could appear with impunity vividly illustrates the English policy of enforcing the laws for blasphemy only in the case of publications addressed to the masses.
Political circumstances thus invited and stimulated rationalists to come forward boldly, but we must not leave out of account the influence of the Broad Church movement and of Darwinism. The Descent of Man appeared precisely in 1871. A new, undogmatic Christianity was being preached in pulpits. Mr. Leslie Stephen remarked (1873) that “it may be said, with little exaggeration, that there is not only no article in the creeds which may not be contradicted with impunity, but that there is none which may not be contradicted in a sermon calculated to win the reputation of orthodoxy and be regarded as a judicious bid for a bishopric. The popular state of mind seems to be typified in the well-known anecdote of the cautious churchwarden, who, whilst commending the general tendency of his incumbent’s sermon, felt bound to hazard a protest upon one point. ‘You see, sir,’ as he apologetically explained, ‘I think there be a God.’ He thought it an error of taste or perhaps of judgment, to hint a doubt as to the first article of the creed.”
The influence exerted among the cultivated [213] classes by the aesthetic movement (Ruskin, Morris, the Pre-Raphaelite painters; then Pater’s Lectures on the Renaissance, 1873) was also a sign of the times. For the attitude of these critics, artists, and poets was essentially pagan. The saving truths of theology were for them as if they did not exist. The ideal of happiness was found in a region in which heaven was ignored.
The time then seemed opportune for speaking out. Of the unorthodox books and essays, [2] which influenced the young and alarmed believers, in these exciting years, most were the works of men who may be most fairly described by the comprehensive term agnostics—a name which had been recently invented by Professor Huxley.
The agnostic holds that there are limits to human reason, and that theology lies outside those limits. Within those limits lies the world with which science (including psychology) deals. Science deals entirely with phenomena, and has nothing to say to the nature of the ultimate reality which may lie behind phenomena. There are four possible [214] attitudes to this ultimate reality. There is the attitude of the metaphysician and theologian, who are convinced not only that it exists but that it can be at least partly known. There is the attitude of the man who denies that it exists; but he must be also a metaphysician, for its existence can only be disproved by metaphysical arguments. Then there are those who assert that it exists but deny that we can know anything about it. And finally there are those who say that we cannot know whether it exists or not. These last are “agnostics” in the strict sense of the term, men who profess not to know. The third class go beyond phenomena in so far as they assert that there is an ultimate though unknowable reality beneath phenomena. But agnostic is commonly used in a wide sense so as to include the third as well as the fourth class—those who assume an unknowable, as well as those who do not know whether there is an unknowable or not. Comte and Spencer, for instance, who believed in an unknowable, are counted as agnostics. The difference between an agnostic and an atheist is that the atheist positively denies the existence of a personal God, the agnostic does not believe in it.
The writer of this period who held agnosticism [215] in its purest form, and who turned the dry light of reason on to theological opinions with the most merciless logic, was Mr. Leslie Stephen. His best-known essay, “An Agnostic’s Apology” (Fortnightly Review, 1876), raises the question, have the dogmas of orthodox theologians any meaning? Do they offer, for this is what we want, an intelligible reconciliation of the discords in the universe? It is shown in detail that the various theological explanations of the dealings of God with man, when logically pressed, issue in a confession of ignorance. And what is this but agnosticism? You may call your doubt a mystery, but mystery is only the theological phrase for agnosticism. “Why, when no honest man will deny in private that every ultimate problem is wrapped in the profoundest mystery, do honest men proclaim in pulpits that unhesitating certainty is the duty of the most foolish and ignorant? We are a company of ignorant beings, dimly discerning light enough for our daily needs, but hopelessly differing whenever we attempt to describe the ultimate origin or end of our paths; and yet, when one of us ventures to declare that we don’t know the map of the Universe as well as the map of our infinitesimal parish, he is hooted, reviled, [216] and perhaps told that he will be damned to all eternity for his faithlessness.” The characteristic of Leslie Stephen’s essays is that they are less directed to showing that orthodox theology is untrue as that there is no reality about it, and that its solutions of difficulties are sham solutions. If it solved any part of the mystery, it would be welcome, but it does not, it only adds new difficulties. It is “a mere edifice of moonshine.” The writer makes no attempt to prove by logic that ultimate reality lies outside the limits of human reason. He bases this conclusion on the fact that all philosophers hopelessly contradict one another; if the subject-matter of philosophy were, like physical science, within the reach of the intelligence, some agreement must have been reached.
The Broad Church movement, the attempts to liberalize Christianity, to pour its old wine into new bottles, to make it unsectarian and undogmatic, to find compromises between theology and science, found no favour in Leslie Stephen’s eyes, and he criticized all this with a certain contempt. There was a controversy about the efficacy of prayer. Is it reasonable, for instance, to pray for rain? Here science and theology were at issue on a practical [217] point which comes within the domain of science. Some theologians adopted the compromise that to pray against an eclipse would be foolish, but to pray for rain might be sensible. “One phenomenon,” Stephen wrote, “is just as much the result of fixed causes as the other; but it is easier for the imagination to suppose the interference of a divine agent to be hidden away somewhere amidst the infinitely complex play of forces, which elude our calculations in meteorological phenomena, than to believe in it where the forces are simple enough to admit of prediction. The distinction is of course invalid in a scientific sense. Almighty power can interfere as easily with the events which are, as with those which are not, in the Nautical Almanac. One cannot suppose that God retreats as science advances, and that he spoke in thunder and lightning till Franklin unravelled the laws of their phenomena.”
Again, when a controversy about hell engaged public attention, and some otherwise orthodox theologians bethought themselves that eternal punishment was a horrible doctrine and then found that the evidence for it was not quite conclusive and were bold enough to say so, Leslie Stephen stepped in to point out that, if so, historical [218] Christianity deserves all that its most virulent enemies have said about it in this respect. When the Christian creed really ruled men’s consciences, nobody could utter a word against the truth of the dogma of hell. If that dogma had not an intimate organic connection with the creed, if it had been a mere unimportant accident, it could not have been so vigorous and persistent wherever Christianity was strongest. The attempt to eliminate it or soften it down is a sign of decline. “Now, at last, your creed is decaying. People have discovered that you know nothing about it; that heaven and hell belong to dreamland; that the impertinent young curate who tells me that I shall be burnt everlastingly for not sharing his superstition is just as ignorant as I am myself, and that I know as much as my dog. And then you calmly say again, ‘It is all a mistake. Only believe in a something —and we will make it as easy for you as possible. Hell shall have no more than a fine equable temperature, really good for the constitution; there shall be nobody in it except Judas Iscariot and one or two others; and even the poor Devil shall have a chance if he will resolve to mend his ways.’ ”
Mr. Matthew Arnold may, I suppose, be numbered among the agnostics, but he was [219] of a very different type. He introduced a new kind of criticism of the Bible—literary criticism. Deeply concerned for morality and religion, a supporter of the Established Church, he took the Bible under his special protection, and in three works, St. Paul and Protestantism, 1870, Literature and Dogma, 1873, and God and the Bible, 1875, he endeavoured to rescue that book from its orthodox exponents, whom he regarded as the corrupters of Christianity. It would be just, he says, “but hardly perhaps Christian,” to fling back the word infidel at the orthodox theologians for their bad literary and scientific criticisms of the Bible and to speak of “the torrent of infidelity which pours every Sunday from our pulpits!” The corruption of Christianity has been due to theology “with its insane licence of affirmation about God, its insane licence of affirmation about immortality”; to the hypothesis of “a magnified and non-natural man at the head of mankind’s and the world’s affairs”; and the fancy account of God “made up by putting scattered expressions of the Bible together and taking them literally.” He chastises with urbane persiflage the knowledge which the orthodox think they possess about the proceedings and plans of God. “To think they know what passed in the Council of the [220] Trinity is not hard to them; they could easily think they even knew what were the hangings of the Trinity’s council-chamber.” Yet “the very expression, the Trinity, jars with the whole idea and character of Bible-religion; but, lest the Socinian should be unduly elated at hearing this, let us hasten to add that so too, and just as much, does the expression, a great Personal First Cause.” He uses God as the least inadequate name for that universal order which the intellect feels after as a law, and the heart feels after as a benefit; and defines it as “the stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being.” He defined it further as a Power that makes for righteousness, and thus went considerably beyond the agnostic position. He was impatient of the minute criticism which analyzes the Biblical documents and discovers inconsistencies and absurdities, and he did not appreciate the importance of the comparative study of religions. But when we read of a dignitary in a recent Church congress laying down that the narratives in the books of Jonah and Daniel must be accepted because Jesus quoted them, we may wish that Arnold were here to reproach the orthodox for “want of intellectual seriousness.”
These years also saw the appearance of [221] Mr. John Morley’s sympathetic studies of the French freethinkers of the eighteenth century, Voltaire (1872), Rousseau (1873), and Diderot (1878). He edited the Fortnightly Review, and for some years this journal was distinguished by brilliant criticisms on the popular religion, contributed by able men writing from many points of view. A part of the book which he afterwards published under the title Compromise appeared in the Fortnightly in 1874. In Compromise, “the whole system of objective propositions which make up the popular belief of the day” is condemned as mischievous, and it is urged that those who disbelieve should speak out plainly. Speaking out is an intellectual duty. Englishmen have a strong sense of political responsibility, and a correspondingly weak sense of intellectual responsibility. Even minds that are not commonplace are affected for the worse by the political spirit which “is the great force in throwing love of truth and accurate reasoning into a secondary place.” And the principles which have prevailed in politics have been adopted by theology for her own use. In the one case, convenience first, truth second; in the other, emotional comfort first, truth second. If the immorality is less gross in the case of religion, [222] there is “the stain of intellectual improbity.” And this is a crime against society, for “they who tamper with veracity from whatever motive are tampering with the vital force of human progress.” The intellectual insincerity which is here blamed is just as prevalent to-day. The English have not changed their nature, the “political” spirit is still rampant, and we are ruled by the view that because compromise is necessary in politics it is also a good thing in the intellectual domain.
The Fortnightly under Mr. Morley’s guidance was an effective organ of enlightenment. I have no space to touch on the works of other men of letters and of men of science in these combative years, but it is to be noted that, while denunciations of modern thought poured from the pulpits, a popular diffusion of freethought was carried on, especially by Mr. Bradlaugh in public lectures and in his paper, the National Reformer, not without collisions with the civil authorities.
If we take the cases in which the civil authorities in England have intervened to repress the publication of unorthodox opinions during the last two centuries, we find that the object has always been to prevent the spread of freethought among the masses. [223] The victims have been either poor, uneducated people, or men who propagated freethought in a popular form. I touched upon this before in speaking of Paine, and it is borne out by the prosecutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The unconfessed motive has been fear of the people. Theology has been regarded as a good instrument for keeping the poor in order, and unbelief as a cause or accompaniment of dangerous political opinions. The idea has not altogether disappeared that free thought is peculiarly indecent in the poor, that it is highly desirable to keep them superstitious in order to keep them contented, that they should be duly thankful for all the theological as well as social arrangements which have been made for them by their betters. I may quote from an essay of Mr. Frederic Harrison an anecdote which admirably expresses the becoming attitude of the poor towards ecclesiastical institutions. “The master of a workhouse in Essex was once called in to act as chaplain to a dying pauper. The poor soul faintly murmured some hopes of heaven. But this the master abruptly cut short and warned him to turn his last thoughts towards hell. ‘And thankful you ought to be,’ said he, ‘that you have a hell to go to.’ ”
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The most important English freethinkers who appealed to the masses were Holyoake, [3] the apostle of “secularism,” and Bradlaugh. The great achievement for which Bradlaugh will be best remembered was the securing of the right of unbelievers to sit in Parliament without taking an oath (1888). The chief work to which Holyoake (who in his early years was imprisoned for blasphemy) contributed was the abolition of taxes on the Press, which seriously hampered the popular diffusion of knowledge. [4] In England, censorship of the Press had long ago disappeared (above, p. 139); in most other European countries it was abolished in the course of the nineteenth century. [5]
In the progressive countries of Europe there has been a marked growth of tolerance (I do not mean legal toleration, but the tolerance [225] of public opinion) during the last thirty years. A generation ago Lord Morley wrote: “The preliminary stage has scarcely been reached—the stage in which public opinion grants to every one the unrestricted right of shaping his own beliefs, independently of those of the people who surround him.” I think this preliminary stage has now been passed. Take England. We are now far from the days when Dr. Arnold would have sent the elder Mill to Botany Bay for irreligious opinions. But we are also far from the days when Darwin’s Descent created an uproar. Darwin has been buried in Westminster Abbey. To-day books can appear denying the historical existence of Jesus without causing any commotion. It may be doubted whether what Lord Acton wrote in 1877 would be true now: “There are in our day many educated men who think it right to persecute.” In 1895, Lecky was a candidate for the representation of Dublin University. His rationalistic opinions were indeed brought up against him, but he was successful, though the majority of the constituents were orthodox. In the seventies his candidature would have been hopeless. The old commonplace that a freethinker is sure to be immoral is no longer heard. We may say that we have now [226] reached a stage at which it is admitted by every one who counts (except at the Vatican), that there is nothing in earth or heaven which may not legitimately be treated without any of the assumptions which in old days authority used to impose.
In this brief review of the triumphs of reason in the nineteenth century, we have been considering the discoveries of science and criticism which made the old orthodoxy logically untenable. But the advance in freedom of thought, the marked difference in the general attitude of men in all lands towards theological authority to-day from the attitude of a hundred years ago, cannot altogether be explained by the power of logic. It is not so much criticism of old ideas as the appearance of new ideas and interests that changes the views of men at large. It is not logical demonstrations but new social conceptions that bring about a general transformation of attitude towards ultimate problems. Now the idea of the progress of the human race must, I think, be held largely answerable for this change of attitude. It must, I think, be held to have operated powerfully as a solvent of theological beliefs. I have spoken of the teaching of Diderot and his friends that man’s energies should be devoted to making the earth pleasant. A [227] new ideal was substituted for the old ideal based on theological propositions. It inspired the English Utilitarian philosophers (Bentham, James Mill, J. S. Mill, Grote) who preached the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the supreme object of action and the basis of morality. This ideal was powerfully reinforced by the doctrine of historical progress, which was started in France (1750) by Turgot, who made progress the organic principle of history. It was developed by Condorcet (1793), and put forward by Priestley in England. The idea was seized upon by the French socialistic philosophers, Saint-Simon and Fourier. The optimism of Fourier went so far as to anticipate the time when the sea would be turned by man’s ingenuity into lemonade, when there would be 37 million poets as great as Homer, 37 million writers as great as Molière, 37 million men of science equal to Newton. But it was Comte who gave the doctrine weight and power. His social philosophy and his religion of Humanity are based upon it. The triumphs of science endorsed it; it has been associated with, though it is not necessarily implied in, the scientific theory of evolution; and it is perhaps fair to say that it has been the guiding spiritual force of the nineteenth century. It has introduced [228] the new ethical principle of duty to posterity. We shall hardly be far wrong if we say that the new interest in the future and the progress of the race has done a great deal to undermine unconsciously the old interest in a life beyond the grave; and it has dissolved the blighting doctrine of the radical corruption of man.
Nowhere has the theory of progress been more emphatically recognized than in the Monistic movement which has been exciting great interest in Germany (1910–12). This movement is based on the ideas of Haeckel, who is looked up to as the master; but those ideas have been considerably changed under the influence of Ostwald, the new leader. While Haeckel is a biologist, Ostwald’s brilliant work was done in chemistry and physics. The new Monism differs from the old, in the first place, in being much less dogmatic. It declares that all that is in our experience can be the object of a corresponding science. It is much more a method than a system, for its sole ultimate object is to comprehend all human experience in unified knowledge. Secondly, while it maintains, with Haeckel, evolution as the guiding principle in the history of living things, it rejects his pantheism and his theory of thinking atoms. The old mechanical theory of the [229] physical world has been gradually supplanted by the theory of energy, and Ostwald, who was one of the foremost exponents of energy, has made it a leading idea of Monism. What has been called matter is, so far as we know now, simply a complex of energies, and he has sought to extend the “energetic” principle from physical or chemical to biological, psychical, and social phenomena. But it is to be observed that no finality is claimed for the conception of energy; it is simply an hypothesis which corresponds to our present stage of knowledge, and may, as knowledge advances, be superseded.
Monism resembles the positive philosophy and religion of Comte in so far as it means an outlook on life based entirely on science and excluding theology, mysticism, and metaphysics. It may be called a religion, if we adopt Mr. MacTaggart’s definition of religion as “an emotion resting on a conviction of the harmony between ourselves and the universe at large.” But it is much better not to use the word religion in connexion with it, and the Monists have no thought of finding a Monistic, as Comte founded a Positivist, church. They insist upon the sharp opposition between the outlook of science and the outlook of religion, and find the mark of spiritual progress in the fact that religion is [230] gradually becoming less indispensable. The further we go back in the past, the more valuable is religion as an element in civilization; as we advance, it retreats more and more into the background, to be replaced by science. Religions have been, in principle, pessimistic, so far as the present world is concerned; Monism is, in principle, optimistic, for it recognizes that the process of his evolution has overcome, in increasing measure, the bad element in man, and will go on overcoming it still more. Monism proclaims that development and progress are the practical principles of human conduct, while the Churches, especially the Catholic Church, have been steadily conservative, and though they have been unable to put a stop to progress have endeavoured to suppress its symptoms—to bottle up the steam. [6] The Monistic congress at Hamburg in 1911 had a success which surprised its promoters. The movement bids fair to be a powerful influence in diffusing rationalistic thought. [7]
If we take the three large States of [231] Western Europe, in which the majority of Christians are Catholics, we see how the ideal of progress, freedom of thought, and the decline of ecclesiastical power go together. In Spain, where the Church has enormous power and wealth and can still dictate to the Court and the politicians, the idea of progress, which is vital in France and Italy, has not yet made its influence seriously felt. Liberal thought indeed is widely spread in the small educated class, but the great majority of the whole population are illiterate, and it is the interest of the Church to keep them so. The education of the people, as all enlightened Spaniards confess, is the pressing need of the country. How formidable are the obstacles which will have to be overcome before modern education is allowed to spread was shown four years ago by the tragedy of Francisco Ferrer, which reminded everybody that in one corner of Western Europe the mediaeval spirit is still vigorous. Ferrer had devoted himself to the founding of modern schools in the province of Catalonia (since 1901). He was a rationalist, and his schools, which had a marked success, were entirely secular. The ecclesiastical authorities execrated him, and in the summer of 1909 chance gave them the means of destroying him. A strike of workmen at [232] Barcelona developed into a violent revolution, Ferrer happened to be in Barcelona for some days at the beginning of the movement, with which he had no connection whatever, and his enemies seized the opportunity to make him responsible for it. False evidence (including forged documents) was manufactured. Evidence which would have helped his case was suppressed. The Catholic papers agitated against him, and the leading ecclesiastics of Barcelona urged the Government not to spare the man who founded the modern schools, the root of all the trouble. Ferrer was condemned by a military tribunal and shot (Oct. 13). He suffered in the cause of reason and freedom of thought, though, as there is no longer an Inquisition, his enemies had to kill him under the false charge of anarchy and treason. It is possible that the indignation which was felt in Europe and was most loudly expressed in France may prevent the repetition of such extreme measures, but almost anything may happen in a country where the Church is so powerful and so bigoted, and the politicians so corrupt.

[1] From Greek monos, alone.
[2] Besides the works referred to in the text, may be mentioned: Winwood Reade, Martyrdom of Man, 1871; Mill, Three Essays on Religion; W. R. Cassels, Supernatural Religion; Tyndall, Address to British Association at Belfast; Huxley, Animal Automatism; W. K. Clifford, Body and Mind; all in 1874.
[3] It may be noted that Holyoake towards the end of his life helped to found the Rationalist Press Association, of which Mr. Edward Clodd has been for many years Chairman. This is the chief society in England for propagating rationalism, and its main object is to diffuse in a cheap form the works of freethinkers of mark (cp. Bibliography). I understand that more than two million copies of its cheap reprints have been sold.
[4] The advertisement tax was abolished in 1853, the stamp tax in 1855, the paper duty in 1861, and the optional duty in 1870.
[5] In Austria-Hungary the police have the power to suppress printed matter provisionally. In Russia the Press was declared free in 1905 by an Imperial decree, which, however, has become a dead letter. The newspapers are completely under the control of the police.
[6] I have taken these points, illustrating the Monistic attitude to the Churches, from Ostwald’s Monistic Sunday Sermons (German), 1911, 1912.
[7] I may note here that, as this is not a history of thought, I make no reference to recent philosophical speculations (in America, England, and France) which are sometimes claimed as tending to bolster up theology. But they are all profoundly unorthodox.
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